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ABSTRACT
x v i i i
With the current trend toward globalization and the increasing competitive and 
technological challenges of today’s environment the formation of international strategic 
alliances between firms have become an important part of many firm’s strategies and 
have grown in importance as a mode of international business operations. However, 
experience with international strategic alliances has shown that they face a number of 
problems which can often result in the termination of the alliance. For this purpose it is 
important to address the factors that are impacting the success of international strategic 
alliances. Behavioural and organizational characteristics of interorganizational 
relationships have been identified as being important to the successful management of 
the international strategic alliance. However, a clear understanding of their impact on 
performance in the academic literature is deficient.
The purpose of this study was, therefore, to address the behavioural and organizational 
characteristics of international strategic alliance success. The specific objectives of this 
study are (i) to provide an empirical analysis of UK strategic alliance activity with firms 
from Western Europe, the USA and Japan (ii) to determine the successful characteristics 
of strategic alliances between UK firms and their international partners and (iii) to 
assess the influence of behavioural and organizational characteristics on the success of 
UK international strategic alliances.
Data was collected using both primary and secondary sources. The creation of a 
database of UK international strategic alliances through secondary sources was the first 
stage of the research. This allowed the identification of a number of international 
strategic alliances used in the second stage of the research, which involved the 
collection of data through a mail survey. The data was analysed using factor analysis, 
descriptive statistics, t-tests, multiple discriminant analysis and multiple regression.
The results of the study have shown that while both behavioural and organizational 
characteristics are important to UK international strategic alliances, behavioural 
characteristics distinguish successful UK international strategic alliances from less 
successful international alliances. Successful UK international strategic alliances are 
characterized by higher levels of commitment, trust, coordination, interdependence and 
communication and lower levels of conflict. Performance of UK international strategic 
alliances was also found to be positively related to commitment, trust, coordination, 
interdependence and communication. Relatively few differences were found between 
successful and less successful alliances in terms of structure and control. Furthermore, 
very few relations were found between performance and structure and control 
characteristics.
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
1.1 INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY
Over the last two decades the world economy has been dramatically transformed. 
The business environment is characterised by increasing complexity, uncertainty 
and discontinuity (Grant 1991) and unprecedented levels of diversity, knowledge 
richness and turbulence (Achrol 1991). Changing market conditions, intensified 
global competition and increasingly shorter product life cycles mean that firms are 
having to re-examine the traditional methods and strategies for doing business 
(Ohmae 1989; Bartlett and Ghoshal 1987). Managers are realising that, no matter 
how strong and resourceful their firms might be, they are no longer able to 
maintain a competitive advantage at every step in the value chain in all national 
markets, nor are they able to maintain a cutting edge in the wide range of 
technologies required for the design, development, manufacture and marketing of 
new products. Thus international strategic alliances have become an important 
means to rationalise operations to overcome potential difficulties and to help firms 
regain and maintain their competitive position in international markets (Ohmae
1989).
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1.2 THE RESEARCH PROBLEM
The formation of strategic alliances have become an increasingly important part of 
many organization’s strategies and have grown in importance as a means of doing 
business across national boundaries. As a result they have received much 
attention both in the media and in academic circles (Hergert and Morris 1988; 
Harrigan 1985, 1986, 1988; Buckley and Casson 1988; Kogut 1988; Perlmutter 
and Heenan 1986; Borys and Jemison 1989; Anderson 1990; Bucklin and 
Sengupta 1993; Hamel 1991; Glaister and Buckley 1994). For many firms, 
international strategic alliances have become an institutionalised phenomenon 
strongly influencing organisational structures and behaviours (Parkhe 1991). 
Some firms perceive international alliances as strategic weapons (Harrigan 1987; 
Kogut 1988; Jarillo 1989) while others consider them to be a superior method of 
investing corporate resources (Christlow 1987; Das et al 1998). Several studies 
have shown that the number of alliances being used by firms is increasing. 
Hergert and Morris (1988) found a steady increase in the number of strategic 
alliances between 1979 and 1985. According to Anderson (1990) more 
international strategic alliances were started between 1981 and 1990 than in all 
previous years put together. Glaister and Buckley (1994) also reported an 
accelerating trend in international strategic alliances between 1980 and 1989. 
Thus there can be no doubt that international strategic alliance activity is crucially 
important, both empirically and theoretically (Buckley 1994). There is a need to 
understand the nature of alliance activity, not least because such an activity has a 
profound effect on the practising manager. Furthermore, while there is a growing 
volume of literature on international strategic alliances, there is a lack of empirical
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evidence on the incidence of UK-foreign strategic alliances. This study, therefore, 
seeks to explain a phenomena, which is academically important and has relevance 
to current managers especially in UK multinational firms involved in strategic 
alliances with developed economies.
Despite the popularity of strategic alliances, there appears to be a high failure rate. 
It has been estimated that between 30% and 70% of alliances fail (Bleeke and 
Emst 1991; Harrigan 1988; Killing 1982; Kogut 1988). Experience with 
international strategic alliances shows that there are potentially many problems 
associated with their management because of the a number of problems they face 
such as conflict, poor perceived performance and inflexibility (Parkhe 1993; 
Geringer and Herbert 1991). Glaister and Wu (1994) in their study of UK joint 
ventures in China pointed out that differences in the economic systems and 
management systems impacted the management of the joint ventures. Cultural 
differences between the two countries made the actual management more difficult. 
These factors would appear to adversely affect the successful implementation of 
the joint ventures. The fact that international strategic alliances are a significant 
firm strategy and many alliances are not successful suggests an inadequate 
theoretical and practical understanding of this complex phenomenon. It is, 
therefore, important to understand what characterises successful and less 
successful strategic alliances in order that managers, in the future, can develop 
more effective international partnerships. This study focuses on the 
characteristics of international strategic alliances with specific reference to UK 
multinational enterprises.
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Much research has been and is still being conducted into international strategic 
alliances. The focus of much of that research has been on the motives behind the 
formation of alliances, partner selection and the characteristics of the resulting co­
operative working relationships (Contractor and Lorange 1988; Hennart 1988; 
Bleeke and Ernst 1991; Kogut 1988; Harrigan 1988; Ohmae 1989; Blodgett 1991; 
Geringer 1991; Hagedoom 1993; Parkhe 1993; Glaster and Buckley 1996). 
Meanwhile studies considering the factors associated with success are still limited 
(Anderson 1990; Parkhe 1993). Where research has considered the factors 
influencing success or failure most research has focused on the control- 
performance relationship and less on the behavioural and structural aspects 
(Killing 1983; Kogut 1988; Beamish 1985). This research has, however, still 
tended to concentrate on the problems associated with trying to run a strategic 
alliance rather than providing directions for the effective management of 
successful international strategic alliances.
There fs a growing volume of literature on strategic alliances that strongly 
supports the notion that alliance performance can be understood more fully by the 
examination of behavioural characteristics (Parkhe 1993; Mohr and Spekman 
1994; Aulakh et al 1996; Monckza et al 1998; Saxton 1997). Researchers have 
focused on behavioural characteristics emphasising the relationship attributes 
between the partners as an explanation for alliance success. Research in the USA 
has identified a number of these factors that appear to have an impact on the 
success of strategic alliances. These include shared ownership and management, 
good relationships between partners, good organisational arrangements, and a 
willingness to leant (Lane and Beamish 1990; Bucklin and Sengupta 1993; Mohr
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and Spekman 1994; Olson and Singsuwan 1997; Monckza et al 1998; Anderson 
and Narus 1990). These studies have, however, focused on alliances between US 
firms concentrating on co-marketing and supplier-dealer type relationships. These 
fundamental issues have not been addressed in any empirical study at a cross 
national level except for Olson and Singsuwan (1997) who measured the 
perceptions of Thai and American executives as to the importance of behavioural 
characteristics on the success of strategic alliances. Even still, Olson and 
Singsuwan’s (1997) sample did not constitute international alliances since both 
samples were collected from the individual countries. That is, the American and 
Thai firms were not in alliance relationships with each other. Second, there has 
been a lack of empirical attention to the impact of behavioural characteristics on 
alliance success. Many of the research studies except those of Mohr and Spekman 
(1994), Monckza et al (1998) and Olson and Singsuwan (1997) have not 
considered all the behavioural characteristics such as partnership attributes 
(coordination, interdependence, trust and commitment), communication attributes 
and conflict and their effect on the performance and satisfaction of international 
alliances. By, contrast, in spite of the number and strategic importance of 
alliances in the UK, little is known about the success of UK international alliances 
and the characteristics of those alliances which do appear to work (Glaister and 
Buckley 1994; Glaister and Buckley 1999). Whilst Glaister and Wu (1994) have 
undertaken a survey of strategic alliances between UK and Chinese firms and 
have explored the impact of behavioural, cultural and administrative factors on the 
management of those alliances only 21 relationships were explored. Furthermore, 
their study was limited largely to explaining general issues of management control 
and perceptions of performance. More recently Glaister and Buckley (1999)
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considered the relationship between a set of alliance characteristics and 
performance for UK international alliances in the US, Japan and Western Europe. 
These alliance characteristics included for instance cultural distance, previous 
relationships, depth of analysis conducted prior to alliance formation, the 
propensity for competition and partner behaviour and alliance integration. There 
appears, therefore, to be no empirical studies reported in the literature that 
specifically examine the behavioural characteristics of successful UK alliances 
with partners from developed countries.
Many researchers have emphasized the issue of international strategic alliance 
control as a crucial organization process for alliance success (see Geringer and 
Herbert 1989 for a review). Much research has been conducted on control 
through ownership and through bargaining power (Killing 1983; Root 1988; 
Blodgett 1991; Mjoen and Tallman 1997) that has tended to emphasize the 
control-conflict relationship (Parkhe 1993). However the majority of research on 
strategic alliance control has had a limited perspective of the control concept 
(Geringer and Herbert 1989). There is very little conceptual and empirical 
research available concerning control as a determinant of alliance success 
especially in developed countries (Geringer and Herbert 1989). Apart from the 
study by Glaister (1995) on the dimensions of control in UK international joint 
ventures, no other studies have been reported. Their study however did not 
consider the relationship between control and performance. Researchers have also 
emphasised the structural characteristics and performance of strategic alliances 
(Parkhe 1993). Surprisingly little systematic empirical research has been done to 
examine the structural determinants of alliance success. Given the lack of
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empirical evidence on the assessment of the control and structural determinants of 
international strategic alliances an understanding of the relationship between 
control and alliance success and structure and alliance success represents a useful 
contribution to the existing literature on international strategic alliances.
While the behavioural, structural and control characteristics of strategic alliances 
identified above have been examined in various interorganizational contexts, there 
is no published research that has empirically examined their joint effects on the 
success of international strategic alliances. Furthermore, this has not been done 
within the context of UK international alliances. These gaps are addressed in this 
study through a method that employs quantitative data collection, representing a 
wide range of strategic alliances within a wide range of industries. This study 
incorporates both behavioural and organizational (structure and control) 
characteristics of international strategic alliances to develop a more complete 
understanding of the factors that may impact the success of alliances.
1.3 OBJECTIVES OF THE RESEARCH
The previous section has suggested that there is a significant need to understand 
the successful management of international strategic alliances. This study 
investigates and provides evidence on the management of international strategic 
alliances formed between UK firms and partner firms from the USA, Japan and 
Western Europe. The specific objectives of this study are:
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(i) To provide an empirical analysis of UK international strategic alliance 
activity with partner firms from Western Europe, the USA and Japan
(ii) To determine the successful characteristics of strategic alliances between 
UK firms and their international partners
(iii) To assess the influence of behavioural and organizational characteristics 
on the success of UK international strategic alliances
1.4 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
To achieve the objectives of this study it was necessary to employ two research 
methods to collect the data needed to undertake the empirical analysis. The first 
involved the building of a database of UK international strategic alliance 
formation. The creation of the database, from secondary sources, allowed data to 
be presented on several dimensions of activity: trends in UK international 
alliances between 1988 to 1995, industry characteristics, geographic distribution, 
alliance motive, number of partners and alliance type. A total of 778 UK 
international alliances were recorded. The database provided a sampling frame 
for the second phase of data collection, a mail survey to obtain primary data on 
the behavioural and organizational and performance characteristics of UK 
international strategic alliance firms. Data for this part of the study was collected 
in two stages. During the first stage, telephone calls were made to firms, asking 
them to provide the names and addresses of senior personnel who were directly 
involved in the international alliances in question. This process resulted in the 
identification of 450 potential informants. In the second stage, a questionnaire
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was mailed to the 450 senior personnel identified. Finally, data obtained from the 
questionnaire was analysed using the SPSS statistical analysis software.
1.5 ORGANIZATION OF THE THESIS
Following on from the introduction, chapter two comprises the literature review 
pertaining to the research problem. The first part of the chapter discusses existing 
perspectives of international strategic alliances; namely transaction cost theory, 
strategic behaviour theory, resource dependency and organizational learning 
theory. The second part of the chapter reviews the literature concerned with the 
assessment of success in international strategic alliances. Following this, there is 
a review of the theoretical and empirical studies of prior research on the 
behavioural and organizational characteristics of international strategic alliance 
that are relevant to the research objectives of the study. Based on this review of 
the literature a number of research propositions are developed.
Chapter three presents the first part of the findings of this study. These findings 
are based on the development of the database from secondary sources of UK 
international strategic alliances. The chapter outlines the international strategic 
alliance activity of UK firms for the period 1988 to 1995. The analysis provides 
data on the number of alliances formed, the types of alliances, partner nationality, 
industry sector of UK firms and the motivations of the alliances.
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Chapter five presents the results for the reliability and validity of the concepts 
used in the study.
Chapter six presents the results of the study. In the first section the principal 
characteristics of the study’s sample are discussed. General descriptive statistics 
are provided for data collected regarding the sample of international strategic 
alliances. The second part presents the research findings on the characteristics of 
successful and less successful alliances. The propositions are tested regarding the 
relationships linking the behavioural and organaizational characteristics with 
success and the results obtained are discussed.
Chapter seven provides a review of the study and a summary of the major findings 
of the study. The research implications for managers are discussed, as well as 
the contribution of the study to the existing literature on international strategic 
alliances. Finally the limitations of the work are considered and suggestions for
Chapter four presents the methodology of the study. This chapter reviews the
research problems and its objectives and the research design. It also discusses the
approaches adopted for survey research and the analysis of the results.
future research are offered.
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CHAPTER TWO
LITERATURE REVIEW
2.1 INTRODUCTION
Research has devoted very little attention to understanding characteristics of 
international strategic alliances that may be associated with their success. 
Although previous researchers consider behavioural and organizational 
characteristics as important determinants of international strategic alliance 
success, there has been very little empirical investigation between these 
characteristics and the success of alliances (Mohr and Spekman 1994; Parkhe 
1993; Geringer and Herbert 1989). The limited empirical evidence suggests that 
behavioural and organizational characteristics are indeed important factors for 
explaining the success of international strategic alliances. However the reliability 
and validity of this evidence is affected by the unclear and partial understanding of 
the concepts investigated in this study. Therefore, the current chapter will attempt 
to clarify the meaning of the concepts for the behavioural, organizational and 
success dimensions of the study by reviewing existing research.
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This chapter will review the existing body of knowledge concerning the 
behavioural and organizational characteristics of international strategic alliances 
and the success. The chapter begins by providing a conceptual definition of 
strategic alliances, followed by a discussion of major streams of literature 
concerning the motivations for international strategic alliance formation. The next 
section will provide an examination of the meaning of the concept of alliance 
performance. The final section will review the literature related to the behavioural 
and organizational factors of alliance success and from this the propositions to be 
tested in this study are developed.
2.2 THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL STRATEGIC 
ALLIANCES
2.2.1 The Concept of Strategic Alliances: Towards a Definition
A strategic alliance is regarded as a new term which is applied to independent 
firms cooperating and forming partnerships based on mutual needs. Yoshino and 
Rangan (1995) refer to them as the “ New” alliances, which are different from 
traditional joint ventures and distribution relationships, licensing, franchising 
agreements, mergers and takeovers. Traditionally, alliances were seen as a vehicle 
for multinational companies to enter the local markets of firms overseas, 
especially within developing and socialist countries where, in order to enter the 
market, companies had to form alliances with domestic firms to satisfy host 
government requirements (Yoshino and Rangan 1995; Porter and Fuller 1986; 
Contractor and Lorange 1988; Gomes-Casseres 1988). These alliances between 
companies in the form of joint ventures emerged as an important international
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supply mode during the 1960s (Contractor and Lorange 1988). Most of these joint 
ventures took the form of portfolio investments with little or no involvement by 
investors in the management of the venture partnership. These ventures have been 
referred to as equity joint ventures (Harrigan 1985; 1988).
Today alliances are more complex. They are seen as a response to globalization 
(Contractor and Lorange 1988). Companies are seeking strategic alliances to 
respond to increased competition, changing market conditions and rapid 
technological advances (Pucik 1988; Hladik 1988; Yoshino and Rangan 1995; 
Porter and Fuller 1986; Burgers et al 1993). Firms of all sizes and strengths 
cooperate with rivals and form complex webs of informal and formal alliances and 
compete worldwide. Perlmutter and Heenan (1986) assert that “to be globally 
competitive, MNCs must be globally cooperative. This necessity is reflected in the 
acceleration of global strategic partnerships among companies large and small” 
(p.136). These alliances are referred to as international strategic alliances, the 
incidence of which has increased over the last decade (Ghemawat et al 1986; 
Hergert and Morris 1988; Osborn and Baughn 1987; Glaister and Buckley 1994). 
The recognition that the “New” strategic alliances (Yoshino and Rangan 1995) are 
different is emphasized by Viesti (1988:1) who determined that:
(i) There has been an increase in collaboration between major firms in 
advanced countries and at the same time a significant increase in 
collaboration initiatives between large multinational companies and small 
businesses, particularly in the high tech area.
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(ii) Recent joint ventures have an important technological content and often 
concern joint R&D projects between two or more firms.
(iii) In the past the joint venture relationship has mainly involved a small 
company, usually acting on a subcontracting basis, for large a large 
purchaser (Hladik 1985:18). The more recent tendency has increasingly 
favoured balanced agreements between firms, often located at the same 
stages of the production cycle, which have similar products and are 
mutually competitive and equally strong in the market. Agreements of this 
type have often been described as “strategic partnerships” (Harrigan 1988) 
or in cases involving two companies which are developing a common long 
run strategy for the entire world market, “global strategic partnerships” 
(Perlmutter and Heenan 1986).
However it is important to clearly define the nature of strategic alliances being 
discussed, since the term has become a generally used one covering a wide variety 
of collaborative agreements between firms. Despite the attention paid to strategic 
alliances by practioners and academics (Berg et at 1982; Harrigan 1988; Burgers 
et al 1993; Parkhe 1993) there is no sufficiently detailed and theoretically 
consistent definition of what actually constitutes a strategic alliance. Researchers 
have used a number of different terms and as a result offered various definitions 
and characteristics to explain strategic alliances. The most commonly used terms 
are “strategic alliance” and “joint venture” which have been used interchangeably 
in the literature to refer to a all types of interfirm agreements (Yoshino and 
Rangan 1995; Ohmae 1989; Tepstra and Simonin 1993; Hagerdoom and 
Sadowski 1999; Harrigan 1985; 1986; 1988; Hennart 1988; Kogut 1988; Pucik
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1988). To add to the confusion researchers have adopted the use of various other 
terms described in the literature which also refer to a range of interfirm 
agreements, such as international cooperative arrangements (Root 1988), 
international collaborative arrangements (Hergert and Morris 1988), hybrid 
arrangements (Borys and Jemison 1989), cooperative ventures (Buckley and 
Casson 1988), coalitions (Porter and Fuller 1986), partnerships (Perlmutter and 
Heenan 1986; Mohr and Spekman 1994), channel relationships (Anderson and 
Narus 1990; Buchanan 1992; Heide 1994; Kumar et al 1995; Spekman and 
Sawhney 1990; Bucklin and Sengupta 1993) and cooperative agreements 
(Harrigan 1988). Other forms of collaboration between independent firms, such 
as licensing agreements, franchising, cross-licensing, buy/sell contracts and 
mergers and acquisitions have also been described as a form of interfirm 
arrangements (Harrigan 1985; Yoshino and Rangan 1995). However these types 
of arrangements are considered to be an alternative mode of organization to 
strategic alliances (Yoshino and Rangan 1995). This manifestation of terminology 
has resulted in a number of definitions and characteristics of strategic alliances. 
All the above listed terminology are used to address interfirm arrangements 
ranging from contractual agreements to a 50:50 joint venture (Yoshino and 
Rangan 1995). It appears from this that the use of the term strategic alliance is not 
uniformly utilized in research studies and researchers are not united in their 
concept of a strategic alliance and have thus used different terminology for 
describing what appears to be the same thing. However strategic alliances reflect 
a wide range of interfirm arrangements that are aimed at achieving the strategic 
objectives of the partners and include such arrangements as joint ventures.
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minority equity stake, and contractual agreements (Das and Teng 1998; Yoshino 
and Rangan 1995; Tepstra and Simonin 1993; Harrigan 1988; Ohmae 1989).
2.2.1.1 Definitions of Strategic Alliances
Harrigan (1988) posits that strategic alliances, joint ventures, cooperative 
agreements etc, “are partnerships among firms that work together to attain some 
strategic objective”. The emphasis in Harrigan’s definition is on the strategic 
aspect of the alliance. Porter and Fuller (1986) give a simpler definition and 
defined coalitions as formal, long-term alliances between firms that link aspects of 
their business and include joint ventures, licensing agreements, supply 
agreements, marketing agreements and a variety of other arrangements.
A more specific definition is proposed by Sheth and Parvatiyar (1992) who define 
an alliance “as an ongoing formal relationship between two or more independent 
organizations to achieve common goals...which encompasses any formalized 
organizational relationship between two or more firms for some agreed
purpose.....where the relationship is more than a standard customer-supplier or
labour management relationship, but falls short of an outright acquisition or 
merger”.
Another definition is proposed by Yoshino and Rangan (1995) which is more 
specific and provides a useable framework for strategic alliances. According to 
them “a strategic alliance links facets of the business of two or more firms. At its 
core, this link is a trading partnership that enhances the effectiveness of the 
competitive strategies of the participating firms by providing for the mutually
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beneficial trade of technologies, skills, or products based upon them”. They use 
the term strategic alliance to include a variety of forms, ranging from contractual 
agreements to a joint venture and refer to them as possessing three characteristics: 
(i) two or more firms unite to pursue a set of agreed upon goals but remain 
independent subsequent to the formation of the alliance, (ii) that partner firms 
share the benefits and control over the performance of the alliance, (iii) that 
partner firms contribute on a continuing basis in one or more key strategic areas. 
Their classification of strategic alliances excludes traditional contractual 
agreements such as arms’s-length contracts, franchising, licensing since these 
types of arrangements involve no long-term mutual dependence, shared 
managerial control or continuing contributions of technology or products. 
Similarly, overseas subsidiaries of multinational corporations and mergers and 
acquisitions are not considered to be strategic alliances because only one firm 
assumes control of the new entity.
The marketing channels literature which is concerned with dealer-supplier type 
relationships are also referred to as strategic alliances (Mohr and Spekman 1994; 
Anderson and Narus 1990; Kumar et al 1995). For example Mohr and Spekman 
(1994) who investigated the relationship between a computer dealer and 
manufacturer defined partnerships as “purposive strategic relationships between 
independent firms who share compatible goals, strive for mutual benefit and 
acknowledge a high level of mutual interdependence. They join efforts to achieve 
goals that each firm, acting alone, could not attain easily”. These supplier-dealer 
type relationships fall under what Yoshino and Rangan (1995) refer to as 
traditional contractual agreements and are not considered to be a strategic alliance.
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In addition, within the marketing channels literature, marketing alliances have also 
been viewed as strategic alliances (Spekman and Sawhney 1990; Bucklin and 
Sengupta 1993;Tepstra and Simonin 1993). These marketing alliances can be 
structured as either equity or non-equity joint ventures (Sheth and Parvatiyar 
1992).
Borys and Jemison (1989) defined hybrid organizational structures of strategic 
alliances that “use resources and or governance structures from more than one 
existing organization”. These hybrid arrangements include mergers and 
acquisitions, joint ventures, license agreements and supplier arrangements. 
Cravens and Shipp (1993), however, classified different forms of hybrid alliances 
in to vertical supplier and channel relationships, joint ventures and strategic 
alliances.
The above definitions however do not emphasize that strategic alliances are an 
important phenomenon in international business and do not account for the 
international scope of alliances. Geringer and Herbert (1989) therefore proposed 
that a joint venture is considered to be international if at least one of the partners 
has its headquarters outside the venture’s country of operation or where there is a 
significant level of activity in more than one country. This definition 
encompasses both equity and non-equity joint ventures (Glaister and Buckley 
1998). Root (1988) defines an international cooperative agreement as “any form 
of long-term cooperation between two or more independent firms headquartered 
in two or more countries that undertakes or supports a business activity for mutual 
economic gain”. Similar definitions have been provide by Hergert and Morris
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(1988) and Contractor and Lorange (1988). Hergert and Morris (1988) use the 
term collaborative agreements and propose four attributes: (i) that the participants 
must share the risks and rewards, (ii) that they remain independent, (iii) that they 
provide inputs to the project on a continuing basis, (iv) that there is effective 
communication between participants. Contractor and Lorange (1988) use the term 
cooperative arrangements to characterize strategic alliances and refer to them as 
arrangements that involve firms of comparable size that may make similar rather 
than complimentary contributions.
The above discussion of definitions and terminology used to represent interfirm 
arrangements suggests that researchers have used many facets of strategic 
alliances and that “strategic alliance” has become a common term to refer to all 
types of interfirm arrangements (Sheth and Parvatiyar 1992).
2 .2 .1.2 Types of Strategic Alliances
Within this framework of interfirm arrangements, strategic alliances have been 
classified in a variety of different ways. Researchers are by no means united in 
their methods of classification (Faulkner 1995). The literature distinguishes 
between equity and non-equity arrangements. Equity arrangements are normally 
referred to as joint ventures and have been defined as independent organizational 
entities formed by two or more parent organizations to carry out productive 
economic activities (Harrigan 1985; 1989; Hennart 1988) and to create new 
certain advantages (Beamish and Banks 1987; Contractor 1984). Equity 
arrangements also include forms of alliances that involve equity participation, but 
no new entity is created (Yoshino and Rangan 1995; Tepstra and Simonin 1993).
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In contrast non-equity arrangements have been referred to as cooperative 
agreements between partners that do not involve equity or the creation of a 
separate legal entity (Contractor and Lorange 1988; Hennart 1988; Tepstra and 
Simonin 1993). Harrigan (1988) refers to them as “cooperative agreements” and 
points out that cooperative agreements are easier to terminate than more formal 
ones because no equity is involved. Such agreements are described as non- 
traditional contracts (e.g. joint R&D, joint product development, long-term 
sourcing agreements, joint manufacturing, joint marketing, shared distribution 
service, research consortia).
Porter and Fuller (1986) classified strategic alliances into two types of coalitions; 
X and Y. In X coalitions the value chain activities of the partners are divided, for 
instance, one partner manufactures while the other takes the responsibility of 
marketing. In Y coalitions the partners share in all the various value chain 
activities. This is similar to Hennart’s (1988) classification of equity joint 
ventures which he referred to as scale and link joint ventures. The scale joint 
ventures correspond to the Y coalition and the link joint ventures to the X 
coalition. However Hennart’s (1988) classification includes only equity joint 
ventures, while Porter and Fuller (1986) include both equity and non-equity in 
their classification.
Dussauge and Garrette (1995), meanwhile use the terms horizontal strategic 
alliances, linking competing firms operating in the same industry, and vertical 
strategic alliances, linking buyers and suppliers in separate industries. Tepstra and 
Simonin (1993) distinguish between four types of alliances: (i) contractual
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agreements between two parties for which no legal entity is created and there is no 
purchase of equity between parties, (ii) equity participation which involves the 
acquisition of equity in one firm by another, (iii) joint ventures in which a 
separate legal entity is created, (iv) consortia, a collaborative arrangement among 
three or more parties, regardless of the equity structure.
Faulkner (1995) notes that the number of different classifications of strategic 
alliances makes it difficult to decide which form to choose for analytical purposes. 
This has, therefore, resulted in a lack of a clear systematic definition of the 
phenomenon, that may be universally accepted (Terpsta and Simonin 1993).
From the above it can be seen that there is much confusion regarding what 
strategic alliances are. In all instances the assumption that cooperation between 
partners will improve performance exists. The above review has also indicated 
how the nature of strategic alliances has changed. Whereas traditionally the 
rationale for cooperation between firms was competitive and economic, alliances 
formed today have a strategic objective (created to realize certain corporate 
objectives) and are based on cooperation. Organizations are forming alliances 
with competitors, but at the same time are enhancing their capabilities and 
competitive positions through cooperation. Examples include Toyota and General 
Motors joint manufacturing at Nummi; Philips and AT&T’s alliance in 
telecommunications; Bull and NEC in computer mainframes (Pucik 1988). Within 
this perspective alliances are seen as a way of nurturing cooperation between
firms.
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2.2.1.3 Conceptualization of International Strategic Alliance
In this study the term international strategic alliance will be used to describe both 
equity and non equity arrangements. Figure 2.1 illustrates the range of possible 
interfirm links and subsets that will be included in this study (Yoshino and 
Rangan 1995). Terpstra and Simonin (1993) have classified the range of interfirm 
links described in figure 2.1 into four types of international strategic alliances. As 
discussed above, these include contractual agreements, joint ventures, equity 
participation, and consortia. The focus of this study is on international strategic 
alliances that include these four types of alliances. In this study contractual 
agreements will include alliances that have been classified as “non traditional 
contracts” (see Figure 2.1). This type of alliance is defined as a non-equity formal 
agreement between two or more firms that pool resources or complement each 
other’s strengths in the various functions of business such as in R&D, 
manufacturing, marketing or distribution (Contractor and Lorange 1988; Ohmae 
1989; Hamel et al 1989; Tepstra and Simonin 1993). A joint venture in this study 
falls under equity arrangements in Figure 2.1 and includes only fifty-fifty joint 
venture types. A joint venture is defined as the establishment of a separate legal 
entity in which the equity is equally shared by both parties to the venture 
(Harrigan 1985; Terpstra and Simonin 1993; Yoshino and Rangan 1995). Equity 
participation also fall under equity arrangements in Figure 2.1 and include what 
Yoshino and Rangan (1995) refer to as minority equity investments, equity swaps 
and unequal equity joint ventures. Alliances of this type involve relationships 
between firms in which one firm purchases a minority or majority equity stake in 
the other firm in order to undertake joint activities (Killing 1983; Terpstra and 
Simonin 1993). Finally consortia are collaborative arrangements between three or
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more partners regardless of their equity structure. In this study consortia can range 
between the “contractual arrangements” and “equity arrangement” depicted in 
Figure 2.1. Other types of cooperative agreements, such as licensing and 
franchising, cross-licensing, mergers and acquisitions, subsidiaries of MNCs will 
not be considered because they do not involve for example pooling of resources, 
common objectives, sharing of costs and risks, commitment, interdependency. 
International strategic alliances investigated in this study are ones in which UK 
international firms are engaged in alliances with firms from the USA, Western
Europe and Japan.
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2.3 MOTIVES FOR INTERNATIONAL STRATEGIC 
ALLIANCES
There are many motivating factors behind the formation of international strategic 
alliances. According to Terpstra and Simonin (1993) the motives represent the 
benefits sought by international firms when entering partnerships. The real 
objectives of the firms are difficult to observe because of hidden agendas. For 
instance collecting intelligence, blocking competition, or learning new 
competencies from a partner are examples of motives that are difficult to trace 
(Terpstra and Simonin 1993).
Most research on strategic alliances has been concerned with theories addressing 
the reasons why firms enter into closer business relationships. A number of 
theoretical frameworks have been advanced, which attempt to explain the motives 
underlying the entry of firms into strategic alliances. The motives underlying a 
firm’s entry into strategic alliances will be discussed in the following section in 
relation to these theories. As noted in the previous discussion, the use of the term 
strategic alliance, international strategic alliance and joint venture will be used 
throughout the study.
2.3.1 Theoretical Perspectives on International Strategic
Alliances
In this section the main theoretical perspectives will be reviewed. The theoretical 
perspectives will help to clarify the motivation and goals of international strategic 
alliances. This is followed by an examination of the basic propositions of each
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theory which help to identify the application of these theories in understanding the 
success of international strategic alliances. In international business theory 
various perspectives have been addressed to explain international strategic 
alliances, emphasizing conceptual and empirical evidence. Theoretically these 
approaches can be summarized into four major areas, namely:
(i) transaction cost theory
(ii) strategic behaviour theory
(iii) resource dependency theory
(iv) organization theory
2.3.1.1 Transaction Cost Theory
Internalization theory was developed to provide an economic rationale for 
multinational activity as a response to imperfect markets (Buckley and Casson 
1976; Buckley 1993; Buckley and Young 1993; Dunning 1988; Beamish and 
Banks 1987). The internalization theory posits that, due to the transaction costs of 
conducting business in imperfect markets, it is more efficient (less expensive) for 
the firm to internalize market structures by establishing local operations as a 
means of serving a foreign market than to engage in arms-length transactions with 
market intermediaries (Teece 1986; Buckley 1988). Thus, market failure is a 
crucial reason for internalization.
In relation to joint ventures internalization theory states that firms would have a 
strong economic incentive to avoid joint ventures (as well as contractual 
agreements) since these are regarded as being inferior to wholly owned
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subsidiaries in exploiting the firm’s ownership-specific advantages (Caves 1982; 
Rugman 1983; Killing 1983) Harrigan 1985). The firm should internalize their 
markets because problems associated with joint ventures (and contractual 
arrangements), such as strategic risk and transaction costs, cannot offset the firm’s 
ownership-specific advantages (Beamish and Banks 1987)
According to Teece (1983), however the attractiveness of joint ventures is a 
function of both the revenue-enhancing and cost-reducing opportunities they 
provide to the multinational enterprise. Beamish and Banks (1987) have extended 
the internalization approach to the theory of the multinational enterprise (MNE) 
to explain the rationale of joint ventures. Following Teece (1983), Beamish and 
Banks (1987) argue that joint ventures represent the most efficient solution under 
two conditions. These are: (i) the firm possesses a rent-yielding asset which 
would allow it to be competitive in a foreign market, (ii) the joint venture 
arrangements must be superior to other means for appropriating rents from the 
sale of assets in the foreign market. Another perspective on international strategic 
alliances based on transaction cost theory has been offered by Buckley and Casson 
(1988) who suggest that three aspects of transaction cost theory can explain the 
existence of joint ventures: (i) Internalization o f economies. The firms involved 
in the joint venture gain some benefit from internalizing the intermediate market 
of goods and / or services, (ii) An element of economic indivisibility. The firms 
involved in the joint venture do not prefer outright ownership because of some 
compensating advantage of operating jointly, (iii) Obstacles to merger. There are 
disincentives to a merger for the parties involved in a joint venture.
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The internalization approach has also been extended to provide an economic 
rationale for joint ventures utilizing transaction cost theory (Buckley and Casson 
1988). Transaction cost theory relates to the governance structures that are 
developed in order to mange transactions. Coase (1937) developed insights into 
why firms exist and viewed firms and markets as alternative governance structures 
that differ in their transaction costs. Coase (1937) proposed that the costs of 
economic exchange in a market may exceed the costs of economic exchange 
within a firm. The firm will internalize those activities it is able to perform at a 
lower cost and will rely on the market for those activities in which other providers 
have an advantage (Coase 1937). Hence, firms exist because they can sometimes 
reduce the costs of negotiating and enforcing terms and conditions of exchange 
relative to market transacting
Williamson (1975) offered an additional explanation within the transaction cost 
framework and identified the “markets and hierarchies” approach. According to 
Williamson (1975) market failure is determined by a set of environmental factors 
that, together with a set of related human factors, explain how multinational firms 
can organise transactions to reduce the costs associated with these transactions. 
The environmental factors include uncertainty, small number bargaining and asset 
specificity; the human factors are bounded rationality and opportunism.
The combined force of these factors results in an increased need for extensive 
contracts to cover all contingencies thus increasing the costs of writing, executing 
and enforcing arms-length contracts with market intermediaries. It thus becomes 
more efficient to organize such transactions internally. Williamson (1975) argues
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that by internalizing transactions efficiency can be increased in several ways: (i) 
the bounds of rationality can be extended by specialization of decision-making 
and economising on communications, (ii) interdependent units can adapt to 
unforeseen contingencies through coordination and reduce uncertainty, (iii) 
opportunism can be reduced through internal incentives and control mechanisms,
(iv) the information gap between autonomous units can be narrowed.
These properties of transaction costs have also been used to explain joint ventures 
by many researchers (Buckley and Casson 1988; Beamish and Banks 1987; 
Hennart 1988). Beamish and Banks (1987) extended the internalization approach 
to provide an economic rationale for joint ventures using the transaction cost 
paradigm. Beamish and Banks (1987) suggested that joint ventures that conformed 
to certain preconditions and structural arrangements were better able to deal with 
the market disabling factors of opportunism, small numbers dilemma and 
uncertainty in the face of bounded rationality than wholly-owned subsidiaries.
Joint ventures are less likely to exhibit opportunistic behaviour if the venture has 
been created with a spirit of trust and commitment to its long-term success. This 
is similar to the concept of forbearance where agents on a reciprocal basis 
deliberately pass up short-term advantages (Buckley and Casson 1988). Anderson 
and Weitz (1992) found that channel members committed to the relationship made 
more short-term sacrifices for long-term benefits. Furthermore, if these positive 
attitudes are reinforced with supporting inter-organizational linkages such as 
mechanisms for the division of profits, joint decision-making processes and 
reward and control systems, the incentives to engage in opportunistic behaviour
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could be minimized (Williamson 1983). In the absence of opportunism, supported 
by the inter-organizational linkages mentioned above the small numbers dilemma 
can be effectively dealt within a joint venture (Beamish and Banks 1987)
Beamish and Banks (1987) also proclaim that pooling and sharing of information 
provides the joint venture parties with little incentive to behave opportunistically, 
thus reducing the problem of uncertainty more cost effectively than through pure 
hierarchical or market approaches. Although bounded rationality would continue 
to be a problem, a pure hierarchical mode of transacting would not represent a 
superior solution to this problem alone. Thus, the low costs associated with 
opportunism, small number, uncertainty in joint ventures under the conditions 
specified above would render this mode of transacting the most efficient means of 
serving a foreign market (Beamish and Banks 1987).
Hennart (1988) explains that joint ventures are preferred because of the presence 
of inefficient markets for intermediate inputs. The presence of high transaction 
costs in each firms intermediate markets will lead to internalization between the 
two firms. Global competition, technological developments and rising costs ate 
forcing technologically driven companies to pursue economies of scale for 
efficiency reasons (Contractor and Lorange 1988; Hennart 1988). In many 
industries, such as automobile manufacturing, increases in the minimum efficient 
scale of economic activities have led firms to form alliances on a global scale 
(Hennart 1988). Hennart (1988) points out that coordination through alliances is 
more preferable than coordination through spot markets or contracts because of 
the desire to reduce costs through economies of scale. This means that the ability
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of independent firms to go it alone is not viable and so formation of alliances 
becomes necessary. John (1984) argues that the web of norms, attitudes, and 
perceptions constituting the social contract reduces incentives for opportunistic 
behaviour. John’s findings are consistent with Ouchi’s (1980) proposition that a 
common set of norms, values and beliefs reduces opportunism and leads to 
cooperation.
2.3.1.2 Strategic Behaviour Approach
The strategic behaviour approach offered by the strategic management literature 
stresses the strategic motives of firms for engaging in international strategic 
alliances. In this approach international strategic alliances are formed to enhance 
their competitive position or market power in order to improve their overall 
profitability (Porter and Fuller 1986; Harrigan 1985; Contractor and Lorange 
1988; Ohmae 1989). Whereas the transaction cost theory predicts that strategic 
alliances will be formed for minimizing costs, the strategic behaviour explanations 
rests on the assumption that firms transact by the mode which maximizes profits 
through improving a firm’s competitive position vis-à-vis its rivals (Kogut 1988).
Harrigan (1985) provides a comprehensive view of strategic motives and classifies 
them into internal benefits associated mainly with cost reduction and the sharing 
of resources; competitive benefits aimed at improving the firm’s strategic position 
through forcing their industries structures to evolve in a favorable manner, pre­
empting competitors and developing defensive strategies in mature industries; 
strategic benefits aimed at implementing changes in the firms; and strategic 
postures through access to new technology or diversification.
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Porter and Fuller (1986) identified four classes of strategic benefits for alliance 
formation. The first is gaining economies o f scale by concentrating the activity 
within one entity to serve both firms. The second is gaining access to the 
knowledge and ability to perform an activity where there are asymmetries between 
firms. Thirdly strategic alliances are seen as an attractive mechanism for hedging 
risk because neither partner bears the full risk and cost of the alliance activity. A 
fourth class of benefits of alliances is shaping competition, because strategic 
alliances can influence whom a firm competes with and the basis of competition.
Ohmae (1989), meanwhile, based the motives for alliance formation on the 
challenges of globalization. Ohmae (1989) suggested that international strategic 
alliances are an important means for firms to gain a foothold in the global 
marketplace and thus become effective global competitors. Contractor and 
Lorange, (1988) in addressing the conditions necessary for entering into a 
cooperative relationship, take the viewpoint of one partner and examine the 
contribution it makes to a given venture’s strategy. They cite several strategic 
motives necessary for alliance formation:
(i) risk reduction, through spreading the risk of a large project over more than 
one firm; enabling product diversification and thus reducing market risks 
associated with being reliant on only one product; enabling faster market 
entry and quicker establishment of presence in the market.
(ii) economies o f scale and/or rationalization. Costs are reduced by using the 
comparative advantage of each partner and through the larger volume
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produced in the more advantageous location by realizing economies of 
large-scale production.
(iii) technology exchanges. Strategic alliances may be formed to bring together 
complimentary skills and talents and the exchange of patents and 
territories.
(iv) co-opting or blocking competition. Strategic alliances can be used as either 
a defensive strategy to reduce competition or as an offensive strategy to 
increase costs and/or lower market share for a third company.
(v) overcoming government trade or investment barriers. Forming alliances 
with a local firm to accommodate host government policy to enter the 
market and thus satisfy the needs of the local market.
(vi) facilitating initial international expansion o f inexperienced firms. 
Alliances facilitate entry to a foreign market for small and medium sized 
firms lacking in international experience.
(vii) Vertical quasi integration. Alliances can be a form of quasi-integration 
with each partner contributing one or more different elements in the 
production and distribution chain (access to markets, technology, 
materials, labor, capital, distribution channels etc.).
However Glaister and Buckley (1996), in their study on the strategic motives for 
alliance formation by UK firms with partners from Western Europe, Japan and the 
USA, found that gaining a significant presence in a new market, enabling faster 
market entry, market penetration, shaping competition and maintaining market 
share were the most important motivating factors compared to motives of risk 
reduction and economies of scale which were not particularly important. Thus
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their research emphasizes the competitive motives of forming alliances used to 
gain competitive advantage and global market share. Burgers et al (1993) 
investigated strategic alliance activity in the global automotive industry and also 
found the desire to reduce demand and competitive uncertainty were two motives 
for alliance formation. Child and Faulkner (1998) however stated that all these 
strategic rationales for forming alliances shows compatibility and transparency of 
the strategic motives of the partners for forming alliances. They state that a lack 
of openness about the motives is likely to limit the chances of trust developing 
between the partners and may threaten the very survival of the partnership. They 
also note alliance partners need to cooperate in a way that they can work together 
effectively and have a sound basis on which mutual confidence can develop. For 
this to happen, each partner must have sufficient awareness of each other’s 
requirements to be able to work together effectively. This means that partners 
should be able to learn from each other’s cultural differences and be able to bring 
together their respective management systems, capitalizing on the strengths of 
each. This suggests a learning aspect to the formation of strategic alliances (Child 
and Faulkner 1998).
Kogut (1988) argued that both transaction cost theory and strategic behaviour 
theory should be treated as complementary rather than as substitutes. He further 
argues that the joint venture decision may stem from profit motivations and, in 
fact, may represent a more costly, though more profitable, alternative to other 
choices. Kogut (1988) states that there are two important differences in the 
implications of a transaction cost and strategic behaviour analysis. These are the 
identification of the motives to cooperate and the selection of partners.
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2.3.1.3 Resource Dependency Theory
The resource dependency theory maintains that firms depend on other firms within 
their environment to acquire needed resources (Pfeffer and Nowak 1976). In this 
view no firm is self sufficient for all the required resources in order to compete 
effectively (Root 1988) and all firms must engage in an exchange relationship 
with other firms to survive (Levine and White 1961). Pfeffer and Nowak (1976) 
propose that alliances are formed to manage interorganizational dependence and 
suggest that patterns of alliance activity are systematically related to patterns of 
competition and to symbiotic interdependence confronted by organizations. As a 
result, organizations strive to reduce uncertainty in their interactions with other 
organizations in their environment. Thus strategic alliances may be a viable form 
of interorganizational structure to minimize uncertainty and gain access to the 
resources needed for survival. Heide (1994) proposed that the identification of 
dependence and uncertainty are key antecedent variables underlying the formation 
of strategic alliances. Thus the need to acquire resources creates dependencies 
between different organizations.
According Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) this scarcity of resources prompts firms to 
engage in strategic alliances in an attempt to exert power and control over firms, 
which possess the required resources. Resource dependencies compel 
organizations to construct interorganizational structures to reduce uncertainties 
(Pfeffer and Salancik 1978). However if firms are certain about each other’s 
actions and intentions, the concern for control of interdependencies would be 
minimal (Sheth and Parvatiyar 1992). Similarly, Child and Faulkner (1998) noted
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that resource scarcity may encourage cooperation rather than competition, 
resulting in a relationship based on mutual support rather than domination.
2.3.1.4 Organization Theory
A number of authors ( Kogut 1988; Hamel 1991; Badaracco 1991) have stressed 
the role of organizational learning as a primary motive for the formation of 
strategic alliances. The basis of this perspective is that firms can be conceived as 
organizations embodying different skills (Kogut 1988). Kogut (1988) views 
strategic alliances as a means by which firms leant or seek to retain their 
capabilities. In this view, firms consist of a knowledge base, or set of 
competencies, that are not easily diffused across the boundaries of the firm 
(Hamel 1991; Badarraco 1991). Badarraco (1991) described this knowledge and 
skill as being “embedded knowledge” which resides primarily in specialized 
relationships among individuals and groups of people, and in the particular norms, 
attitudes, information flows and ways of making decisions that shape their dealing 
with each other. This means that the transfer of organizational knowledge and 
skills through the market may be impeded (Kogut 1988). Strategic alliances are 
then the only way through which knowledge may be successfully transferred 
(Badarraco 1991). Kogut (1988) maintains that the choice of a strategic alliance is 
fundamentally driven by two conditions:
(i) one or both firms desire to acquire the other’s organizational know-how
(ii) one firm wishes to maintain an organizational capability while benefiting 
from another firm’s current knowledge or cost advantage.
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Hamel (1991) uses the term “core competencies” to describe the capabilities of a 
firm and argues that alliances may provide the optimal mode to acquiring access 
to these capabilities thus providing the opportunity for the internalization of skills 
to improve a firm’s competitive position. Similarly, Hall (1992) identified 
intangible sources of sustainable completiti ve advantage associated with the 
possession of advantages in capabilities over competitive rivals. These intangible 
resources included patents, trade marks, data, know-how and learning capabilities.
2.3.1.5 Discussion
The four theoretical approaches reviewed above offer considerable insight in to 
the understanding of international strategic alliances. However, there are certain 
limitations. The transaction costs approach explains why international strategic 
alliances will occur but cannot predict how the process of forming alliances 
actually unfolds (Hamel 1991). Furthermore it tells us nothing about how an 
alliance should be managed successfully. The strategic behaviour approach does 
not make clear how an alliance agreement should be negotiated or how to deal 
with the relationship between partners (Gomes-Casseres 1988). The resource 
dependency theory does not prescribe how an alliance should be organized and 
managed successfully (Gomes-Casseres 1989). Organization theory as a theory 
of strategic alliances has not been fully developed in terms of explaining the 
choice to form an alliance relative to other modes of cooperation (Kogut 1988). 
The theoretical perspectives delineated above provide a comprehensive 
understanding for the existence of strategic alliances from different perspectives. 
The explanations provide distinct, though at times, overlapping explanations for 
alliance formation. The underlying premise of the above theories is that strategic
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alliances which are able to minimize their organisation costs, reduce opportunistic 
behaviour, improve their competitive position, minimize uncertainty by drawing 
on the competence and skills of other firms, will be able to compete more 
effectively in the marketplace. Basically the theories are implying that if strategic 
alliances are formed under the right circumstances, they will be successful.
Although the theories addressing the reasons for alliance formation may be seen as 
benefits of international strategic alliances, there is some evidence to suggest that 
strategic alliances do not succeed (Harrigan 1988; Devlin and Bleackley 1988; 
Beamish 1985; Kogut 1989). Strategic alliances have been widely described as 
difficult to manage (Harrigan 1985, 1988; Beamish 1985, 1988; Killing 1983; 
Parkhe 1993) and prone to high rates of failure (i.e. 30% to 70%) due to 
dissatisfaction with performance ( Beamish 1985; Gomes-Casseres 1987; Kogut 
1988; Devlin and Bleackley 1988). Harrigan’s (1988) explanation for the failure 
of alliances is derived from the resources dependency theory. The stability of 
strategic alliances depends upon the strategic symmetry between partners. This 
means that partners must possess complimentary goals, resources and managerial 
capabilities. The idea behind strategic symmetry is that each partner brings unique 
strengths to the alliance. Therefore a lack of strategic symmetry between partners 
contributes to the instability and failure of strategic alliances (Harrigan 1988).
A number of early researchers paid much attention to organizational 
characteristics of strategic alliances, concentrating mainly on the control of these 
alliances ( Killing 1983; Kogut 1988). More recently, a number of researchers 
have emphasized the behavioural dimensions that are characteristic of
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international strategic alliances (Beamish and Banks 1988; Mohr and Spekman 
1994; Aulakh et al 1996). Researchers have addressed the role of trust, 
commitment, coordination, interdependence, conflict, communication as 
determinants of alliance success (Mohr and Spekman 1994; Aulakh et al 1996; 
Saxton 1997; Cullen et al 1994). In this study it is proposed that firms that 
establish international strategic alliances based on both organizational and 
behavioural characteristics are more likely to be successful in meeting their 
objectives compared to less successful alliances.
2.4 INTERNATIONAL STRATEGIC ALLIANCE SUCCESS
2.4.1 The Concept of Strategic Alliance Success
The importance of the performance concept and the broader area of organizational 
effectiveness has been widely recognized (Campbell 1977; Goodman and 
Pennings 1980; Venkatraman and Ramanujam 1986; Varadarajan and Ramanujam 
1990; Eccles 1991). Despite the volume of literature on this topic, there appears 
to be little consensus on basic terminology and definition. This controversy over 
the terminology used and the definition and measurement of performance has 
made the conceptualization and operationalization of performance within strategic 
alliances difficult, making it a primary concern within the strategic alliance 
literature and an important issue among researchers (Anderson 1990; Geringer and 
Herbert 1989; 1991). Most researchers tend to define performance to reflect the 
measures they have used. For example Beamish (1988: 68) defined success as “ a 
stable healthy and profitable business relationship that meets the needs of both 
partners”. Anderson (1990) suggested that alliance performance should be based
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on whether the objectives of the alliance have been achieved. Parkhe (1993) 
argued that performance should be based on the fulfillment of the alliance’s 
strategic goals. In terms of terminology some researchers have used the term 
“performance” (Dang 1977; Geringer and Herbert 1989) and “effectiveness” 
(Lyles and Baird 1994; Reuer 1998) while others have used the term “success” 
(Killing 1983; Schaan 1983; Dussauge and Garrette 1995). A variety of measures 
for the performance of strategic alliances have also been used by researchers.
2.4.2 Measures of Success
Measures of international strategic alliance performance have been classified in to 
three main groups: (i) financial indicators, (ii) objective measures and (iii) 
subjective measures (Geringer and Herbert 1991).
2.4.2.1 Financial Indicators
Financial performance reflect the fulfillment of the economic goals of the 
international strategic alliance and can be measured by a broad range of financial 
indicators. Early studies used a variety of financial measures such as profitability 
(Good 1972; Dang 1977), growth (Good 1972; Dang 1977), cost position 
(Renforth 1974) and return on investment (Good 1972; Dang 1977; Renforth 
1974).
Good (1972) in a comparative study of 28 American and Mexican joint ventures 
discriminated between successful and less successful ventures in terms of three 
financial measures. These were (i) profitability measured in terms of return on
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equity and return on investment, (ii) growth of sales, profits and total assets and 
(iii) capital intensity measured by the ratio of fixed assets to total employment. 
Renforth (1974), meanwhile, compared the performance of two types of joint 
ventures: joint ventures involving US firms and a family partner firm and joint 
ventures between US firms and non family partner firms in the Caribbean. His 
measures included (i) total sales, (ii) cost of goods sold, (iii) net profit, (iv) return 
on assets, (v) return on investment, (vi) total assets, (vii) total liabilities, and (viii) 
total capital and (ix) working capital. Another study by Dang (1977) investigated 
the relationship between ownership and performance of US joint ventures and 
wholly-owned subsidiaries in Taiwan and the Philippines. Dang’s (1977) 
performance measures included (i) growth of sales, (ii) return on equity, (iii) 
return of sales, (iv) return on assets, (v) asset turnover, (vi) value added and (vii) 
productivity.
In each of the three studies, no significant differences were found between 
performance and joint venture, despite the researchers using different 
measurement processes. Good (1972) used the raw data from the financial 
statements, Renforth (1974) used the percentage changes of the final measures 
over a five-year period, while Dang (1977) expressed his performance indicators 
in terms of deviations from the means of local industries. It seems that while 
financial indicators were the performance goals of these studies, their usefulness 
was less effective because of their limited comparability across industries and
countries.
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2.4.2.2 Objective Measures
A variety of objective measures can also be found in the literature on international 
strategic alliances, such as survival -  whether the venture is still operating at the 
time it is being studied (Franko 1971; Killing 1983; Blodgett 1991; Kogut 1988; 
Geringer and Herbert 1991), its duration -  the number of years between its 
formation and its termination (Harrigan 1988; Geringer and Herbert 1991) and 
stability which refers to changes in ownership or capital structure (Gomes- 
Casseres 1987; Kogut 1988; Geringer and Herbert 1991).
Both financial indicators and objective measures manifest limitations that make 
them ineffective in evaluating the performance of a strategic alliance (Geringer 
and Herbert 1991). Firstly financial indicators do not adequately reflect the extent 
to which an international strategic alliance has achieved its short-term objectives. 
For example, an alliance may not, in the first instance, have been formed to 
increase short-term profits, but to improve access to overseas markets, to 
encourage technology transfer, to block competitors or to pool resources for more 
cost effective, speedy product development (Killing 1983; Blodgett 1991; 
Contractor and Lorange 1988). Financial indicators are, therefore, in such cases, 
poor indicators of the success of the alliance. Furthermore, financial indicators of 
performance, although adequate for measuring financial goals, are not the only 
goals of international strategic alliances (Anderson 1990; Geringer and Herbert 
1989). Anderson (1990) notes, that financial measures evaluate only one 
dimension of performance and argues that other measures, including qualitative 
ones, must also be examined in order to better evaluate the performance of 
international strategic alliances. This is because, in spite of poor financial
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performance, the alliance may have achieved its objectives and thus be 
considered, by the firm’s managers, to have been a success. Conversely Geringer 
and Herbert (1991) argue that an international strategic alliance may be viewed as 
unsuccessful despite good financial results. It appears that financial measures are 
adequate only in those cases in which financial performance is a prominent goal, 
as in the case of most early studies rather than more recent ones. Thus although 
financial measures are adequate measures of business performance, in 
international strategic alliances, by themselves they are a poor measure of the 
alliance’s value, because alliances are set up in risky and uncertain environments 
(Anderson 1990). Furthermore, access to financial data may be difficult, since 
firms may be reluctant to provide this information, making these data biased and 
questionable (Lasserre 1997). This finding can be reinforced by the fact that 
financial indicators were used more frequently in earlier studies rather than in 
more recent ones (Geringer and Herbert 1991).
Objective measures may also be ineffective in evaluating the business 
performance of international strategic alliances and the extent to which the 
objectives of the alliance have been achieved in the short and long-term. One 
explanation given is that in order for these measures to be effective, the alliance 
must first have been terminated and secondly failed. For example Raveed (1976) 
used the concept of survival in his study of joint ventures between US 
multinationals and host governments in Trinidad and Venezuela to distinguish 
between successful and less successful joint ventures. In Trinidad the survival 
rate was 100% (all joint ventures survived) whereas in Venezuela the survival rate 
was zero (all joint ventures failed) and therefore the concept of survival proved to
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be ineffective. On the same subject Blanchot and Mayrhofer (1997:911) have 
argued that objective measures are ambiguous dimensions of joint venture success 
because it is the “premature failure of the joint venture in regard to the objectives 
fixed by its parents that has to be avoided. Therefore, a short duration of a joint 
venture should not systematically be equated with failure”. Gomes-Casseres 
(1987) identified several reasons for joint venture termination including 
dissolution due to partner’s acquisition of new capabilities, growth in a partner 
firm’s network that may lead to a change in ownership structure to exploit 
economies of scope and government policy changes. Thus Gomes-Casseres 
(1987) argued that joint ventures are an intermediary organizational form in 
transition because of the very nature of their strategic objectives and thus 
termination of the venture does not necessarily mean failure. Moreover, Harrigan 
(1988:207) suggests that “if exit barriers are high, successful strategic alliances 
are not necessarily indicated by long-lived ventures, and short-lived ventures can 
be judged as successes from both sponsors’ perspectives if they have achieved 
their strategic purpose”. According to Reuer (1998: 167) firms may undertake 
international strategic alliances as a “temporary gap-filling mechanism, as a means 
of taking an option on an emerging technology or market, as a structural choice 
suited to features of exchange at the time of market entry, or as a response to legal 
and political conditions in a host country”. In this way international strategic 
alliances may be viewed as intentionally temporary and thus plan and anticipate 
their termination (Park and Gerado 1997). Therefore, it can be said that duration 
and survival do not effectively assess the performance because the termination of 
an international joint venture may be the result of success or failure.
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2.4.2.3 Subjective Measures
Because of the inadequacies associated with both financial and objective 
measures, many researchers have relied on subjective measures of performance 
(Killing 1983; Schaan 1983; Beamish 1984; Geringer and Herbert 1991; Bucklin 
and Sengupta 1993; Cullen et al 1994; Lee and Beamish 1995; Mjoen and 
Tallman 1997; Saxton 1997).
The most commonly used subjective measure is an overall assessment of the 
firm’s satisfaction with the performance of the international strategic alliance 
(Killing 1983; Schaan 1983; Geringer and Herbert 1991). This has the advantage 
of assessing to what extent the alliance’s objectives have been achieved. Killing 
(1983) was the first researcher to use a perceptual measure of performance in 
international joint ventures. Killing (1983) used the subjective evaluation of 
international joint venture general managers by asking them to rate on a five-point 
scale (Lextremely well to 5:extremely poorly) how well their company was doing. 
In order to enhance the measure’s reliability Schaan (1983) and Beamish (1984) 
both used a similar single-item perceptual indicator to measure each parent firm’s 
satisfaction with the performance of the venture. While this type of measure is 
easier to obtain and has the advantage of overcoming the limitation of using 
financial measures (as discussed above) the researchers have typically used this 
perceptual measure in isolation leading to a more subjective assessment of an 
alliance’s performance. The disadvantage in this is that respondents may be 
biased in their subjective judgements. However, Geringer and Herbert (1991) in 
their study of international joint ventures in Canada and the USA found that 
perceptual assessments of performance and satisfaction significantly correlated
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with objective measures such as survival and duration, which justifies the use of 
these measures over other performance measures. Another subjective measure is 
the assessment of the actual performance as compared to expectations with respect 
to specific dimensions of the international strategic alliance such as sales levels, 
production, profits and market share (Killing 1983; Schaan 1983; Geringer and 
Herbert 1991). Geringer and Herbert (1991) classify this measure as subjective 
because the kind of data cannot be found in secondary sources.
In more recent studies, a number of other perceptual measures are being used. 
Bucklin and Sengupta (1993), in an exploratory study of co-marketing strategic 
alliances in the computer and semiconductor industries, measured performance in 
terms of the perceived effectiveness of the relationship. Perceived effectiveness 
was the extent to which both firms found the alliance productive and worthwhile. 
Bucklin and Sengupta’s (1993) explanation for this was that many benefits would 
be difficult to track if quantitative measures were used. Similarly Cullen et al 
(1994) measured the performance of Japanese international joint ventures using a 
perceptual measure because of the reluctance of the Japanese to disclose 
performance data. Their measure of performance addressed whether the 
international joint venture had met or exceeded expectations concerning 
profitability, market penetration and growth. These aspects of performance have 
also been considered by other researchers (Geringer and Herbert 1991; Dussauge 
and Garrette 1995; Aulakh et al 1996).
To summarize, the review of the literature on international strategic alliance 
success has shown that there is no single or adequate measure of success. One
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reason for this may be the lack of a definition of international strategic alliance 
success. As a result more empirical evidence is required in order to improve our 
understanding of what success within international strategic alliances means. In 
the current study , in view of the heterogeneous nature of the sample (in terms of 
industrial classification and the types of international strategic alliance), it was 
considered necessary to use multiple measures of success measuring both the 
perceived performance and satisfaction of the international alliances investigated. 
For a more detailed discussion on the measurement of international strategic 
alliance success for this study see section 4.5.2.
2.4.3 Determinants of International Strategic Alliance Success:
Empirical Evidence
This section discusses prior research examining strategic alliance success. The 
importance of managing successful international strategic alliances has been 
reflected extensively in the literature, and has primarily focused on the ex ante 
structuring of alliances (Parkhe 1993). Researchers have examined the rationale 
for international alliances (Contractor and Lorange 1988; Hagedoom 1993; 
Harrigan 1988; Hennart 1991; Kogut 1988; Glaister and Buckley 1994)), partner 
selection and characteristics (Geringer 1991; Blodgett 1991), and the ownership, 
control and performance relationship (Killing 1983; Schann 1983; Tomlinson 
1970; Geringer and Herbert 1989). For a full discussion on the control- 
performance relationship see section 2.5.2.2. The fundamental basis of these 
studies is that if the partners are not compatible, motivations of partners are not 
congruent and ownership and control are not sorted out, the alliance is likely to
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experience difficulties and thus become unsuccessful. Furthermore, these 
dimensions are unlikely to capture the relationship aspects of alliances.
Research studies have reported both satisfactory and unsatisfactory performance 
of international strategic alliances (Killing 1983; Bleeke and Ernst 1991; Harrigan 
1985). Estimated failure rates have ranged from 30% to 70% depending on the 
region, with joint ventures in developing nations suffering from greater failure 
than those in developed countries (Beamish and Delios 1997). These studies 
however, only investigated the stability of the international joint venture and not 
any other measures of success.
In terms of factors influencing alliance success or failure, most research has 
focused on the control - performance relationship^ Killing 1983; Tomlinson 1970; 
Janger 1980; Beamish 1984; Kogut 1988; Bleeke and Ernst 1991; Blodgett 1992).
Kogut (1988) examined the mortality rate among international joint ventures and 
the reasons for joint venture success. He argued that joint ventures underwent a 
life cycle of creation, institutionalization and eventual termination - which may be 
the result of either dissolution of the partnerships or full acquisition by one of the 
partners. From his sample of 148 of US domestic firms and international joint 
ventures, 60% had been terminated within a life cycle of six years, 57% were 
dissolved, and 43% were fully acquired by one partner. As a result Kogut (1988) 
posited that: (i) dominant joint ventures were more stable than shared joint 
ventures, (ii) joint ventures that differed in size were less stable, (iii) joint
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ventures were more unstable in highly concentrated industries, (iv) joint ventures 
with a partner who has market access are more stable.
However his results were inconclusive because they were not supported by 
statistical testing. Dymsza (1988) in his analysis of 100 joint ventures in 
developing countries argued that major factors for success included achievement 
of major goals, complimentary contributions; synergy; comprehensive agreement; 
joint management responsibilities; control; transfer pricing; financial 
arrangements.
In terms of the number of alliances that were found to be successful, all of the 
above studies reported that almost half of the alliances performed unsatisfactorily. 
Between thirty to sixty percent of the alliances failed. Furthermore, these studies 
have indicated that perhaps all strategic alliances cannot be managed in the same 
way. Beamish (1985) suggested that the management of international joint 
ventures should differ because of the differing environments and experiences of 
different countries. Though there is no doubt that many contextual factors 
contribute to the success or failure of international strategic alliances, more recent 
research has theorized that the presence of behavioural factors are central to 
successful alliances (Mohr and Spekman 1994; Morgan and Hunt 1994; Faulkner 
and Mcgee 1995; Aulakh et al 1996). Faulkner and Mcgee (1995) provide 
evidence to suggest that the success and failure of strategic alliances is dependent 
upon a close relationship between partners; good organizational arrangements; 
ability to learn from one’s partner and an evolving relationship. Their research 
was limited, however to 10 international strategic alliances. Mohr and Spekman
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(1994) addressed the behavioural characteristics associated with strategic alliance 
success within the context of dealer-supplier channel relationships. The results of 
their study indicated that trust, willingness to coordinate activities and the ability 
to convey a sense of commitment to the relationship are critical to success of the 
partnership. However their research only investigated domestic strategic alliances 
in the USA personal computer industry. A full discussion of behavioural 
characteristics is provided in section 2.5.
In conclusion although research on international strategic alliances has been 
ongoing for the last decade, it is still at a stage of infancy. Descriptions and 
prescriptions dominate the literature. Several significant gaps still exist in our 
understanding. Most importantly we do not know the criteria that UK managers of 
international alliances use in evaluating performance in the 1990s nor the factors 
by which these criteria are developed. This study will go some way to plugging 
this gap in the literature.
2.4.4 A Measure of International Strategic Alliance Success
As explained in the above section, strategic alliance success is a problematic 
construct, both in terms of establishing a definition and also in terms of 
measurement. Given the range of purposes for which international strategic 
alliances are formed and the many different types of alliances formed, it would not 
be possible to arrive at one definition of strategic alliance success that would be 
applicable to all types of alliances. Furthermore, it would not be possible to use a 
single measure of alliance success, which would be appropriate to the many types 
of alliances formed, because of their different objectives.
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In this study, international strategic alliance success is the dependent variable. 
The measures of alliance success are subjective assessments rather than objective. 
The discussion of prior research earlier highlighted the importance of subjective 
evaluation as an alternative for objective data on performance. This approach was 
used for various reasons. The current study is examining different types of 
strategic alliances across a range of industries. The above discussion has 
suggested that financial indicators would be of little use because of their limited 
comparability across different types of alliances and different industries, as well as 
the difficulty of accessing accurate financial data. Likewise objective indicators 
would also not adequately evaluate business performance or the extent to which 
the objectives of the alliance have been achieved. While a subjective evaluation 
may fail to provide an objective assessment of the strategic alliance, it does 
provide a greater understanding of the subjective assessments provided by key 
executives (Geringer and Herbert 1989; Anderson 1990). Subjective measures 
have the ability to incorporate the variety of goals pursued by international 
strategic alliances. Subjective measures also reduce the problem of lack of 
comparability across different types of international strategic alliances or the 
different types of industry in which they are formed (Hill 1988). Furthermore, 
subjective assessments incorporate both perceptual and objective measures of 
performance (Anderson 1990).
In the current study the subjective assessment of UK international strategic 
alliances was evaluated multidimensionally, combining perceptual and objective 
measures to assess the performance of the alliance. A number of researchers have 
used such composite measures of performance. For instance Blumenthal (1988)
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relied on the parent firm’s assessment of alliance performance along nine 
dimensions and a measure of the parent firm’s overall satisfaction. Hill (1988) 
combined similar variables and a perceptual assessment of financial performance. 
Secondly, it was made clear from the initial contact with the UK firms that 
financial data would be virtually impossible to obtain. In the absence of such 
performance data, the use of subjective measures was further justified. 
International strategic alliances are formed for a variety of goals and objectives 
and the accomplishment of these goals and objectives results in the satisfaction or 
dissatisfaction with the alliance. Thus alliance performance was measured along a 
number of performance dimensions. In addition to the performance categories, 
measures of alliance satisfaction were also obtained (see section 4.5.2). The 
dependent variable international strategic alliance success is evaluated in this 
study from the perspective of the UK firm. A UK perspective was taken because 
of the sheer number of international strategic alliances investigated. Geringer and 
Herbert (1991) have argued that collecting data from a single respondent for each 
alliance provides reliable and efficient information. Furthermore, within the time 
and financial constraints, it would have been virtually impossible to contact all 
international firms used in this study. For this reason, a measure of the partners 
satisfaction with the alliance performance from the perspective of the UK firm 
was included. Success of international strategic alliances was defined 
multidimensionally and was measured in terms of alliance performance and 
alliance satisfaction (see section 4,5.2 for success measures).
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2.5 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSING 
INTERNATIONAL STRATEGIC ALLIANCES IN THE
UK
The effective management of international strategic alliances has proven to be 
difficult because of the problems associated with the running of strategic alliances 
(Anderson 1990; Parkhe 1991; Geringer and Herbert 1989; Lorange and Ross 
1991). Experience with international strategic alliances has shown that they 
frequently face a number of problems such as conflict, poor perceived 
performance and inflexibility (Parkhe 1993; Geringer and Herbert 1991), poor 
communications, opportunism, incompatible objectives (Buckley and Casson 
1988; Gugler and Dunning 1993), control and ownership arrangements (Ohmae 
1989). The theoretical framework for this study is based upon the assumption that 
all international strategic alliances incorporate behavioural and organizational 
characteristics in their relationships (Mohr and Spekman 1994; Saxton 1997, 
Parkhe 1993; Geringer and Herbert 1989). This study seeks to assess the impact 
of the behavioural and organizational characteristics on international strategic 
alliance success. The relationship between the behavioural and organizational 
characteristics and success are described in the model shown in Figure 2.2. The 
model is based on a review of the literature, which will be discussed below. The 
behavioral characteristics depicted in the model are based on Mohr and 
Spekman’s (1994) model. The control characteristics are based on three 
dimensions of control identified by Geringer and Herbert (1989). The 
relationships depicted in the model form the basis of the research propositions to 
be developed in the next sections. In the framework the success of international 
strategic alliances depends on five groups of factors:
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(i) Strategic alliance attributes, including, commitment, coordination, 
interdependence and trust (Mohr and Spekman 1994: Aulakh et al 1996; 
Kumar et al 1995).
(ii) Communication attributes, such as the quality of information, participation 
and information sharing (Huber and Daft 1987; Mohr and Spekman 1994).
(iii) Conflict (Anderson and Narus 1990; Mohr and Spekman 1994)
(iv) Structure, which includes formalization, centralization and complexity 
(John 1984; Moorman et al 1993).
(v) Control, which considers the focus of control, the extent of control and the 
mechanism of control (Geringer and Herbert 1989).
The following sections will review the literature to identify the behavioural and 
organizational variables which are most likely to impact the success of 
international strategic alliances.
2.5.1 Behavioural Characteristics
2.5.1.1 International Strategic Alliance Attributes
Kanter (1988) suggested that strategic partnerships are constrained by blurred 
boundaries in which there emerge close ties that bind the two parties. Yoshino and 
Rangan (1995) described alliances as firms that unite to pursue a set of agreed 
upon goals, share benefits and control over assigned tasks, and contribute on a 
continuing basis in one or more key strategic areas. Faulkner and Mcgee (1995), 
meanwhile, found the most important factors necessary for the development of a 
successful alliance are contained in the concept of a close relationship between the
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partners, such that they demonstrate flexible, trusting and committed attitudes 
towards each other. In such relationships there exist a set of commodities that 
help guide the flow of information between partners, manage the depth and 
breadth of interaction, and capture the complex and dynamic interchange between 
partners. Mohr and Spekman (1994) make the assumption that the existence of 
partnership attributes implies that both partners acknowledge their mutual 
dependence and their willingness to work for the survival of the relationship and 
thus reducing the potential for opportunistic behaviour.
The importance of partnership attributes has been reflected in the extensive 
literature which has focused on commitment, coordination, interdependence and 
trust. (Anderson and Narus 1990; Mohr and Spekman 1994; Morgan and Hunt 
1994; Geyskens et al 1996; Monckza et al 1998). These four items tend to be a 
repeated theme throughout the alliance literature. Theoretical contributions 
(Parkhe 1993) as well as empirical and case study (Mohr and Spekman 1994; 
Monckza et al 1998; Olson and Singsuwan 1997; Dymza 1988; Anderson and 
Narus 1990) research have shown the importance of these four items to alliance 
success.
2.5.1.1.1 Coordination
The word “coordination” has been frequently used within the strategic alliance 
literature as a general concept with no specific definition. Coordination has been 
described as the extent to which two firms are integrated within an alliance 
relationship (Salmond and Spekman 1986). According to Drucker (1974) 
coordination is critical because no firm is in complete control and because
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alliances cannot be “commanded”. The two firms must work together. Thus 
coordination involves the interaction between firms in an alliance relationship. 
The process of interaction has been described as a social exchange process 
between two firms (Thibaut and Kelley 1959; Emerson 1972). Within this 
exchange process the firms coordinate their activities in order to achieve mutual 
outcomes (Anderson and Narus 1990). The coordination of activities and 
resources can, therefore, lead to a better match between the firms (Hallen et al 
1991).
The coordination of activities between the two firms can also lead to 
interdependence (Salmond and Spekman 1986). Resource dependency theory 
argues that firms that seek to reduce uncertainty and manage dependency by 
coordinating their activities will result in greater interdependence between the 
firms and a greater opportunity to coordinate their work (Pfeffer and Salancik 
1978). Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) suggest that greater coordination can be 
determined by each party’s desire to balance dependence and autonomy. 
According to Salmond and Spekman (1986) each firm sees the other’s work as an 
extension of its own, recognizes the joint benefits of coordinating work and strives 
to maximize the benefits of interdependence. In this study coordination has been 
defined in terms of how well the partners interact with each other in order to 
facilitate goal attainment (Salmond and Spekman 1986; Anderson and Narus
1990).
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2.5.1.1.2 Coordination and Success
There has been very little empirical investigation into how coordination between 
partners may impact the success of international strategic alliances. Mohr and 
Spekman (1994), in their study of partnerships among computer dealers and 
suppliers, found coordination to be a strong predictor of partnership success. 
They used two measures of success. These included a subjective measure 
“satisfaction with manufacturer support and satisfaction with sales” and an 
objective indicator measuring sales volume. In their study coordination was 
positively associated with satisfaction in terms of manufacturer support and sales. 
However Mohr and Spekman (1994) measured coordination with only three item 
scales of which one was dropped from the analysis because of a low item-to-total 
correlation. Furthermore their study was limited to domestic supplier-dealer 
relationships in the computer industry, thus limiting the generalizability of their 
results.
Monckza et al (1998), meanwhile investigated 84 international strategic supplier 
alliances located in the USA, Canada, Mexico, Europe and Australia. They 
measured coordination as a combined measure with trust and a single measure of 
coordination. Success was assessed with two subjective (how well the alliance 
partners worked together and buying company’s satisfaction with the alliance) 
and one objective measure (measures of cost reduction, quality, access to 
technology, cycle time and NPD time). Similar to Mohr and Spekman (1994) their 
results reported a significant relationship between coordination and the two 
subjective measures of success. However like Mohr and Spekman (1994) their 
study was limited to supplier-dealer type relationships.
Chapter Two: Literature Review 59
Olson and Singsuwan (1997) investigated the perceptions of Thai and American 
executives across a range of industries. Their measure of strategic alliance 
success was based on the perceptions of company executives in terms of market 
share, sales growth and ROI. They observed that coordination correlated with the 
performance measure of ROI, but was not seen to be a predictor of international 
strategic alliance success. They, however, did not define their measure of 
coordination and how it was measured. Although these studies have reported that 
coordination could ensure some degree of success within strategic alliances, 
neither study defined their concept of a coordinated international strategic 
alliance. Furthermore, each study has operationalized coordination in different 
ways. However, this limited research has shown that coordination can impact the 
success of strategic alliances and suggests that there is a need to identify if 
successful international strategic alliances are characterized by higher levels of 
coordination. Therefore, the following proposition is suggested:
Proposition 1: T h e level o f  co o rd in a tio n  betw een  p a r tn e rs  w ill b e  h ig h e r
f o r  su ccessfu l U K  in te rn a tio n a l stra teg ic  a llia n ces , 
c o m p a red  w ith  less  su ccessfu l in tern a tio n a l s tra teg ic  
a llian ces.
2.5.1.1.3 Interdependence
Firms form international strategic alliances to manage their resource 
interdependencies. This perspective flows directly from an exchange paradigm 
which is based on the assumption that firms must develop and maintain 
relationships with other firms because neither are self sufficient or specialized to
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produce all their inputs or consume all their outputs (Cook 1977; Pfeffer and 
Salancik 1978).
One approach that has been applied to interdependence within strategic alliances 
is the task interdependence approach (Butler and Gill 1996). This approach was 
conceptualized by Thomson (1967) in organizational research. Thomson (1967) 
assumed that all organizational units were goal interdependent, with each unit 
contributing to the organization and thus affecting the outcomes of all other units. 
However the greater the interdependence among the groups, the greater the 
potential for conflict. Butler and Gill (1996) used Thomson’s (1967) 
conceptualization of interdependence in their study of international joint ventures. 
They extended Thomson’s (1967) approach by finding that task interdependencies 
can be related to trust within alliances. Gill and Butler (1996) identified three 
types of interdependencies and found that the pattern of interdependencies will 
effect the development of trust between the partners in joint venture relationships: 
(i) within pooled interdependence in which both partners are expected to provide 
an output but have no direct dependence on each other, they found that direct 
competition will be less likely if there is no conflict which may stimulate the 
development of trust; (ii) on the other hand, they found that in sequential 
interdependence, which is the difference between the firm’s dependence on its 
partner and the partner’s dependence on the firm, both partners may come into 
competition with each other and risk exploitation and thus lessen the degree of 
trust between the partners, and (iii) reciprocal interdependence which occurs when 
there is mutual dependence and a balanced power between partners was found.
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The majority of empirical investigations of interdependence are between 
dealer/supplier type relationships within the channels literature (Anderson and 
Weitz 1989; Anderson and Narus 1990; Buchanan 1992; Kumar et al 1995). 
Anderson and Weitz (1989) found that the degree of dependency has also been 
related to the balance of power within strategic alliances. Strategic alliances 
involve the sharing of power and decision-making between partners in the 
management of the alliance. Firms that are highly dependent upon their partners 
for critical resources have less autonomy and control over their partners 
(Anderson and Narus 1990; Gundlach and Cadotte 1994). Anderson and Weitz 
(1989) also found that symmetrical dependence in relationships results in greater 
stability and trust than relationships that are asymmetric in dependence. The 
symmetry of a relationship is determined by the extent to which trade partners 
value one another’s resources. If resources are valued equally by the two parties, 
the relationship is symmetrical; if the resources of one party are valued more than 
the other party’s, the relationship becomes asymmetrical (Buchanan 1992). 
Buchanan (1992) found that symmetrical interdependence enhances performance. 
Similar findings have also been reported by Kumar et al (1995).
Buckley and Casson (1988) stated that the degree of dependency within alliances 
can also determine the behaviour of the parties involved. High dependency 
between partners in the alliance relationship is more likely to encourage 
cooperation than opportunism, thus making both parties equally vulnerable. Thus 
both party’s have the incentive to forbear on a reciprocal basis.
Chapter Two: Literature Review 62
The concept of interdependence has been a crucial concept in channel research 
(Geyskens et al 1996). Despite its centrality and importance interdependence has 
been little researched in other contexts such as equity joint ventures. As indicated 
above different researchers have examined different aspects of interdependence. 
Furthermore, the channel research has focused solely on domestic relationships 
within the USA and the need to establish cross-cultural validity of theoretical 
models of marketing channel relationships is pertinent (Frazier et al 1989).
For the purpose of this study interdependence was defined as the degree of 
replaceability and dependency of each firm on its partner (Kumar et al 1995) with 
regards to investment in the relationship in terms of the resources mediated by 
each party (Geyskens et al 1996).
2.5.1.1.4 Interdependence and Success
The above studies have identified interdependence as a key factor in strategic 
alliances. Recent empirical investigations have provided strong evidence that 
interdependence enhances the performance of alliances (Mohr and Spekman 1994; 
Monckza et al 1998; Olson and Singsuwan 1997; Buchanan 1992). Mohr and 
Spekman (1994) measured interdependence with a two-item scale and examined 
the ease with which one partner could switch to a new trading partner. They 
observed no significant relationship between interdependence and partnership 
success. They realized that the non-significant relationship may have been due in 
part to the measure used by interdependence. Monckza et al (1998) using 
measures developed by Mohr and Spekman (1994) however, found 
interdependence to be a predictor of success for partnerships in the computer
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industry. Their significant finding may have been due to the fact that Mohr and 
Spekman (1994) relied on only one specific measure of success related to the 
success of the alliance, while Monckza et al (1998) employed two perceptual 
measures and one objective measure of alliance performance.
Olson and Singsuwan (1997) showed that interdependence was perceived to be an 
important factor of strategic alliance success by both Thai and American 
executives. In addition, they found interdependence to be correlated with ROI. 
According to Buchanan (1992) symmetrically highly dependent relationships 
increase the performance while asymmetrically dependent relationships decreases 
performance. The context of his study was the relationship between a retail 
department store and its suppliers. Buchanan (1992) found that increasing 
dependence on suppliers in symmetric departments increased the buyers ability to 
attain the departments objectives. The preceding discussion has suggested that the 
successful international strategic alliances will be characterized by 
interdependence between partner firms. Thus the following proposition has been 
proposed:
Proposition 2: T he le v e l o f  in terd ep en d en ce  be tw een  p a r tn e rs  w ill be
h ig h er  f o r  su ccess fu l U K  in te rn a tio n a l s tra teg ic  a lliances, 
c o m p a red  w ith  le ss  su ccessfu l in te rn a tio n a l stra teg ic
a llian ces.
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2.5.1.1.5 Commitment
The construct of organizational commitment has received a great deal of attention 
in the organizational behaviour literature where considerable focus has been 
given to examining the relationships between employee commitment to the 
organization in terms of job satisfaction (Becker 1960; Kelly 1983; Mowday et al 
1982). The study of commitment has also emerged in the marketing channel 
literature as a critically important element for channel survival and performance 
(Anderson and Narus 1990; Anderson and Weitz 1992; Morgan and Hunt 1994; 
Kumar et al 1995; Noordewier et al 1990). Here, commitment has been defined as 
an implicit or explicit pledge of relational continuity between exchange partners 
(Dwyer et al 1987). Committed partners are willing to invest in valuable assets, 
demonstrating that they can be relied upon to perform essential functions in the 
future (Anderson and Weitz 1992). Partners demonstrate their commitment 
through their willingness to adopt a long-term perspective regarding their 
involvement in a strategic alliance to achieve valuable assets for themselves 
(Morgan and Hunt 1994).
In the literature there are two views of organizational commitment that are 
relevant to international strategic alliances (Anderson and Weitz 1992; Morgan 
and Hunt 1994). One view of organizational commitment emphasizes the 
economic costs of maintaining a relationship (Morgan and Hunt 1994). This view 
stems from the side-bet theory of Becker (1960). Becker (1960:33) described 
commitment as a disposition to engage in “ consistent lines of activity” as a result 
of the accumulation of “side-bets” that would be lost if the activity were 
discontinued. In explaining commitment to the organization, the consistent line of
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activity refers to maintaining membership in the organization. In contrast to these 
economic views of commitment, others have stressed emotional ties to the 
organization (Gundlach et al 1995; Anderson and Weitz 1992). This kind of 
commitment is called affective commitment. The most detailed account, to date, 
of affective commitment to the organization has been provided by Mowday et al 
(1982), and is characterized as having three major components: (i) a strong belief 
in and acceptance of the organizational goals, (ii) a willingness to exert 
considerable effort on behalf of the organization, (iii) a definite desire to maintain 
organizational membership.
Porter et al (1974), meanwhile, define commitment as the willingness of trading 
partners to exert effort on behalf of the relationship. This suggests that partners 
attempt to build a relationship that can endure unanticipated problems. Dwyer et 
al (1987) described commitment as a long-term orientation toward the relationship 
with a willingness to make short term sacrifices to realize long-term benefits from 
the relationship. Kiesler (1971) found that commitment as a pledge by alliance 
members to undertake certain actions will facilitate the attainment of the alliances 
strategic goals. Kumar et al (1995) concluded that affective commitment is the 
most effective for developing and maintaining mutually beneficial relationships 
between partners. Thus this study focuses on the affective component of 
commitment. In the present context commitment to the strategic alliance was 
defined in terms of each firm’s identification with and involvement in the alliance
relationship (Porter et al 1974).
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2.5.1.1.6 Commitment and Success
Several researchers have emphasized the role of commitment to strategic alliance 
success (Beamish 1988; Buckley and Casson 1988; Dwyer et al 1987; Anderson 
and Wietz 1992; Cullen et al 1994; Lee and Beamish 1992; Mohr and Spekman 
1994; Morgan and Hunt 1994; Monckza et al 1998). Beamish (1988) found a 
strong correlation between commitment and performance in strategic alliances, 
noting that most of the commitment characteristics in high-performing alliances 
were related to the multinational firm’s willingness to invest in resources 
necessary for the development and success of the relationship. Similar results 
were found by Dwyer et al (1987). Lee (1989) also found, in his work on Korean 
alliances, that mutual confidence and close business relationships between local 
partners and Korean investors significantly influenced the level of success. 
According to Williamson (1975) commitment can reduce the threat of 
opportunism, thereby reducing transaction costs and thus the costs associated with 
the partnership. Buckley and Casson (1988) also noted that committed partners 
are likely to avoid opportunistic behaviour, thus allowing for greater exchanges 
between the partners that would be of mutual benefit. Mohr and Spekman (1994), 
in their study of supplier-dealer relationships among computer dealers in the U.S., 
suggested that the ability to convey a sense of commitment was the key to 
successful partnerships. Cullen et al (1994) investigated the antecedents of 
commitment in Japanese international joint ventures and found that higher 
economic performance resulted in higher levels of commitment between partners. 
Olson and Singsuwan (1997) in their study of strategic alliances found that both 
American and Thai executives perceived mutual commitment to be an important 
factor contributing to the success of the strategic alliance. They also found
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commitment to be a good predictor of performance in terms of return on 
investment and market share. The research indicates that partners who are 
affectively committed to the alliance relationship will tend to perform at a higher 
level than those who are not committed. The literature therefore suggests the 
following proposition:
Proposition 3: The le v e l o f  co m m itm en t be tw een  p a r tn e rs  w ill  be  h igh er
f o r  su ccess fu l U K  in tern a tio n a l s tra teg ic  a lliances, 
co m p a red  w ith  less su ccessfu l in te rn a tio n a l stra teg ic  
a llian ces
2.5.1.1.7 Trust
The development of trust has been found to be a critical concept in trying to 
understand interpersonal relationships and group behaviour, organizations and 
interorganizational relationships (Zucker 1986; Mayer and Schoorman 1995). 
Golembiewski and Mcconkie (1975:131) stated that, “there is no single variable 
which so thoroughly influences interpersonal and group behaviour as does trust”. 
Hirsch (1978) viewed trust as kind of exchange necessary for the success of 
economic transactions. Hosmer (1995) identifies four perspectives of trust, which 
draw attention to individual, interpersonal relationships, economic exchange and 
social structures. The first is “trust as an individual expectation about the 
outcome of an event”. In this sense trust is the non-rational choice of a person 
faced with an uncertain event in which the expected loss was greater than the 
expected gain (Deutsch 1969). This emphasizes the vulnerability aspect of trust. 
The second potential basis for trust “interpersonal relationships” lies in the
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“willingness of one person to increase his/her vulnerability to the actions of 
another person whose behaviour he or she could not control” (Zand 1972). In this 
view the consequences of trust are dependent upon the behaviour of other people. 
A third view of trust is that it is based on the expectation that parties will not 
behave opportunistically. In this case trust is based on the willingness of parties to 
cooperate with the benefits resulting from that cooperation (Williamson 1985; 
Hill 1990). Within an alliance context trust is therefore seen as a means of 
reducing transaction costs. Finally, trust is viewed as a collective attribute based 
upon the relationships between people in a social system such as an organization 
(Lewiss and Weigart 1985). In this sense trust is seen as being essentially social 
and normative requiring prior social relationships to exist rather than being 
individual and calculative. In the case of a international strategic alliance, “trust 
would exist if the partners can act secure in the knowledge that all members will 
be trying their best to fulfil their obligations contained in a prior agreement” (Gill 
and Butler 1996).
Trust has, therefore, emerged as a significant concept in the field of strategic 
alliances (Anderson and Weitz 1989; Morgan and Hunt 1994; Moorman et al 
1993; Aulakh et al 1996; Monczka et al 1998). Transaction cost theory suggests 
that the presence of trust is a critical factor in the relational governance of 
strategic alliances because of problems of coordination and mutual dependency 
(Williamson 1985; Anderson and Narus 1990; Zaheer and Venkatraman 1995; 
Nooteboom et al 1997). Ouchi (1980) argues that trust has the ability to reduce 
transactions costs by deterring opportunistic behaviour. Madhok (1994) suggested 
that the presence of trust develops tolerance to short term losses in case of
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opportunistic behaviour, reduces the potential for conflict and supports the belief 
among partners that they will be compensated by longer term benefits. Beamish 
and Banks (1987) found that if trust is embedded in the alliance partnership, the 
incentive for opportunistic behaviour is reduced and partners are more likely to 
take a long-term view concerning the alliance. Similarly, trust based alliance 
relationships are a seen as a substitute for hierarchical control when ownership- 
based control is not strategically viable or economically feasible (Aulakh et al 
1996). However, trust as a contract may be essential for the creation of a 
relationship, but not sufficient for its continuation. Trust has also been 
characterized as building and maintaining of relationships within strategic 
alliances (Parkhe 1993; Madhok 1994; Aulakh et al 1996). In this sense, trust is 
essentially dynamic and it develops over time in conjunction with the actions of 
the partners (Ven de Ven and Walker 1984).
This study is concerned with the behavioural aspect of building trust within the 
relationship. In the strategic alliance literature trust has been viewed as 
“behavioural trust”, in which one party willingly trusts the other party and 
involves vulnerability and uncertainty on the part of the trustier (Zand 1972). 
Second, trust has been viewed as “intentional trust”, in which trust results from 
reliability or intentional belief, confidence or expectation about an exchange 
partner’s trustworthiness (Gambetta 1988; Mayer et al 1995; Anderson and Weitz 
1989; Dwyer and Oh 1987). This view of trust has been defined as “the 
willingness to rely on an exchange partner in whom one has trust” (Moorman et al 
1992: p.82). Similarly Anderson and Narus (1990: p.45) have focused on this 
confidence aspect of trust by defining it as a “firm’s belief that another company
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will perform actions that will result in positive outcomes for the firm as well as 
not take unexpected actions that result in negative outcomes”. In the context of 
international strategic alliances this confidence element of trust is useful in 
maintaining an ongoing relationship, since cooperation is based on the confidence 
in the reliability and intentions of an exchange partners structural vulnerability 
(Aulakh et al 1996). Accordingly, a person must believe that a partner is 
trustworthy and willingly rely on that partner to have complete trust.
2.5.1.1.8 Trust and Success
Trust has been defined as an essential element for the success of international 
strategic alliances (Peterson and Shimada 1978; Sullivan and Peterson 1982; 
Madhok 1995; Spekman and Sawhney 1990; Ring and Van de Ven 1992; 
Badarraco 1991). Pruitt (1981) indicates that trust is highly related to a firm’s 
desire to collaborate. Williamson (1985) states that partners that trust each other 
will be better able to manage stress and display greater adaptability. Badaracco 
(1991) suggests that when partners in an alliance trust each other, they are more 
inclined to grant substantial autonomy to managers, enabling them to respond 
more quickly to problems and opportunities and thereby raising the venture’s 
success. Black et al (1991) suggest that trust is needed for a synergistic match, as 
well as for valued relationships in the long run and found the greatest obstacle to 
success to be a lack of trust. Buckley and Casson (1988) suggested that the higher 
the trust, the more efficient the international joint venture will be in transforming 
an input of cooperation into an output.
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Several studies recognize trust to be a critical factor for successful collaboration. 
Anderson and Narus (1990), in their study of distributor/manufacturer 
partnerships, found that trust enables firms to leant that joint efforts will lead to 
outcomes that exceed what the firm would achieve had it acted solely in its own 
best interests. Madhok (1995) conducted interviews with four senior managers 
from different Montreal-based firms and found that trust was regarded by all the 
managers as a critical facilitator of joint venture relationships.
In Mohr and Spekman’s (1994) study of successful partnerships trust was 
significantly associated with partner satisfaction in terms of profitability. They 
proposed that this significant relationship between trust and profitability suggested 
that trust was important in easing the dealer’s fear of opportunistic behaviour on 
the part of the vendor, thus leading to greater perceived satisfaction. Aulahk et al
(1996) investigated a sample of U.S. firms having distributor and licensing 
relationships with firms from Asia, Europe and Central/South America. They 
empirically examined the direct association between trust and performance, as 
well as contingency effects. Although their findings indicated no direct 
relationship between trust and performance their results support the notion that 
trust in international partnerships has positive implications for partnership 
performance when conditions exist for opportunistic behaviour. Aulahk et al 
(1996) have addressed the fact that their conceptualization and operationalization 
of trust does not capture the many facets of this concept. Furthermore, they 
considered only one type of partnership performance in their study (i.e. sales
growth and market share).
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Monckza et al (1998) used Mohr and Spekman’s (1994) measure of trust and 
showed that trust was an important factor in strategic supplier alliances. However 
Monckza et al (1998) used three measures of success and trust was positively 
related to all three.
Therefore, it is expected that the presence of high levels of trust will be a factor of 
higher success for the international strategic alliances which suggests the fourth 
proposition of this study:
Proposition 4: T he le v e l  o f  tru s t b e tw een  p a r tn ers  w ill be  h ig h er  f o r
su c c e ss fu l U K  in te rn a tio n a l stra teg ic  a llian ces, com pared  
w ith  le ss  su ccessfu l in te rn a tio n a l stra teg ic  a lliances.
In sum the literature cited above suggests that higher levels of commitment, 
coordination, interdependence and trust are positively related to the success of 
international strategic alliances.
2.5.1.2 Communication Attributes
Communication is a central process in organizational activities and is critical to 
the success of organizations (Mohr and Nevin 1990). Cummings (1984) argues 
that in order to realize the benefits of collaboration, effective communication is 
fundamental. Jain (1987) contends that because international strategic alliances 
involve companies of different nationalities communication problems may arise 
because of cultural and language barriers, different working methods and 
management styles. These differences and ineffective communication can lead to
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“misunderstandings, incorrect strategies, and “mutual feelings of frustration” 
(Mohr and Nevin 1990) which may reduce the effectiveness of the alliance, and 
thus lead to conflict between partners (Jain 1987). This suggests that an 
awareness of communication processes is essential within alliances if maximum 
efforts are to be coordinated and directed towards the success of international 
strategic alliances.
Three aspects of communication behaviour were identified by Mohr and Spekman 
(1994) as critical to the success of partnerships and will be considered in this 
study: communication quality, extent of information sharing between partners , 
and participation in planning and goal setting.
2.5.1.2.1 Information Quality
Communication quality is perceived as a key aspect of transmitting information 
(Jablin et al 1987). Quality includes such aspects as the accuracy, timeliness, 
adequacy and credibility of information exchanged (Daft and Lengel 1986; Huber 
and Daft 1987). Timely, accurate and relevant information between parties in a 
strategic alliance may be a significant factor in determining the degree to which 
each partner understands each other’s goals and coordinate their efforts to achieve 
those goals (Mohr and Spekman 1994). Meaningful and timely exchange of 
information may also result in a trusting relationship between firms (Anderson 
and Narus 1991) and thus help partner firms to realize mutual benefits by reducing 
dysfunctional misunderstandings (Dwyer et al 1987; Anderson and Nanis 1991). 
The quality of the information sharing process has been investigated within the 
context of strategic alliances (Mohr and Spekman 1994; Olson and Singsuwan
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1997; Monckza et al 1998). Mohr and Spekman (1994) developed measures for 
the quality of information and tested them within the context of dealer-supplier 
channel transactions. They suggested that timely, accurate, and relevant 
information is essential if the goals of the partnership are to be achieved. In their 
study quality of information was found to significantly predict the success of the 
partnership in terms of manufacturer support. Similarly Monckza et al (1998) 
using the same measures found quality of information to be a good predictor of 
the success of supplier alliances. Similar findings were also observed by Olson 
and Singsuwan (1997) on the perceptions of Thai and American executives.
2.5.1.2.2 Information Sharing
Information is present in every part of and created by every activity of a firm 
(Yoshino and Rangan 1995) and refers to the extent to which critical information 
is communicated to one’s partner (Badaracco 1991). Huber and Daft (1987) 
suggest that closer ties result in more frequent and more relevant information 
exchanges between partners. By sharing information and by being knowledgeable 
about each other’s business, partners are able to act independently in maintaining 
the relationship over time. Effective information sharing increases information 
value for all people in the organization (Glazer 1991), is associated with increased 
levels of satisfaction (Schuler 1979) and is an important predictor of partnership 
success (Devlin and Bleackley 1988). In the channel literature manufacturers and 
distributors have been found to develop trust (Anderson and Narus 1990) and 
commitment (Anderson and Weitz 1992) through the formal and informal sharing 
of timely information. Salmond and Spekman (1986) also suggested that sharing
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information reduces the potential for conflict resolution and mistrust within 
collaborative relationships. While empirical research on alliance communication 
is sparse (Mohr and Nevin 1990), Mohr and Spekman (1994), Monckza et al 
(1998) and Olson and Singsuwan (1997) have examined the sharing of 
information within the context of strategic alliances. Mohr and Spekman (1994) 
investigated the extent to which computer dealers and suppliers kept each other 
informed about important issues and found that information sharing was 
negatively related to satisfaction with profits. Monckza et al (1998) using similar 
measures, found that information sharing between industrial purchasing partners 
resulted in overall satisfaction with the alliance partnership in terms of partners 
working together, how flexible partners were with each other and helping each 
other in an emergency. Olson and Singsuwan (1997) found information sharing 
between Thai and American alliances to be negatively associated with market 
share and positively associated with sales growth.
2.5.1.2.3 Participation
Participation refers to the extent to which partners actively engage in planning and 
goal setting. When one partner’s actions influence the ability of the other to 
effectively compete, the need for participation becomes necessary for defining 
roles and responsibilities (Anderson et al 1987). Anderson et al (1987) also 
suggest that decision making and goal formulation are important aspects of 
participation thât help partnerships to succeed. Mohr and Spekman (1994) found 
support for the relationship between participation and alliance success for 
computer dealers and suppliers within the USA. Using four measures they 
assessed the extent to which the dealers input was required by the suppliers for
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planning purposes. Mohr and Spekman (1994) found participation was significant 
in predicting the success of the partnership in terms of satisfaction with profits and 
manufacturer support. Similarly, Monckza et al (1998) found evidence to support 
Mohr and Spekman (1994) finding that participation is an important factor in 
alliance success. However they examined participation as a combined measure 
with information quality. Further evidence, for the relationship between 
participation and alliance success has been provided by Olson and Singsuwan
(1997). They showed that not only was participation in decision-making 
perceived to be an important factor in contributing to the success of the alliance by 
both Thai and American Executives, participation correlated with market share 
and ROI.
2.5.1.2.4 Communication and Success
From the above review of the literature, it is apparent that communication 
processes underlie most aspects of how strategic alliances function and are thus 
critical to alliance success. Nonetheless, studies of communication are under­
represented in the empirical research literature, especially research on 
international alliances. Although many aspects of communication have failed to 
receive the attention of researchers, the comprehensive review by Mohr and Nevin 
(1990) concluded that the major omission in this area concerned studies of how 
communication relates to the overall performance of alliances. Since Mohr and 
Nevin’s (1990) review, there have been few studies on communication in 
international strategic alliances. As discussed above various researchers have 
looked at different facets of communication, and have identified them to be 
critical for alliance success (Mohr and Spekman 1994; Monckza et al 1998).
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In sum, higher levels of communication quality, more information sharing 
between partners, and more participation in planning and goal setting are 
positively related to the success of international strategic alliances. The following 
propositions have been formulated.
Proposition 5: T he q u a lity  o f  in form ation  be tw een  p a r tn ers  w ill be  
g re a te r  f o r  su ccessfu l U K  in tern a tio n a l s tra teg ic  a llian ces  
c o m p a re d  with less su ccessfu l in te rn a tio n a l s tra teg ic  
a llia n c e s .
Proposition 6: T h ere  w ill  be  a  g rea te r  le ve l o f  in fo rm a tio n  sh a rin g  
b e tw een  p a rtn ers  f o r  su ccessfu l U K  in te rn a tio n a l stra teg ic  
a llia n c e s  com pared  w ith  less su c c e ss fu l in tern a tion a l 
s tra te g ic  a lliances.
Proposition 7: T he le v e l  o f  partic ip a tio n  in p la n n in g  a n d  g o a l se ttin g  
b e tw een  p a rtn ers  w ill be  h ig h e r  f o r  su ccessfu l U K  
in te rn a tio n a l s tra teg ic  a llian ces, c o m p a re d  w ith  le ss  
s u c c e s s fu l in tern a tion a l stra teg ic  a llia n ces .
2.5.1.3 Conflict
Conflict has been regarded as an important feature of international strategic 
alliances. Conflicts are an inherent characteristic between units within a single 
organization and, therefore, are more likely to occur in the cooperation between
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people from different organizations (Child and Faulkner 1998). Firms that engage 
in strategic alliances try to maintain their autonomy in an interdependent 
relationship, which gives rise to conflicts (Van de Ven and Walker 1984). 
Partners within a strategic alliance relationship have a drive for both autonomy 
and cooperation, which results in the coexistence of cooperative and conflictual 
motives within the alliance (Aldrich 1977). There are many ways in which 
conflicts can arise between partners. Conflicts may arise from differences in 
cultural values, management styles, operational methods and procedures which 
may jeopardize the alliance (Jain 1987). In international strategic alliances the 
presence of two parent firms can lead to differences between them in terms of 
management style, culture, communication, and operational practices which are 
conducive to conflict (Killing 1983; Jain 1987; Devlin and Bleackley 1988). 
Given that a certain amount of conflict is expected, an understanding of how such 
conflicts can be resolved is also important (Borys and Jemison 1989).
Cummings (1984) reports that strategic alliances are encouraged to engage in joint 
problem solving, so that they are able to mange the uncertain environment that 
they are faced with. Joint problem solving allows a mutually satisfactory solution 
to be reached, thereby enhancing alliance success. Partners very often attempt to 
persuade each other to adopt particular solutions to the conflict situation, which 
appear to be more constructive than the use of coercion or domination (Deutsch 
1969). Domination or coercion are seen as being counterproductive and are likely 
to strain the fabric of the strategic alliance. In some strategic alliances conflict 
resolution is institutionalized, and third party arbitration is recommended 
(Anderson and Nanis 1990). However it has been suggested that internal
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resolution is more likely to lead to long-term success (Assael 1969). Other 
conflict resolution techniques such as smoothing over or ignoring and avoiding 
the issue are somewhat at odds with the norms and values advocated in more 
successful strategic alliances. Such techniques do not fit in with alliances in 
which the problems of one party become the problems affecting both parties 
(Mohr and Spekman 1994).
2.5.1.3.1 Conflict and Strategic Alliance Success
Conflicts between partners have been identified as a key factor in the success and 
failure of strategic alliances (Friedman and Beguin 1971; Killing 1983; Anderson 
and Narus 1990; Tilman 1990; Lane and Beamish 1990; Lewis 1990; Ding 1997). 
Conflicts between alliance partners can result in misunderstandings and distrust, 
leading to reduced cooperation and thereby deteriorating the performance of the 
strategic alliance (Freidman and Beguin 1971; Wright 1979; Killing 1983; Lewis 
1990). Frequent disagreements in a relationship tend to cause frustration and 
unpleasantness, and thus result in dissatisfaction (Anderson and Narus 1984; 
1990). In addition, conflict may harm accomplishment of the task of the 
relationship. Frequent disagreements may result in complex, time consuming 
decision making or in obstructive behaviours that simply block any decision­
making (Killing 1983). As a result, time and resources are devoted to conflict 
resolution rather than activities productive for the alliance. Such situations may 
limit an alliances ability to cope with and to respond to changes in its environment 
and thus to be successful in its business. Conflicts may also arise from 
withholding resources that may be required by the other partner to achieve its 
objectives (Buckley and Casson 1988; Lane and Beamish 1990). Transaction cost
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theory advocates that conflict breaks down trust and increases the potential for 
opportunistic behaviour, thereby resulting in economically inefficient 
relationships (Beamish and Banks 1987; Buckley and Casson 1988).
Some empirical studies also suggest that there is a negative relationship between 
conflict and alliance performance. Wright (1979) examined 25 U.S. and Canadian 
joint ventures in Japan and found that conflicts between partners resulted from 
differences between the Japanese and the Western culture, which in turn reflected 
differences in management style. Wright (1979) observed that conflicts such as 
differing objectives, differences in decision-making styles, conflicting contracts 
led to the deterioration of the alliance partnership. Lewis (1990) from his 
investigation of 40 American and Asian alliances observed that the potential for 
conflict resulted from cultural distance between alliance partners which adversely 
affected the performance of the alliance. Similarly Simiar (1984) investigated the 
causes of failure in 29 international joint ventures in Iran and attributed the failure 
of ventures to conflicting goals between partners resulting from cultural 
misunderstandings. In a study of Thai/Japanese UVs Tilman (1990) found that 
conflict had a significant negative impact on satisfaction and performance. More 
recently Ding (1997) empirically investigated the relationship between conflict 
and performance using a sample of U.S./Chinese joint ventures and observed that 
conflicting issues of quality control, export and import and administration and 
supervision of Wage and labor policies significantly hindered the performance of 
the joint ventures. Other studies have also suggested that conflicts were a major 
catalyst for the failure and termination of UVs (Lane and Beamish 1990; Reynolds 
1984).
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Some studies have also shown that the manner in which conflicts are resolved has 
implications for the success of alliance relationships. Mohr and Spekman (1994) 
found successful partnerships were more likely to utilize problem solving 
techniques and less likely to use techniques such as smoothing over the problem, 
avoiding the issue and domination and harsh words. Similarly results were also 
noted by Monckza et al (1998) who used the same measures of conflict resolution 
as Mohr and Spekman (1994). Against this background the following proposition 
was formulated.
Proposition 8: There w ill b e  less con flic t betw een  p a r tn e rs  f o r  su ccessfu l
U K  in tern a tio n a l s tra teg ic  a llian ces co m p a re d  w ith  less  
su ccessfu l in tern a tio n a l stra teg ic  a llia n ces
2.5.2 ORGANIZATIONAL CHARACTERISTICS
2.5.2.1 Structure and Success
In a traditional sense, structure concerns the organizational design of lines of 
authority and communication flows (Chandler 1962; Kotler and Armstrong 1991). 
It is the unique way an organization provides a foundation for its people to work 
together to achieve goal directed activities (Dalton et al 1980). Organization 
structure is believed to affect the behaviour of organization members (Hall 1977). 
Hall (1977: 109) suggested that “structure is the setting in which power is 
exercised...., decisions are made...., and the organizations activities are carried 
out”. Campbell et al (1974) suggested a useful distinction between the
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“structural” and “structuring” characteristics of organizations. The structural 
qualities of an organization are its physical characteristics such as size, span of 
control, and hierarchy. Structuring characteristics refer to the policies and 
activities occurring within the organization that prescribe the behaviour of 
members in an organization. These structuring activities include centralization, 
formalization and complexity which have been commonly used to analyze the 
structure of an organization (Frederickson 1986).
• C en tra liza tion
Centralization refers to the hierarchical level that has authority to make a decision 
(Frederickson 1986). In centralized organizations, decisions tend to be made at 
the top. In decentralized organizations, similar decisions would be made at a 
lower level (Frederickson 1986). It has been shown that increased 
decentralization in organizations leads to improvements in several facets of 
effectiveness. Research shows that decentralization has been related to
performance (Lawrence and Lorsch 1976) and profitability (Negandi and Reiman 
1973).
• F orm aliza tion
Formalization refers to the rules, procedures and written documents such as policy 
manuals and job descriptions that prescribe the rights and duties of employees 
(Walsh and Dewar 1987). Thus formalization has significant consequences for 
organizational members because it specifies how, where and by whom tasks are to 
be performed (Frederickson 1986). Within the context of organizations,
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formalization threatens professional autonomy and represents a hindrance to 
effectiveness (Frederickson 1986).
• C om plex ity
Complexity refers to both the number of levels in the hierarchy (vertical 
complexity) and the number of departments (horizontal complexity). Nadler and 
Tushman (1988), Lawrence and Lorsch (1976) argue that a high level of 
complexity makes it difficult to coordinate and control decision activities. Nadler 
and Tushman (1988) contend that organizations must be deigned to encourage 
information flow in both vertical and horizontal directions to enable organizations 
to achieve their objectives. They state that the structure should fit the information 
requirements of the organization. If it does not, people will have too little 
information or will spend time processing information that is not vital to their 
tasks, thus reducing effectiveness.
While these three dimensions have received considerable attention in the 
organization theory literature, they have received the least amount of systematic 
attention within the strategic alliance literature.
Using data from dyadic relationships in marketing channels John and Reve (1982) 
identified centralization and formalization as the key dimensions of 
interorganizational relationships (John and Reve 1982). They defined 
formalization of channel dyad activities as “the degree to which rules and fixed 
procedures govern channel dyad activities”. Centralization of channel decision­
making was defined as “the degree to which power to make and implement
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decisions within the dyadic relationship is concentrated at one vertical level” 
(John and Reve 1982: 518). John (1984) investigated bureaucratic structuring 
within a marketing channel and found that a higher level of formalization 
undermined positive attitudes and increased opportunism. Dwyer and Oh (1988) 
studied levels of bureaucratic structuring in interorganizational relationships 
between hardware stores in the US. They defined centralization as the need for 
permission, freedom to make program adaptations and force of supplier 
recommendations and suggestions. Formalization was measured in terms of 
standardized procedures, specified responsibilities, reliance on written contracts 
and order policy. While no significant differences were found in centralization 
between wholesalers and dealers, the dealers were more formalized than the 
wholesalers.
Another study by Provan and Skinner (1989) investigated interorganizational 
relationships between farm and power equipment dealers and suppliers and used 
formalization and centralization measures as a method of decision control used by 
the suppliers. They found that supplier control through rules and procedures 
(formalization) and through direct involvement of supplier management 
(centralization) over their dealers was positively related to opportunistic 
behaviour, which in turn has been found to decrease trust within strategic alliances 
(Beamish and Banks (1987). Since the literature has recognized trusting 
partnerships to be associated with alliance success, this would suggest that 
formalized and centralized relationships would result in a dissatisfied alliance.
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Although there has been no academic research that has attempted to document 
empirically the relationship between complexity and success within the context of 
strategic alliances, Moorman et al (1993) have investigated organizational 
complexity between market research relationships. Moorman et al (1993: 85) 
defined organizational complexity as the “degree of formal structural 
differentiation within an organization”. They proposed that a lower level of 
complexity should reduce trust in research relationships. However their results 
were not significant.
Despite these theoretical developments, researchers have not adequately pursued 
empirical analysis to address these interorganizational arrangements. Although 
evidence from the organization theory literature suggests a relationship between 
formalization, centralization and complexity and organizational performance, the 
lack of empirical analysis within the context of strategic alliances leads to the 
conclusion that the association between formalization, centralization, complexity 
and alliance performance has not been clearly demonstrated. The present study is 
concerned with the structuring characteristics of UK international strategic 
alliances and should go some way to filling this gap in the international strategic 
alliance literature. This research will extend previous work by specifically 
examining the relationship between formalization, centralization and complexity 
and the success of UK international strategic alliances. The intention here, is to 
offer an empirical contribution to an area within international strategic alliances in 
which very little conceptual and empirical progress has been made. Using John 
and Reve’s (1982) definition of formalization and centralization cited above, this 
study characterizes formalization as the extent to which rules and procedures
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govern the activities o f UK international strategic alliances, and centralization as 
the extent to which decision-making within UK international strategic alliances 
are centralized. Complexity is defined as the degree o f structural differentiation 
that govern international strategic alliances. This definition is adapted from 
Moorman et al (1993). Based on the foregoing discussion, the following 
propositions have been suggested:
Proposition 9: S uccessfu l U K  in te rn a tio n a l stra teg ic  a llia n ces  w ill be  
less fo rm a lized  in  th e ir  a c tiv itie s  a n d  re la tio n sh ip s  
com pared  to  less su ccessfu l in te rn a tio n a l stra teg ic  
alliances
Proposition 10: S uccessfu l U K  in te rn a tio n a l s tra teg ic  a llia n ces  w ill b e  
less cen tra lized  in  th e ir  approach  to  m a n a g in g  ac tiv ities  
a n d  re la tion sh ips co m p a red  to  less  su ccessfu l  
in tern a tion a l s tra te g ic  a llian ces
Proposition 11: S uccessfu l U K  in te rn a tio n a l s tra teg ic  a llia n ces  w ill h ave  
sim p ler levels o f  o rg a n iza tio n  a rra n g em en ts  c o m p a red  to  
less su ccessfu l in te rn a tio n a l s tra teg ic  a llian ces
2.S.2.2 Control
Control is a critical issue for the successful management and performance of 
international strategic alliances (Geringer and Herbert 1989). However there is a
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great deal of uncertainty surrounding the meaning of control. There are few 
definitions of the concept but there are many inconsistencies in its operational 
definitions. Geringer and Herbert (1989) from their review of the literature 
defined control as the process by which one partner influences, to varying degrees, 
the behaviour and output of the other partner, through the influence of power, 
authority and a wide range of bureaucratic, cultural and informal mechanisms. 
They identified three dimensions of control in international joint ventures. These 
are the focus of control, the mechanism by which control is exercised and the 
extent of control exercised over a joint venture.
2.5.2.2.1 Focus of Control
The “focus” refers to the scope of activities over which a parent seeks to exercise, 
or not to exercise, control (Geringer 1993). A criticism of the locus of decision 
making perspective is its implicit suggestion that parent firms seek to control the 
overall joint venture, rather than targeting specific activities or processes 
perceived as crucial for the achievement of the joint venture’s or the parent’s 
strategic objectives (Brooke and Remmers 1978). Concern with this implicit 
conceptualization of control constituted one of the bases for Schaan’s (1983) 
examination of 10 joint ventures in Mexico. Schaan (1983) defined control as “the 
process through which the parent company ensures that the way a joint venture is 
managed conforms to its own interest” and demonstrated that firms tended to seek 
control over specific “strategically important activities” rather than over the whole 
joint venture. This contention was supported by Geringer’s (1988) study of 90 
developed country joint ventures. He mentioned that most 50/50 equity based 
joint ventures in his sample did not share control over specific activities of the
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joint venture (such as product design, manufacturing and day-to-day management) 
as equally as ownership. According to Geringer and Herbert (1989) these findings 
suggest that the exercise of effective control should emphasize selective control 
over those dimensions a parent perceives as critical, rather than attempting to 
control the entire range of the joint ventures activities.
2.S.2.2.2 Control Mechanisms
The second dimension of control that has been examined is the mechanisms by 
which parents exercise control over the joint venture (Geringer 1993). Early 
studies on joint ventures associated control with majority ownership or a 
percentage of a joint ventures equity share (Tomlinson 1970; Franko 1971). 
Tomlinson (1970), in his study of joint ventures in India and Pakistan, found that 
firms used majority ownership or equity control as a mechanism for achieving 
effective management control over the activities of a joint venture. However, 
although in the past firms have frequently relied on majority ownership to achieve 
effective management control of joint venture activities, such an option has not 
always been available, especially when constraints have been enforced by host 
governments (Porter and Fuller 1986). This has led to joint ventures with equally 
divided or minority control. Thus subsequent research suggested that control is 
not a strict and automatic consequence of ownership, but that a variety of 
mechanisms may be available to firms for exercising effective control over joint 
ventures (Behrman 1970; Friedman and Beguin 1971).
Friedman and Beguin 1971) identified a variety of mechanisms through which 
control of the joint venture could be exercised, such as right of veto.
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representation in management bodies and special agreements between parents 
such as licensing and management contracts. Firms could also rely on their 
technological expertise and managerial skills as a means of guaranteeing 
participation in the daily management of joint venture operations. Schaan (1983), 
in his investigation of 10 Mexican strategic alliances, identified a broad range of 
control mechanisms. These included the board of directors, formal agreements, 
the appointment of key personnel, the joint venture planning process, the reporting 
relationships and a variety of informal mechanisms. Schaan (1983) also 
categorized control into two types: positive control mechanisms which parent 
firms employed to promote certain behaviours such as staffing, participation in 
planning process and reporting relationships; negative control mechanisms, which 
were used by parent firms to prevent the implementation of certain activities and 
decisions. Positive control was exercised through informal mechanisms, staffing, 
and participation in the planning process and reporting relationships. In contrast, 
negative control was enforced through formal agreements, power of veto and 
board of directors. Thus the control mechanisms used by strategic alliances can 
have a significant effect on the alliance.
2.5.2.2.3 Extent of Control
A third dimension examined by researchers was the extent of control exercised 
over an international joint venture (Geringer and Herbert 1989). The “extent” of 
control refers to the degree of control exercised by a parent over individual 
alliance activities (Geringer 1993). This can range from complete control by one 
parent, to equal control by each parent or alliance manager, to complete control by 
the alliance managers (Geringer 1993). Previous studies have conceptualized
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control as being dependent on the centralization or locus of the decision making 
process (Geringer and Herbert 1989). Dang’s (1977) research on US 
multinational subsidiaries in the Philippines and Taiwan measured control based 
on the locus of decision-making, with control being defined as the degree of 
autonomy of a subsidiary. The study found no differences between the degree of 
foreign ownership and the degree of control exerted by the parent firm over the 
subsidiary. Dang (1977), therefore, concluded that equity ownership could not 
explain the degree of control in joint ventures.
Killing (1983), meanwhile, studied the division of control in a sample of thirty- 
seven joint ventures from developed countries. He measured the extent of control 
by determining how much influence each parent firm had on nine decision-making 
areas: pricing policy, product design, production scheduling, manufacturing 
process, quality control, replacements of managers, sales targets, cost budgeting 
and capital expenditures. For each decision, parent firms had to indicate whether 
the decision was made by one or the other parent, by both parents or by the joint 
venture. Based on these decisions Killing (1983) identified three categories of 
joint venture control: dominant control joint ventures, where only one of the 
parents played a dominant role in decision-making; shared management joint 
ventures, where each parent played an active role in decision-making; and 
independent joint ventures, where the joint ventures are autonomous. Similarly 
Beamish (1984) used the same scale and classified twelve joint ventures in less 
developed countries. He also made the distinction between dominant control 
exercised by the foreign parent or local partner. More recently (Geringer 1993) 
suggested that dominant or shared control should be determined by the skills and
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resources of each partner, that are necessary to satisfy the market requirements, 
such as sufficient manufacturing expertise, financial acumen, relationships with 
government regulators. Exercising extensive control over activities and decisions 
can generate coordination and governance costs and limit the efficiency of the 
alliance (Contractor and Lorange 1988).
The extent of control exercised within international strategic alliances has also 
been perceived as a result of negotiation reflected by the partners relative 
bargaining power (Blodgett 1991; Yan and Gray 1994; Mjoen and Tallman 1997). 
From this perspective the extent of control obtained by each partner within a 
strategic alliance was related to their bargaining power. This bargaining power 
was interpreted as resulting from the type of resources provided and how these 
resources can be used to gain control. The partner having the strongest bargaining 
position can usually negotiate for a higher level of control (Mjoen and Tallman 
1997). In a study of 69 international joint ventures, Blodgett (1991) investigated 
the relationship between bargaining power and equity ownership. She reported 
that resources such as market access and technology would provide dominant 
bargaining power to a parent firm and thus a majority equity position. Yan and 
Gray (1994), in their comparative case study of four joint ventures between 
partners from the USA and China, challenged Blodgett’s (1991) assumption that 
all international joint ventures prefer one-hundred percent ownership and that 
ownership split is determined by negotiation representing the relative power of 
participating interests. Their results indicated that management control is 
determined by the partners at the outset of the negotiations. Their findings 
indicated that the type of resources committed by each partner constitutes equity
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power bases that can be used as a source of bargaining power Yan and Gray 
1994).
2.5.2.2.4 Control and Success
In addition to examining the exercise of control in international strategic alliances, 
researchers have also tried to enhance the understanding of the relationship 
between control and the performance. For example, Tomlinson (1970) studied the 
control-performance relationship for UK international joint ventures in India and 
Pakistan. Tomlinson (1970) argued that dominant control was not necessary for 
successful joint ventures since the sharing of responsibility was more than 
compensated for by the other contributions made by the local partner. He found 
that international joint ventures were more successful when the UK parent firms 
had a more relaxed attitude towards control. However Tomlinson (1970) used 
profitability (ROI) as a measure of success and reported approximately between 
50%-80% of the international joint ventures to be unsatisfactory. The validity of 
his findings is questionable since the use of profitability as a measure for a multi­
industry study is inadequate and may have produced unreliable results (Geringer 
and Herbert 1989).
Janger (1980) investigated 168 international joint ventures in both developed and 
developing countries in which he considered the relationship between parental 
control and the success of the venture. He found no relationship between the 
control and success of an international joint venture for either shared or dominant
joint ventures.
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From a sample of 34 joint ventures between North America and Europe, Killing 
(1983) investigated the overall division of control as a predictor of joint venture 
success. Killing (1983) however relied on the perceptual assessment of the 
performance of the joint venture from the perspective of the parent firms and 
reported that seventy-seven percent of the dominant joint ventures were 
performing satisfactorily with fifteen percent of these terminated. Of the shared 
management ventures only forty-five percent were satisfactory and fifty percent 
were terminated. The independently managed ventures were satisfactory seventy- 
five percent of the time and none were terminated. Schaan (1983), also using the 
joint venture’s management’s assessment, investigated control as a predictor of 
success in ten Mexican joint ventures. While Killing’s (1983) study focused on 
the amount of overall control, Schaan’s (1983) examined control in terms of the 
mechanisms used. Schaan (1983) found that the most successful joint ventures 
were those in which managers in the parent firm achieved a fit between their 
criteria of success, the activities or decisions they controlled and the mechanisms 
they used to exercise control. Beamish (1984), using Killing’s measure of control, 
investigated a sample of joint ventures set up by multinational companies in less- 
developed countries. While Beamish (1984) found that shared or local dominant 
ventures performed better than when the multinational was the single largest 
shareholder, he identified a small number of cases where dominant control was 
associated with unsatisfactory performance. In all of the above studies, except for 
Tomlinson (1970), performance was based on the assessment of managers.
More recently Bleeke and Ernst (1991), in their analysis of 49 strategic alliances, 
found that alliances with an even split of ownership were more likely to be
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successful than those in which one partner held a majority stake. Of the 49 
alliances analyzed, only fifty-one percent were successful for both parents. They 
further reported that most alliances, even successful ones will terminate. Likewise 
Blodgett (1992), based on a sample of over a 1000 international joint venture in 
manufacturing and retailing, found that ventures with equal ownership were more 
successful than dominant partner ventures.
Yan and Gray (1994) investigated the relationship between bargaining power, 
management control and performance and found that a shared management 
structure of control determined by the bargaining power of potential partners is 
associated with the success of a joint venture.
Although the above research has indicated that there is a relationship between 
control and performance, inconsistencies in the empirical findings have led to 
inconclusive results (Geringer and Herbert 1989). Geringer and Herbert (1989) 
have noted a number of limitations in the conceptual and operational definitions 
of control and performance. Firstly, the majority of the studies have looked at only 
one dimension of control. They propose that all three dimensions of control 
(focus o f control, mechanism o f control and extent o f control) need to be 
examined together to get a better understanding of how control can effect the 
performance of international strategic alliances. Similarly, most studies have 
relied on a variety of objective measures of performance ranging from profitability 
(Tomlinson 1970) to survival (Killing 1983), duration (Kogut 1988), instability 
(Franko 1971). Geringer and Herbert (1989) argue that the validity of these 
studies may be questionable since these measures do not adequately reflect the
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extent to which the international alliance has achieved its objectives. To 
overcome this methodological problem they suggest the use of a perceptual 
measure based on the satisfaction of the alliances objectives achieved. Previous 
researchers such as Killing (1983); Schaan (1983) and Beamish (1984) have also 
used these measures. Geringer and Herbert (1989) thus argue that the control- 
performance relationship within international joint ventures is limited and more 
empirical analysis of this relationship is needed.
Based on this review, the current study suggests the following propositions:
Proposition 12: U K  in te rn a tio n a l s tra teg ic  a llia n ces  th a t seek  to  fo c u s  
th e ir  in flu en ce  o v e r  p a r tic u la r  a llia n ce  activ ities , ra th er  
th an  co n tro l a ll  ac tiv itie s  w ill  b e  m o re  su ccessfu l
Proposition 13: U K  In tern a tio n a l s tra teg ic  a llia n ce  p a r tn e rs  th a t u se  a  
varie ty  o f  co n tro l m ech a n ism s to  m o n ito r  a llian ce  
ac tiv itie s  w ill b e  m o re  su ccessfu l.
Proposition 14: S u ccessfu l U K  in te rn a tio n a l s tra teg ic  a llia n ces  a re  th ose  
in  w h ich  th e  m a n a g em en t o f  th e  a llia n ce  is sh ared  
c o m p a red  to  le ss  su ccess fu l in tern a tio n a l s tra teg ic
a llia n ces
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2.6 SUMMARY
This chapter has provided a review of the relevant literature in the field of 
international strategic alliances and has discussed the theoretical background for 
the current study. The research model within which the research objectives are 
investigated integrates the behavioural and organizational characteristics that may 
impact the success of international strategic alliances. These include, partnership 
attributes, communication attributes, conflict, structure and control. In terms of 
the behavioural factors impacting the success of UK international strategic 
alliances, the focus has been on the level of commitment, coordination, trust and 
interdependence between partners in alliance relationships as well as the 
communication behaviour and the degree and resolution of conflicts. It has been 
determined that higher levels of commitment, coordination, trust and 
interdependence between UK firms and their international partners will result in 
higher success for these international alliances. Likewise, greater levels of 
communication combined with lower levels of conflict will also result in more 
successful international alliances. The examination of the organizational 
characteristics that may impact the success of international alliances suggested 
that structure and control may be important determinants of international strategic 
alliance success.
Several researchers have attempted to measure the success of international 
strategic alliances. However the diversity of definitions and measurement criteria 
used have created some confusion. The chapter analyzed the literature on the
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measurement of strategic alliance success in order to determine the most 
appropriate measure to use in this study. Relationships between various 
performance criteria and strategic alliance success were also investigated.
While the literature has addressed the importance of the behavioural and 
organizational characteristics on the success of international strategic alliances, 
there are very clear gaps in our understanding of these characteristics in relation to 
international alliance success especially in the case of UK international alliances. 
By addressing the propositions, the current study will make a valuable 
contribution to the growing body of literature on international strategic alliances. 
The literature review also revealed that there is little agreement among researchers 
as to the operationalization of both the behavioural and organizational measures 
and the success measures. Clearly more empirical evidence is needed to develop a 
better understanding of what characteristics determine success and the meaning of 
success. The current study will attempt to further this understanding through the 
use of improved operational definitions and measures.
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CHAPTER THREE
DATABASE
DEVELOPMENT ON UK 
INTERNATIONAL 
STRATEGIC ALLIANCES
3.1 INTRODUCTION
This chapter presents the level of international strategic alliance activity being undertaken 
by UK firmswithin Europe, the USA and Japan for the period 1988 to 1995. The chapter 
will review the level of activity with that observed by previous researchers (e.g. Hergert 
and Morris, 1988 and Glaister and Buckley, 1994; 1998) as well as discussing the 
database constructed by the present researcher. It will show that, although the number of 
international strategic alliances entered into by UK firms has increased significantly since 
the 1970s, there are signs that the peak may have been reached. First, the research design 
of the database will be presented. Second an analysis of the patterns of activity of UK 
international strategic alliances will be presented.
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3.2 RESEARCH DESIGN
3.2.1 Database Construction
International strategic alliances have become an important phenomenon in international 
business and are perceived as increasing in number and strategic importance (Hergert and 
Morris 1988; Harrigan 1988; Anderson 1990). However despite the increased interest in 
strategic alliances there is a lack of systematic data available from official sources on the 
incidence of UK international strategic alliances (Hergert and Morris 1988; Glaister and 
Buckley 1994; 1998). To address this need a database was constructed to determine the 
overall pattern, trend and characteristics of UK international strategic alliances and to 
identify the companies for the later stage of this research.
Glaister and Buckley (1994) were the first researchers to develop a comprehensive 
database of the international joint venture activities of British firms. Their database was 
compiled over the period 1980 to 1989. More recently Glaister et al (1998) have 
extended the time frame of their previous research. However, their approach is different 
to their initial study which means that a direct comparison of alliance activity over time 
was not possible. By using only the Financial Times Mergers and Acquisitions File 
(FTM&A) for the period 1990 to 1996 their more recent study does not cover all likely 
incidents of international joint ventures or strategic alliances formed between British 
companies and their triad partners. The FTM&A is an on-line database providing 
information on international bid activity, mainly mergers and acquisitions, share swaps, 
buyouts and buy-ins, including some information on joint ventures. It is important to
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note that the FTM&A will have a bias towards mergers and acquisitions and the full data 
available on the total number of strategic alliances formed will not have been included for 
that period. The authors themselves acknowledge ‘the FTM&A file is biased towards 
equity joint ventures because the establishment of a new firm by international partner 
companies is frequently considered to be more newsworthy than contractual agreements 
to co-operate’ (Glaister et al 1998: 171). The use of such a restricted database has 
resulted in significantly smaller numbers of international joint ventures and strategic 
alliance’s which goes against Glaister and Buckley’s (1994) own observation that there is 
an increasing trend in the formation of international joint ventures. This increasing trend 
has also been observed by other researchers (e.g. Gomes-Casseres 1996). The sudden 
drop in international joint venture activity observed by Glaister et al (1998) seems, in 
reality, to be unlikely and, therefore, misleading. Furthermore, Glaister and Buckley
(1998) consider partners from Canada as well as the USA, grouped together as North 
America. Therefore their 1998 study is not considered to be an update of their earlier 
work into UK international alliance activity for the period 1990 to 1996.
The database for this study comprises international strategic alliances formed between 
1988 to 1995, as reported in the financial press, and builds on Glaister and Buckley’s 
(1994) analysis of UK international joint venture formation over the 1980s. Glaister and 
Buckley’s (1994) concept of an international joint venture includes both equity and non­
equity joint ventures, excluding cooperative agreements such as franchising, licensing. 
However they do not state whether mergers and acquisitions are included or excluded in 
the context of their study. In the context of the current study the term international
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strategic alliance is used to include both equity and non-equity joint ventures (see section
2.2.1 for a discussion on defining an international strategic alliance) and excludes 
licensing agreements, franchising and mergers and acquisitions.
The first part of this research was, therefore, to collect information on equity and non­
equity partnership formations across a range of industries between UK firms and their 
partners in Western Europe, USA and Japan. There is a well established precedent for 
researchers to compile their own database in this way (e.g. Hergert and Morris 1988; 
Osborn and Baughn 1987; Ghemawat et al 1986; Glaister and Buckley 1994; 1998). The 
period between 1979 and 1989 saw a wave of extensive research because there was an 
explosive growth in the formation of international strategic alliances by multinational 
firms (Hergert and Morris 1988; Gomes-Casseres 1989). For the purposes of this study 
data was collected from the Financial Times and the Economist publications in full text 
on the CD Rom Network at the Central Campus Library of the University of Warwick. 
The time period 1988-1995 was selected for a number of reasons: Firstly data on the CD 
Rom Network was only available from 1988 onwards, which would have required to go 
through the Financial Times newspapers individually. Secondly Glaister and Buckley 
(1994) would not give access to their database. This meant that it was only feasible to 
gather data on UK international alliances after 1988. Thirdly it was felt that because of 
the nature of the data required alliances formed prior to 1988 would have been too old to 
consider, with many possibly not even in existence. Lastly 1995 was used because any 
alliances after that period would be too new and performance data would be difficult to 
ascertain. A strategic alliance was recorded, if it was announced as a joint venture,
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alliance, cooperative agreement, collaborative agreement, consortia and other interfirm 
cooperations (e.g. marketing arrangement, manufacturing arrangement, shared 
distribution service). Information was collected on the date the alliance was cited in the 
press, the name of the UK firm, the name of the international alliance partner, the country 
of origin of the partner, the form the alliance took (e.g. joint venture, equity participation, 
joint agreement or consortium), the industry sector in which the alliance was formed and 
the motive of the alliance. This research is, therefore similar in design to previous work 
in this area (Hergert and Morris 1988; Glaister and Buckley 1994 ).
3.2.2 Limitations of Research Design
The Economist and Financial Times were used as the sources of data collection as they 
are considered to be reputable, international publications (Hergert and Morris 1988). The 
methodology assumes that the information obtained from these sources is representative 
of the international British alliances formed for the period 1988 to 1995. However, as 
other researchers have acknowledged, there is likely to be a bias in the data as only well 
known firms and alliance activities are likely to be reported in the press. Furthermore, as 
the published information is likely to be based on press releases issued by the firms there 
is potential for bias in the motives for forming the alliance (Hergert and Morris 1988; 
Glaister and Buckley 1994). However, given the lack of official sources of international 
strategic alliance activity, the approach adopted is considered to be feasible (Glaister and 
Buckley 1994). Furthermore, given that the research is concentrating on the alliance 
activity of British companies and that both the Economist and Financial Times are
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established British publications there is a greater chance that a high proportion of the 
international partnerships formed by UK companies have been included.
3.2.3 Empirical Analysis of International Strategic Alliance Activity
The dataset of international strategic alliances was entered into the Access database 
software. The data were then analysed using descriptive statistics and the chi-square test 
of independence using the SPSS-PC statistical package. The descriptive analysis 
identified the patterns observed in the formation of UK international strategic alliances. 
The chi-test of independence is designed to test the association between two variables for 
significance. The chi-square tests were conducted to examine the association between 
the observed patterns of UK international strategic alliances. The results of the database 
are presented according to the type of alliance, the industry sector, the regional 
distribution, and the purpose of the alliance as recorded in the financial press.
3.3 PATTERNS OF INTERNATIONAL STRATEGIC ALLIANCE
ACTIVITY
3.3.1 Trends in UK International Strategic Alliances
A total of 778 international strategic alliances between UK and European, US and 
Japanese firms across 17 industries were identified. As Figure 3.1 shows the level of 
alliance activity has remained relatively stable over the period under study. This suggests 
that the level of alliance activity has reached its peak and that the big increases in 
international partnerships observed in the 1970s and 1980s (e.g. Hergert and Morris,
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1988; Glaister and Buckley, 1994) have settled down. However, when the level of 
activity across the three regions is compared it can be seen that the number of alliances 
formed between British firms and their European partners peaked in 1989. This may be 
around the time when many British companies were actively preparing for the 
introduction of the Single European Market in 1992. Interestingly the number of 
alliances with US firms has also seen a steady increase since 1989. This may also be 
attributed to the imminent introduction of the Single European Market as many 
Americans feared that 1992 would create a kind of ’fortress Europe’ with strong 
protectionist measures to keep out foreign competitors (Gogel and Larreche 1989). 
Alliances with Japanese firms appear to fluctuate, but the overall numbers remain 
relatively stable.
From the total of 778 international strategic alliances reported during the 1988-1995 
period, 51% of all alliances took place between British and other European firms (see 
Table 3.1).
Table 3.1: International Strategic Alliance Formation: 1988-1995
Region 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 Total
No %
Western
Europe
50 84 46 61 53 31 25 48 398 51.2
USA 28 13 21 21 31 40 46 42 242 31.1
Japan 16 14 23 19 9 5 16 11 113 14.5
Other* 4 7 1 3 2 3 2 3 25 3.2
Total 98 118 91 104 95 79 89 104 778 100.0
‘Other: Alliances formed with partner’s from more than one region i.e. consortia
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This compared with just over 30% of alliances being formed with American partners and 
less than 15% of all alliances with Japanese organisations. The remaining 3.2% were 
consortia formed between the Triad partners from more than one country. The lower 
levels of partnerships with Japanese firms may be a reflection of the difficulty faced by 
foreign firms in establishing a stronghold in the Japanese market. Perhaps not 
surprisingly France and Germany represent the main European partners for British firms 
entering into strategic alliances. Of those formed with European partners 26% were with 
French firms and nearly 20% with German organisations. This is probably a reflection of 
the fact that France and Germany are the two largest markets in Europe and also ones in 
which customers appear to display high levels of loyalty to domestic firms (Turnbull and 
Cunningham, 1981).
It is also interesting to compare the general level of alliance activity in the 1990s with 
that observed by Hergert and Morris (1988) and Glaister and Buckley (1994) in the 1970s 
and 1980s. From 1979-1985 Hergert and Morris (1988) observed approximately 148 
agreements between UK firms and their European, Japanese and American partners. Put 
simply this suggests that, on average, 25 alliance were formed a year. Glaister and 
Buckley (1994), meanwhile, recorded a total of 520 joint ventures over a ten year period 
from 1980 to 1989 which represents an average of 52 partnerships a year. This study 
shows that the number of international strategic alliances entered into by British 
companies has increased by almost 300% compared with Hergert and Morris (1988) and 
nearly 90% compared with Glaister and Buckley (1994) with 778 alliances formed 
between 1988 and 1995 - an average of 97 a year. Although there is clear evidence that 
the number of international partnerships being formed is still increasing there are signs 
that there is a slow down in activity.
Chapter Three: Database Development on UK International Strategic Alliances 107
There is a clear pattern of growth and decline in alliance formation across the three 
regions over the period (see Table 3.2). For Western Europe and Japan the incidence of 
alliance formation was higher during the first four years compared with the last four 
years. In the case of the USA, more alliances were formed in the latter part of the period. 
This is in agreement with Glaister and Buckley (1994) who observed a downward trend 
with the number of joint ventures being formed with firms from the USA in the latter part 
of the 1980s. To show that the incidence of international strategic alliances has changed 
over the period 1988 to 1995, the number of alliances reported in the first four years was 
compared with the number reported in the last four years in terms of the region of the 
partner. The chi-square test of independence was used to determine whether significant 
differences existed. The chi-square analysis revealed that the formation of alliances 
across the three regions has changed over the period studied ( X =90.1, p = 0.000 ). Table 
3.2. presents the results for the time period of the strategic alliance (first or last four 
years) and the region of the partner firm. The percentage of alliances was higher for the 
first four years than for the last four years. This was possibly due to the highest number 
of strategic alliances being formed in 1989 and 1991. As previously stated, many UK 
firms were preparing for the Single European market in 1992. The competitive pressures 
accompanying the Single European Market may have created a competitive climate for 
many UK firms to form international strategic alliances. The decrease of alliances in the 
second half may be explained by the completion of the European Single Market. Kay 
(1989) asserted that many European firms began to shift their attention towards mergers 
and acquisitions away from alliances at this time. However in the case of the USA, the 
trend towards strategic alliances increased in the second half (last four years) as stated 
previously.
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Table 3.2. Classification for Total Number of International Strategic Alliances
Formed
Time Period USA Japan Europe Other Total
First Four Years 83 72 241 15 411
10.7% 9.3% 31.0% 1.9% 52.8%
Last Four Years 159 41 157 10 367
20.4% 5.3% 20.2% 1.3% 47.2%
Chi-Square = 90.1; d.f. =21; p = 0.000
3.3.2 Types of International Strategic Alliances
In keeping with the findings of other researchers the majority of alliances in this database 
are formed between two partners with only just fewer than 10 % of agreements recorded 
being between three or more partners. Taking the type of alliance formed into 
consideration Table 3.3 shows that over half of all international partnerships between 
British and foreign firms are joint ventures with just over 22% entering into joint 
agreements and under 16% opting for equity participation.
Table 3.3. Types of International Strategic Alliances Formed: 1988-1995
Alliance Form Frequency % Total
Contractual Agreement 175 22.5
Joint venture 406 52.2
Equity Participation 122 15.7
Consortium 75 9.6
Taking the different regions into account Table 3.4 shows that joint ventures are the most 
common form of international strategic alliance in all three areas being studied. The 
overall preference for some sort of equity stake would appear to support the trend 
observed by Glaister and Buckley (1994). However, over two thirds of all international
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alliances formed by British firms between 1988 and 1995 involve some kind of equity 
stake which is a marked increase on the figure of 55.9% of equity joint ventures recorded 
by Glaister and Buckley (1994). Interestingly more British firms enter into contractual 
agreements with US and Japanese companies than with European partners. This may be 
because such agreements offer lower risk options. The purpose for forming the alliance 
may also play a role that is addressed later in the chapter.
Table 3.4 : Type of International Strategic Alliance formed by Region 1988 -1995
Region Contractual
Agreement
Joint Venture Equity
Participation
Consortium
Western Europe 19.3% 53.0% 21.9% 5.8%
USA 28.5% 56.2% 11.2% 4.1%
Japan 27.4% 59.3% 10.6% 2.7%
Note: This table excludes consortia form ed by British firm s with partners from  more than  one region
To test the view that more equity type strategic alliances compared to non equity 
alliances are formed in all of the three regions, a chi-square test of independence was 
conducted. The results in Table 3.5 indicated that all three regions preferred equity joint 
ventures to non equity ventures (X = 229.5; P= 0.000). The significant difference 
indicates that equity joint ventures are more likely to be formed than non equity joint 
ventures in the three regions. It appears, therefore that a higher proportion of equity joint 
ventures are formed in all three regions.
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Table 3.5. Classification for Types of International Strategic Alliances
Country Equity Type Non Equity 
Type
Other Total
USA 163 (21.0% 69 (8.9%) 10(1.3%) 242 (31.1%)
Japan 79(10.2%) 31 (4.0%) 3 (0.4%) 113 (14.5%)
Western Europe 284 (36.5%) 75 (9.6%) 39 (5.0%) 398 (51.2%)
Total 528 (67.9%) 175 (22.5%) 75 (9.6%) 753(100.0%)
Note: This table does not include consortia formed by British firms with partners from  more than one region 
(Chi-Square = 229.5; d.f. = 9; P = 0.000)
The type of alliance by industry groupings is shown in Table 3.6. In Table 3.6 the joint 
venture category includes both joint venture and equity participation. There appears to be 
a greater preference for joint ventures in all of the industry groups. This may be the case 
because a higher number of joint ventures were recorded than contractual agreements. A 
chi-square test of independence was conducted. The test was conducted using the broad 
industry groupings of Group 1 manufacturing, Group 2 manufacturing and Tertiary 
because thirteen of the cells in Table 3.6 contained less than five observations. These 
classifications are based on Glaister and Buckley’s (1994) definitions of their industry 
groupings. They classified group 1 as including industries such as food and drink, metals 
and minerals, energy, construction and chemicals. Group 2 was classified as including 
pharmaceuticals, computers, telecommunications, electrical, automobiles, aerospace and 
other manufacturing. Group 2 was distinguished from group 1 in terms of more 
sophisticated technology being manifested in the products and processes of group 2 
manufacturing. The tertiary group consisted of transport, distribution, financial services 
and other services.
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Table 3.6: Type of International Strategic Alliance by Industry Groups
Industry Joint
Venture
Contractual
Agreement
Consortium Total
No
No % No % No %
Aerospace 21 51.2 8 19.5 12 29.3 41
Automotive 33 84.6 6 15.4 0 0 39
Business and 
Information Services
12 44.4 13 48.1 2 7.4 27
Chemical 31 75.6 4 9.8 6 14.6 41
Engineering 47 79.7 10 16.9 2 3.4 59
Financial Services 73 65.2 30 26.8 9 8.0 112
Food and Drink 37 75.5 11 22.4 1 2.0 49
Heavy Industry 35 79.5 2 4.5 7 15.9 44
Leisure and 
Entertainment
31 75.6 4 9.8 6 14.6 41
Pharmaceutical 27 50.9 25 47.2 1 1.9 53
Property and 
Construction
44 63.8 18 26.1 7 10.1 69
Retailing 18 78.3 3 13.0 2 8.7 23
Computing 34 63.0 16 29.6 4 7.4 54
Telecommunication 26 55.3 9 19.1 12 25.5 47
Transport 10 45.5 8 36.4 4 18.2 22
Utilities 17 94.4 1 5.6 0 0 18
Other 32 82.1 7 17.9 0 0 39
Total 528 175 75 778
The test revealed no association between the industry and type of the alliance, X = 7.66; 
P=0.10 (see Table 3.7). No one industry was significantly more likely to enter into 
equity joint ventures than contractual agreements. The number of consortia were also 
equally formed in all three industry groupings.
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Table 3.7 Preference for Equity Joint Ventures in Industry Groupings
Industry Grouping Equity Joint 
Ventures
Contractual
Agreements
Consortia Total
Group 1 163 36 21 220
Manufacturing 74.1% 16.4% 9 .5 % 28.3%
Group 2 188 75 31 294
Manufacturing 63.9% 2 5 .5% 1 0 .5%
Tertiary 177 64 23 264
67.0% 24 .2% 8 .7 %
Total 528 175 75 778
67 .9% 22 .5% 9 .6 % 100.0%
(Chi-Square = 7.66; d.f. = 4; P  = 0.10)
The type of alliance by purpose is shown in Table 3.8. Equity joint ventures dominate in 
marketing and non-marketing related alliances as well as in service provision. This 
suggests that there may be a preference for equity joint ventures over contractual 
agreements for UK firms when forming international strategic alliances regardless of the 
purpose. The chi-test of independence found a significant association between the type of 
alliance chosen with the purpose of the alliance ( X  = 15.40; P= 0.02). The test indicated 
that there is a greater preference for equity joint ventures compared to contractual 
agreements in marketing and non-marketing related alliances as well as in the service 
provision.
Table 3.8: Type of International Strategic Alliance by Purpose
Purpose 50:50 Joint 
Venture
Contractual
Agreement
Consortium Total
Marketing related 292 110 34 436
Non-marketing related 119 31 27 177
Service provision 99 32 10 141
Other 18 2 4 24
Total 528 175 75 778
(Chi-Square = 15-40; d.f. = 6; P = 0.02)
Joint venture category also Includes equity participation ventures
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3.3.3 International Strategic Alliance Activity by Industry Sector
Seventeen different industries were represented in the database. The total number of 
alliances that represent these seventeen industries observed by Glaister and Buckley 
(1994) are 441. However their total number of alliances observed across all industries in 
their database constituted 520. Thus 79 of their observations are not represented in this 
database because some of their industry classifications were different to ones used in this 
study. As Table 3.9 shows the largest number of alliance in any one industry were 
recorded in the financial services sector (14.4%). This is an industry sector which did not 
feature in Hergert and Morris’s (1988) research, but which also represented the highest 
number of joint ventures in Glaister and Buckley’s (1994) database. This observation is 
perhaps not too surprising given Britain’s strength in financial services with London 
being one of the major financial centers in the world. A further reason for this high 
number of alliances in this sector could be the deregulation in financial services, largely 
as a result of the Single European Market, which has encouraged cross-border 
collaboration. This factor may explain why Glaister and Buckley (1994) and this database 
recorded higher numbers of international alliances in financial services at the end of the 
1980s and the start of the 1990s than at any other time.
As Table 3.9 shows, after the financial services sector, the level of international strategic 
alliance activity in other industries is much lower with no other sector recording above 
10% of the total number of partnerships formed. Industries, which in previous studies, 
were key participants in international partnerships are now less active. Motor vehicles, 
for example, which accounted for nearly a quarter of Hergert and Morris’s (1988) 
alliances only represented 5% of British firms’ alliance activity between 1988 and 1995.
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This may be because the number of vehicle manufacturers in the UK is now very small. It 
should be noted that the number of alliances observed in the automotive sector in the 
current study are generally accounted for by component manufacturers. Aerospace is 
another industry in which the number of alliances has decreased, perhaps as governments 
look to divert funds away from their defense budgets. It is also an industry characterized 
by consortia, therefore the number of actual alliances is smaller - i.e. it would be bigger if 
all the bilateral partnerships were counted.
By comparison increases in international alliance activity have been recorded in the 
pharmaceutical, food and drinks, property and construction and transport sectors. For 
British companies the pharmaceutical industry is the third most likely sector in which 
international strategic alliances are found. This is probably because of the high costs and 
risks associated with developing and testing new drugs - one of the classic reasons for 
entering an alliance in the first place (Contractor and Lorange 1988; Hennart 1988).
Furthermore, between 1988 and 1995, new industries previously, not recorded as separate 
sectors by Glaister and Buckley (1994) include utilities and retailing. One explanation for 
the increased level of international alliances activity in utilities is the fact that there has 
been a high level of privatization in this sector which allows such organisations to enter 
into international partnerships previously not permitted under state ownership. Retailers 
appear to also be engaging in more partnership activities as well-known British 
supermarkets seek to expand overseas (Table 3.9). A higher number of alliances have 
also been recorded the construction and property services in this database compared to 
Glaister and Buckley (1994). However Glaister and Buckley (1994) does not indicate 
whether property was included in their classification.
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For the majority of the industries a clear pattern of growth and decline in international 
strategic alliance formation over the period 1988-1995 exists. In five of the cases 
alliances are higher for the first four years compared to the last four years: Business and 
information services, leisure and entertainment; pharmaceutical, retailing and transport. 
However in five other cases the number of alliances is lower for the first four years 
compared to the last four years: Engineering, financial services, food and drink, property 
and construction, and utilities. The chi-square test of independence (see Table 3.10) has 
indicated that the incidence of alliances across the various industry groupings is different 
for the first four years (1988-1991) compared to the last four years (1992-1995) X = 9.03; 
P= 0.01. A higher number of alliances for group 1 manufacturing were formed in the 
first four years (61.4%) compared to the last four years (38.6%). For group 2 
manufacturing the number of alliances formed was greater for the last four years (51.0%) 
than the first four years (49%). For this test, the industries were reclassified in to three 
broad groups:
Group 1 Manufacturing'.
Aerospace; automotive; engineering; pharmaceutical; computing; telecommunications. 
Group 2 Manufacturing:
Chemical; food and drink; heavy industry; property and construction; utility.
Tertiary:
Business and information services; financial services; leisure and entertainment; retailing; 
transport; other.
These classifications are based on Glaister and Buckley’s (1994; 1998) definitions of the 
industry groupings (see section 3.3.2. for an explanation). Strategic alliance formation by 
these broad industry groupings are shown in Table 3.10. Clearly care has to be taken in 
comparing databases as different researchers use a variety of industry categories and may
Chapter Three: Database Development on UK International Strategic Alliances 117
classify individual alliances into different industries. The trends are, nevertheless, 
interesting.
Table 3.10: International Strategic Alliance - Broad Industry Grouping by Time
Period
Broad Industry 
Grouping
Time Period 
1988-1991
No %
Time Period 
1992-1995
No %
Total
Group 1 
Manufacturing
135 61.4 85 38.6 220
Group 2 
Manufacturing
144 49.0 150 51.0 294
Tertiary 132 50.0 132 50.0 264
Total 411 52.8 367 47.2 778
(Chi-Square = 9.03; d.f. = 2 ; P  = 0.01)
There are also some interesting differences in terms of the countries with which different 
industry sectors prefer to develop alliances (see Table 3.11). Given the level of activity 
in the financial services sector it is not surprising that this industry accounts for the 
highest number of alliances between British and European and Japanese firms.
More alliances, however, with US partners were formed in the pharmaceuticals industry, 
which is probably a reflection of the US strength in this sector. Two other factors may 
contribute to this phenomenon which is the size of both the European and American 
markets and the cost of the research and development of new drugs. In order to ensure 
commercial success pharmaceutical companies need to ensure that they can obtain the 
maximum sales levels possible. Furthermore, there is a recognition that in order to be 
successful new drugs need to obtain the necessary regulatory approval in the USA.
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Table 3.11. International Strategic Alliance Formation by Industry and Country
1988- 1995
Industry
Western
Europe
USA Japan Other Total
No % No % No % No %
Aerospace 28 7.0 10 4.1 l 0.9 2 8.0 41
Automotive 18 4.5 6 2.5 15 13.3 0 0 39
Business and 
Information Services
9 2.3 15 6.2 2 1.8 1 4.0 27
Chemical 28 7.0 5 2.1 5 4.4 3 7.3 41
Engineering 38 9.5 11 4.5 9 8.0 1 4.0 59
Financial Services 65 16.3 26 10.7 21 18.6 0 0 112
Food and D rink 31 7.8 14 5.8 3 2.7 1 4.0 49
Heavy Industry 20 5.0 22 9.1 1 0.9 1 4.0 44
Leisure and 
Entertainm ent
8 2.0 25 10.3 6 5.3 2 8.0 41
Pharmaceutical 13 3.3 31 12.8 8 7.1 1 4.0 53
Property and 
Construction
44 11.1 12 5.0 11 9.7 2 8.0 69
Retailing 9 2.3 6 2.5 8 7.1 0 0 23
Computing 23 5.8 19 7.9 10 8.8 2 8.9 54
T elecommunications 19 4.8 18 7.4 2 1.8 8 32.0 47
Transport 9 2.3 10 4.1 2 1.8 1 4.0 22
Utilities 12 3.0 6 2.5 0 0 0 0 18
Other 24 6.0 6 2.5 9 8.0 0 0 39
Total 242 31.1 113 14.5 398 51.2 25 3.2 778
Within Europe property and construction is the second most common industry in which 
international alliances are found. Most of these partnerships were formed in the late 
1980s and early 1990s perhaps in response to the opening up of Eastern Europe and the 
need for much new construction work especially in eastern Germany.
In alliances with Japanese firms the second most important industry was automotive. This 
probably follows the setting up of car plants in the UK by firms such as Nissan, Honda 
and Toyota as component manufacturers team up with each other to supply the new 
production facilities. It would appear from the above discussion, that there is a strong
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association between particular industry groups and the region of the partner. This 
observation was tested in terms of the broad industry groupings (see Table 3.12). The 
chi-square test of independence showed a difference (X = 20.88; P=0.002). Therefore, 
there is an association between the industry of the strategic alliance and the region of the 
partner firm (see Table 3.12).
Table 3.12. Association between broad Industry Groupings and the Region
Industry
Grouping
USA Japan Western
Europe
Other Total
Group 1 
Manufacturing
57 20 136 7 220
Group 2 
Manufacturing
95 46 139 14 294
Tertiary 90 47 123 4 264
Total 242 113 398 25 778
Chi-Square = 20.88; df = 6; P = 0.002
3.3.4 Purpose of the International Strategic Alliance
As Glaister and Buckley (1994) note it is very difficult to assess the actual motives for 
the formation of an alliance. Therefore, details were recorded, where possible, on the 
purpose of the alliance as stated in the press. Of the 754 alliances where a purpose could 
be determined from the press cutting 28.5% of alliances were formed specifically for 
marketing purposes (see Table 3.13). This compares with 13.7% observed by Glaister 
and Buckley (1994). However, if all of the reasons with marketing or market 
development objectives are examined it can be seen that 57.8% of all international 
strategic alliances formed by British firms between 1988 and 1995 were for marketing- 
related purposes (see Table 3.14). This suggests that in the late 1980s and early 1990s co-
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operation in marketing and market development are more important then R & D or 
manufacturing collaboration. Less than 10% of the international strategic alliances 
formed between 1988 and 1995 were for R & D purposes. This is a very different picture 
to that obtained from Hergert and Morris’s (1988) database in which only 15.8% of 
alliances were formed for marketing purposes.
Table 3.13 : International Strategic Alliance Formation by Purpose 1988 -1995
Purpose Number of Alliances % of Alliances
R and D 71 9.4
Development and 
Production
48 6.4
Production 58 7.7
Development and 
Marketing
18 2.4
Production and Marketing 17 2.2
Marketing 215 28.5%
Market Development 186 24.7
Service Provision 141 18.7
There are, however, many explanations as to why fewer British Firms are entering R&D 
or manufacturing agreements. Given that it is well-known that as many as 70% of all 
strategic alliances end in failure (Bleeke and Emst, 1991; Harrigan, 1989) and that, in the 
past, the majority of alliances have been formed for manufacturing of R & D purposes 
British managers may be more wary of such an approach, preferring instead to design and 
develop their own products and services and then enter alliances in order to get access to 
overseas markets. Alternatively the overseas firms may be taking the same approach with 
their British partners signing agreements for British companies to represent them in the 
British or perhaps even the European market. A further reason for the decline in R &D 
and manufacturing type alliances may be the industries represented and the fact that more
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alliances are being formed in service sectors. This would suggest that the service sector 
is thus becoming more prominent. Almost as many alliances were recorded in the service 
provision sector for this database (141) as compared to Glaister and Buckley’s (1994) 
who recorded 142.
Table 3.14: General Purpose of International Strategic Alliances formed: 1988-1995
Purpose Number of Alliances % of Alliances
Non marketing-related 177 23.5
Marketing-related 436 57.8
Service Provision 141 18.7
Interestingly just under 20% of British firms enter alliances in order to improve the level 
of service provided overseas, again a reflection of the number of service industries now 
forming alliances. The category of 'service provision' was first identified by Glaister and 
Buckley (1994) and accounted for just under 30% of the reasons for joint ventures in the 
1980s. The percentage appears to have fallen, but could be due to different reporting 
mechanism and greater use of the term market development. Table 3.15 also shows the 
incidence of strategic alliances by purpose to be similar over the period 1988-1995.
Table 3.15: International Strategic Alliance Formation - Broad Purpose Grouping
by Time Period.
Purpose
Time Period 
1988-1991
Time Period 
1992-1995 Total
Marketing related 233 203 436
Non marketing-related 93 84 177
Service Provision 76 65 141
Other 9 15 24
Total 411 367 778
Chi Square = 2^40; df = 3; P = 0.49
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The chi-square test of independence found no significant difference (X = 2.40; P=0.49) 
between the broad purpose of the alliance and the time period of alliance formation. 
There was no association between the purpose of the strategic alliance and the time 
period of the formation (i.e. first or last four years of the period studied ) and therefore 
there are no changes in the motives of UK firms for forming international alliances over 
the period under study.
Comparing the purpose of the international strategic alliance with the geographic region 
with which it has been formed it can be seen (see Table 3.16) that over two thirds of 
alliances between Britain and the USA are for marketing-related purposes. This may well 
explain why so many contractual agreements exist between British and American 
companies as it is probably less likely that marketing agreements will result in some form 
of equity stake. This is again quite a different picture to that provided by Glaister and 
Buckley (1994) who observed that less than 30% of international joint ventures between 
British and American firms were for marketing purposes.
Table 3.16: International Strategic Alliance Formation by Purpose and Region
Broad Purpose Western Europe USA Japan Other Total
Marketing Related 208 47.7 153 35.1 61 14.0 14 3.2 436
Non-marketing related 94 53.1 51 28.8 24 13.6 8 4.5 177
Service provision 81 57.4 32 22.7 25 17.7 3 2.1 141
Other IS 62.5 6 25.0 3 12.5 0 0 24
Total 398 51.2 242 31.1 113 14.5 25 3.2 778
We can also consider the purpose of the alliance in terms of the industry groupings as 
shown in Table 3.17. It is shown that a high proportion of non-marketing related 
alliances are concentrated in group 2 manufacturing which includes the chemical, heavy
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industry, property and construction, food and drink and utilities. In some of these 
industries strategic alliances are formed to perform R&D and production related 
activities. The marketing related alliances exist in all the industry groupings which 
supports the fact that marketing is a very important activity for the British firms. The 
service provision alliances, are concentrated in the Tertiary sector, as would be expected. 
The chi-square shows an association between the purpose of the alliance and the industry 
sector in which it is formed (X = 107.86; P=0.000).
Table 3.17. International Strategic Alliance Formation by Industry and Purpose
Broad
Industry
Groups
Marketing
related
Non­
marketing
related
Service
provision
Other Total
Group 1 
Manufacturing
110
(14.1%)
46
(5.9%)
54
(6.9%)
10
(1.3%)
220
(28.3%)
Group 2 
Manufacturing
152
(19.5%)
113
(14.5%)
19
(2.4%)
10
(1.3%)
294
(37.8%)
Tertiary 174
(22.4%)
18
(2.3%)
68
(8.7%)
4
(0.5%)
264
(33.9%)
Total 436
(56.0%)
177
(22.8%)
141
(18.1%)
24
(3.1%)
778
(100.0%)
Chi Square = 107.863; d f = 6; P = 0.000
3.4. Summary
This chapter has shown that the level of international strategic alliance activity being 
undertaken by UK firms in the late 1980s and early 1990s is continuing at a high level. 
Although the overall level of activity appears to have peaked compared with the big rises 
observed in the 1970s and 1980s (e.g. Hergert and Morris, 1998; Glaister and Buckley
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1994), the number of international partnerships being formed with US firms is increasing, 
whilst the number of alliances formed with European firms is on a more downward trend 
and the alliance activity with Japanese companies has remained relatively stable.
The type of alliances entered into appears to have changed with much greater emphasis 
on equity participation. Whilst the risks may be higher, it would appear that maintaining 
some level of equity control may be an important factor within international UK strategic 
alliances. The industries represented show a number of changes too. Although financial 
services are still the main firms entering into international strategic alliances, an overall 
decrease in activity has been seen in the aerospace and automotive industries. Meanwhile 
increased activity has been observed in the pharmaceutical sector as well as in food and 
drink, property and construction and transport. Furthermore, new industries such as 
retailing and utilities, are getting more involved in international strategic alliances.
The purpose for forming alliances has also seen a marked change over the data collected 
in the 1970s and 1980s (e.g. Hergert and Morris, 1988; Glaister and Buckley, 1994) as 
marketing-related reasons become more important factors in alliance formation with 
marketing and market development being the key purposes for British firms entering into 
international strategic alliances. The number of service-related organisations is also 
reflected in the high percentage of alliances being set up for service provision purposes.
The continuing high level of international strategic alliance activity by UK firms is a 
clear indication that managers realize that to compete effectively in an increasingly global 
business environment they need to pool resources and knowledge with overseas firms. 
However, whilst this chapter has provided a good overview of the level of activity and 
the reported reasons for engaging in cross-border partnerships it does not provide any 
indication as to the likely outcome of an international strategic alliance. It is widely
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reported within the literature that between 30% and 70% of all strategic alliances fail (e.g. 
Killing 1982; Beamish 1985; Kogut 1988; Harrigan 1985; Bleeke and Ernst 1991). 
Given that so many firms continue to enter into cross-border alliances it is important to 
gain a deeper understanding of what makes an international strategic alliance successful. 
The development of this database is, therefore, the first stage of this study to determine 
the characteristics of successful international strategic alliances between UK firms and 
their US, European and Japanese partners.
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CHAPTER FOUR
RESEARCH
METHODOLOGY
4.1 INTRODUCTION
This chapter sets out the methodology adopted in the course of this research and it 
specifically considers the approach used to select and contact UK firms with 
international strategic alliances. It considers the dimensions of the sample, the 
measurement of the constructs, the collection of the data and proposed method of 
analysis.
4.2 CHOICE OF METHODOLOGY
Research methodology is concerned with the analysis of how theories are designed, 
tested and analysed and so the choice of the appropriate philosophical perspective for 
the particular research question is important. There is a long-standing debate in the 
social sciences about the appropriate philosophical position from which methods 
should be derived. Two basic approaches are proposed: phenomenology and 
positivism (Easterby-Smith et al 1995; Cassell and Symon 1994; Evered and Louis
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1991). Positivism is a school of thought that maintains that the social world exists 
externally and that knowledge should be based on objective measures rather than 
subjective inference. Researchers following this approach, use quantitative methods. 
Quantitative research is concerned with establishing causal associations among 
objectively specified variables through testing hypothesis derived from predictive 
theories (Kerlinger 1973). Phenomenology contends that the world and reality are not 
objective and exterior but socially constructed and given meaning by people, and 
therefore dependent upon subjective interpretation (Evered and Louis 1991). 
Researchers following this approach tend to use the qualitative methods for data 
collection and data analysis (Easterby-Smith et al 1995; Cassell and Symon 1994). 
The qualitative methodology is appropriate when the research problem is explorative 
and intuitive and research is concerned with understanding social processes rather 
than social structures (Ghauri 1994). The technique is often defined by what it is not. 
The different research focus of the two approaches is also reflected in the 
methodologies used. Quantitative methods involve the precise measurement of 
variables and collection of data under standardised conditions. The reliability and 
consistency of the data collected, its analysis by sophisticated statistical means and its 
replicability are issues of crucial importance in quantitative studies (Bryman 1988). 
In qualitative research the data are collected through observation and interviews and 
case studies (Bryman 1988). Central features of this approach are the importance 
given to the careful selection of cases, drawing causal inferences, the subjective 
account, emphasis accuracy, and the subsequent search for inconsistencies in the data 
collected (Easterby-Smith et al 1995; Cassell and Symon 1994). According to 
Easterby-Smith et al (1995) the nature of the social phenomena being explored, and
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the context of the research can determine the appropriate research design. This means 
that your research design will be determined by what you want your study to achieve. 
Researchers in the area of strategic alliances have employed a range of research 
approaches, from case studies (Yoshino and Rangan 1995; Cullen et al 1994), surveys 
(Bucklin and Sengupta 1993; Mohr and Spekman 1994; Yan and Gray 1994) and 
historical analysis (Gomes-Casseres 1989; Hennart 1991) to game theory and 
simulations (Parkhe 1993; Shamdasani and Sheth 1994). However there has been a 
lack of systematic research on international strategic alliances (Terpstra and Simonin 
1993). Researchers know little about the underlying causes of successful alliances 
(Mohr and Spekman 1994). Drawing upon the tradition of positivism, this study used 
quantitative research methods to investigate the basic patterns and relationships of the 
phenomena of international strategic alliances. The aim was to examine the impact of 
behavioural and organisational characteristics on alliance performance. The 
constructs were measured objectively using a questionnaire. The study required the 
collection of data across a number of organisations and industries, which made it 
possible to . generalise statistically significant findings to a wider population. 
Qualitative data would not have allowed such systematic comparisons to be made.
4.3. SAMPLE DESIGN
One of the most fundamental stages in research design is deciding on the number of 
participants to include. Sample selection refers to the question of whether the group 
of individuals or the situation that is being studied is typical of the population being 
studied (Cramer 1998). In the current study a sample size of 450 alliances was 
selected and was considered to be representative of the population (see section 4.3.2.).
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It is important to devise careful systematic sampling to try to ensure 
representativeness in survey research (Bryman 1988). For the purpose of this 
research, it was only possible to include alliances that had been reported in the press 
(see section 3.2.1. on database construction).
4.3.1 The Population and Sample
The population sample for the study was defined as international strategic alliances 
between British firms and their US, Japanese and European partners in the UK. A full 
range of industries was covered and the alliance included at least one overseas 
partner. Equity and non-equity partnerships were included. UK companies were 
selected because of ease of access to companies and budget and time constraints. In 
terms of the nationality of the partner firms, the triad region (USA, Japan, Western 
Europe) was selected for a number of reasons. The countries of the triad region have 
similar industrial structures, as well as different and competitive positions in the 
world marketplace (Terpstra and Simonin 1993; Ohmae 1986). The triad region is 
also regarded as an important market for alliances and a source of partners for 
international alliances. Tepstra and Simonin (1994) found that in terms of market 
coverage for the formation of international alliances, the American market ranked 
first, followed by Western Europe and Japan. Furthermore, collaboration between 
UK companies and firms from the triad region has increased since the late 1970’s 
(Hergert and Morris 1988; Glaister and Buckley 1994) and has attracted much 
attention (Terpstra and Simonin 1993). The size of the population was initially 
unknown, because the information concerning the number of strategic alliances 
between British companies and their international partners was not available from 
official sources. This information was to be obtained from listings of strategic
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alliances reported in the financial press. A total of 778 strategic alliances between 
British and European, Japanese firms and US were identified (see section 3.2.1). 
Within Western Europe the majority of the UK international strategic alliances had 
been formed with firms from Germany, France and Italy. As these represent the 
major European trading countries for UK firms and accounted for 61.6% of all 
European alliances, it was decided to limit the European population to these countries. 
This reduced the number of alliances to 613, which represents the population for this 
study. The next stage was to ascertain whether or not the selected 613 strategic 
alliances were still in operation. A comprehensive survey of business and telephone 
directories was carried out to locate each firm’s telephone number, head office and the 
names of either the company secretary or Managing Director. The following sources 
were used to set up a database of UK firms names, addresses, and telephone.
a) OneSource UK Companies. A business information database in the University of 
Warwick library
b) Key British Enterprises 1997. Published by Dun and Bradstreet International, 
London
c) Major UK Companies Handbook 1997. Published by Extel (part of Financial 
Times Information Ltd)
d) Kompass 1997. Published by Company Information.
Neither a contact name nor an address could be obtained for 57 of the strategic 
alliances. The remaining 556 alliances were contacted by telephone, of which 450 
alliances agreed to participate. Therefore the number of alliances that could be 
sampled was reduced to 450. A number of reasons were given by the 106 firms.
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which declined to participate in the study. Many firms claimed that the information 
requested was sensitive and their terms of agreement did not allow them too disclose 
such information. A small number of firms refused without giving a valid reason and 
added that they were simply not interested.
4.3.2 Sample Representativeness
This section will analyse the representativeness of the sample of 450 alliances which 
agreed to participate in the research, in terms of the date the alliance was formed, the 
industry sector of the UK firm, and the foreign partner country. The 450 alliances 
represent 73.4% of the total population of 613 strategic alliances.
In terms of the date of the alliance formed, the sample is validated by the examination 
of the number of alliances formed each year in terms of the total population. As can 
be seen from Table 4.1 the sample number of alliances is fairly representative of the 
population in terms of the number of alliances formed each year.
Table 4.1. Date of Alliance Formation of Sample International Strategic
Alliances
Date of 
alliance
Sample 
Number of 
Alliances
Percent Population 
Number of 
Alliances
Percent
1988 56 12.4% 79 12.9%
1989 61 13.6% 82 13.4%
1990 54 12.0% 75 12.2%
1991 48 10.7% 76 12.4%
1992 55 12.2% 73 11.9%
1993 50 11.1% 69 11.3%
1994 55 12.2% 76 12.4%
1995 71 15.8% 83 13.5%
Total 450 100.0% 613 100.0%
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As for representativeness in terms of the nationality of the partner, the sample was 
drawn from five countries (USA, Japan, France, Germany, and Italy). Table 4.2 gives 
a breakdown of alliance activity in terms of the foreign countries with which UK 
firms have formed alliances. The sample of countries used in the study appears to be 
representative of the population. In the case of consortia, the average size of the 
sample is lower than that of the total population. This may be because, of the total 
number of consortia, only 11 were willing to participate in the study. Furthermore, 
fewer agreed to participate because of the complex nature of consortia involving more 
than one overseas partner and often more than one country. Also some of the 
consortia had partners outside the Triad region and so were not willing to participate.
Table 4.2 Nationalities of Foreign Partner Firms of Sample International
Strategic Alliances
Foreign
Country
Sample 
Number of 
Alliances
Percent Population 
Number of 
Alliances
Percent
USA 184 40.8% 242 39.5%
Japan 88 19.6% 113 18.4%
France 82 18.2% 104 16.9%
Germany 52 11.6% 74 12.1%
Italy 33 7.3% 42 6.9%
Consortia 11 2.4% 38 6.2%
Total 450 100.0% 613 100.0%
As far as the industrial sectors of the alliances are concerned, the sample includes 17 
industries. Table 4.3 shows that the number of alliances across industry groupings in 
the sample is broadly representative. There appears to be a divergence between the 
sample and the total population in terms of the following industries: aerospace, 
telecommunication, pharmaceutical, engineering, and technology. The sample size of
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these five industry groups is lower than that of the total population. This was due to 
the fact that some individual companies in these industries had a number of alliances 
and were only willing to complete questionnaires for two or three of their 
relationships. For example one of the telecommunication companies had 
approximately 12 alliance partners, but agreed to only complete questionnaires for 
five of these partnerships. For three of the industries (leisure and entertainment, 
advertising and food and drink, the total population was included. Alliances within 
these industries appeared to have increased during the second half of the eighties 
(Culpan and Kostelac Jr 1993). These alliances may have agreed to participate 
because the alliances are relatively new.
Table 4.3 Industry Sector of UK Firms for Sample International Strategie
Alliances
Industry Sample of 
Alliances
Percent Population 
of Alliances
Percent
Financial Services 71 15.7% 85 13.9%
Pharmaceutical 27 6.0% 47 7.7%
Construction and Property 41 9.1% 47 7.7%
Food and Drink 34 7.6% 34 5.4%
Engineering 25 5.6% 48 7.8%
Technology 27 6.0% 49 8.0%
Heavy Industry 27 6.0% 33 5.4%
Aerospace 12 2.7% 33 5.4%
T eleco m mu n ica t ion 17 3.8% 36 5.9%
Automotive 29 6.4% 32 5.2%
Chemical 20 4.4% 27 4.4%
Leisure and Entertainment 37 8.2% 37 6.0%
Business and Information
Services
21 4.7% 25 4.1%
Transport 12 2.7% 15 2.4%
Utility 13 2.9% 15 2.4%
Retailing 20 4.4% 22 3.5%
Advertising 9 2.2% 9 1.5%
Other 8 1.5% 21 3.4%
Total 450 100.0% 613 100.0%
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4.4 DATA COLLECTION
Data can be collected in many different ways. There are three methods of data 
collection in quantitative research (Sekaran 1992). Interviewing, self-administered 
questionnaires that are personally administered, or sent through the post, and 
observation. The choice of data collection method depends on the facilities 
available to the researcher, the degree of accuracy required, the expertise of the 
researcher, the time span of the study, and other costs and resources associated with 
and available for data gathering (Sekaran 1992). Mail questionnaires are less 
expensive and less time consuming than interviewing (Sekaran 1992) and are a more 
efficient and accurate means of assessing information about the population (Zikmund 
1984). For the purposes of this research a mail questionnaire was used so that a wide 
geographical area could be covered.
The development of the database was the first stage of the research project, which was 
necessary to identify the number and nature of UK international strategic alliances 
(see chapter 3). The second stage required the collection of primary data through a 
mail questionnaire. Prior to the administration of the questionnaire, an initial enquiry 
with either the company secretary or senior personnel was made by telephone, to 
confirm names and addresses of the UK firms involved in strategic alliances. An 
attempt was also made to ascertain whether or not selected firms had been involved in 
the alliance. This was necessary because of the lack of reliable data on UK 
international strategic alliances available from published sources. This provided a 
means of correctly identifying strategic alliances.
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Questionnaires were mailed to 450 alliances, addressed to either a senior executive 
who was or had been involved in the alliance or to a named person provided by the 
initial inquiry. Each letter outlined the aims of the research and promised 
confidentiality and a copy of the findings of the study as an inducement to participate 
(see Appendix 1 for a copy of the letter). The questionnaires were mailed to the 
respondents, with self-addressed, stamped return envelopes. Three weeks after the 
mailing of the questionnaires telephone calls were made to all firms to whom 
questionnaires had been sent.
4.4.1 Response Rate
Improving mail survey response rates, and reducing response bias have been the focus 
of numerous research studies (Saxton 1997; Lee and Beamish 1995; Moorman et al 
1993). In conducting quantitative research, researchers are concerned with the overall 
response rate to a survey and the ability to apply the findings to a larger population. 
To utilise the results, the researcher must take account of non-response error by being 
sure of whether non-respondents hold significantly different attitudes and opinions 
from those held by the survey respondents (Zikmund 1984). There are a number of 
criteria which can be used to ensure higher response rates, including layout and 
presentation of questionnaire, inclusion of a covering letter, using the respondents 
name, stamped addressed envelope, a copy of the results (Tull and Hawkins 1990). 
However, the effect of these are generally small (McCrohan and Lowe 1986; 
Dommeyer et al 1985; Yu and Cooper 1985). According to Chebat and Picard 
(1984) an initial enquiry usually by telephone to inform the respondent that they will 
receive a questionnaire and requesting their cooperation can increase the response
rate.
Chapter Four: Research Methodology 136
From the 450 questionnaires mailed 287 responses (63.7%) were received. A total of 
114 completed questionnaires were received representing a usable response rate of 
25.3%. In the light of previous research, this can be said to be a good response rate 
(Mohr and Spekman 1994), and was likely to have been influenced by the initial 
enquiry by telephone to each firm to inform respondents that they would receive a 
questionnaire. Nonetheless, the response was lower than hoped for since all 
respondents who failed to reply had initially agreed to participate in the study. This 
may have been due to the lengthy nature of the questionnaire and time of year. The 
173 respondents who returned uncompleted questionnaires are analysed in Table 4.4.
Table 4.4: Analysis of International Strategic Alliances which declined
to Co-operate
Reason for Non-Response Number of Firms Percentage Total
Alliance terminated/acquired 83 48.0%
Contractual confidentiality 38 22.0%
Heavy work load 27 15.6%
Agreement not a strategic alliance 12 6.9%
Agreement did not materialise 13 7.5%
Total 173 100.0%
Apart from the 27 firms who did not complete the questionnaire due to a heavy 
workload, all 146 firms provided significant reasons for being unable to complete the 
questionnaires. Eighty-three of the firms, which declined to co-operate, declared the 
alliance had been terminated and that senior management who had been involved in 
the alliance were no longer with the company. Despite the assurances of 
confidentiality 38 firms declined to co-operate because the terms of the agreement 
did not allow them to disclose proprietary information regarding their relationship 
with their partner. Artisien (1985) also noted this finding in his research on joint
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ventures in Yugoslavia. It was interesting to note that 12 firms did not co-operate 
because they claimed that their agreement did not constitute a strategic alliance. This 
may be because varied interpretations of the term strategic alliance exist even within 
the academic literature. These firms were involved in joint ventures, but did not 
consider them to be strategic hence their unwillingness to participate in the study.
4.5 OPERATIONALIZATION OF VARIABLES
This section provides the operational definitions of the variables and their method of 
measurement. The process of operationalization or measurement involves assigning 
meaning to a construct by specifying the activities or operations necessary to measure 
it (Kerlinger 1973). Nunnally (1978) defines it as the assignment of numerals to a 
concept that has been adopted for a specific scientific purpose. The development of 
measures, which are reliable and valid, is a critical requirement for the evolvement of 
the strategic alliance field, where measurement of constructs is vastly 
underdeveloped. This deficiency has been noted in many studies. Geringer and 
Herbert (1988) for example, pointed out a lack of commonly accepted guidelines for 
measuring control in international joint ventures. Parkhe (1993), meanwhile, outlined 
the importance of clearly defining theoretical concepts and measuring them in reliable 
and valid ways. A number of other researchers have also noted that in many areas 
within strategic alliances there has been a lack of well defined constructs and 
measures (Ruekert and Churchill 1984; Aulakh et al 1996; Stem and Reve 1980). For 
the purposes of this research since an appropriate instrument was not available in the 
literature, a questionnaire was designed exclusively for this study. The survey
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instrument was developed according to the approach offered by Churchill (1979) who 
recommended a number of stages (see section 4.5.4).
In this study responses to all items were made on Likert-type-five-point scales for the 
measurement of constructs. A Likert scale requires that respondents indicate how 
strongly they agree or disagree with a series of statements which are associated with 
the attitude under investigation (Zikmund 1984; Tull and Hawkins 1990). The Likert 
scale was chosen because they are the most widely used measures of attitude and 
because they are simple to construct and easy to administer (Zikmund 1984; Tull and 
Hawkins 1990). They are thus the most useful in circumstances where there is no 
interviewer to explain how to use the measuring instrument, such as the mail 
questionnaire (Webb 1995). This was important in this study because the questions 
were quite detailed. For these reasons the scales were believed to be effective and 
appropriate instruments for the measurement of the study’s constructs. The variables 
in this study are classified as independent and dependent. Multiple item and single 
measure items were used to operationalise the independent and dependent variables.
4.5.1 Independent Variables
The independent variables ate grouped into two sets - behavioural characteristics and 
organisational characteristics. The behavioural characteristics include coordination, 
interdependence, commitment, trust, conflict, and communication behaviour. The 
organizational characteristics include the structural relationship and control issues 
(see Appendix 2 for questionnaire and Appendix 3 for construct development)).
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Coordination concerns how well the partners interact with each other in order to 
facilitate goal attainment (Salmond and Spekman 1986; Anderson and Narus 1987). 
Coordination was assessed though four measures (eleven items). Respondents were 
asked to respond to eleven items designed to capture the extent of coordination 
between the UK partner and its international partner.
Interdependence can be defined as the degree of dependency of each firm on its 
partner (Kumar et al 1995). Interdependency was measured on two dimensions - 
replaceability and dependency on resources using four measures (13 items), regarding 
the perceived dependency of the UK partner on its international partner (Heide 1994; 
Kumar et al 1995; Geyskens et al 1996).
Commitment has been defined as each firm’s identification with and involvement in 
the alliance relationship (Porter et al 1974). Commitment has been operationalized 
from Porter et al’s (1974) organizational commitment questionnaire (OCQ), to 
measure the extent to which each party identifies with the goals and objectives of the 
alliance, is willing to exert effort on behalf of the alliance, and intends to maintain the 
relationship. The OCQ has been used widely in research and has demonstrated good 
psychometric properties (Mowday et al 1979) and high reliability in over thirty-five 
studies in organizational behaviour (Randall 1990). The three dimensions were 
assessed using four multi-item scales (28 items), tapping the extent of commitment 
the UK partner perceives to have with its international partner.
Trust has been defined as the willingness to rely on an exchange partner, in whom 
one has confidence (Moorman et al 1992). Trust was measured using four measures
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The conflict measure concerns the level of conflict between the partner firms and was 
assessed in terms of the degree of conflict, the basis of conflict (Anderson and Narus 
1990; Kogut 1988) and how conflicts may be resolved (Mohr and Spekman 1994) 
among alliance partners. This construct was operationalized using four measures (14 
items).
Communication was measured in terms of information quality, information sharing 
and participation (Huber and Daft 1987; Mohr and Spekman 1994). Information 
quality refers to the timeliness, accuracy, adequacy and credibility of information 
exchanged (Daft and Lengel 1986; Huber and Daft 1987). Information sharing 
measures the extent of information exchange between the UK firm and its partner 
(Mohr and Spekman 1994). Participation measures the extent to which partners 
engage jointly in planning and goal setting (Mohr and Spekman 1994). All three 
dimensions were adapted from Mohr and Spekman (1994) using three multi-item 
scales (15 items).
A nine-item scale was used to measure the organizational structure of international 
strategic alliances. The measure concerned the assessment of formalization, 
centralization and complexity (Hall et al 1967; Frederickson 1986; Dalton et al 1980). 
Formalization and centralization and complexity were measured using three multi­
item scales (9 items) based on the work of John (1984), Ruekert and Walker (1987)
(15 items) adapted from the literature reviewed to assess the extent of perceived trust
between the partners from the perspective of the UK firm.
and Moorman et al (1993).
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Control refers to the process by which one entity influences the behaviour and output 
of another entity through the use of power, authority and a wide range of bureaucratic, 
cultural and informal mechanisms (Ouchi 1977; Geringer and Herbert 1989). In 
measuring control Geringer and Herbert’s (1989) characterization of control in terms 
of the scope, extent and mechanisms of control was adopted. The first dimension, the 
scope of control is assessed using a ten-item scale. The second dimension, the extent 
of control is measured with a single item. The mechanism of control was assessed 
using an eleven-item scale. These scales are adapted versions of the scales used by 
Killing (1982, 1983), Schaan (1983) and Beamish (1984).
4.5.2 Dependent Variable.
The dependent variable in this study is the success of the strategic alliance. As stated 
earlier (see section 2.4) international strategic alliance success is a problematic 
construct, both in terms of its definition and also in terms of measurement. Given the 
range of motives and objectives for which firms engage in international strategic 
alliances, it-would not be feasible to measure success in one way. Therefore, a 
multiple approach to the measurement of success in international strategic alliances 
was designed and five sets of questions were included in the questionnaire (see 
questions 38, 39, 40, 41 and 43 in Appendix 2 and Appendix 3 for construct 
development). Strategic alliance success was measured in terms of perceived 
“alliance performance” and “alliance satisfaction”.
Strategic alliance performance was measured with a multi-item scale derived from 
the ones proposed by Schaan (1983) and used by Geringer and Herbert (1991). The 
UK partner firm was asked to indicate the criteria used to evaluate performance along
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11 dimensions, and indicate how successful the alliance was in terms of those criteria. 
These dimensions included market share, sales growth, profitability, access to 
market, cost control, competitive position, technology development, product design, 
marketing , distribution and return on investment.
Four measures were used to measure Alliance satisfaction. The first measure asked 
UK firms to evaluate their satisfaction with the alliance along eight dimensions. 
These included coordination of activities, level o f interaction between managers, 
compatibility o f activities, participation in decision-making by partner, level of 
commitment shown by your partner, your partner's sharing of information with your 
firm, your partner's assistance in managing alliance activities and level o f honesty 
shown to your firm. This measure of satisfaction was developed for the study based 
on the review of the literature (Anderson and Narus 1990; Bucklin and Sengupta 
1993; Cullen et al 1994; Geringer and Herbert 1986). The second measure was a 
single measure of the UK firm’s satisfaction with the overall performance of alliance. 
Killing (1983), Schaan (1983) and Beamish (1985) have previously used this 
measure. A third measure of alliance satisfaction measured the UK firm’s satisfaction 
with meeting alliance objectives along five dimensions (profits, market share, sales 
growth, market development and product development). This was adapted from 
Ruekert and Churchill (1984). Lastly, partner satisfaction from the perspective of the 
UK firm was considered using a single measure (Bucklin and Sengupta 1993).
4.53  Other Variables
In addition to the above variables, a number of general questions were considered (see 
questionnaire in Appendix 2). Questions concerning the date o f alliance formation,
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industry sector, type of alliance, function of alliance, motives for engaging in the 
alliance were asked in order to obtain as a complete picture as possible of the 
international strategic alliances formed by UK firms in the period 1988-1995. These 
questions also helped to verify the database information collected from published 
sources (see Chapter three).
There were also some general questions concerning the frequency and mechanism of 
contacts between alliance managers, and the future of the alliance. In the case of 
frequency of contacts between alliance partners the respondents were asked to 
indicate from a list of eight possible choices; daily, weekly, monthly, quarterly, half 
yearly, yearly, no set frequency and never. Respondents were asked the importance 
of contact mechanisms used in the alliance partnership on a scale from one (not at all 
important) to five (very important). These measures were adapted from a review of 
the relevant literature (Bucklin and Sengupta 1993; Mohr and Nevin 1990). Future of 
the alliance was measured on a five-point scale based on whether both parties agreed 
on either a specific plan for termination or a long-term relationship. Respondents 
were also asked to indicate if the alliance had been terminated and the date of 
termination. This measure was based on a review of the literature (Beamish 1985; 
Gomes-Casseres 1987).
4.5.4 Construct Measurement
As already stated above construct measurement followed the guidelines offered by 
Churchill (1979).
Step 1. Specify Domain o f the Construct. From a review of the literature, the 
underlying characteristics of international strategic alliances were identified. Each
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Step 2. Generate Sample o f Items. A thorough review of the literature aided item 
generation. The literature provided definitions for each of the variables used in the 
study as well the dimensions for each of the variables. Relevant existing measures 
were assembled from the literature and bases for new measures were developed. Most 
of the items were developed specifically for the study, though some scale items were 
adapted from previous research (see section 4.5.). Existing scales used were modified 
and adapted for the purposes of this study.
Step 3. Purify the Measure. This step examines the extent to which the 
measurements used for the study are reliable. The most important reliability 
assessment is internal consistency between multiple measurements of a variable 
(Nunnally 1978). The two most popular procedures used to estimate internal 
reliability are split-half reliability and Cronbach’s alpha (Bryman and Cramer 1997; 
Churchill 1979). In the split-halves method the total set of items is split into two 
groups and the scores on the two groups are correlated to obtain an estimate of 
reliability (Bryman and Cramer 1997). However the major problem with the split- 
halves approach is that the correlation between the halves will differ, depending on 
how the total number of items is divided into halves and could thus lead to a different 
reliability estimate (Carmines and Zeller 1994). The most popular and widely used 
approach to estimate reliability is given by Cronbach’s alpha (Bryman and Cramer 
1997). This essentially calculates the average of all possible split-half reliability 
coefficients, and can be computed for any multiple-item scale. Nunnally (1978)
variable was defined conceptually and a pool of items was generated that were
consistent with the defined construct.
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proposes that coefficient alpha provides a good estimate of reliability. The alpha 
coefficient generated from the analysis varies between .00 and 1.00 and the closer the 
result to 1.00 the greater the internally reliability of the scale (Bryman and Cramer 
1997). While a Cronbach’s alpha score of > 0.5 is acceptable, a score of > 0.7 
signifies good scale reliability (Nunnally 1978). The average inter-item correlation 
and the number of items in the scale determine the interpretation of Cronbach’s alpha. 
As the average correlation among items increases and the number of items increases, 
the value of alpha increases. However, Carmines and Zeller (1994) note that adding 
items to a scale can reduce the scale’s reliability, if the additional items lower the 
average inter-item correlation. An essential requirement for the alpha coefficient 
providing an unbiased estimate is that the scale is unidimensional (Nunnally 1978). 
The dimensionality of the constructs may be examined by using factor analysis.
In this study, it was not feasible to test the subjects more than once, therefore only 
Cronbach’s alpha reliability tests were performed. The following procedure was 
used. First .all multi-item measures were estimated with item-to-total correlations. 
Items with low item-to-correlations were deleted. Second all remaining measures 
were factor analyzed to assess the extent to which the measures of the constructs 
reflected a single dimension (see section 4.6.1. for a discussion on factor analysis). 
The resulting factors were then assessed for reliability using Cronbach’s alpha 
(Nunnally 1978; Churchill 1979).
Step 4. Assess Reliability with New Data. This requires the collection of additional 
data to test reliability, by giving the same test to the same subjects after a period of 
time, in order to rule out the possibility that the findings in the previous steps are due
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to chance. However Churchill (1979) contends this procedure should not be used 
because they underestimate the reliability of empirical measurements. In this study it 
was not feasible to assess the reliability with new data because of financial limitations 
and time constraints of the respondents.
Step 5. Assess Construct Validity. Construct validity refers to the extent to which an 
instrument measures the theoretical constructs it claims to assess (Carmines and 
Zeller 1994). Three different types of validity are generally used in testing an 
instrument: content validity, criterion validity and construct validity.
Content validity determines the extent to which an empirical measurement reflects a 
specific domain of content. This type of validity implies that all the dimensions and 
elements of a concept being measured are considered by the instrument (Carmines 
and Zeller 1994). Content validity can be established if a group of experts in the field 
can evaluate that the items pertain to the variable being measured. To ensure high 
content validity, all measurements developed were based on a comprehensive review 
of the literature and detailed evaluation by an academic and managers. Pre-tests of 
the questionnaire was conducted by a faculty member of the Warwick Business 
School. Copies of the questionnaires were also sent to senior executives with 
extensive alliance management experience in the automotive sector. The objective of 
the pre-test was to check whether the questions were easy to answer and easy to 
follow. However it must be noted that this type of validity is subjective and there is 
no objective way to assess it (Carmines and Zeller 1994).
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Criterion validity is sometimes referred to as predictive, concurrent or external 
validity (Carmines and Zeller 1994). Nunnally (1978: 87) notes that criterion validity, 
“is at issue when the purpose is to use an instrument to estimate some important form 
of behaviour, the latter being referred to as the criterion”. Basically the measure 
differentiates individuals on a criterion it is expected to predict. In this study criterion 
validity of the behavioural and organizational constructs would be demonstrated if the 
score on the measures highly and positively correlate with the level of success.
Construct validity refers to the extent to which a measurement instrument actually 
measures the theoretical constructs it claims to assess (Carmines and Zeller 1994; 
Churchill 1979). Construct validation can be determined by (1) the degree to which 
measures of the same concept have similar correlations, and (2) the degree to which 
the measures of a construct have low correlations with constructs not measuring the 
same concept. This means that measures of different constructs should share little 
variance (Nunnally 1978). Factor analysis was conducted to assess the convergent 
and discriminant validity of the study’s constructs (see Section 4.6.1).
4.6 DATA ANALYSIS
The data collected were analysed by using several techniques that are available in the 
SPSS statistical package. The analysis of data was accomplished in three steps. The 
first step aims to validate the proposed constructs in the theoretical framework. The 
reliability and consistency of the scales was assessed with Cronbach’s alpha and 
factor analysed. Factor analysis was also conducted to evaluate the validity of the 
constructs. The second step presents a description of the general characteristics of the
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sample of international strategic alliances as reported by the respondents. Simple 
frequency distribution analysis was used to establish the overall pattern of alliance 
activity for the sample. In the final step, the propositions were tested. T-tests were 
employed to analyse the data. Multivariate discriminant analysis was employed to 
test differences between successful and less successful strategic alliances on all 
independent variables. The propositions were also tested using multivariate 
regression analysis.
4.6.1 Factor Analysis
Factor analysis is a multivariate statistical technique, which aims to simplify complex 
sets of data (Kline 1994). The primary objective of factor analysis is to identify a 
minimum number of underlying factors by grouping together a set of variables that 
are intercorrelated under one factor, and thus producing a set of interrelated variables. 
The factors extracted will express what was common among the original variables 
(Hair et al 1998; Kim and Mueller 1982).
Two factor analytical techniques can be distinguished. An exploratory factor 
analytical (EFA) approach and a confirmatory factor analytical (CFA) perspective. 
The former attempts to determine the underlying factor model that best fits the data, 
whilst in the latter a factor model is derived and then evaluated for goodness of fit to 
the data (Grimm and Yamold 1997). In this study factor analysis was employed using 
the EFA approach. The study conducts a principal components factor analysis with 
varimax rotation to assess convergent and discriminant validity of the various items to 
confirm the construct validity of the data set and provide reassurance as to the 
reliability of the research design employed.
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Factor analysis involves four basic steps: (1) an examination of the interrelationships 
among variables in the correlation matrix; (2) initial extraction of factors; (3) rotation 
of factors; and (4) interpreting the factor matrix and computing factor scores (Hair et 
al 1998; Kim and Mueller 1982). A discussion of each stage follows.
Correlation Matrix
A correlation matrix is a set of correlation coefficients between a number of variables 
(Kline 1994). This is the first major step in factor analysis and involves an 
examination of the interrelationships among the variables in the data matrix. The data 
matrix must specify a significant number of correlations between the variables to 
justify the application of factor analysis. If the correlations among variables is low, 
(correlation coefficients lower than 0.3) then factor analysis is inappropriate because 
it is unlikely that the variables will be related to one another and so will not share 
common factors (Hair et al 1998). A number of criteria can be used to determine the 
adequacy of the factor analysis. The first is the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) measure 
of sampling adequacy. KMO is an index for comparing the magnitudes of the 
observed correlation coefficients with the magnitudes of the partial correlation 
coefficients. The KMO measure tests whether the partial correlations among the 
variables are small, which would indicate that factor analysis is appropriate. The 
measure can be interpreted using the guidelines proposed by Kaiser (1974): (see Table 
4.5.). Small values on the KMO measure mean that the correlation coefficient 
between variables is small and the partial correlation coefficient is large which 
indicates that correlations between pairs of variables could not be explained by other 
variables. In such a case factor analysis would not be appropriate.
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Table 4.5: Interpretation of KMO Index
KMO Index Applicability of Factor Analysis
.90 or above Marvelous
.80 or above Meritorious
.70 or above Middling
.60 or above Mediocre
.50 or above Miserable
Below .50 Unacceptable
Source: H a ir  et al 1998
This suggests, therefore, that the KMO measure should be greater than about 0.5 for a 
satisfactory factor analysis to proceed.
The second method is known as the Bartlett test of sphericity, and is used to test the 
hypothesis whether the correlation matrix is an identity matrix-that is all diagonal 
terms are one and all off-diagonal terms are zero. The Bartlett test value should be 
large and its significance levels low. Rejection of the hypothesis is an indication that 
the data are appropriate for factor analysis (Hair et al 1998). The next step was to 
identify the appropriate method for factor extraction and factor rotation.
4.6.1.1 Factor Extraction
The initial unrotated factor matrix provided an initial pattern of the data from the 
various factor loadings and provides a linear combination set of variables, which 
account for the maximum variance in the data (Hair et al 1998). There are several 
methods available for extracting factors. These include principal component, 
common factor, principal-axis factoring, maximum likelihood, alpha factoring, image 
factoring. The two most widely used methods in social science are principal 
components and principal-axis factoring (Bryman and Cramer 1997; Kline 1994). 
Before selecting the appropriate method of factor extraction, it is essential to
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Common variance = proportion of variance common to all factors.
Specific variance = proportion of variance unique to a variable.
Error variance = proportion of variance due to random error (Bryman and Cramer 
1997).
Factor analysis does not discriminate between specific and error variance and so they 
are combined to form unique variance. Thus total variance is equal to the sum of 
common and unique variance (Bryman and Cramer 1997). In this study principal 
component analysis was used because it explains the greatest proportion of the total 
variance, whereas in principal-axis factoring, only the variance common to all 
variables is analyzed, excluding unique variance from the analysis (Bryman and 
Cramer 1997; Kline 1994).
Once the factor model has been selected, the initial unrotated factor matrix is 
extracted to reveal a combination of factored variables. The first factor extracted 
calculates the maximum variance in all variables, followed by a smaller number of 
variables, explaining the remaining amount of variance (Hair et al 1998; Kim and 
Mueller 1982).
understand w hat is  m eant b y  variance. T h e factor analytical m o d e l o f  variance can  be
d iv id ed  in to  co m m o n , sp e c if ic  and error variance (B rym an a n d  Cram er 19 9 7 ; K line
1994).
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4.6.1.2 Factor Rotation
Once the factors have been extracted, the factors must be rotated to yield meaningful 
groups of variables. The initial factor matrix solution is often difficult to interpret. 
The first factor is essentially an average of all variables. Unrotated factors are 
extracted in order of their importance. In order to find factors which are easier to 
interpret, the factors need to be rotated (Bryman and Cramer 1997; Hair et al 1998). 
Rotation of factors is said to improve interpretation by reducing some of the 
ambiguities present in the preliminary analysis (Child 1990). Rotation redistributes 
the variance from earlier factors to later ones to achieve a more meaningful factor 
pattern (Hair et al 1998) so that each variables tends to load highly on only one factor. 
The two most widely used techniques for rotating factors are orthogonal rotation, 
which produces factors that are independent of one another and oblique rotations, in 
which the factors are correlated (Bryman and Cramer (1997).
Orthogonal rotation methods are used more frequently because the analytical 
procedures used for performing these rotations are more developed than oblique 
rotation methods (Nunnally 1978; Hair et al 1998). Orthogonal rotation has also been 
used more often in the marketing literature because the factors are easier to interpret 
since they have the same pattern and structure matrix (Churchill 1979). In addition, 
the problem of multicollinearity can be avoided when the factors are used for further 
analysis. In this study orthogonal rotation was applied because the rotated factors 
explain the same amount of variance as did the unrotated factors and because it is 
mathematically more simple than oblique rotation (Nunnally 1978). Also since the 
main objective of the rotation is to simplify the factor matrix, the researcher feels that 
this will be better achieved through an orthogonal solution. However there is no
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There are three major orthogonal approaches used: Quarimax; Varimax; and Equimax 
(Hair et al 1998; Marcoulides 1998). In this study orthogonal rotation was used with 
varimax, which is the most commonly used rotation scheme, and in which the 
maximum possible simplification is achieved (Hairet al 1998).
4.6.1.3 Interpretation of Factor Matrix
The rotated factor matrix loadings are interpreted as in the initial factor extraction 
solution. A factor solution has been obtained when all variables have a significant 
loading on a factor, and factor labels appropriate for representing the underlying 
dimensions of a particular factor can then be assigned to each factor. According to 
Nunnally (1978) unrotated factors are as good in a statistical sense as any rotation of 
them. The major reason for rotating factors is to obtain a more interpretable solution. 
The number, of factors to be retained can be determined using a number of criteria. 
According to Marcoulides (1998) the first factors selected should account for the 
largest amount of variance. However most solutions account for between 50% to 80% 
of the total variance. The Kaiser-Eigenvalue Criterion can also be used (Marcoulides 
1998). Using this method factors which have an eigenvalue greater than 1 are 
retained. The scree plot is another technique Cattell (1978) which can be used to 
select factors. This is a graphical representation of the eigenvalues and the initial 
factors extracted. The factors to be retained are determined by the point at which the 
eigenvalues seem to level off. According to Bryman and Cramer (1997) factor 
loadings which have a value of 0.3 or less are not worth considering. Hair et al
co m p ellin g  analytica l reason  to favou r on e rotational m eth od  o v er  another (H air et al
1998).
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(1998) propose more accurate guidelines for identifying significant factor loadings 
based on sample size (see Table 4.6.). Thus the larger the absolute size of the factor 
loading, the more meaningful the loading is in interpreting the factor matrix. Since 
the squared loading is equal to the amount of the variable’s total variance, a loading of 
0.7 indicates that 49% of the variance is accounted for by the factor while factors 
below 0.5 will explain less than 25% of the variance. In this study the lowest factor 
loading to be considered significant was ±0.50. because of the size of the sample.
Table 4.6: Guideline for Identifying Significant Factor Loadings based on
Sample Size
Factor Loading Sample Size for Significance
.30 350
.35 250
.40 200
.45 150
.50 120
.55 100
.60 85
.65 70
.70 60
.75 50
Source: Hair et al (1998)
In some cases a variable will load significantly on more than one factor. This makes 
it difficult to interpret the factors. When a variable has several significant loadings it 
must be considered in interpreting all the factors on which it has a significant loading. 
For this reason it is advisable to evaluate the factor matrix until each variable 
associates with one factor (Hair et al 1998). In this study all variables which loaded 
on more than one factor were eliminated. The factor matrix may also identify 
variables that do not load on any factor and these variables are identified as not 
having sufficient explanation. These variables can either be ignored in the 
interpretation or deleted (Hair et al 1998). In this study all variables that did not load
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on any factor were eliminated from the interpretation because these variables will be 
poorly represented in the factor solution. It should be noted that the elimination of 
variables from the factor solution requires the researcher to respecify the factor 
model, to derive a new factor solution without the variables that have been eliminated 
(Hair et al 1998). When the final set of factors is tested for appropriateness by 
examining factor reliability as stated previously in section 4.5.4. Following 
Nunnaly’s (1978) suggestion, factors with Cronbach’s alpha less than 0.5 are 
discarded. Then the meaningfulness of each factor is evaluated. Finally, the ability of 
the selected factors to explain the degree of variance of the variables is assessed. The 
final set of factors together should account for at least 60% of the total variance of all 
the variables. Factors explaining only a small portion of the variance, cannot be 
considered as useful substitutes of the original variables. The selected factors are 
named based on the variables, which have the highest factor loadings. The last step in 
the procedure is the development of factor scores. In this study the final factors 
derived will be used for further analysis of the data, and thus factor scores were 
produced. The results of the factor analysis are discussed in chapter five.
4.6.2 T-test
The t-test is one of the best known statistical test for comparing the averages of two 
samples. The test is designed to test the difference between two means for 
significance (Kinnear and Gray 1994). The t statistic is calculated by dividing the 
difference between the sample means by an estimate of the standard deviation of the 
distribution of differences, which is known as the standard error of the difference. If 
the t-test statistic exceeds a critical value, the null hypothesis of no difference between 
the two groups is rejected (Kinnear and Gray 1994). In this study the t-test will be
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used to examine all the propositions, comparing the means of high and low 
performing groups.
4.6.3 Discriminant Analysis
Multiple Discriminant Analysis (MDA) is a statistical technique, which can be used to 
group objects into two or more groups on the basis of a set of independent variables 
and to classify observations into one of these groups. The technique is used to 
determine a linear combination of the independent variables that will discriminate 
best between two or more defined groups or classifications (Hair et al 1998). The 
technique can also be used to identify which variables contribute to making the 
classification (Afifi and Clark 1996).
4.6.3.1 Objectives of Discriminant Analysis
Discriminant analysis was employed in this study to test how well and often the 
independent variables could correctly predict the dichotomous dependent variable 
(whether the alliance was successful or unsuccessful). The technique was considered 
to be appropriate because it addressed the following objectives:
i) Determine whether statistically significant differences exist between average 
group score profiles
ii) Determine which of the independent variables discriminate the most between 
the groups
iii) Classify observations correctly into their groups with predictive accuracy
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The objective in discriminant analysis is to find a linear combination of the 
independent variables that minimizes the probability of misclassifying individuals or 
objects into their respective groups. Discriminant analysis therefore can be 
considered either a type of profile analysis or an analytical predictive technique 
(Dillon and Goldstein 1984; Hair et al 1998).
4.6.3.2 Assumptions Underlying Discriminant Analysis
MDA requires that the data used for a particular problem must satisfy a number of 
assumptions. Namely (Hair et al 1998):
(i) Discriminating variables must be measured at the interval or ratio level of 
measurement
(ii) No variables may be a linear combination of other discriminating variables
(iii) The covariance matrix of the independent variables in each group must be the 
same
(iv) Each group is drawn from a population which has a multivariate normal 
distribution
(v) Two variables, which are perfectly correlated, cannot be used at the same 
time.
There is mixed evidence concerning the stability/affect of the discriminant analysis if 
these assumptions are violated (Hair et al 1998). Violation of assumptions can 
adversely affect the significance of statistical results and the estimated error rates 
(Klecka 1984; Eisenbis 1977). It has been noted that the application of MDA yields 
optimal results only if the assumptions of multivariate normality and identical
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variance-covariance matrices are in place (Eisenbeis 1977; Dillon and Goldstein 
1984).
4.6.3.3 Procedure for Discriminant Analysis
The application of discriminant analysis can be divided into three major stages (Hair 
et al 1998)
(i) Method of estimation: Deriving a linear function that best discriminates 
between two or more groups
(ii) Validation: Classifying existing and new cases into predetermined groups
(iii) Interpretation: Identifying the variables that contributes most to discriminating 
between the groups
4.6.3.4 Method of Estimation
Deriving the discriminant function involves selecting the variables that best 
discriminate between the groups and rejecting the variables that do not add 
significantly to the model. A stepwise procedure was utilized to select the most 
powerful discriminating variables into the discriminant function (Hair et al 1998). 
This method uses a combination of both the backward and forward selection methods. 
At each step, the variable with the greatest discriminating power, given the other 
variables in the function, is selected for inclusion and any variables already in the 
function are considered for removal on the basis that the variable/s do not add a 
statistically significant amount of discriminating power to the model. This procedure 
will continue until all variables in the equation satisfy both the inclusion and the 
removal criteria (Klecka 1980; Hair et al 1998). A stepwise procedure was used 
because a large number of variables are being analysed and it is useful in screening
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and discarding those variables that are poor discriminators between the groups and 
selecting those variables already present in the model (Grimm and Yamold 1997).
4.6.3.5 Selection Criteria
Many selection criteria are available when using a stepwise procedure. The Wilk’s 
Lambda criterion was used as the selection criterion with a 0.0001 tolerance level. 
This means, any variable whose tolerance is less than the specified value 0.0001 is 
automatically excluded from the analysis. Wilk’s Lambda was used in the stepwise 
procedure because it considers ‘both the differences between groups and the 
cohesiveness or homogeneity within groups’ (Klecka 1980 p.54). In entering the 
variables in to the discriminant function, the stepwise method uses a stopping 
criterion, based on the P value of an F statistic (Grimm and Yamold 1997). Values of 
two statistics are considered. The F-to-enter value determines the discrimination 
introduced by the variable that is being considered for entry and the variables already 
in the analysis. If the F is small, the variable is not selected because it is not adding 
enough to the overall discrimination. The F-to-remove value tests the decrease in 
discrimination should that variable be removed from the lists of variables already 
selected, because the variable no longer makes a significant contribution to the 
discrimination (Klecka 1984; Huberty et at 1987). The F-to-enter and F-to-remove 
values were set at liberal levels as recommended by previous researchers (Hair et al 
1998). A minimum F value of 1.00 was required for entry. The F-to-remove value
was set at 0.5.
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4.6.3.6 Statistical Significance of Discriminant Function
After the derivation of the discriminant function, the next stage is to determine the 
extent to which the two a priori defined groups differ with respect to their average 
score profiles (Dillon and Goldstein 1984). Klecka (1984) noted several ways to 
assess the statistical significance and substantive utility of the discriminant function.
One way to assess the strength of the discrimination is by examining the Wilk’s 
Lambda statistic, which tests for group differences between the discriminating 
variables. The range of Wilk’s is from zero to unity. Lower values indicate larger 
mean differences, thus indicating stronger group separation (Grimm and Yamold
1997) . However the test fails to recognize the different dimensions in which the 
groups may differ (McKay and Campbell 1982). Lambda, however can be 
transformed into a test of significance, by converting it into an approximate chi- 
square distribution or an F statistic, which is then used to see if the two groups are 
statistically different from each other. Discriminant functions are significant at the 
0.5 level or beyond.
Another way to determine the substantive validity of a discriminant function is to 
examine the canonical correlation. This coefficient is a measure of the degree of 
association between the groups and the discriminant function. The higher the 
correlation the stronger the relationship between the discriminant function and the 
groups. In addition to Wilk’s Lambda and canonical correlation, the eigenvalue 
associated with the discriminant function should also be considered. The larger the 
eigenvalue, the greater the discrimination between the groups (Klecka 1984; Hair et al
1998) .
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However the statistical tests are poor indicators for assessing the predictive accuracy 
of the discriminant function. To determine the predictive power of a discriminant 
function, it is necessary to construct classification matrices (Hair et al 1998). Before a 
classification matrix is constructed to determine the predictive power of the 
discriminant function it is important to demonstrate that the observed proportion of 
correct predictions is significantly larger than would be expected by chance (Frank et 
al 1965). It is therefore necessary to test the significance of the difference between 
the proportion of correctly classified cases in the sample and the proportion that 
would be expected by chance. When the two groups are of equal size, the expected 
accuracy would be 50%. For two groups of unequal size, two criteria might be 
considered (Hair et al 1998). If the main objective is to maximise the percentage 
correctly classified by chance, then the maximum chance criterion is appropriate.
Cmax = max (p, 1 - p) 
where
p is the proportion of individuals in groupl 
(1 - p) is the proportion of individuals in group 2
When the objective is to maximise the percentage correctly classified into both groups 
(and you have unequal sized groups), as in this case, then the percentage correctly 
classified by the model should be compared with the proportional chance criteria. 
Cprop = p2 + (1 - P)2 
Where
P is the proportion of cases in group A 
1-p is the proportion of cases in group B
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4.6.3.7 Interpretation of the Discriminant Function
The discriminant function is evaluated to determine the importance of each variable in 
discriminating between the groups (Hair et al 1998). A number of methods have been 
proposed to determine the individual contribution of variables to the overall 
discrimination. The stepwise procedure assesses the significance of individual 
variables by removing variables that do not make a significant contribution to the 
discriminant function. Secondly variables can be ranked on the basis of their 
standardised discriminant function coefficients. The larger the magnitude of the 
coefficient, the greater that variable’s contribution to the discriminating power of the 
function. The sign of the coefficient is arbitrary, and indicates whether individual 
variables are making a positive or negative contribution to the function. The problem 
with this approach is that if two variables are intercorrelated, it is not possible to 
assess the contribution of an individual variable because the standardized discriminant 
weight may be split between the two of them. Thus, both variables would appear as 
though they were marginal contributors. Alternatively, the discriminant weight for 
one of the variables may be artificially inflated while the standardized weight for the 
other is near zero. The problem with this approach is that the variables are treated 
independently and unimportant variables may become important when combined with 
other variables. This approach may lead to a distorted estimate of the relative power 
of individual variables (Dillon and Goldstein 1984; Affifi and Clark 1996) and should 
be used with caution (Hair et al 1998). Another way to assess the contribution of a 
variable to the discriminant function is to examine the discriminant loadings or
If the d iscrim inant fu n ction  is  sta tis tica lly  sig n ifica n t an d  the p red ictiv e  accuracy
acceptable the fu n ctio n  can  b e  interpreted.
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structure coefficients (Hair et al 1998; Klecka 1984). A discriminant loading 
measures the simple correlation of a variable with a discriminant function. The 
discriminant loadings consider the common variance between the independent 
variables, and are less subject to instability caused by intercorrelations and thus tend 
to be more useful in interpreting the discriminant function than standardized 
discriminant weights (Hair et al 1998; Klecka 1984). This research will therefore, 
consider the structure coefficients when interpreting the discriminant analysis. All of 
the above methods for investigating the importance of variables for the discriminant 
functions are subject to limitations and should be employed to arrive at the most 
accurate interpretation.
4.6.2.8 Validation of the Discriminant Function
Validation is the final stage of discriminant analysis and is aimed at estimating the 
degree of bias in the predictive power of the discriminant function (Frank et al 1965; 
Hair et al 1998). Two validation procedures commonly used to estimate error rates of 
the discriminant function are the split-sample approach and the jack-knife or U- 
method. The split-sample method requires the splitting of the total sample in two. 
One subsample is used for the analysis and the other is used for validation. Although 
this method produces unbiased estimates it requires relatively large samples (Frank et 
al 1965; Afifi and Clark 1996). An alternative method is the U-method (Dillon and 
Goldstein 1984; Hair et al 1998). This method is based on the “leave-one-out” 
principle, in which the discriminant function is fitted to repeatedly drawn samples of 
the original sample (Hair et al 1998). This approach is sensitive to small samples and 
it has been suggested that the smallest group size is at least three times the number of 
predictor variables (Huberty et al 1987). This procedure also makes use of all the data
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4.8 MULTIPLE REGRESSION ANALYSIS
Multiple regression analysis is a widely used quantitative technique in the analysis of 
data in the social sciences. Regression analysis is a powerful tool for summarizing 
the nature of the relationship between variables and making predictions of likely 
values of the dependent variable (Hair et al 1998). To investigate the combined effect 
of the behavioural and organizational characteristics on the success of international 
alliances, multiple regression analysis was undertaken with each of the dependent 
variables measuring success. All the identified factors from the factor analysis will be 
used as the explanatory variables (independent variables). Therefore the explanatory 
power of factor matrices which consist of correlation coefficients between variables 
and factors will be assessed.
without ser io u s b ias in e stim a tin g  error rates (H air et al 1 9 9 8  A fif i and C lark 1996;
Lachenbruch 1 9 6 7 ). T h e v a lid ity  o f  the d iscrim inant r e su lts  in th is  stu d y  w a s
validated through the use o f  the U  m eth od , u sin g  S P S S .
4.8.1 Assumptions in Multiple Regression
In calculating the regression coefficients, to predict the dependent variable, certain 
assumptions should be met to ensure that the results obtained are representative of the 
sample (Hair et al (1998). In the current study the three assumptions of multiple 
regression analysis (normality, homoscedasticity and linearity) were met. Firstly, 
scatterplots of the individual variables indicated linear relationships between each of 
the dependent variables and the independent variables. Tests for homodescedsaticity 
revealed that the variance of the residuals about predicted dependent variable scores
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4.8.2 Estimating the Regression Model and Statistical Significance
The intent of the multiple regression analysis was to determine whether certain 
behavioural and organizational characteristics were related to each of the alliance 
performance and satisfaction measures. Therefore, all variables were entered in to the 
equation simultaneously. After the regression model has been estimated, the 
significance of the overall model can be determined (Afifi and Clark 1996; Hair et al 
1998). To determine how well the regression model implied by the regression 
equation fits the data, the following statistics are assessed.
Multiple R
Multiple R is the correlation coefficient and reflects how well the independent 
variables collectively correlate with the dependent variable (Hair et al 1998).
R Square
R squared is the correlation coefficient squared and indicates the percentage of total 
variation of the dependent variable explained by the independent variables (Hair et al 
1998).
F Ratio
The F ratio determines whether there is a linear relationship between the variables by 
testing the null hypothesis that the multiple correlation is zero in the population from 
which the sample is taken.
were the sam e fo r  all p red icted  sco res . F in a lly , resid u a ls (d ifferen ces betw een
obtained and predicted  d ep en d en t variab le sco res) w ere  found to be norm ally
distributed about the p red icted  dep en d en t variable sco res .
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4.8.3 Interpretation of the Regression Variate
In addition to predicting the dependent variable, the impact of each independent 
variable in predicting the dependent variable can also be assessed (Hair et al 1998). 
Thus in the case of this study, it can be determined which of behavioural and 
organizational characteristics had the greatest impact in predicting the success of the 
international alliance in terms of performance and satisfaction measures. Beta 
coefficients are standardized coefficients that are used to determine the relative 
importance of the independent variables included in the regression equation. The beta 
coefficients represent the impact on the dependent variable of a change in one 
standard deviation in the independent variable Bryman and Cramer 1997; Hair et al 
1998).
4.8.4 Multicollinearity
A key issue in interpreting the regression equation is the correlation among 
independent variables (Hair et al 1998). If the independent variables are highly 
correlated the regression coefficients may be unstable and subject to considerable 
variation (Bryman and Cramer 1997). One measure available for testing the impact of 
multicollinearity is calculating the tolerance and VIF values. A high tolerance value 
indicates little collinearity, while tolerance levels nearer to zero indicate high 
intercorrelations between variables. Likewise, small VIF values are indicative of low 
intercorrelations between independent variables (Hair et al 1998).
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4.9 Missing Data
Missing data can occur for many reasons. There may be several reasons for the 
respondents’ failure to complete the entire questionnaire (Hair et al 1998). It may that 
some questions are inapplicable, or that the respondent simply refuses to answer 
certain questions because of sensitive issues. An analysis of the data in this study 
revealed that out of the 114 completed questionnaires received eight variables 
contained missing data regarding alliance performance, and three variables regarding 
overall objectives. The proportion of missing data for these variables could be 
explained by the fact that not all of the strategic alliances used these criteria for 
measuring performance. The proportion of missing data for these variables was very 
high, therefore these variables were considered unusable for the study.
4.10 SUMMARY
In this chapter we have discussed the methodology and research design of the study. 
A quantitative methodology was used for data collection and analysis. Based on this 
approach, 114 questionnaires were received from UK international firms involved in 
strategic alliances with firms from USA, Japan and Western Europe. The data 
collected were analysed using quantitative techniques. In this chapter we also 
introduced and summarised statistical techniques that were used to perform the 
analysis.
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CHAPTER FIVE
Validity and Reliability of 
Constructs
5.1 INTRODUCTION
This chapter reports the reliability and validity of the study’s constructs. The 
constructs were tested using the approach suggested by Churchill (1979) (see section 
4.5.4). First the reliability of the multi-item constructs were computed to estimate the 
reliability of each scale. The purpose of this analysis was to examine the item-to-total 
correlations and determine any low items. On this basis, a few items were discarded. 
Secondly exploratory factor analysis was employed in order to examine the presence 
of underlying behavioural and organizational dimensions and confirm that 
questionnaire items used in the study measured the proposed constructs (see section 
4.6.1.for a discussion on factor analysis). The reliability of each factor was then 
assessed using Cronbach’s alpha. Finally the reliability of the dependent variable
success was assessed.
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5.2. Factor Analysis o f Behavioural and Organizational 
Characteristics
A principal components factor analysis with varimax rotation to assess convergence 
within and divergence between the scales used for measuring the behavioural and 
organizational characteristics was carried out in order to determine the number of 
dimensions underlying the constructs. Because of the large number of variables in 
this study it was not possible to factor analyse behavioural and organizational 
dimensions together. Therefore the factor analysis was conducted separately for the 
behavioural and organizational dimensions. This has been demonstrated in previous 
studies (Mohr and Spekman 1994). Conflict resolution was not included in the factor 
analysis for the reasons stated below.
The factor models for both behavioural and organizational dimensions were 
respecified. This iterative process of evaluating the factor analysis results and 
dropping items and performing the analysis on the remaining items is an effective 
way of deriving a stable factor structure (Hair et al 1998; Anderson and Gerbin 1982). 
On this basis a few variables were discarded. All variables loading lower than 0.5 on 
each factor were eliminated from the analysis because they had a low affinity with all 
factors and did not tap the underlying dimension (Churchill 1979; Hair et al 1998; 
Anderson and Gerbin 1988). Variables loading on more than one factor were also 
omitted from the analysis, since they constitute a threat to unidimensionality 
(Anderson and Gerbin 1988).
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5.3 Reliability and Validity of the Behavioural Constructs
5.3.1 Internal Consistency of Behavioural Constructs
In terms of reliability the behavioural constructs demonstrated good internal 
consistency. An inspection of the alpha coefficients from Table 5.1 reveals that all 
coefficients for the scales are greater than .70, and eight of the 12 multiple measure 
items have coefficients greater than .80, indicating good reliability (Nunnally 1978). 
The reliability was assessed prior to factor analysis to refine the measures and delete
Table 5.1. Reliability Scales for Behavioural Constructs
Behavioural Constructs Original 
Number of Scale 
Items
Number of 
Scale Items 
after Deletion
Cronbach’s
Alpha
Coordination 8 7 .88
Interdependence 10 9 .70
Commitment /Goals and Values 1 10 10 .93
Commitment / Goals and Values 2 5 5 .91
Commitment/Obligations 7 7 .91
Commitment/stav in relationship 6 6 .86
Trust 1 5 4 .90
Trust 2 8 7 .90
Conflict Resolution 6 N/A N/A
Conflict 6 4 .70
Information Quality 5 5 .89
Information Sharing 4 3 .72
Participation 5 5 .79
Total 85 72
items that resulted in low alpha coefficients. In this analysis seven variables were 
eliminated because of low item-to-total correlations. The variable “we develop 
strategies and expect our partner to fit in with them” was eliminated from the 
coordination dimension. The “manufacturing capability” variable from the 
interdependence dimension was omitted. From the trust dimension the variables “our 
partner is seen as being self centered and opportunistic” and “there is a lack of 
continuity in management teams” were removed. In the conflict dimension “poor
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communications” and “language difficulties” were removed. Finally, the variable 
“we hesitate to give our partner too much information” was omitted from the 
dimension information sharing. The measures for conflict resolution were not tested 
for reliability, since each of the six items used to represent the construct taps a 
different dimension of the construct (Mohr and Spekman 1994). This type of 
measurement has been referred to as a ‘check list’, or composite scale (Howell 1987). 
This reduced the total number of multi-item variables to be factor-analysed from 85 to 
72. Following this initial analysis, the multi-item measures were subjected to factor 
analysis to establish unidimensionality and construct validity.
5.3.2. Behavioural Characteristics: Key Dimensions
The factor analysis for the behavioural dimensions was conducted on 72 multi-item 
measures. The factor model was respecified three times because during the first and 
second factor extraction and rotation, variables needed to be eliminated from the 
factor. The third factor model was conducted to derive a final set of factors. 
Variables were removed using the criteria stated above. All variables removed from 
the analysis are discussed below with the relevant factors. After the third 
respecification a final composition model for the 114 UK international strategic 
alliances was obtained. The model retained 56 of 72 measures and produced thirteen 
dimensions of behavioural characteristics. The analysis grouped the variables into 
thirteen orthogonal factors with eigenvalues greater than 1.0 and explaining 77.1% of 
the total variance in the data. This figure meets the level suggested in (between 50% 
and 80%) the literature (see Section 4.6.1.). Therefore the thirteen factors produced 
can explain the original data. The results of the factor analysis for the behavioural 
constructs are presented in Table 5.2.
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• Factor 1: Trust in Partner
As Table 5.2 shows factor one concerns the UK firm’s belief in their partner’s 
trustworthiness. This factor correlated with twelve variables and explained 37.4 % of 
the total variance. This shows trust is the main factor that affects international 
strategic alliance and accounts for 33.3% of the variance. Trust has also emerged as 
an important factor of strategic alliances in previous studies (Mohr and Spekman 
1994; Pilling and Zang 1992; Smith et al 1995). Nine of the variables came from the 
eleven original trust variables in the analysis. One trust variable “we share work 
related problems” did not load on any factor (i.e. loaded below 0.50) and was 
therefore omitted from the analysis. The trust variable “close and personal ties 
between partners” loaded on factor nine. Factor one also correlated with one item of 
commitment “enjoy relationship with partner firm” and two items of coordination, 
“work as a team with partner” and “regular exchange of ideas between partners”. 
This can be explained by the fact that trust is a major factor in the development of 
commitment and coordination (Morgan and Hunt 1994; Anderson and Narus 1990). 
This factor was labelled “trust in partner”.
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Factors 2, 3 and 4 are all concerned with the issue of commitment in strategic 
alliances. This suggests that commitment is also an important factor in UK alliance 
partnerships which provides support for previous studies into international strategic 
alliance success (Mohr and Spekman 1994; Morgan and Hunt 1994; Gundlach et al 
1995;). All four dimensions that were designed to measure commitment loaded on 
their individual factors.
• Factor 2: Commitment to Alliance Goals and Values
Factor 2 relates to the UK firm’s commitment to their international partners in terms 
of their identification and involvement in the alliance relationship. This factor 
incorporated eleven of the fifteen variables in the analysis relating to commitment in 
terms of goals and values loaded on the second factor. Three variables “daily 
operation of alliance”, “strong sense of loyalty to partner”, and “strong sense of 
belonging to partnership” did not load on any factor and were eliminated (i.e. factor 
loading < 0.5). The variable “alliance partnership is valuable to us” loaded on factor 
four. The factor accounts for 9.0% of the variance. This factor was labelled 
“commitment to alliance goals and values”.
• Factor 3: Committed to make an Effort for the Alliance
The variables loaded on factor three consisted of seven items relating to the UK firm’s 
willingness to exert effort on behalf of the alliance. All the variables that were 
designed to measure commitment in terms of obligations to the alliance partner loaded 
on this factor. Factor three explained 4.9% of the variance. This factor was, 
therefore, labelled “committed to make an effort for the alliance”.
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• Factor 4: Commitment to Stay in the Relationship
Factor 4 loaded positively on five variables. This factor correlated with four variables 
from the commitment/motivation dimension and one variable from the 
commitment/goals and values dimension (alliance partnership is valuable to us). This 
variable was included in the factor because it was more strongly associated with 
“commitment to stay in the relationship” than with “commitment to alliance goals and 
values”. The variable “we enjoy our relationship with the partner firm” loaded on the 
trust factor as already stated. Finally the variable “making short term sacrifices for 
long term gains” did not load on this factor and was omitted from the analysis. The 
factor accounts for 4.0% of the variance. This factor relates to the UK firm’s 
motivation to maintain their relationship with their partner and was thus labelled 
“commitment to stay in the relationship”.
• Factor 5: Information Quality
Factor five incorporated five of the variables that focused on various aspects of 
information quality such as the accuracy, timeliness, adequacy, completeness and 
credibility of information that may be exchanged between the partner firms. These 
attributes have all been found to be critical in alliance relationships (Mohr and 
Spekman 1994). This factor accounted for 3.5% of the variance. The variables used 
to assess information quality loaded positively on one factor and were thus labelled 
“information quality”.
• Factor 6: D ep en d en cy  o n  P a r tn e r ’s  M a rk e tin g  C apab ilities
For interdependency nine variables were included in the factor analysis. This factor 
loaded on four of the nine variables in the factor analysis. Two variables
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“technological expertise” and “manpower resources” were omitted because they did 
not correlate with any factor. Three variables loaded independently on their own 
factors (see factors 11, 12, and 13). The variables underlying factor 6 were concerned 
with the UK firm’s degree of dependency on the partner firm’s marketing capabilities. 
This relationship has already been observed by previous researchers who have 
suggested that firms have been forced into such interdependencies because of their 
need for such resources (Pfeffer and Nowak 1976; Buchanan 1992; Kumar et al 
1995). This factor accounted for 3.3% of the variance. This factor was labelled 
“dependency on partner’s marketing capabilities”.
• Factor 7: Mutual Integration between Partner Firms
The variables loading on to factor 7 are associated with coordination between partner 
firms and reflected the integration of the partners in the alliance agreement. The two 
variables, “UK firm well integrated with partner” and “partner well integrated with 
UK firm” correlated highly with this factor. This suggests that both parties make 
coordinated efforts for achieving integration within the alliance, supporting Mohr and 
Spekman’s (1994) finding that coordination is an important factor in successful 
strategic alliances. Two of the variables from the coordination dimension loaded on 
to factor one as already stated. Three variables “partner’s activities an extension of 
UK firm’s activities”, “interaction between alliance managers”, and “keep partner 
well informed of important decisions” were omitted because they did not load on any 
factor. This factor accounted for 2.8% of the variance. This factor was labelled 
“mutual integration between partner firms”.
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• Factor 8: Information Sharing
Factor 8 loaded on its own three variables concerning the way in which the UK Firms 
communicate information with their partner firms. Informing each other of changing 
needs had a higher loading on the factor as compared with sharing proprietary 
information. This indicates that, although UK firms consider the sharing of critical 
information with their partner as important, being knowledgeable about each other’s 
needs is of greater importance for the effective operation of the alliance (Huber and 
Daft 1987). This factor accounted for 2.7% of the variance. This factor was labelled 
“information sharing”.
• Factor 9: Close Relationship
Factor 9 correlated with two variables. The first variable, “we hold regular meetings 
with our partner” was taken from the dimension concerning participation in decision 
making. The remaining four variables of this dimension, “we participate in goal 
setting”; “we help our partner in planning activities”, “we seek partner’s advice when 
making decisions”, and “our partner consults us before decision making”, were 
eliminated from the analysis because they did not load on any factor. The second 
variable which loaded on this factor concerns the variable “there are close personal 
ties between us and our partner”, taken from the trust dimension. Close examination 
of the two variables that incorporated factor 9 indicated that they reflect a sense of 
camaraderie between the partners. Accordingly, this factor was labelled “close 
relationship”.
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• Factor 10: Conflict
The tenth factor deals with the issue of conflict between the alliance partners. This 
factor loaded on two of the four variables concerning conflict in the analysis. The two 
variables, “personality conflicts” and “cultural misunderstandings” had a negative 
significant loading with this factor. This negative correlation suggests that conflicting 
personalities and cultural misunderstandings do not lead to conflict in the alliance 
relationship. Previous research has suggested that if conflicts are handled 
successfully, it can lead to greater trust, commitment and coordination in an alliance 
relationship (Mohr and Spekman 1994: Monckza et al 1998). This dimension was 
further reinforced by the fact that trust, commitment and coordination were found to 
be important factors for the UK alliance partnership. Two variables “conflicting 
goals” and “distrust” did not load on any factor and were eliminated from the 
analysis. This factor accounted for 2.3% of the variance. This factor was labelled 
“conflict”.
• Factor 11; 12; 13 Dependency
Three variables loaded independently on factors eleven, twelve and thirteen 
concerning the interdependency between the partner firms. The variable 
“administrative support” correlated highly with factor eleven and accounted for 2.0% 
of the variance, “management skills” correlated with factor twelve, accounting for 
1.9% of the variance and “financial resources” loaded highly on factor thirteen with 
1.8% of the variance. These dimensions were thus labelled accordingly. This has 
indicated the UK firm’s necessity to find a partner which had strategically important 
management and administrative skills, as well as the financial resources they required.
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5.3.3. Construct Validity of Behavioural Dimensions
In an attempt to assess convergent and discriminant validity, an inter-item correlation 
matrix of all the behavioural constructs was produced. This method allows an 
assessment of convergent and discriminant validity by comparing within construct 
and between construct inter-item correlations (see Appendix 4 for correlation matrix). 
The correlation matrix provided some insights into the convergent and discriminant 
validity of the behavioural constructs. An examination of the within-construct inter­
item correlations revealed high correlations among the measures for each construct, 
suggesting that each of the behavioural constructs exhibit high convergent validity. 
Furthermore, an examination of the inter-item correlation matrix revealed that within 
construct inter-item correlations were greater than between construct inter-item 
correlation. This was observed for all the behavioural constructs. For example, 
within-construct correlations for trust ranged from 0.56 to 0.80 while between 
construct correlations never exceeded 0.20. These results support the behavioural 
constructs discriminant validity. To confirm the above observation, the Bartlett’s test 
of sphericity was calculated. This test assesses the hypothesis that the correlation 
matrix is an identity matrix, that is, that the off-diagnol terms of the matrix are all 
zero. The Bartlett’s test was significant at the 0.00 level. This suggests that the matrix 
is not diagonal and therefore, there are significant correlations between the variables. 
The KMO measure of adequacy is an index that compares the magnitude of the 
observed correlation coefficients with the magnitude of the partial correlation 
coefficients. Small values on the KMO measure mean that the simple correlation 
coefficient between variables is small and the partial correlation coefficient is large 
which indicates that correlations between pairs of variables could not be explained by 
other variables. Applying the KMO test to the present data a 0.84 index was
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calculated which indicates a good sampling adequacy, (see section 4.6.1). Both the 
MSA (0.840) and the significance of the Bartlett Test (P<0.001) suggested a highly 
stable instrument design.
The factor loadings for the behavioural constructs are shown in Table 5.2. Each of 
the variables correlates highly on to one of the factors demonstrating adequate 
convergent validity. Thus the measures discriminate between the different constructs, 
providing evidence for discriminant validity. In addition, subsequent reliability of the 
factors indicated the homogeneity of the scales. The coefficients ranged from 0.60 to 
0.94 are presented in Table 5.3 which is higher than the 0 .05 benchmark suggested by 
Nunnally (1978) and thus fall within the range of acceptability recommended by 
Nunnally (1978).
Table 5.3 Reliability Analysis of Behavioural Factor Dimensions
Factor Dimensions Number of 
Items
Cronbach’s
Alpha
Trust in partner 12 .90
Commitment to alliance goals and values 11 .94
Obligations to partner 7 .91
Commitment to stay in relationship 5 .90
Information quality 5 .89
Marketing capabilities of partner 4 .81
Coordination between partners 2 .93
Information sharing 3 .72
Close relationship 2 .61
Conflict 2 .63
Administrative support 1 N/A
Management skills 1 N/A
Financial resources 1 N/A
Total 56
Two of the factors “close relationship” and “conflict” resulted in lower alpha scores 
by comparison to the other factors. Prior to the factor analysis, the reliability measure 
of conflict reported an alpha of 0.70, which is an acceptable measure. The factor
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analysis of the conflict dimension resulted in only two out of the four original 
measures, with negatively correlated factor loadings. However the factor loadings for 
conflict are above +/-0.50, the criterion suggested in section 4.6.1. thus strengthening 
confidence in the resulting factors. An explanation for the low alpha value for “close 
participation” may be that this factor loaded on only one of the variables from the 
original dimension measuring participation and one variable from the trust dimension. 
Therefore, this factor is considered to be a good measure of participation, since most 
of the variables were eliminated in the analysis.
5.4. Reliability and Validity of the Organizational Constructs
5.4.1 Internal Consistency of the Organizational Constructs
The reliability and validity of the organizational constructs were assessed using the 
same procedure and techniques as used for the behavioural constructs. The 
reliabilities for the organizational constructs are presented in Table 5.4 and show 
sufficient internal consistency. The coefficients range from 0.57 to 0.89, falling 
within the range of acceptability recommended by Nunnally (1978). Nunnally (1978) 
reports that 0.50 to 0.60 are the lower bounds of reliabilities for an early stage of 
research and are sufficient for research. In the case of the structural constructs the 
alpha scores fall within the lower boundary of acceptable reliability because these 
measures have not been fully developed in the strategic alliance literature. While 
previous researchers have developed measures of formalization and centralization that 
have evidenced reliability, the reliabilities have fallen within the lower domain 
acceptability. For instance, John and Reve (1982) in their investigation of dyadic 
relationships in marketing channels revealed an alpha coefficient of 0.52 for
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centralization and 0.58 for formalization. In the case of organization of the alliance, 
the measures are derived from a review of the literature and are thus new measures. 
Churchill and Peter (1984) have reported that 85% of scales used in marketing studies 
have Cronbach’s alphas of 0.5 or greater and 69% have 0.7 or greater. In Table 5.4 
all the scales have alphas greater than 0.5. A few items were deleted because of low 
item-to-total correlations. These items appeared to decrease the alpha coefficient and 
were removed from the measure prior to factor analysis. As a result in the case of 
centralization one variable “both parties participate in joint decision making” was 
deleted. From the mechanism of control dimension the variables “power of veto”, 
“contractual formal agreement”, “technical superiority”, and management skills were 
eliminated. A total of Five variables were removed prior to factor analysis. This 
reduced the total number of items from 30 to 25.
Table 5.4. Reliability Scales for Organizational Characteristics
Organizational Constructs Original Number of 
Scale Items
Number of 
Scale Items 
after Deletion
Cronbach’s
Alpha
Formalization 3 3 .57
Centralization 3 2 .65
Complexity 3 3 .57
Focus of control 10 10 .89
Mechanism o f control 11 7 .69
Total 30 25
5.4.2. Organizational Characteristics : Key Dimensions
Factor analysts was applied to 25 organizational measures. The factor model was 
respecified three times during the first and second analysis, a few variables had to be 
removed from the analysis. The third factor solution resulted in a final set o f factors. 
All variables removed are discussed below with the relevant factors. The third factor
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solution retained 22 of the 25 measures and produced seven dimensions of 
organizational characteristics. The analysis grouped the variables into seven 
orthogonal factors with eigenvalues greater than 1.0 and explaining 72.8% of the total 
variance in the data. The results of the factor analysis for the organizational 
constructs are presented in Table 5.5. All variables relating to the issue of the focus 
of control loaded on factors one and two. These two factors accounted for 31.3% of 
the total variance. This suggests that UK firms may be more concerned with seeking 
to control activities than the means by which control may be exercised. Previous 
research has suggested that alliances seek control over specific activities that are 
strategically important to them (Schaan 1983).
• F a c to r  1: O p era tio n a l C o n tro l
The first factor loaded on six of the ten variables relating to the issue of the focus of 
control, explaining 17.4% of the total variance. These variables related to control 
over specific operational activities. This suggests that control over distribution 
facilities, pricing policy, customer support, marketing and sales, manpower 
management and financial activities account for the most variance and is thus the 
main factor that affects international strategic alliances. This control factor was 
labelled “operational control”.
F actor 2 : T ech n o lo g ica l C o n tro l
The second factor correlated with four of the ten variables relating to the issue of the 
focus of control, explaining 13.9%% of the total variance. These variables reflected 
control in terms of technological activities. The four variables relate to control over
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R&D, product planning, quality control and production planning. This was labelled 
“technological control”.
The organizational construct “mechanism of control” was composed of seven 
variables, which were included in the factor analysis. One of the variables, “regular 
reporting on performance” was omitted from the analysis because it correlated with 
more than one factor. Four variables correlated with factor three and two variables 
correlated with factor four. These two factors together explained 18% of the total 
variance in the factor analysis.
• F actor 3: In fo rm a l C o n tro l M ech an ism s
Factor three correlated with four variables that reflected the use of informal control 
mechanisms that may be exercised by the UK firms their strategic alliances. These 
informal mechanisms of control (involvement in planning process, teamwork culture, 
appointment o f key personnel and informal and formal contacts between managers) 
has been referred to by Schaan (1983) positive control mechanisms, which were used 
to promote certain behaviours. This factor was labelled “informal control 
mechanisms”.
• F actor 4: F o rm a l C o n tro l M ech an ism s
Factor four was composed of two variables, which focused on the use of formal 
mechanisms of control that can be exercised in alliances. These formal mechanisms 
(equity ownership and board o f directors) have been described as negative control 
mechanisms, employed to prevent certain activities and decisions from being
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implemented (Schaan 1983). This factor was therefore labelled “formal control 
mechanisms”.
• Factor 5: Centralized Decision Making
The fifth factor is related to centralized control of decision making within strategic 
alliances and correlates highly with the two variables in the analysis (all information 
channelled through designated office and all contact between firms through alliance 
managers). It would appear from this that UK firms may have adopted a centralized 
approach to the control of information flow and a less participative role in terms of 
planning activities and decision making. This was further reinforced by the fact that 
the behavioural measures relating to participation in decision making did not load on 
any factors. Yoshino and Rangan (1995) from their analysis of interviews with 
managers in international U.S. strategic alliances found that alliances centralize 
activities whereby all outgoing and incoming information is controlled by alliance 
managers. This factor is labelled “centralized decision making”.
• Factor 6: Organizational Complexity o f Alliance
Factor 6 correlated with two of the three variables concerning the organizational 
complexity of strategic alliance. The variable “hierarchy/informal” negatively 
correlated with factor six, while the variable “flexible/inflexible was positively 
correlated. The variable “complex/simple” did not correlate with any of the factors. 
In this respect the UK firms would appear to be more informal and flexible in their 
approach. This factor was labelled “organizational complexity of alliance”.
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• F a c to r  7: In fo rm a lity
Factor 7 loaded on two of three variables in the analysis. The variable “both parties 
follow specific terms and condition of agreement” did not load on any factor and was 
eliminated from the analysis. Factor seven negatively correlated with “written 
documents set out detailed tasks and activities” and positively correlated with the 
variable “partnership is based on a shared informal understanding”. This indicated 
that UK firms do not follow rules and regulations set out in the agreement and are 
more informal in their approach. This factor was labelled “informality”
5.4.3 Construct Validity of Organizational Dimensions
A correlation matrix was constructed of the organizational variables (see Appendix 4). 
The correlation matrix provided some insights into the convergent and discriminant 
validity of the organizational constructs. The examination of the correlation matrix 
revealed significant differences between the proposed constructs. The KMO Measure 
of sampling Adequacy (MSA) and Bartlett Test of Sphericity were calculated. The 
resultant MSA (0.70) and the significance of the Bartlett Test (P<0.001) also 
suggested a highly stable instrument design.
The factor loadings are shown in Table 5.5. The results of the factor analysis showed 
that each item loaded highly on its hypothesized factor, providing evidence of 
convergent validity. Moreover, the analysis indicated no high cross loadings between 
the control and structural measures and thus the measures discriminate between the 
different constructs, providing evidence for discriminant validity. To assess the 
reliability of the items loading on each factor, (see Table 5.6) an alpha coefficient 
(Cronbach’s alpha) was computed across the items within each factor. The reliability
Chapter five: Validity and Reliability o f  Constructs 189
of the factors indicated the homogeneity of the scales. The results in Table 5.6 
indicate that all coefficients ranged from 0.60 to 0.90 except for the factors 
“organization of alliance” (r=0.58) and “formalization” (r=0.48) falling within the 
range of acceptability recommended by Nunnally (1978). These two factors 
(,organization o f alliance and formalization) provided low reliability scores prior to 
the factor analysis (see section 5.3.1) because reliable and valid measures have not 
been developed for these constructs in the literature.
Table 5.6. Reliability Analysis of Factor Dimensions
Factor Dimensions Number of Items Cronbach’s Alpha
O p e ra tio n a l c o n tro l 6 .87
T echno log ical c o n tro l 4 .88
In fo rm al c o n tro l  m e c h a n ism s 4 .67
F orm al c o n tro l  m e c h a n ism s 2 .70
C e n tra liz ed  d e c is io n -m a k in g 2 .65
O rg a n iza tio n  o f  a ll ia n c e 2 .58
F o rm a liz a tio n 2 .48
Total 25
5.5. Reliability and Validity Assessment of Success Measures 
5.5.1. Internal Consistency of Success
Success of UK international strategic alliances was measured using three multi-item 
measures and two single item measures (see section 4.5.2. for operationalization of 
success). The internal consistency of the three multi-item success measures was 
produced to test their reliability using Cronbach’s alpha. Table 5.6 provides the 
reliabilities for each of the success dimensions. As can be seen, Cronbach’s alphas 
for all three success measures are similar in magnitude and exceed the recommended
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level of .70 suggested by Nunnally (1978), thus providing evidence of reliability and 
stability.
Table 5.7. Reliability of Success Measures
Success Dimension Number of 
Items
Cronbach’s Alpha
Strategic alliance performance 3 .89
Alliance satisfaction 8 .94
UK firm objectives 3 .94
Total 14
5.5.2. Factor Analysis of Success Measures
A principal components factor analysis with varimax rotation was performed on the 
success measures to assess their construct validity. The factor solution was derived 
from a rotation of 14 variables. The results in Table 5.8 revealed two factors. These 
were factor (1) alliance satisfaction and factor (2) strategic alliance performance and 
objectives. In both factors all items loaded above 0.50. Both factors accounted for 
75.3% of the total variance.
• Factor 1: Alliance Satisfaction
Factor 1 concerns the aspects of the alliance relationship that the UK firm’s are 
satisfied with. All eight variables designed to assess alliance satisfaction in terms of 
relationship aspects (satisfied with partner in decision-making, partner sharing 
information, partner commitment, partner honesty, partner assistance in managing 
alliance activities, management interaction and compatibility o f activities) loaded 
positively on one factor. Factor 1 accounted for 39.0% of the total variance.
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• Factor 2 : Strategic Alliance Performance and Objectives
Factor 2 loaded positively on six variables relating to alliance performance and 
objectives. The three variables measuring alliance performance (profitability, sales 
growth and market share) correlated positively with the three variables measuring 
alliance satisfaction in terms of the UK firm’s overall objectives (profitability, market 
share and sales growth) to form factor 2. Factor 2 accounted for 36.3% of the total 
variance.
Table 5.8. Underlying Dimensions of International Strategic Alliance Success
Factors
Success Variables Factor 1 Factor 2
Satisfied with participation in decision-making .87
Satisfied with partner sharing information .84
Satisfied with management interaction .81
Satisfied with partner commitment .81
Satisfied with coordination of activities .80
Satisfied with partner honesty .79
Satisfied with partner assistance in managing alliance .75
Satisfied with compatibility of activities .67
Market share objectives .89
Profitability. .88
Profitability objectives .88
Sales growth objectives .87
Sales growth .85
Market share .81
5.5.3. Construct validity of Success Measures
An examination of the correlation matrix revealed high correlations among the 
measures of success in factor 1 (alliance satisfaction with relationship) which 
provides evidence for the convergent validity of this measure. Likewise, high 
convergent validity was also found for the measures of factor 2 (alliance performance 
and objectives), (see Appendix 4 for correlation matrix). An examination of the
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correlation matrix also revealed that the measures of factor 1 do not correlate highly 
with the measures of factor 2, thus providing evidence of discriminant validity.
The KMO result is very high (.904) and the Bartlett’s Test of Sphericity is 
significant(P<0.000) which indicates high stability for the measures. The 
communality values of the variables are all above 0.6 suggesting that the variances for 
all the variables are sufficiently by the two factors. The subsequent reliability of the 
two factors was examined to determine the homogeneity of the scales. The overall 
alpha for factor 1 was 0.94 and factor 2 was 0.92 which comfortably exceeds 0.70 
confirming reliability of the success measures.
The results of the reliability and factor analysis suggest that the two factors that 
correlated with measures of the success dimensions, (alliance satisfaction with 
relationship and alliance performance and objectives) have strong internal 
consistency, are highly correlated and thus have convergent and discriminant validity. 
Taken as a whole, the subjective measures of international strategic alliance success 
are good measures of this concept, as shown by the reliability and construct validity 
tests.
5.6. Summary
This chapter assessed the reliability and validity of the study’s constructs. The 
statistical analyses have provided support for the reliability and validity of the 
behavioural, organizational constructs central to the study’s research model. In
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addition analysis conducted on the dimensions of success also produced valid and
reliable measures.
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CHAPTER SIX
FINDINGS AND 
DISCUSSION
DETERMINANTS OF SUCCESSFUL AND 
LESS SUCCESSFUL UK INTERNATIONAL 
STRATEGIC ALLIANCES
6.1 INTRODUCTION
This chapter will present the statistical tests, findings and analysis of the data used 
in the study. The first section reports descriptive results regarding the sample of 
international strategic alliances. General statistics are presented on the sample of 
international strategic alliances, including the number of alliances formed, 
nationality of foreign partner, industry sector, type of alliance, function of 
alliance, motives, alliance formation, frequency and mechanisms of contact used 
in alliances and alliance survival. The second section reports the tests of the 
propositions of the study. Three separate tests were carried out. First t-tests were 
reported to test the differences between successful and less successful 
international UK alliances among the behavioural and organizational
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characteristics. Second the findings were tested with multivariate discriminant 
analysis to determine the most significant behavioural and organizational that 
discriminate between successful and less successful UK alliances. Finally the 
propositions were tested using multiple regression analysis in an attempt to 
establish which of the behavioural and organizational characteristics accurately 
predicts alliance performance.
6.2 SAMPLE CHARACTERISTICS OF UK INTERNATIONAL 
STRATEGIC ALLIANCES
6.2.1 Number of Strategic Alliances Formed
Table 6.1 shows that a total of 114 alliances were entered into by the 93 UK firms 
in this sample during the period 1988 to 1995. As can be seen from Table 6.1 the 
highest number of responses came from strategic alliances formed in 1995. This 
may be because these alliances were fairly new and still in operation at the time of 
data collection in 1998.
Table 6.1 Year of International Strategic Alliance Formation
Year Frequency Percentage Total
1988 12 10.5%
1989 12 10.5%
1990 9 7.9%
1991 13 11.4%
1992 13 11.4%
1993 15 13.2%
1994 9 7.9%
1995 31 27.2%
Total 114 100.0%
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Furthermore, it could be that managers involved in the alliance were available to 
complete the questionnaires. The higher representation of responses for 1995 may 
also be attributed to the fact that these constituted the majority in the population 
sample for the survey (see section 4.3.1).
6.2.2 Nationality of Foreign Partner
The population sample of 450 alliances that agreed to participate in the research 
included alliances from the USA, Japan, France, Germany and Italy. All three 
regions were represented in the population sample (see section 4.3.2). Yet as can 
be seen from Table 6.2 of the 114 responding UK international alliances the 
majority of responses came from alliances that entered into partnerships with 
firms from the USA (approximately 40%).
Table 6.2 International Strategie Alliances entered into by UK Firms
Partner Nationality Frequency Percentage Total
USA . 45 39.5%
Japan 28 24.7%
France 15 13.2%
Germany 15 13.2%
Italy 8 7.0%
USA/Japan 1 0.9%
Germany/France/Italy 1 0.9%
Germany/F ranee 1 0.9%
Total 114 100.0%
Approximately 33% of responses included alliances from France, Germany and 
Italy and 25% involved Japanese firms. There were also three responses that 
involved more than one country (i.e. consortia). The number of countries 
represented in the population sample of 450 alliances is fairly representative in the 
responding 114 alliances (see section 4.3.2). In the population sample 40.8% of
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alliances are represented by US partners compared to 39.5% of US partners in the 
responding sample. Similarly Japan constitutes 19.6% and France, Germany and 
Italy make up 37.1% of the population sample compared to 24.5% of Japanese 
alliances and 33.4% alliances representing France, Germany and Italy in the 
responding sample. The small number of consortia represented in the responding 
sample can be accounted for by the fact that there were only a total of eleven 
consortia in the population sample.
6.2.3 Industiy
Table 6.3 shows a breakdown of the responses received from the population 
sample of strategic alliances by industry.
Table 6.3 Industry Sector of International Strategic Alliances
Industry Sector Frequency Percentage Total
Financial Services 17 14.9%
Pharm aceutical 6 5.3%
C onstruction  and  Property 12 10.5%
Food and  D rink 5 4.4%
Engineering 1 0.9%
Electronic and Technology 3 2.6%
Heavy Industry 9 7.9%
Aerospace 5 4.4%
Telecom m unications 7 6.1%
Autom otive 7 6.1%
Chemical 8 7.0%
Leisure and E n terta inm en t 5 4.4%
Business and Inform ation  Services 10 8.8%
T ran sp o rt 5 4.4%
Utility 5 4.4%
Retailing 5 4.4%
Advertising 3 2.6%
O ther 1 0.9%
Total 114 100.0%
The 114 alliances were classified according to the industry sector of the UK firm. 
The majority of responses received were from strategic alliances concentrated in
Chapter Six: Findings and Discussion 198
the financial services (14.9%), construction and property (10.5%) sectors and 
business and information services (8.8%). These alliances constituted the most 
number of alliances in the population sample for this study. Table 6.3 has shown 
that most other alliances are fairly evenly distributed, the only two exceptions 
being engineering and the other category which were less than 1%.
6.2.4 Type of Alliance
The majority of responses received constituted 50/50 joint ventures, with seventy 
five of the alliances involving some sort of equity (see section 4.3.2). Table 6.4 
indicates the majority of responses received from alliances involved some sort of 
equity. Only 25% of responses included strategic alliances involved in 
contractual agreements, while a small number of responses included consortia. 
This characteristic is consistent with the most common patterns of division of 
equity in developed country joint ventures (Beamish 1993).
Table 6.4 Type of International Strategic Alliance
Type of Alliance Frequency Percentage Total
50:50 Joint Venture 40 35.1%
Majority Equity 22 19.3%
Minority Equity 13 11.4%
Contractual Agreement 29 25.4%
Consortium 10 8.8%
Total 114 100.0%
6.2.5 Alliance Function
Strategic alliances are set up to perform specific activities regardless of their 
equity structure (Terpstra and Simonin 1993; Yoshino and Rangan 1995). Based
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on the literature the function of a strategic alliance was categorised into six 
different categories: joint marketing agreement, joint manufacturing, joint product 
development, joint R&D agreement, shared distribution services and an other 
category (Ghemewat et al 1986; Tepstra and Simonin 1993; Yoshino and Rangan 
1995). This information was not available from secondary sources. The 
respondents have indicated that UK international strategic alliances are formed to 
perform many functional activities.
Table 6.5 Function of International Strategic Alliance
Function o f Alliance Frequency Percentage
Total
M arketing 27 23.8%
M anufac tu ring 16 14.0%
Product Developm ent 7 6.1%
R&D 2 1.8%
Shared  D istribution 13 11.4%
M arketing /P roduct Developm ent 3 2.6%
M arketing/D istribution 10 8.8%
M arketing / R& D 2 1.8%
M arketing /M anufacturing 2 1.8%
P roduct Developm ent/D istribution 1 0.9%
M arketing/R & D /Product Developm ent 2 1.8%
M arketing /M anufac tu ring /P roduct Developm ent 5 4.4%
M anufacturing/R & D 1 0.9%
M arketing/Service Provision 4 3.5%
Service Provision 4 3.5%
Account Service 1 0.9%
Investm ent Fu n d 1 0.9%
Product Expertise 1 0.9%
Property  Developm ent 2 1.8%
Investm ent 2 1.8%
New Plant 1 0.9%
C red it C a rd  Issuer 1 0.9%
M arket Presence/Service Provision 1 0.9%
C onstruction 4 3.5%
Expansion/D iversiflcation 1 0.9%
Total 114 100.0%
Over 57% of the alliances formed were engaged in only one of the activities listed 
in Table 6.5. The majority of these were involved in marketing activities. This
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clearly indicates that UK firms engage in international strategic alliances 
primarily for market oriented purposes. In 26% of the cases, the alliances were 
involved in more than one activity. The remaining 16% of alliances were formed 
for specific activities in the Service Sector, such as construction, property 
development, investment service provision.
6.2.6 Motives for Alliance Formation
Table 6.6 summarises the motives of the 114 responding firms. The analysis 
focuses on the UK firm’s motives for entering in to strategic alliance agreements 
with firms from the USA, Western Europe and Japan. Table 6.6 has indicated that 
UK firms are motivated by a multiple of factors when forming international 
strategic alliances with international firms. The results indicate that “costs and 
risks of market entry” was the most important motive for UK international 
alliances with a mean of 3.29. The spreading of financial risk is frequently cited 
as a fundamental motive for the formation of international strategic alliances 
(Porter and Fuller 1986; Contractor and Lorange 1988; Hladik 1988). It has been 
pointed out that in many industries, the development of new products can be very 
expensive with high risks involved. Strategic alliances allow firms to reduce their 
financial exposure to the costs and risks of R&D (Hladik 1988). Transaction cost 
explanations for strategic alliances also emphasize that alliances are a means of 
reducing costs and risks.
The “need to gain access in to a foreign market” (3.15), was the second most 
important motive for UK international strategic alliances and “the opportunity to 
improve market share” (3.04), was the third most important motive. Forming
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international strategic alliances to facilitate access to new markets and gain market 
share are major reasons for firms to cooperate (Harrigan 1985). This suggests that 
UK firms engage in international strategic alliances mainly to gain faster market 
entry which would enable them a quicker presence in the foreign market 
(Contractor and Lorange 1988). Glaister and Buckley (1996) identified gaining 
presence in new markets as the highest ranked motive for UK firms forming 
international alliances.
Table 6.6 Motivations for International Strategic Alliances
Motive Frequency
Important
Mean score
Costs and Risks of market entry 60 (52.6%) 3.29
Access to overseas market 54 (47.4%) 3.15
Improve market share 51 (44.8%) 3.04
Distribution channel of partner 46 (40.4%) 2.68
Marketing skills of partner 45 (39.5%) 2.90
Management skills of partner 39 (34.2%) 2.87
International competition 39 (34.2%) 2.71
Costs of operating in market 38 (33.3%) 2.67
Costs and risks of NPD 35 (30.7%) 2.61
Costs of distribution networks 35 (30.7%) 2.38
Economies of scope 34 (29.8%) 2.50
R&D capability of partner 32 (28.1%) 2.38
Technological competition 27 (23.7%) 2.19
Economies of scale 26 (22.8%) 2.21
Costs of R&D 26 (22.8%) 2.13
Shorter product life cycle 15(13.2%) 1.78
Scale l=not at all important, 5= very important
The mean score for each motive is shown in the relevant column
The next three most important motives include “distribution channels of partner” 
(2.68), “marketing skills of partner” (2.90), and “management skills of partner” 
(2.87). Although the results indicated that the acquisition of skills are fairly 
important, the majority of UK firms considered them to be less important. This 
result is not surprising since it has been suggested that Western firms primarily 
collaborate to reduce costs and risks (Hamel et al 1989) and not to enhance their
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technologies and acquire new skills. UK international alliances also considered 
other motives relating to costs such as costs of operating in the market (2.67), 
costs and risks of NPD (2.61), costs of distribution (2.38) and costs of R&D 
(2.13). Other motives which appear to be less important include “international 
competition”, “technological competition”, and “economies of scale and scope”.
6.2.7 Frequency and Mechanisms of Contact
The results of Table 6.7 indicate that personal face to face contact (76.3%) and 
contact by telephone, using memos and written reports (76.3%) is very high. This 
mode of contact has been cited as being the “most rich” (Mohr and Nevin 1990). 
The frequency of contact is also high, with 71.9% of alliances keeping in contact 
on a daily and weekly basis.
Table 6.7 Frequency of Contacts and Contact Mechanisms Used
Contact Mechanism Important Frequency of 
Contact
Frequency
Personal face to face discussions 87 76.3% Daily 42 36.8%
Letters, memos, w ritten  rep o rts 58 50.9% W eekly 40 35.1%
Telephone calls 87 76.3% M onthly 18 15.8%
G roup /  C om m ittee m eetings 55 48.3% Q uarterly 7 6.1%
Board meetings 51 44.7% Vi Yearly 0 0.0%
Yearly 1 0.9%
No set frequency 6 5.3%
Never 0 0.0%
Scale l=not at all important, 5=very Important
The “Important”  category represents the sum of 4 and 5 on the scale
This suggests that managers involved in the alliance communicate regularly. 
Ruekert and Walker (1987) found that the higher the frequency of contact, the less 
likely they are to encounter difficulty in communicating effectively. This does 
suggest that UK international alliances, which are in contact regularly, are 
communicating more frequently, coordinating their efforts and there is less
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conflict. There were only 15.8% of alliances who kept in contact on a monthly 
basis and there were no alliances that never kept contact.
6.2.8 Survival and Age of Sample alliances
Eighty-four of the 114 strategic alliances (73.7%) were still in operation at the 
time of the data collection in 1997/1998. Table 6.9 shows that 30 alliances were 
terminated. More than half of these 30 non-surviving alliances had ceased 
operation within four years of being formed.
Table 6.8 Terminated International Strategic Alliances
Alliance Age Terminations Termination Reason Terminations
1 - 2  Years 9 Acquisition 7
3 - 4  Years 9 Perform ance below expected 3
5 - 6  Years 9 O bjectives not met 2
7 - 9  Years 3 D isagreem ents 1
Pro ject Com pleted 8
O th er 9
Total 30 30
This does not indicate that the alliances were terminated because they failed, since 
only six of the 30 alliances ceased due to reasons of disagreements, objectives not 
being met and low levels of performance. Of the remaining 24 alliances, seven 
were terminated because of acquisitions and eight came to an end because the 
alliance project had been completed. The nine remaining alliances gave no reason 
for their termination. The results in Table 6.9 also show that 60% of terminated 
alliances ended within four years compared to 40% of terminated alliances being 
dissolved after five years.
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6.2.9 Future of Alliance
Of the 114 UK international strategic alliances, 31 (27.2%) alliances had agreed 
on a termination plan. These 31 alliances which agreed on a termination plan 
include the 30 terminated alliances. Of the remaining 83 alliances, approximately 
16% were undecided on the future of their alliance compared to 57% of alliances 
in which both parties anticipated a long-term relationship. It has been suggested 
that alliances that agree on a date of termination are the most satisfied (Taucher 
1988). Over 50% of the alliances had anticipated a long-term relationship. It has 
been suggested that long-term relationships enhance the performance of alliances. 
Anderson and Weitz (1992) refer to long-term arrangement in a relationship as 
“commitment” and indicate that mutual commitment results in independent firms 
working together to serve customer needs better and increase mutual profitability.
Table 6.9 Time Period of International Strategic Alliance Partners
Time Period Frequency Percent
Both aeree  on term ination  plan 31 27.2%
Undecided 18 15.8%
Both an tic ipa te  lone-term  relationship 65 57%
Total 114 100.0%
Scale l=Both agree on termination, 5=Both agree long-term
Both agree on termination represents 1 and 2 on the scale
Both agree on long-term relationship represents 4 and 5 on the scale
6.3 UK INTERNATIONAL STRATEGIC ALLIANCE
6.3.1 Alliance Performance
In rating the success of UK international strategic alliances in the current study, 
two measures of alliance success were applied (see section 4.5.2 for measures
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used and see questions 37, 38, 39, 40 and 42 in Appendix 2). Respondents to the 
survey were asked to evaluate the performance of the alliance by, first, indicating 
which of the eleven (see Table 6.10) criteria they used to evaluate performance 
and, second, in terms of these criteria, indicate the success of the alliance. The 
results in Table 6.10 suggest that market share, sales growth and profitability are 
the most important criteria used by UK firms engaged in international strategic 
alliances since all 114 respondents used them as criteria for evaluating the 
performance of the alliance. Furthermore, approximately 57% of alliances were 
successful in terms of market share, sales growth and profitability. 
Approximately 20% of UK firms indicated that their alliances were unsuccessful 
in meeting market share, sales growth and profitability targets and just over 22% 
confirmed that moderate success had been achieved. These results indicate that 
UK firms engaged in international alliances appear to exhibit high performance in 
terms of these three criteria. This would suggest that securing profits, market 
share and sales growth are important performance criteria for UK firms engaged 
in international strategic alliances. Previous researchers have identified these 
three indicators as reliable subjective measures of performance (Schaan 1983; 
Artisien 1985; Geringer and Herbert 1991; Dussauge and Garrette 1994).
Over 50% of the 114 respondents considered access to market, competitive 
position, return on investment and marketing as being important criteria for 
evaluating alliance performance. These respondents indicated that the 
performance of the alliance was more successful in terms of access to market, 
competitive positioning, marketing and return on investment than less successful.
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For the rating of cost control, technology development, product design and 
distribution, just over 40% of the respondents considered these criteria in their 
evaluation of alliance performance. However, despite these criteria being 
regarded as significant for approximately 40% of the respondents, more than half 
of these respondents considered the performance of the alliance to be successful in 
terms of technology development, cost control, product design and distribution.
Table 6.10 Descriptive Results of UK International Strategic Alliance
Performance
Perform ance
M easure
R espondent Successful in 
term s o f 
Perform ance
M oderate 
Success with 
Perform ance
Unsuccessful 
in term s of 
Perform ance
Too early  to 
C om m ent
M arket share 114 65 (57%) 26 (22.8%) 23 (20.0%) -
Sales grow th 114 65 (57%) 32(28.1% ) 17(14.9%) -
Profitability 114 64 (56.2%) 27 (23.7%) 23 (20.2%) -
Access to m arket 80 49(61.3% ) 17 (21.3%) 10(12.5%) 4 (5.0%)
Cost contro l 48 19 (39.6%) 11 (22.9%) 14 (29.2%) 4 (8.3%)
Competitive
position
74 32 (43.3%)) 16(21.6%) 18(24.3%) 8(10.8% )
Technology
development
43 26 (60.5%) 8(18.6% ) 6(14.0% ) 3 (7.0%)
Product design 42 23 (54.8%) 10(23.8% ) 7(14.3% ) 2 (4.8%)
M arketing 60 27 (45.0%) 16 (26.7%) 13(21.7%) 4 (6.7%)
Distribution 35 16 (54.7%) 10 (28.6%) 6(17.1% ) 3 (8.6%)
R eturn on 
investm ent (R O I)
72 27 (37.5%) 13(18.1% ) 18(25.0% ) 14(19.4% )
Seal* l=very unsuccessful, 5=very successful
The above findings suggest that, in assessing alliance performance, operational 
aspects such as technology development and cost control are utilized by UK 
partners and result in higher performance for UK international alliances compared 
to for example marketing. This finding is inconsistent with that of Glaister and 
Wu (1994) who found that operational areas resulted in the highest performance 
for UK partners engaged in alliances with firms from China compared to sales and 
marketing which resulted in lower performance. It should be noted that Glaister 
and Wu’s (1994) sample consisted of only 21 UK international joint ventures
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The above results suggest that profitability, market share and sales growth appear 
to be the primary criteria used for evaluating alliance performance by UK firms 
engaged in international alliances. Furthermore, profitability, market share and 
sales growth would appear to be sufficient for measuring the performance of the 
alliance since all 114 respondents have indicated their use of this measure over all 
other measures. This finding is inconsistent with that of Glaister and Wu (1994) 
who suggested that profitability, market share and sales growth are not measures 
which are mostly utilized by UK international alliances. In terms of the other 
criteria listed in Table 6.10, it would be unrealistic to suggest that these criteria 
are less important for UK international alliances. Rather, it would be more 
appropriate to maintain that UK international alliances’ evaluation of success 
along these criteria are reflected by their interest in these areas. These findings 
suggest that on the whole, UK international alliances have been successful in their 
performance in terms of their primary alliance success criteria (profitability, 
market share and sales growth) as well their less important success criteria. The 
results also suggest that performance is not evaluated on economic criteria alone 
and that a range of performance indicators can be utilized, all of which have been 
shown to be significant in the success of UK international strategic alliances.
A number of important conclusions can be drawn from the data represented in 
Table 6.10 to understand what alliance performance means to UK firms engaged 
in international alliances. The results have shown that there is no single criterion 
that is applicable to all alliances. It appears that UK alliances measure success 
along criteria that reflect their goals and objectives. Secondly UK alliances take 
into consideration a number of criteria rather than just one. As the data in Table
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6.10 indicates, all of the 114 respondents used a combination of criteria to 
measure the performance of their alliance. The implication here may be that 
alliance performance does not mean the same thing to all firms. While they are 
assessing their alliances with a multiplicity of goals and objectives, the findings 
indicate that profitability, market share and sales growth appear to be the primary 
criterion used by UK firms when assessing alliance performance and alliance 
satisfaction.
6.3.2 Alliance Satisfaction
• Satisfaction with the Relationship
Alliance satisfaction was assessed by asking respondents to indicate their 
satisfaction with certain aspects of the alliance relationship with their partner firm. 
The results in Table 6.11 indicate that the level of honesty of the partner firm is a 
very important factor for UK firms and that UK firms were most satisfied (62.3%) 
with this aspect of their relationship. Approximately 57% of UK partners were 
satisfied with the alliance relationship in terms of the level of commitment shown 
by their international partners and by the level of interaction between managers. 
UK partners appear to be less satisfied with the coordination of activities, 
compatibility of activities, participation in decision-making, sharing information 
and partner assistance in managing alliance activities, for which less than 50% of 
the respondents were satisfied. However, overall UK alliances were more 
satisfied with these aspects of the relationship then less satisfied.
The above results suggest that the success of UK international alliances is not just 
determined by profitability, market share and sales growth. It also means having
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trust and commitment in your partner as well as a high level of interaction 
between managers. Satisfaction with certain aspects of an alliance relationship 
has been investigated by previous researchers (Ruekert and Walker 1984; Mohr 
and Spekman 1994) and has shown that satisfaction with certain aspects of the 
alliance relationship between partners can serve as a proxy for partnership success 
(Mohr and Spekman 1994).
Table 6.11 Descriptive Results for UK International Strategic Alliance 
Satisfaction with Alliance Relationship
Satisfaction  M easure R espondent
Satisfied with 
Relationship
M oderate
Satisfaction
Not Satisfied 
with
Relationship
C oord ination  o f activities 114 53 (46.5%) 40(35.1) 21 (18.4%)
Level o f  in te rac tio n  between m anagers 114 65 (57%) 31 (27.2%) 18(15.8%)
C om patib ility  o f activities 114 54 (47.3%) 40(35.1% ) 20(17.5% )
P artic ip atio n  in  decision-m aking by 
p a rtn e r
114 55 (48.2%) 31 (27.2%) 28 (24.6%)
Level o f com m itm ent shown by p a rtn e r 114 65 (57.1%) 23 (20.2%) 26 (22.8%)
P a rtn e r sh a rin g  inform ation 114 43 (37.7%) 37 (32.5%) 34 (29.8%)
P a rtn e r assistance in m anaging alliance 
activities
114 54 (47.4%) 37 (32.5%) 23 (20.2%)
Level o f honesty  shown to y o u r firm 114 71 (62.3%) 24 (21.1%) 19(16.7%)
Scale l= very  dissatisfied, 5=very satisfied
• Satisfaction with Overall Objectives
Another assessment of alliance satisfaction measured the extent to which the 
objectives of the UK firms had been met in terms of five criteria: profits, market 
share, sales growth, market development and product development. The results in 
Table 6.12 suggest that all 114 respondents indicated that their firm’s overall 
objectives were determined by profits, market share and sales growth compared to 
96 respondents using market development and 92 respondents using product 
development as criteria for measuring overall objectives met. It appears that 
profits, market share and sales growth are dominant objectives and source of
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satisfaction for UK international strategic alliances. Furthermore, UK 
international alliances are in agreement on using profits, market share and sales 
growth as measures of alliance satisfaction in terms of overall objectives met. 
These results are interesting, since earlier it was indicated that profitability, 
market share and sales growth are also employed as the primary indicators of 
performance measurement in UK international alliances.
Table 6.12 Descriptive Results for UK International Strategic Alliance 
Satisfaction with Meeting Alliance Objectives
Satisfaction M easure Respondents Satisfied M oderate
Satisfaction
N ot Satisfied
Profits 114 59 (51.7%) 26 (22.8%) 29 (25.4%)
M arket share 114 61 (53.5%) 30 (26.3%) 23 (20.2%)
Sales grow th 114 57 (50%) 33 (28.9%) 24(21.1% )
M arket developm ent 96 44 (44.0%) 31 (31.0%) 21 (21.0%)
Product development 92 40  (43.0%) 24 (25.8%) 28 (30.1%)
Scale l=not at all, 5=very well
• Satisfaction with Overall Alliance Performance
Respondents were asked to indicate their level of satisfaction with the overall 
performance of the alliance (see Table 6.13). All 114 UK international alliances 
responded to the questionnaire item that measured satisfaction with overall 
performance of the alliance. Of the 114 respondents approximately 52% were 
satisfied with the overall performance with 25% being just moderately satisfied 
and less than 23% not satisfied. These findings are similar to the results of alliance 
performance and satisfaction with objectives. Over 50% of respondents reported 
that their alliances were performed successfully compared to no more than 20% of 
alliances whose performance was below expectations. Similarly over 50% of 
respondents reported satisfaction with overall objectives in terms of profits.
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market share and sales growth, with no more than 25% reporting dissatisfaction 
with these same objectives. Therefore, satisfaction with the alliance’s overall 
performance strengthens the effectiveness of the results of the other success 
criteria by suggesting that overall the UK partners are satisfied with their 
international strategic alliances which also appear to enjoy higher performance 
levels.
Table 6.13 Descriptive Results for UK International Strategic Alliance 
Satisfaction with Overall Performance of the Alliance
Satisfaction M easure Satisfied M oderate
Satisfaction
Not Satisfied
Overall Perform ance 59 (51.7%) 29 (25.4%) 26 (22.8%)
Scale l=very dissatisfied, 5=very satisfied
• Perception of Partner Satisfaction
As a final way of assessing alliance satisfaction, UK respondents were asked to 
indicate their perception of their partner’s satisfaction with the performance of the 
alliance (see Table 6.14). According to the UK firms, their international partners 
are generally more satisfied (52.6%) and moderately satisfied (28.1%) with 
performance than less satisfied (19.3%). These findings are similar to the UK 
partner’s own perception of alliance satisfaction which suggests that their 
international partners are also satisfied.
Table 6.14 Descriptive Results for UK Firms Perception of Partner
Satisfaction
Satisfaction Measure Satisfied Moderate
Satisfaction
Not Satisfied
Partner satisfaction 60 (52.6%) 32 (28.1%) 22(19.3%)
Scale lsVery dissatisfied, 5=Very satisfied
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6.3.3 Summary: Alliance Success
The above discussion has indicated how UK firms engaged in international 
strategic alliances measure success. The findings suggest that UK international 
strfegic alliances appear to have higher levels of performance and are more 
satisfied than less satisfied with the success of their alliances.
In trying to develop an understanding of how success is measured by UK 
international alliances, the results have suggested that there is no single success 
measure which is used by UK firms and that a combination of criteria are used. 
This is not surprising since the 114 UK international alliances in this study 
constituted a range of strategic alliances formed across a wide range of industries. 
It would be expected that criteria used by one alliance are different to criteria used 
by another alliance since each will have their own goals and objectives. However, 
the findings have indicated that there is consistency across all UK international 
strategic alliances in their use of profitability, market share and sales growth 
measures. As a result these three measures will be combined to form a single 
success measure for subsequent analysis. This issue will be discussed in the next 
section.
6.4 CLASSIFICATION OF UK INTERNATIONAL 
STRATEGIC ALLIANCES BY SUCCESS
UK international strategic alliances were catergorised as successful and less 
successful prior to the t-tests, MDA and regression analysis. Information was 
obtained on the success o f UK international strategic alliances through responses 
to a mail questionnaire. The sample o f 114 UK international strategic alliances
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that responded to the questionnaire were split into two groups: successful and less 
successful UK international strategic alliances based on the mean aggregate scores 
of the measures that examined alliance success. Data was collected on perceived 
alliance performance and alliance satisfaction (see section 4.5.2.). In terms of 
perceived performance alliances were classified according to profitability, market 
share and sales growth (see section 6.3). These three measures were common to 
all the respondents who completed the questionnaire and thus appear to be the 
most popular indicators of alliance performance for UK international strategic 
alliances. To provide an overall measure of alliance success the average score on 
all three performance variables was computed. A mean value for each alliance 
was computed. A successful alliance group and less successful alliance group 
were defined, where alliances with a score above “3.5” were considered 
successful and alliances that scored below “3.5” were considered less successful. 
This procedure resulted in 64 (56.1%) alliances being classified as successful and 
50 (43.9%) alliances being classified as less successful. Previous researchers 
(Doyle et al 1992; Shaw 1994) have used this approach.
The above classification was also used to categorize alliance satisfaction 
measures. As already described in section 4.5.2 alliance satisfaction was assessed 
using four measures. For the first measure, satisfaction with the relationship a 
mean score was computed for 114 respondents along eight dimensions. Based on 
the mean aggregate scores the 114 respondents were split into 60 (52.6%) 
successful and 54 (47.4%) less successful alliances. Similarly, the second 
measure, satisfaction with overall performance using the same procedure was 
classified in to 59 (51.8%) successful alliances and 55 (48.2%) less successful
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alliances. For a third measure, satisfaction with alliance objectives a mean score 
was computed for three dimensions (profits, market share and sales growth) and a 
classification of 59 (51.8%) successful and 55 (48.2%) less successful alliances 
was obtained. Finally, the measure partner satisfaction was categorized in to 60 
(52.6%) successful alliances and 54 (47.4%) less successful alliances. An 
analysis of the success of each individual international strategic alliance showed 
that there was little variation in classification between each of the different 
success measures. This suggests that over 50% of the sample of international 
alliances examined appear to be successful.
As stated in section 6.1 the propositions of the study will be tested using t-test, 
multivariate discriminant analysis and multiple regression. For both the t-tests 
and MDA, the computed mean score for both alliance performance and alliance 
satisfaction measures will be used in the analysis. For the regression analysis, 
each single measure of both dependent variables will be used rather than a mean 
score (see section 6.8). While the data will be analysed using both dependent 
variables (alliance performance and alliance satisfaction measures) the results in 
this chapter will only be reported for the dependent variable alliance performance 
because of the extent of the results. The findings for alliance satisfaction can be 
found in Appendix 5.
6.5 INDEPENDENT VARIABLES: BEHAVIOURAL AND 
ORGANIZATIONAL CHARACTERISTICS
In measuring international strategic alliance success it has been argued that there 
are several dimensions of behavioural attributes linked to alliance success (Mohr
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and Spekman 1994; Cravens and Shipp 1993; Monczka et al 1998). Considerable 
research has been devoted to identifying these alliance attributes. Empirical 
research has linked alliance success to commitment and trust (Mohr and Spekman 
1994; Anderson and Narus 1990; Morgan and Hunt 1994), coordination (Mohr 
and Spekman 1994), interdependence (Buchanan 1992) and communication 
(Mohr and Nevin 1990. The organizational attributes of this study (see section 
2.5.2) included structure and control. The issue of control has been shown to be a 
critical factor that determines how firms can be successful in the alliances they 
form (Geringer and Herbert 1989; Mjoen and Tallman 1997). There has been 
very little empirical work that has addressed how the structure of the alliance can 
affect the performance.
Although a factor analysis (see chapter five) resulted in a reduced set of variables 
the analysis emphasised the aggregation of all the behavioural and organizational 
variables associated with each of the independent variable concepts. That is the 
factor analysis determines the grouping of variables based on the correlation 
between the variables. Each factor generated considers only those variables with 
higher factor loadings, omitting variance associated with variables having weak 
loadings and ignoring sample variance that has not been included in the factor 
solution. As a result factor interpretations are based on a portion of the sample 
variance that has been systematically isolated rather than on the total variance in 
the original sample (Kim and Mueller 1982; Hair et al 1998). Furthermore, the 
preliminary data analysis included only multi-scale items. It was felt that 
summarizing the variables would result in a loss of potentially valuable 
information for understanding the characteristics of each group. The t-test will
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compare the amount of variability due to the predicted differences in scores 
between the two groups against the total variability in respondents scores. Thus 
the t-test will take into account the size of the difference between the means for 
the two groups, taking the total variance in to account. For the t-test analysis, 123 
out of the total 126 behavioural and organizational variables were included. Three 
variables (product planning, production planning and R&D) were omitted from 
the t-test analysis because of missing data. The t-test using SPSS does not 
account for missing values and thus these variables had to be excluded.
Similarly raw data was also used with the MDA because it has been suggested 
that factor scores from a factor analysis cannot be used in MDA because a poor 
representation of the true data structure would be obtained. Furthermore, in using 
raw data for the t-tests and MDA represents consistency in data analysis. For the 
regression analysis however, the factor scores were used because of issues of 
multicollinearity. The impact of multicollinearity is to reduce an independent 
variables predictive power by the extent to which it is associated with other 
independent variables. As the correlation between two or more independent 
variables increases, the unique variance explained by each independent variable 
decreases and all but one provide redundant information and thus each uniquely 
contributes little to the predictive power of the dependent variable (Hair et al 
1998; Afifi and Clark 1996). In order to maximize the prediction from a given 
number of independent variables, the independent variables should have low 
multicollinearity with the other independent variables but also have high 
correlations with the dependent variable (Hair et al 1998). The factor analysis 
produced factor scores for both the behavioural and organizational measures.
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which the independent variables are highly correlated with other independent 
variables in the same factor, but not highly correlated with independent variables 
from other factors. Therefore, the problem of multicollinearity can be evaded 
when the regression models were tested.
6.6 DIFFERENCES NETWEEN SUCCESSFUL AND LESS 
SUCCESSFUL UK INTERNATIONAL STRATEGIC 
ALLIANCES
The first step in examining the data prior to the multiple discriminant analysis 
(MDA) and regression analysis was to test the propositions concerning the 
behavioural and organizational determinants of international strategic alliance 
success using t-tests. The means, standard deviations and the t-tests for the other 
success measures showed similar results and will not be discussed here. The 
results of these tests can, however, be found in Appendix 5.
6.6.1 Partnership Attributes
6.6.1.1 Level of Coordination
P roposition  1: T he le v e l  o f  coord in a tion  b e tw een  p a r tn e rs  w ill b e  h ig h er  f o r  
su ccess fu l U K  in te rn a tio n a l s tra teg ic  a llia n c e s  co m p a re d  w ith  le ss  su ccessfu l 
in te rn a tio n a l s tra teg ic  a llia n ces.
Respondents were asked to describe the level o f coordination between their firm 
and their partner firm. The results in Table 6.15 reveal that there are significant 
differences between successful and less successful UK international strategic
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alliances in terms of coordination. This suggests that UK international alliances 
that have higher alliance performance have a higher level of coordination than UK 
international alliances that characterized by lower performance. Thus coordinated 
partners are more successful in terms of market share, sales growth and 
profitability. Ten of the 11 characteristics (teamwork with partner, exchange of 
ideas with partner, partner activities are an extension o f  the UK firm's activities, 
interaction between managers, partner informed of important decisions, partner 
integrated with UK firm, UK firm integrated with partner, coordinated activities, 
working together to achieve objectives, goals/objectives consistent with partner) 
of coordination show a significant difference between successful and less 
successful international alliances. Eight of these ten characteristics exhibited high 
reliability (see section 5.3). Three of the characteristics were not tested for 
reliability because they were single-item measures (coordinated activities, 
working together to achieve objectives and goals/objectives consistent with 
partner).
The mean scores against all the variables were higher for successful UK alliances, 
except the variable strategic fit for which no difference was found (see Table 
6.15). The variable strategic fit had a low item-to-total correlation in the 
reliability analysis (see section 5.3) and thus it appears that this characteristic of 
coordination is not effective in differentiating between successful and less 
alliances. The exchange of ideas between partners (mean=4.08) and we keep our 
partner well informed o f important decisions (mean=4.05) appear to be the most 
highly rated characteristics of successful alliances.
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Table 6.15 Differences in the Level of Coordination between Successful and 
Less Successful UK International Strategic Alliances in terms of
Performance
Coordination
Successful
G roup
Mean
SD
Less Successful 
G roup
Mean SD
Difference 
T value Sig
Team w ork w ith p a rtn e r 3.88 0.95 2.90 1.04 5.22 .000*
Exchange of ideas with p a r tn e r 4.08 0.88 3.00 1.05 5.97 .000*
Strategic fit 2.36 1.00 2.64 1.08 -1.43 Ns
P artn er activities an  extension o f  UK 
firm ’s activities
3.20 1.31 2.40 1.29 3.26 .001*
Interaction between m anagers 3.77 1.11 2.96 1.21 3.70 .000*
P artner inform ed of im po rtan t decisions 4.05 0.9 3.42 0.99 3.52 .001*
P artn er in tegrated  with UK f irm 2.95 1.20 2.24 1.06 3.31 .001*
UK firm  in tegrated  with p a r tn e r 2.92 1.17 2.12 1.02 3.83 .000*
C oordinated activities 3.84 0.86 2.28 1.10 5.58 .000*
W orking together to achieve objectives 3.66 0.88 2.92 1.01 4.17 .000*
Goals/objectives consistent w ith 
p a rtn e r’s
3.81 0.89 2.94 1.08 4.74 .000*
Scale l=Not at all well; 5=Very well 
♦Difference significant a t the 0.001 level
This suggests that exchanging ideas and keeping each other informed about 
important decisions are probably necessary for the partners in coordinating their 
activities to achieve their mutual objectives. This may depend on how closely 
each partner’s activities are coordinated, how well the different functional groups 
of each party work as a team towards achieving the objectives of the alliance and 
the level of interaction and integration between the partner’s. This suggests that 
successful UK alliances are more likely to coordinate their activities compared to 
less successful UK alliances in order to achieve their objectives. Thus, there is 
strong support for the proposition that successful UK international strategic 
alliances are more likely to be coordinated compared to less successful alliance.
As suggested in the literature review, there has been little investigation of 
coordination and its impact on the success of international strategic alliances. The
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findings of this study are consistent with that of Mohr and Spekman (1994) and 
Monckza et al (1998) both of whom found coordination as a significant predictor 
for successful alliances. However Mohr and Spekman (1994) used two measures 
of coordination in their analysis for which the reliability was satisfactory (r=0.68). 
Monckza et al (1998) relied on one single measure of coordination. Both studies 
investigated dealer-supplier type relationships and the measure of coordination 
was applied in this context. Therefore, Mohr and Spekman (1994) and Monckza 
et al (1998) have not fully tapped the coordination dimension by failing to identify 
some of the critical attributes of coordination that may be associated with 
successful alliances that have been identified in the current study. Furthermore, 
neither study found significant differences between successful and less successful 
international alliances in terms of the level of coordination. The scales used in the 
current study showed a high level of reliability (r=0.88) and thus provide 
encouraging evidence about the utility of these measures. Thus the current study 
provides greater empirical support that more successful UK international alliances 
exhibita higher level of coordination than less successful international alliances.
While managers of successful performing international strategic alliances need to 
realize the benefits of maintaining a high level of coordination between partner 
firms, managers of less successful performing alliances may feel that is essential 
for them to develop and adopt coordinating mechanisms to promote coordinated 
goals and activities toward the aims of the alliance.
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6.6.1.2 Level of Interdependence
Proposition 2: The level o f interdependence between partners will be higher for  
successful UK international strategic alliances compared with less successful
international strategic alliances
Table 6.16 Differences in the Level of Interdependence between Successful 
and Less Successful UK international Strategic Alliances in terms of
Performance
Interdependence
Successful G roup Less Successful 
G roup
Difference
Mean SD Mean SD T value Sig
Equally dependent 3.14 1.32 2.16 1.18 4.12 .000*
P a rtn e r replaceable 2.59 1.16 2.76 1.12 -.77 NS
Likelv to sw itch to new p a rtn e r 1.72 0.98 2.42 1.40 -3.14 .002**
Dependent o f financial resources 1.67 0.99 1.86 1.26 -.89 NS
Dependent on technological resources 2.78 1.17 1.84 0.96 4.60 .000*
Dependent on m anagem ent skills 2.55 0.96 1.90 0.93 3.62 .000*
Dependent on m arketing 2.70 1.33 2.40 1.40 1.18 NS
Dependent on sales/profit 2.45 1.38 2.00 1.07 1.92 NS
Dependent on m arket inform ation 2.56 1.30 2.48 1.18 .35 NS
Dependent on custom er services 2.66 1.46 2.22 1.28 1.67 NS
Dependent on m anufacturing 1.95 1.39 1.36 0.92 2.61 .010 **
Dependent on adm in istration 1.69 0.99 2.04 1.11 -1.79 NS
Dependent on m anpow er 2.39 1.34 2.14 1.28 1.01 NS
Scale l=not a t all; 5=V'ery much so 
•Difference significant at 0.001 level 
••Difference significant at the 0.01 level
Respondents were asked to rate their level of dependency on their partner as well 
as their level of dependency on their partner in terms of a number of resources and 
skills. The results of the t-test in Table 6.16 support the proposition that 
successful UK international alliances are more likely to be interdependent 
compared to less successful alliances. Only five (equally dependent, likely to 
switch to a new partner and dependent on technological resources, management 
skills, and manufacturing) of the thirteen interdependence variables were 
significantly different between successful and less successful alliances. These
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results indicate that “equally dependent” appears to be the most important 
characteristic (mean=3.14) of successful international alliances which suggests 
that high performing UK international alliances are more equally dependent on 
each other compared to less successful alliances that are less dependent on each 
other. In addition, less successful performing UK international alliances are more 
likely to switch partner’s compared to successful performing UK international 
alliances.
The results also show that dependency on technological skills, manufacturing and 
management are more characteristic of UK firms engaged in international 
alliances which have higher levels of performance. Dependency on “financial, 
marketing, sales/profit, market information, customer services, administration and 
manpower” showed no significant differences between the two groups which 
suggest that these characteristics are possibly less significant for UK firms 
engaged in international strategic alliances. There is also the possibility that these 
resources and skills may be more important to the international partner than to the 
UK firm. This shows that partner’s in successful UK international alliance 
relationships support the growth of separate competitive strengths. On the whole 
the results have indicated that while both partner’s in successful UK international 
strategic alliances are equally dependent on each other, the UK partners are 
dependent upon their partner’s for manufacturing, management and technological 
skills. It may be that the UK firm’s dependence on their partner for these 
resources are needed by them to maintain their relationship with the partner to 
achieve their goals. In other words, the UK partner needs the other partner for 
these resources to benefit from the relationship.
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While theorist have proposed that interdependence between partners is the basis 
for the success of the alliance (Frazier 1983; Geyskens et al 1996), the results of 
the current study are not entirely consistent with previous research. In their study 
of 124 dealer-suppliers in the personal computer industry, Mohr and Spekman 
(1994) found that interdependence was not a significant predictor of partnership 
performance. In Monckza et al’s (1998) study interdependence emerged as a 
significant predictor of success in industrial strategic supplier alliances but not in 
market channel relationships. Monckza et al (1998) further stated that despite this 
significant result, interdependence was not a critical antecedent for success 
because of the small beta value of 0.107 in their regression analysis. The results 
of these two studies may be due, in part to the measures used to assess 
interdependence. Mohr and Spekman (1994) used two items to measure 
interdependence which had very low reliability (r=0.26). Monckza et al (1998) 
used Mohr and Spekman’s (1994) two measures in addition to one extra measure. 
The regression analysis presented in section 6.8 will consider how well these 
issues predict the success of UK international strategic alliances.
Previous research has also suggested that alliances with higher asymmetric 
interdependence are less stable and less trusting and more likely to be 
dysfunctional because of the exploitation opportunities that may result from the 
imbalance (Kumar et al 1995; Anderson and Weitz 1989). The results from Table
6.16 indicate that interdependence between successful UK international alliances 
is quite symmetrical since they are equally dependent and as a result they are less 
likely to be opportunistic compared to less successful UK international alliances 
which are more asymmetrical, as they are less dependent on each other. This
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suggests that partners within successful UK international alliances are more likely 
to value each other’s resources and thus need to share their expertise and 
knowledge to achieve their mutual objectives. These results are supportive of 
Buchanan (1992) and Kumar et al’s (1995) finding that symmetrical 
interdependence enhances performance. While overall there were few significant 
differences between the two groups in terms of the UK’s dependency on resources 
and skills the mean scores for successful alliances showed higher dependence. 
Although there is no empirical investigation that examines the UK firm’s 
dependence on the resources and skills of international firms, the current study 
suggests that successful UK international firms perceive technological and 
manufacturing skills as more essential to their firm’s operation than financial and 
marketing skills and thus aim to develop and maintain relationships with 
international firms controlling these resources. Thus the results of this study 
clearly demonstrate that interdependency between UK international partner’s 
enhances their ability to achieve their performance goals in relation to their stated 
objectives and thus leads to the success of the alliance. Therefore, managers need 
to understand that equal dependence between partners can be instrumental to the 
alliances ability to improve its performance and thus should attempt to make sure 
that international partners on whom the UK firms are dependent upon need to 
provide the critical resources that will enable them to achieve their performance 
goals and vice versa. Furthermore, a more interdependent relationship will result 
in partners less likely to switch partners, thereby providing a long lasting 
successful relationship for both parties.
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6.6.1.3 Level of Commitment
Proposition 3: The level o f commitment between partners will be higher for  
successful UK international strategic alliances compared with less successful 
international strategic alliances
Respondents were asked to rate the level of commitment in the alliance 
partnership. The commitment levels of both successful and less successful 
alliances were examined and compared. Table 6.17 shows the results of the 
comparison. The results of the t-tests showed very strong support for the 
proposition that the level of commitment is higher for successful UK international 
alliances compared to less successful UK international alliances whose level of 
commitment is shown to be lower. The two groups differed significantly on all 
twenty-eight characteristics of commitment. These characteristics have shown to 
exhibit high reliabilities (see section 5.3) indicating that they are proficient in 
measuring the characteristics of commitment in UK international strategic 
alliances.
• Commitment to alliance goals and values
The results in Table 6.17 show that successful international alliances are more 
likely to agree on the goals and objectives o f the alliance, the way in which 
activities are performed, the contractual terms o f the agreement, the strategic 
direction o f the alliance, how resources are allocated, who makes key decisions, 
roles and functions performed by each partner, future plans and prospects, 
conflict resolution and daily operation of the alliance. Successful international 
alliances are also more likely to be committed to their partner’s by showing a
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strong sense o f loyalty and belonging to the partnership, identifying with the 
alliance goals and objectives, having a shared vision and believing the 
partnership to be valuable. Thus more successful UK international alliances are 
more likely to have committed partners who identify with the goals and values of 
the alliance compared to less successful alliances.
• C o m m itm en t to  m a k e  a n  e ffo r t f o r  th e  a llia n ce
UK firms engaged in international alliances are more inclined to listen to their 
partner’s problems and try to help them solve them, encourage their firm to 
achieve the goals of the alliance, try to satisfy their partner’s needs, put effort and 
investment in to building the relationship, be patient with their partner if mistakes 
are made and make compromises to reach mutual objectives. This suggests that 
UK firm’s involved in successful international alliances are more willing to make 
an effort to meet the alliances goals and interests on behalf of the relationship 
compared to UK firm’s in less successful alliances.
• C o m m itm en t to  stay  in  th e  re la tio n sh ip
The results presented in Table 6.17 also show that UK firms are motivated to 
maintain their international relationships by believing that maintaining the 
relationship is a necessity as well as desire, making short term sacrifices for long 
term gains, believing that the relationship will be profitable and that the 
relationship is important for them to achieve their strategic objectives. Thus UK 
firms engaged in successful international alliances have a greater desire to 
maintain their relationship with their international partners compared to UK firm’s 
involved in less successful alliances.
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The results presented above show that the level of commitment to alliance goals, 
the UK firm’s willingness to commit to the alliance and their desire to maintain 
the alliance relationship are greater for international alliances that have successful 
levels of performance compared to alliances with less successful levels of 
performance which suggests that successful UK international alliances are more 
likely to be committed compared to less successful international alliances. These 
findings are consistent with previous research. Beamish (1988) found a strong 
correlation between the multinational’s willingness to commit to do something 
and high performance in joint ventures. Lee (1989) also found that a close 
business relationship between local partners and Korean investors significantly 
influenced alliance satisfaction. Similarly Mohr and Spekman (1994) and 
Gundlach et al (1995) observed commitment to be critical for long term 
relationships. The results also support Olson and Singsuwan (1997) who found 
that mutual commitment was perceived to be an important predictor of return on 
investment and market share for both Thai and American executives. More 
recently Monckza et al (1998) observed commitment to be negatively related to 
alliance success. However Monckza et al (1998) assessed only a fraction of the 
relevant determinants of commitment and concentrated on idiosyncratic 
investments, which are characteristic of buyer-supplier type relationships 
(Anderson and Weitz 1992). Kumar et al (1995) and Morgan and Hunt (1994) 
emphasized the role of motivated commitment to alliance success.
While previous research has investigated the relationship between commitment 
and success, the studies have not captured the many facets of the commitment 
concept. The findings of the current study, while consistent with previous
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research that commitment is positively related to the success of alliances, 
measures commitment in three different ways utilizing 28 different reliable 
measures. Thus the results of this study have generated empirical findings for 
three different perspectives of commitment.
Table 6.17 Differences in the Level of Commitment between Successful and 
Less Successful UK Strategic Alliances in terms of Performance
Successful Less Successful Difference
G roup G roup
Commitment T value SigMean SD Mean SD
Goals/obiectives 4.31 0.73 3.00 1.23 7.09 .000*
Activities perform ed 3.80 0.78 2.80 0.97 6.09 .000*
C ontractual term s 3.98 1.00 3.36 1.17 3.06 .003 *
Strategic direction 3.98 0.83 3.02 1.22 5.02 .000*
Resource allocation 3.58 1.02 2.74 1.03 4.34 .000*
Key decisions 3.78 0.97 2.94 1.02 4.50 .000*
Roles/functions 3.94 0.87 3.44 1.05 2.76 .007 *
Fu tu re  plans 3.77 0.94 2.74 1.03 5.56 .000*
Conflict resolution 3.67 0.99 2.88 1.02 4.17 .000*
Dailv operations 3.81 0.99 3.14 1.03 3.54 .001 *
Loyalty to p a rtnersh ip 3.98 0.93 2.90 1.23 5.34 .000*
Sense of belonging 3.84 1.03 2.88 1.24 4.54 .000*
Identify with goals/obiectives 4.14 0.81 3.04 1.24 5.69 .000*
Shared  vision 3.95 0.92 2.70 1.26 6.43 .000*
Partnersh ip  valuable 4.39 0.75 3.26 1.27 5.92 .000*
Listen to problem s 4.34 0.74 3.84 0.89 3.30 .001 *
Goal achievem ent 4.39 0.66 3.74 0.88 4.53 .000*
Overcom e problem s 4.42 0.64 3.86 0.81 4.15 .000*
Satisfy p a rtn e r needs 4.14 0.83 3.34 1.00 4.66 .000*
Effort/investm ent to build relationship 4.22 0.86 3.40 1.01 4.66 .000*
Patient over m istakes 3.97 0.78 3.42 0.84 3.62 .000*
Com prom ise to  achieve objectives 3.81 1.02 3.20 0.97 3.25 .002*
M otivated bv necessity 3.16 1.20 2.42 1.40 3.02 .003*
M otivated bv desire 4.09 0.83 3.10 1.22 5.17 .000*
M otivated bv long-term  gains 3.45 0.97 3.04 1.03 2.19 .031**
M otivated bv enioym ent 3.91 0.92 2.92 1.01 5.45 .000*
M otivated bv profitability 4.39 0.75 3.22 1.39 5.76 .000*
M otivated bv stra teg ic  objectives 4.25 0.80 3.12 1.53 5.08 .000*
Scale IsN ot at all; 5=Very well 
* Difference significant at the 0.01 level 
**DifTerence significant a t the 0.05 level
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Based on the above observations, it is appropriate to conclude that for 
international strategic alliances to succeed, partners need to identify with the goals 
and objectives of the alliance and have positive feelings of identification and 
involvement. Moreover, partners have to be willing to make an effort and invest 
in the relationship to achieve their goals and objectives as well as the inclination 
to maintain the relationship because they feel committed to the alliance through 
necessity, profitability or achievement of long term strategic objectives. Thus 
commitment is more specific to successful compared to less successful UK 
international strategic alliances. The implication of this for managers is that 
commitment to alliance goals and commitment to fulfil these goals through 
sustaining the relationship is pivotal to the applicability and successful 
performance of UK international strategic alliances.
6.6.1.4 Level of Trust
P roposition  4: The le v e l o f  tru s t be tw een  p a r tn e r s  w ill b e  h ig h er  f o r  su ccess fu l  
U K  in tern a tio n a l s tra teg ic  a llia n ces  c o m p a re d  w ith  less  su ccess fu l in te rn a tio n a l  
stra teg ic  a llian ces.
Respondents were asked to rate the level of trust between their firm and their 
partner firm. The results in Table 6.18 showed significant differences for 14 of 
the 15 characteristics of trust. Thus, the proposition that the level of trust is 
higher for successful UK international strategic alliances compared with less 
successful international alliances is supported. While no significant differences 
were found between the two groups in terms of the characteristic opportunistic 
and self/centered the results show a higher mean score for less successful
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alliances. This indicates that UK firms that are less successful in the performance 
of their alliance’s are more likely to be opportunistic in their behaviour and as a 
result less likely to foster trust in their relationships. The level o f confidence in a 
partner appears to be the most important (mean=4.08) characteristic of trust. 
Thus UK firm’s engaged in successful international alliances have confidence in 
their partner’s reliability and integrity.
Table 6.18 Differences in the Level of Trust between Successful and Less 
Successful UK international Strategic Alliances in terms of Performance
Successful Less Successful Difference
Trust
G roup G roup
Mean SD Mean SD T value Sig
Level o f tru s t 3.84 0.88 3.12 1.00 3.76 .000*
T rusted to keep prom ises 3.95 0.92 3.32 1.02 3.49 .001»
T rusted to be sincere 4.00 0.85 3.40 0.93 3.59 .000*
O pportunistic/self centered 2.33 0.98 2.46 0.93 -.73 Ns
Trusted to be supportive 3.48 0.93 2.96 0.83 3.14 .002**
Trusted to show  loyalty 3.72 0.97 2.94 1.00 4.21 .000*
Lack of continuity  in team s 2.28 1.05 2.88 1.17 -2.88 .005**
High degree o f harm ony 3.64 0.78 2.82 0.75 5.66 .000*
Open and inform al 3.77 0.77 2.96 0.99 4.89 .000*
Close personal ties 3.59 1.02 2.98 0.98 3.25 .002*
Keep com m itm ents m ade 3.84 0.80 3.22 0.82 4.09 .000*
Do not take  advantage o f  each o th er 3.77 0.89 3.20 0.97 3.25 .002*
Can alw ays rely on each o th er 2.84 0.98 2.86 0.86 5.62 .000*
Share w ork  re la ted  problem s 3.61 0.90 2.90 0.99 3.98 .000*
Level o f confidence in re lationship 4.08 0.80 3.18 0.98 5.37 .000*
Scale l=Not at all; 5=Very well 
•Difference significant at the 0.001 level 
••Difference significant at the 0.01 level
The literature on trust suggests that confidence on the part of the trusting partner 
results from the belief, sentiment or expectation that the partner's trustworthiness 
is reliable and intentional (Morgan and Hunt 1994; Moorman et al 1992). The 
results indicate that UK firms in successful international alliances trust their 
partner to keep promises, to be ready and willing to offer support, show a high 
degree o f loyalty and be sincere when making important decisions concerning the
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alliance and as a result are less opportunistic in their behaviour. In addition, the 
results indicated that while less successful UK international alliances lack 
continuity in management teams, UK firm’s engaged in successful international 
alliances believe that there relationship with their partner’s is marked by a high 
degree o f harmony, is open and informal, there are close personal ties between 
them, the partner makes an effort to keep commitments, work related problems 
are shared and they do not take advantage o f each other.
The findings support Beamish and Banks (1987) who argued that mutual trust 
reduces the temptation for either partner to take advantage of the other, thus 
reducing opportunistic behaviour. Williamson (1985) and Hill (1990) also 
suggested that trust is based on the willingness of parties to cooperate and the 
expectation that each will not behave opportunistically. Thus the findings suggest 
that trust may be a function of a number of elements.
Previous research has attributed the element of trust to be associated with the 
success of international strategic alliances (Peterson and Shimada 1978; Sullivan 
and Peterson 1982; Mohr and Spekman 1994; Madhok 1995; Monckza et al 
1998). This study supports Madhok’s (1995) view that trust is a critical factor for 
successful collaboration. He posits that trust within collaborations has the 
potential for efficiency and cost reductions. The results of this study indicate that 
trust exists between successful UK international alliances compared to less 
successful alliances as a result of higher profitability, market share and sales 
growth. Accordingly this may result in more efficient use of resources and
reduced costs.
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The results of this study also support both Mohr and Spekman (1994) and 
Monckza et al (1998). Mohr and Spekman (1994) found that a trusting 
relationship for computer suppliers and dealers served to calm the dealer’s fear of 
opportunistic behaviour thus resulting in the success of the partnership. Monckza 
et al (1998) has also observed that trust between strategic supplier alliances was 
important to the success of their partnership.
Despite this empirical evidence relating trust to the performance of strategic 
alliances, it has been noted in the literature that there has been little research 
conducted on trust as an element of international strategic alliance performance 
(Parkhe 1993). Furthermore, while previous studies have relied on two or three 
measures to examine the relationship between trust and performance, this study 
has utilized a number of measures of the international strategic alliance trust 
construct. The benefit of using multiple measures of a construct results in a better 
understanding of its properties (Geringer and Herbert 1989). As a result the 
findings of this study are able to provide a stronger examination of the link 
between trust and the success of UK international strategic alliances. Thus, to 
achieve trust, managers should try to instruct personnel involved in the 
international alliance to keep promises, to be sincere when making decisions, 
show loyalty and offer support to the other party. Managers can help to cultivate 
these trusting behaviours by encouraging both partners to confide in each other by 
having a relationship that is open and informal, has a high degree of harmony and 
in which partners are committed to each other. If managers are able to help 
develop mutual trust between partners this should reduce the possibility of both 
partners attempts to take advantage of each other and the possibility of
Chapter Six: Findings and Discussion 233
opportunism. As a result of developing mutual trust, the partnership can direct its
attention towards achieving its long-term performance goals.
6.6.2 Communication Attributes
6.6.2.1 Quality of Information Transmitted
Proposition 5: The quality o f information between partners will be greater for  
successful UK international strategic alliances compared with less successful 
international strategic alliances.
The quality of information is concerned with the characteristics of the 
communication process, in terms of accuracy, credibility, timely, adequacy and 
completeness of the information transmitted and received between partner firms. 
The t-test results in Table 6.19 show significant differences for three attributes of 
information quality (inadequate/adequate, incomplete/complete and not
credible/credible) out of five.
Table 6.19 Differences in the Quality of Information Transmitted between 
Successful and Less Successful UK international Strategic Alliances in terms
of Performance
In fo rm a tio n  Q u a l i ty
Successful G roup  
Mean SD
L ess Successful 
G roup
Mean SD
Difference 
T value Sig
Untimely /  Timely 3.66 1.01 3.30 1.02 1.86 NS
Inaccurate  /  A ccurate 3.72 1.05 3.42 0.61 1.79 NS
Inadequate  /  A dequate 3.64 0.93 3.24 0.77 2.45 .016**
Incom plete /  Com plete 3.69 0.83 3.08 0.88 3.77 .000 *
Not C redible  /  C red ib le 3.89 1.13 3.42 0.95 2.37 .020**
* Difference significant a t the  level 0.01 
**Difference significant a t the  level 0.05
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For two of the measures (untimely/timely and inaccurate/accurate) no significant 
differences were found between the two groups. However these two non­
significant measures showed higher mean scores for successful UK international 
alliances compared to less successful international alliances. Thus, there is some 
support for the proposition that the quality of information between partners will be 
greater for successful UK international strategic alliances compared with less 
successful international alliances.
The findings above suggest that the quality of information is an important element 
in improving the accuracy, flow and acceptance of relevant information in 
successful UK international strategic alliances. The results support that of Mohr 
and Spekman (1994) and Monckza et al (1998). Mohr and Spekman (1994) 
observed that the quality of information transmitted between computer dealers and 
manufacturers is a key aspect in the relationship in that it enables the achievement 
of their goals and thus contributes to the success of the partnership. They found 
the quality of information to positively predict the success of the partnership in 
terms of satisfaction with manufacturer support. Monckza et al (1998) also 
observed that quality of information within supply chain management is important 
to the relationship. They found the quality of information to predict the 
performance of the international partnerships in terms of quality, cycle time, 
technology and in terms of alliance satisfaction and how well the alliance partners 
worked together. Their results suggested that quality of information resulted in 
reductions in order cycle times, provided timely information on new products or 
process technologies and thus improved the working relationship between the 
partners. However in their analysis, they combined the quality of information
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with participation in decision-making. Participation in decision-making is another 
aspect of communication in this study that has been dealt with separately.
The findings that the quality of information is more specific to successful UK 
international alliances compared to less successful international alliances have 
generally supported the results of Mohr and Spekman (1994) and Monckza et al 
(1998). However their findings relate to successful partnerships within dealer- 
supplier type relationships. Although the specific dimensions of information 
quality examined in this study have been operationalized and developed by Mohr 
and Spekman (1994) the findings in this study are extended to include a range of 
international strategic alliances investigated across a range of different industries. 
Furthermore, both Mohr and Spekman (1994) and Monckza et al (1998) showed 
that the quality of information transmitted may impact the success of the 
partnership. Their findings have not indicated that the quality of information 
transmitted is more characteristic of successfully performing international 
strategic alliances as in the case of this study. Statistical difference was also 
found between the two groups in terms of profitability, market share and sales 
growth, which neither Mohr and Spekman (1994) and Monckza et al (1998) 
examined.
Overall, the results suggest that credibility, adequate and completeness of 
information are important facets of the quality of information that is 
communicated or exchanged between successful UK international strategic 
alliances and are thus necessary for the achievement of the goals and objectives of 
the alliance. Based on these findings managers can attempt to improve the quality
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of information transmitted between international partners by ensuring that the 
information communicated is sufficiently accurate and credible. This can be 
achieved through both parties providing better and more accurate information that 
is required by each party in order for them to be able to succeed in accomplishing 
their performance goals.
6.6.2.2 Level of Information Sharing
Proposition 6: There will be a greater level o f information sharing between 
partners for successful UK international strategic alliances compared with less 
successful international strategic alliances.
Respondents were asked to describe the level and the way in which information is 
exchanged between them and their partners. The t-test results in Table 6.20 
revealed significant differences for three (share proprietary information, inform 
partner of changing needs and both parties expected to inform each other of 
changing needs) of the four measures of information sharing between the two 
groups. Therefore, the proposition that there will be a greater level of information 
sharing between partners for successful UK international strategic alliances 
compared to less successful alliances can be supported. Hesitate to give too much 
information was not found to be significantly different between the two groups, 
but the mean score was higher for less successful UK international alliances. This 
suggests that less successful UK international alliances are more hesitant in 
providing their partners with proprietary information as well as inform their 
partner of changing needs of the alliance.
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The results suggest that the sharing of proprietary information and the exchange 
of relevant information between successful UK international alliances enables 
both parties to understand each others goals and objectives and this allows them to 
coordinate their efforts to achieve their mutual objectives in terms of profitability, 
market share and sales volume. One explanation may be that both parties have 
similar goals and objectives and are thus forced to communicate through sharing 
information and resources and coordinating their efforts. The distribution 
literature has suggested that information sharing allows the coordination of efforts 
and fosters confidence in the continuity of the relationship by reducing conflict 
(Anderson and Narus 1990; Anderson and Weitz 1989). While the role of 
information sharing between partners in an alliance relationship has been 
acknowledged as critical communication strategy for facilitating partnership 
success (Devlin and Bleackley 1988), there have been only two studies that have 
investigated the role of information sharing and partnership success. These are 
the studies of Mohr and Spekman (1994) and Monckza et al (1998). The findings 
of the current study differ from that of Mohr and Spekman (1994) but support that 
of Monckza et al (1998). Mohr and Spekman (1994) found a negative association 
between information sharing and satisfaction with profits. They could not provide 
a rational explanation for this finding and stated that they were inconsistent. 
Mohr and Spekman (1994) measured the extent of information with an eight-item 
scale of which four items were dropped in the analysis, because of low reliability. 
They do not state which of the four measures were used in the analysis. 
Furthermore, the four measures analysed exhibited satisfactory reliability
(r=0.68).
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Monckza et al (1998) observed sharing of information between dealers and 
suppliers was not associated with performance or satisfaction with the 
relationship, but related to the success of the international partnership in terms of 
how well they worked together. Their results indicated that information sharing 
may enable the partners to work together to solve problems, help each other in 
situations of emergency and rely on each other for support.
The current study has provided interesting empirical findings to support the notion 
that successful international alliances are more likely to share information 
compared to less successful alliances. The implication here, that the sharing of 
information between partners by keeping each other informed about their needs 
and changes in the alliance, both parties will be in a better position not only to 
assess their needs but also to work more effectively in achieving their goals and 
objectives.
Table 6.20 Differences in the Level of Information Sharing between 
Successful and Less Successful UK international Strategic Alliances in terms
of Performance
L evel o f  I n fo rm a t io n  S h a r in g
Successful G roup  
Mean SD
Less Successful 
G roup
Mean SD
Difference 
T value Sig
Share p ro p rie ta ry  inform ation 3.72 0.98 2.94 1.25 3.72 .000
Inform  p a rtn e r o f  changing needs 3.88 0.83 3.38 0.97 2.95 .004
Both parties expected to inform  
each o ther o f changing  needs
4.20 0.82 3.58 0.93 3.80 .000
Hesitate to give inform ation 2.39 1.13 2.54 1.03 -.72 Ns
Scale l>Not at all; 5«To a large extent 
Difference significant a t the 0.01 level
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6.6.2.3 Level of Participation in Planning and Goal Setting
Proposition 7: The level o f participation in planning and goal setting between 
partners will be higher for successful UK international strategic alliances
compared with less successful international strategic alliances.
Proposition 7 is concerned with the level of participation in planning and goal 
setting that occurs between UK international strategic alliances. The level of 
participation of both groups were compared. The t-test results in Table 6.21 
showed that the two groups differ significantly on all attributes {participate in 
goal setting, participate in planning, participate in meetings, seek partner's 
advice in decision-making and partner seeks advice in decision-making) 
measuring the level of participation.
Table 6.21 Differences in the Level of Participation between Successful and 
Less Successful UK International Strategic Alliances
Successful G roup Less Successful D ifference
P a r t ic ip a t io n Mean SD
G roup
Mean SD T value Sig
Participate in goal setting 3.84 0.95 3.00 1.14 4.31 .000*
Participate in planning 3.22 1.13 2.28 1.18 4.31 .000*
Participate in meetings 4.22 0.74 3.74 0.99 2.95 .004**
Seek p a r tn e r’s advice in decision 
m aking
3.44 1.14 2.76 1.10 3.20 .002**
P a rtn er seeks advice in m ak in g  
decisions
3.27 1.04 2.24 1.06 5.17 .000*
Scale l=Strongly disagree; 5=Strongly agree 
'D ifference significant a t the  0.001 level 
"D iffe rence significant a t the  0.01 level
This suggests that UK international strategic alliances are more likely to 
participate in goal setting and planning alliance activities through holding regular 
meetings and joint decision-making compared to less successful international
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alliances. Thus the proposition that the level of participation in planning and goal 
setting between partners will be higher for successful UK international strategic 
alliances compared with less successful international strategic alliances is 
supported. Participation in planning, goal setting and decision-making are critical 
in enabling both parties to coordinate their activities and thus help partners to 
succeed (Anderson et al 1987; Dwyer and Oh 1988). This participatory style of 
management suggests that both the UK firms and their partners, whose alliances 
are successful have an equal say on strategic issues and operational matters.
The results are consistent with previous research. Dymsza (1988) investigated a 
number of joint ventures, through using both questionnaires and interviews in 
many developing countries and found that joint ventures performed much better 
when both parties participated in key decision areas such as board meetings, major 
policies and management processes. Mohr and Spekman (1994) found that 
computer dealers obtained higher levels of satisfaction with manufacturer support 
through participation in goal setting and planning activities with the 
manufacturers. Olson and Singsuwan (1997) found that both Thai and American 
executives perceived mutual participation in decision-making to be important to 
the success of their relationship and found that the greater the participation, the 
greater the effect on market share and return on investment. Similarly Monckza et 
al (1998) found participation to be associated with alliance success. However as 
noted in the above discussion, they measured information quality and 
participation as a combined attribute.
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Based on the above evidence it can be concluded that the extent of participation in 
goal setting and planning activities and decision-making is greater for successful 
UK international strategic alliances. Therefore, it can be suggested that 
developing international strategic alliances in which both partners engage jointly 
in the planning and goal setting of their activities are necessary to help in 
facilitating ideas and making decisions. This will result in better outcomes for 
both parties, since more information, knowledge, skills and insights will be shared 
between partners. This can be accomplished through both partners having regular 
meetings and through consulting each other before making important decisions.
6.6.3 Level Of Conflict
P roposition  8: T h ere  w ill b e  less c o n flic t betw een  p a r tn e rs  f o r  su ccess fu l U K  
in te rn a tio n a l s tra teg ic  a llia n ces  c o m p a red  with less su ccess fu l in tern a tio n a l  
stra teg ic  a llia n ces .
Respondents were asked to indicate the type of conflict and their degree of 
conflict with their partner firm. The level of disagreements and how these 
disagreements may be resolved was also investigated. The results of the t-test 
presented in Table 6.22 found significant differences between successful and less 
successful international alliances on five (level o f disagreements, joint problem 
solving, degree o f conflict, conflicting goals and cultural misunderstandings) of 
the fourteen measures of conflict. Both groups do not differ significantly on the 
remaining nine measures (avoid the issue, smooth over the issue, assertive and 
domineering, persuasion, outside arbitration, poor communications, distrust, 
personality conflicts, language difficulties). Thus the overall results shown in
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Table 6.22 indicate no significant differences between the two groups in terms of 
how conflicts are resolved and the causes of conflict, but there are differences 
between the two groups in terms of the level of disagreements and the degree of 
conflict. The results suggest that successful UK international alliances are less 
likely to have disagreements and conflicts compared to less successful 
international alliances. It may be that partners in successful alliances have 
developed better communication skills and are thus in a position to manage 
conflicts that may arise more effectively. Less successful international alliances 
appear to have a higher degree of conflict resulting from cultural 
misunderstandings and conflicting goals and experience disagreements more often 
in their relationships. It is possible that partners in less successful alliances have 
mutually exclusive or incompatible goals, values and interests. Thus, there is 
support for the proposition that there will be less conflict for successful UK 
international strategic alliances compared to less successful international alliances. 
The findings are consistent with previous literature.
Previous research has confirmed that conflicts between alliance partners are a 
major cause of failure and bad performance of strategic alliances (Peterson and 
Shimada 1978; Sullivan and Peterson 1982; Killing 1983; Harrigan 1988; Habib 
1987; Tilman 1990). Both Peterson and Shimada (1978) and Sullivan and 
Peterson (1982) found that cultural differences are the source of management 
problems in American-Japanese joint ventures. Likewise Harrigan (1988) and 
Dymzsa (1988) observed that conflicting goals lead to inter-partner conflicts 
between partners in international joint ventures which may result in the failure of 
the venture (Killing 1983).
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Habib’s (1987) analysis of 258 international joint ventures in the chemical and 
petrochemical industries observed that conflicting goals between partners as well 
as the frequency and intensity of conflict between partners was negatively 
associated with satisfaction of the partnership. More recently Tilman (1990) 
found that conflicts between Japanese-Thai partners had a significant negative 
impact on performance. Thus frequent disagreements and conflicts between 
partners can result in the failure and termination of international joint ventures 
(Killing 1983; Lane and Beamish 1990; Lewiss 1990).
Despite the proposition that a low level of conflict is associated with alliance 
success, it has been proposed in the literature that conflict is an inherent 
characteristic of all international strategic alliances (Habib 1983; Killing 1983; 
Devlin and Bleackley 1988; Borys and Jemison 1989). However, both Mohr and 
Spekman (1994) and Monckza et al (1998) showed that joint problem solving as a 
method of conflict resolution has an impact on the success of the alliance and can 
result m a “win-win” solution between partners. Although the results of this study 
have indicated that successful UK international alliances are less likely to 
encounter conflict with their partner’s, any resulting conflicts that may occur are 
likely to be resolved through joint problem solving.
Based on the above empirical analysis, it is appropriate to conclude that a higher 
frequency of conflicts and disagreements is an inherent element of less successful 
UK international strategic alliances. In successful UK international alliances, any 
conflict is likely to be resolved through the use of joint problem solving. Based 
on these findings it is suggested that to control the level of conflict, international
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partners need to understand the basis of where and why conflicts arise. In this 
way international firms will be in a better position to manage the level of conflict 
between partners in international strategic alliances more effectively and maintain 
it at a level which is productive for both parties. Furthermore, in attempting to 
resolve conflicts that may arise between international partners it would be more 
beneficial for partners to work in a cooperative manner by formulating an 
effective conflict management strategy. This again would be more productive for 
both parties.
Table 6.22 Differences in the Level of Conflict between Successful and Less 
Successful UK International Strategic Alliances in terms of Performance
Successful G roup Less Successful Difference
Conflict
G roup
Mean SD Mean SD T value Sig
Level o f disagreem ents 2.41 0.68 2.76 0.87 -2.43 .017 **
Avoid the issue 2.05 0.95 2.24 0.92 -1.09 Ns
Sm ooth over the issue 3.03 0.96 2.94 0.96 .50 Ns
Assertive and dom ineering 2.41 1.05 2.34 0.96 .35 Ns
Persuasion 3.88 0.93 3.66 0.85 1.27 Ns
Jo in t problem  solving 3.81 0.79 3.40 0.93 2.56 .012 **
Outside a rb itra tio n 1.22 0.70 1.24 0.56 -.18 Ns
Degree of conflict 2.19 0.96 2.84 1.04 -3.48 .001 *
Poor com m unications 2.94 1.08 3.12 1.00 -.92 Ns
Distrust 2.09 1.09 2.32 0.89 -1.19 Ns
Conflicting goals 2.55 1.27 3.38 1.09 -3.70 .000*
Personality Conflicts 2.45 1.21 2.76 1.00 -1.45 Ns
C ultural m isunderstandings 2.81 1.28 3.36 1.12 -2.39 .019 **
Language difficulties 1.84 1.09 2.04 1.18 -.92 Ns
Scale l=Very low; 5=Very high 
* Difference significant at the 0.01 level 
“ Difference significant at the 0.05 level
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6.6.4 Structure
6.6.4.1 Formalization
Proposition 9: Successful UK international strategic alliances will be less 
formalized in their approach to managing activities and relationships compared 
to less successful international strategic alliances.
This proposition relates to the use of rules and standard operating procedures to 
govern the interaction of the alliance partners. Successful and less successful UK 
international strategic alliances were compared as to the level of formalization in 
their activities and relationship. The t-test results revealed no significant 
differences in the formalization of the two groups (see Table 6.23). Thus, no 
support was found for the proposition that successful UK international strategic 
alliances will be less formalized in their approach to managing activities and 
relationships compared to less successful international alliances.
Although formalization has been identified as a key dimension of 
interorganizational relationships (John and Reve 1982; Dwyer and Oh 1988; 
Provan and Skinner 1989) the results of this study have shown that successful UK 
international alliances are not any more formalized in their activities and 
relationships compared to less successful alliances. Furthermore, while empirical 
research has suggested that a higher degree of formalization results in increased 
opportunism (John 1984; Provan and Skinner 1989) and lower levels of trust 
(Moorman et al 1993), proposing that formalized relationships are likely to result 
in dissatisfied alliances, the results of this study found no differences between
successful and less successful international alliances.
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The measures used in this study are based on the work of John (1984) and Dwyer 
and Oh (1988) and Moorman et al (1993). They have provided a somewhat 
general definition and measure of this dimension borrowed from organization 
theory. Although there is some conceptual consensus among researchers, they 
have constructed different indicators to tap the same attributes of formalization. 
John (1984) examined the bureaucratic structuring on opportunism within a 
marketing channel and found satisfactory reliability for formalization (r=0.63). 
Likewise Dwyer and Oh (1988) observed a reliability of r=0.68. Moorman et al 
(1993) found acceptable reliability for formalization (r=0.79). However, this may 
be explained by the fact that they used 15 indicators to measure the degree of 
formalization whereas both John (1984) and Dwyer and Oh (1988) used five 
indicators to measure formalization. This study found a lower level of reliability 
of (r=0.57) for formalization using only three indicators. Furthermore, previous 
research has focused on interorganizational relationships within marketing 
channels as the unit of analysis, while this study has focused on a range of 
international strategic alliances across a range of industries. It may be that 
formalization needs to be operationalized in terms of the context of the strategic 
alliance.
Table 6.23 Differences in the Formalization of Activities between Successful 
and Less Successful UK International Strategic Alliances in terms of
Performance
Formalization
Successful G roup 
M ean SD
Less Successful 
G roup
M ean SD
Difference 
T  value Sig
W ritten docum ents detail tasks 3.36 1.15 3.08 1.14 1.29 Ns
Inform al understand ing 3.16 1.26 2.76 1.08 1.77 Ns
Specific term s/conditlons 3.34 1.04 3.30 1.02 .22 Ns
Scale l=Not at all; 5-Very well
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It seems rather clear, on the basis of the evidence, that formalization of activities 
is not significantly different for either successful or less successful UK 
international strategic alliances. It may be that UK international alliances do not 
necessarily rely upon formalized mechanisms suggesting that the formalization of 
activities is not a very important issue for international strategic alliances in terms 
of how successful they are. It may also be that there have been no valid measures 
developed of this phenomenon within the context of alliances.
6.6.4.2 Centralization
Proposition 10: Successful UK international strategic alliances will be less 
centralized in their activities and relationships compared to less successful 
international strategic alliances.
The degree of centralization for both groups was compared. The t-tests found a 
significant difference between the two groups centralization of activities for one 
variable (both parties participate in decisions) out of three (see Table 6.24). No 
significant differences were found for the variables all information is channelled 
and contact through alliance mangers. Successful UK international alliances are 
not any more centralized in their activities compared to less successful UK 
international alliances. However, successful international alliances participate 
more frequently in joint decision-making. This result was surprising since the 
variable “both parties participate in decisions” was removed prior to factor 
analysis (see section S.3) because this indicator decreased the alpha coefficient of 
the centralization measure. While there is no explanation for this, it is possible 
that this variable does not adequately tap the dimension of centralization and
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perhaps may have been more proficient as a single-item measure. Thus there is 
weak support for the proposition that successful UK international strategic 
alliances will be less centralized in their activities and relationships compared to 
less successful alliances. Despite only one significant difference between the two 
groups, the mean scores indicate that successful UK alliances are more likely to 
have a less centralized decision-making process with a greater tolerance towards 
more independent decision-making through alliance managers rather than 
channelling information through an office and are thus more participative in joint 
decision-making compared to less successful UK alliances. Yoshino and Rangan 
(1995: 130) stated that this approach to centralization “permits hands-on 
management with clear accountability and can foster consistency in the working 
relationship”.
Table 6.24 Differences in the Centralization of Activities and Relationships 
between Successful and Less Successful UK International Strategic Alliances
in terms of Performance
Successful G ro u p Less Successful Difference
Centralization G roup
T  value SigM ean SD M ean SD
All inform ation channelled 3.19 1.42 3.26 1.31 -.28 Ns
C ontact through alliance m anagers 3.16 1.41 3.10 1.27 .22 Ns
Both parties participate  in decisions 3.83 0.92 2.90 1.11 4.88 .000*
Scale l=Not at all; 5=Very well 
Difference significant at the 0.01 level
Dwyer and Oh (1988) propositioned that the decision-making structures of 
channel relationships within the hardware industry are likely to be characterized 
by collaborative structure rather than an administrative hierarchy as a result of 
bargaining over trade terms. They found no significant differences in 
centralization and participation in decision-making. Wholesalers emerged as the
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most centralized and least participative in terms of degree of input to decisions, 
idea generation, decision-making and goal formulation. While the reliability of 
their measures were fairly satisfactory (centralization r=0.72 and participation 
r=0.79) their explanation was that the measures used were not sufficiently 
sensitive and that channel groups may have interpreted the measures differently to 
mask their interorganizational governance.
However, John (1984) found that increased centralization deprived managers in 
channel relationships of participating in decision-making which resulted in 
increased opportunism. Similarly Provan and Skinner (1989) investigated 
supplier control over power equipment dealers in their decision-making and found 
that suppliers attempts to control dealer decisions were positively related to 
opportunistic behaviour on the part of the dealers. These studies, while they have 
not examined the impact of centralization on the success of international strategic 
alliances, suggest that too much centralization results in power and control being 
distributed between relatively few people and decision-making is hierarchical 
rather than participative.
The results of this study have attempted to provide new evidence, regarding the 
centralization of activities between successful and less successful UK 
international strategic alliances. While the proposition is weakly supported in that 
there is little difference between the two groups in terms of how activities are 
centralized, successful UK international alliances are more likely to participate in 
joint decision-making. This means that the participation between partners in joint 
decision-making is one mechanism that should be structured in UK international
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strategic alliances in order to manage the alliance activities and relationships. 
This can be brought about by involving personnel and managers of both parties in 
the activities of the alliance, introducing them to new ideas and techniques for 
solving problems. This means that decision-making will not be concentrated in 
the hands of a few people in top management positions and thus decision-making 
is not tightly controlled and coordinated.
6.6.4.3 Complexity
Proposition 11: Successful UK international strategic alliances will have 
simpler levels o f organizational arrangements compared to less successful 
international strategic alliances.
Table 6.25 Differences in Organization Arrangements between Successful 
and Less Successful UK International Strategic Alliances in terms of
Performance
Complexity
Successful G roup  
M ean SD
Less Successful 
G roup
M ean SD
Difference 
T  value Sig
Complex / Sim ple 3.11 1.30 3.32 1.24 -.88 Ns
Flexible /  Inflexible 2.91 1.19 3.18 0.94 .00 Ns
H ierarchical /  In form al 3.00 1.08 3.00 0.90 -1.33 Ns
Scale 1 to 5 used on all three measures
The results shown in Table 6.25 found no significant differences between the two 
groups in terms of its complexity and therefore, the proposition that successful 
UK international strategic alliances will have simpler levels of organizational 
arrangements compared to less successful international alliances was not 
supported. This suggests that there is no structural differentiation in terms of the
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level of flexibility, complexity and hierarchy between successful and less 
successful UK international alliances. However, this does not mean that 
complexity is not characteristic of UK international strategic alliances, only that it 
is not distinctive of either successful or less successful international alliances. 
The measure of complexity exhibited low reliability (r=0.57). Furthermore, as the 
literature review in chapter two indicated, complexity within international 
strategic alliances remains relatively underresearched.
In summary, given the limited amount of research that has explored structure and 
alliance success within international strategic alliances and given the weak 
findings of the t-tests, it is very difficult to suggest generalizations about their 
relationship. However, it is recommended that the structure of international 
alliances is based on needs of both partners in order for them to meet their mutual 
goals and objectives. The above results have indicated that frequent participation 
in decision-making is characteristic of successful UK international strategic 
alliances suggesting a more decentralized decision-making structure.
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6.6 .5  Control
6.6.5.1 Focus of Control
Proposition 12: UK international strategic alliance partners that seek to focus 
their influence over particular alliance activities, rather than control all 
activities will be more successful.
Where control over a particular function of the international strategic alliance is 
exercised by successful UK international alliances, the performance is expected to 
be higher. That is, the elements of control that significantly determine alliance 
success would vary between successful and less successful UK international 
alliances. The results in Table 6.26 showed no significant differences between 
successful and less successful international alliances in terms of the focus of 
control over alliance activities. As indicated earlier, three variables relating to the 
focus of control were omitted from the analysis because of missing values. These 
variables included product planning, production planning and R&D. This is not a 
reflection of UK international alliances not considering these three areas of 
control to be significant, but rather that some of UK firms in the respondent 
sample were not involved in these activities. For instance a number of the UK 
alliances were formed in industries such as financial services and business and 
information services that did not involve either product or production planning 
and R&D (see section 6.2.3). The two groups differed significantly on only one 
(pricing policy) out of seven items. Differences along the other six measures 
(financial activities, marketing/sales, quality control, distribution facilities, 
customer support and manpower management) are not significant between the 
two groups. Therefore, there is very weak support for the proposition that
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successful UK international alliance partners seek to focus their influence over 
particular alliance activities, rather than control all activities. The results indicate 
that more control is exercised over pricing policy by successful UK international 
alliances compared to less successful UK international alliances. It may be that 
pricing policy is seen as a strategically important activity by the UK firms for 
achieving their strategic objectives or it may be that they have the sufficient 
resources and capabilities to deal with pricing policy issues. Mjoen and Tallman 
(1997) suggested that control over key activities resulted in feelings of overall 
control, thereby the perceptions of performance of international joint ventures.
Previous empirical research has observed that alliance partners which seek to 
focus their control over activities that are strategically important or crucial to the 
achievement of their strategic objectives is related to the success of the venture 
(Schaan 1983; Geringer and Herbert 1989). Schaan’s (1983) investigation of ten 
Mexican international joint ventures illustrated that parent firm’s tend to seek 
control-over specific “strategically important activities”. Schaan’s (1983) finding 
was supported by Geringer (1988) who found that while in his sample of ninety 
joint ventures in developed countries equity control was split on 50:50 basis, 
control over other activities of the joint venture were not shared. Specifically, 
control between partners was more likely to be shared in areas such as capital 
expenditure, appointment of key personnel and the establishment of prices and 
sales targets. Control was less likely to be shared in product design, 
manufacturing set up and the day-to-day management of the joint venture. The 
findings clearly indicate that there is a sharing of responsibility for financial 
activities, marketing and sales, quality control, distribution facilities, customer
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support and manpower management for both successful and less successful UK
international strategic alliances.
Table 6.26 Differences in Focus of Control between Successful and Less 
Successful UK International Strategic Alliances in terms of Performance
Successful G roup Less Successful Difference
Control Focus
G roup
M ean SD M ean SD T value Sig
Financial Activities 3.02 0.93 2.84 1.06 .94 Ns
M arketing /  Sales 3.17 0.98 2.86 1.23 1.50 Ns
Ouality C ontrol 2.87 1.11 2.88 1.15 -.46 Ns
Pricing Policy 3.23 0.98 2.62 1.18 3.05 .003*
Distribution Facilities 3.02 1.15 2.98 1.19 .23 Ns
Custom er Support 2.89 1.18 2.74 1.27 .65 Ns
M anpow er M anagem ent 2.88 1.18 2.76 1.13 .53 Ns
Scale 1=UK firm  has control; 5= P artne r has control 
’"Difference significant a t the 0.01 level
Based on the above data on the scope of activities over which control can be 
exercised by international strategic alliances no firm conclusions can be drawn 
concerning Schaan’s (1983) suggestion that firms seek control over activities that 
are perceived to be crucial for the achievement of their objectives. No significant 
differences were found on any of the measures of control except for pricing 
policy.
As mentioned earlier, the exclusion of the three variables (product planning, 
production planning and R&D) may have prevented significant differences 
between the two groups. The non significant differences may also have been 
influenced by the inclusion of the different types of international strategic 
alliances (equity joint ventures, contractual agreements and consortia) Previous 
research on control has concentrated on equity joint ventures rather than on
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contractual agreements or consortia (for example Schaan 1983; Killing 1983). 
While the results of this study indicate that UK Firms engaged in successful 
international strategic alliances have control over pricing policy issues, the overall 
results suggest that there is no difference between the two groups in terms of what 
they control.
6.6.5.2 Mechanism of Control
Proposition 13: UK international strategic alliance partners that use positive 
control mechanisms as opposed to negative control mechanisms to monitor 
alliance activities are more successful.
The control mechanisms used by UK international alliances was compared for 
both groups and the results are shown in Table 6.27. The two groups differed 
significantly on five (involvement in planning, regular reporting on performance, 
teamwork culture, informal/formal contacts and power of veto) out of the 11 
measures. Both groups did not differ significantly on the other six measures 
(board o f directors, equity ownership, contractual formal agreement, 
technological superiority, management skills and appointment of key personnel). 
Thus, there is some support for the proposition that UK international strategic 
alliances that use positive control mechanisms as opposed to negative control 
mechanisms to monitor alliance activities are more successful.
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Table 6.27 Differences in Mechanism of Control used between Successful and 
Less Successful UK International Strategic Alliances in terms of
Performance
Successful G roup Less Successful Difference
Control Mechanism M ean SD
G roup
M ean T  value Sig
SD
B oard of D irectors 3.48 1.54 3.40 1.47 .30 Ns
Pow er of Veto 1.63 1.00 2.12 1.26 -2.34 .021**
Equity O w nership 2.59 1.49 2.70 1.43 -.38 Ns
C ontractual Form al A greem ent 3.30 1.27 3.30 1.20 -.01 Ns
Technical Superiority 2.36 1.22 1.94 1.11 1.89 Ns
M anagem ent Skills 3.14 0.99 3.08 1.18 .30 Ns
Involvem ent in  Planning Process 3.70 0.83 3.12 1.06 3.29 .001*
R egular reporting  on Perform ance 3.95 0.88 3.60 1.01 1.99 .049**
Team w ork C ultu re 3.75 1.04 2.98 1.19 3.69 .000*
A ppointm ent o f  Key Personnel 3.80 1.24 3.38 1.26 1.77 Ns
Inform al /  F orm al C ontacts 4.17 0.88 3.80 1.07 1.97 .044**
Scale I=Never; 5=Always 
* Difference significant at the 0.01 level 
**Difference significant at the 0.05 level
Schaan’s (1983) study of ten joint ventures in Mexico concluded that joint 
ventures could be turned around by the mechanisms they used to exercise control. 
Schaan (1983) proposed that positive mechanisms are employed by international 
joint ventures to promote certain behaviours while negative control mechanisms 
are used to prevent the joint venture form implementing certain activities. In this 
study the findings indicate that successful UK international strategic alliances are 
more likely to use positive control mechanisms such as involvement in the 
planning process, regular reporting on performance, teamwork culture and formal 
and informal contacts to monitor their alliance activities, compared to less 
successful UK international alliances which are more likely to monitor alliance 
activities through power of veto which has been described as a negative control
mechanism.
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6.6.S.3 Extent of Control
Proposition 14: Successful UK international strategic alliances are those in 
which the management o f  the alliance is shared compared to less successful 
international strategic alliances.
Respondents were asked to indicate the extent of overall control within the 
alliance partnership by indicating whether they had dominant control, equal 
control or whether their partner firm had dominant control. The extent of overall 
control exercised within UK international strategic alliances was examined and 
compared for both groups. The results in Table 6.28 indicate that the two groups 
differ in terms of overall control. UK firms engaged in successful international 
alliances are more likely to have dominant control of the partnership compared to 
UK firms engaged in less successful alliances in which the international partner is 
more likely to have control. This suggests that the management of the alliance is 
not shared in either of the two groups. Therefore the results do not support the 
proposition that successful UK international alliances are those in which the 
management of the alliance is shared compared to less successful international 
alliances.
The results are not entirely inconsistent with previous literature. The results 
support the findings of Killing (1983) and Kogut (1988) but are inconsistent with 
the majority of other research (Tomlinson 1970; Beamish 1984; Bleeke and Ernst 
1991; Blodgett 1992). Killing (1983) in his investigation of 37 international joint 
ventures in developed countries found that dominant partner joint ventures were 
more likely to be successful than shared management ventures. His justification
Chapter Six: Findings and Discussion 258
was that the presence of two or more parents constituted a major source of 
management difficulties in joint ventures and thus dominant control structures 
often make joint ventures easier to manage and may be more successful than when 
control is shared. Kogut (1988) examined the mortality rate among international 
joint ventures and found that dominant joint ventures were more stable than 
shared joint ventures.
Several subsequent studies have not supported the findings of this study or 
Killing’s (1983) hypothesis that dominant control joint ventures outperform 
shared management joint ventures (Tomlinson 1970; Beamish 1984; Bleeke and 
Ernst 1991; Blodgett 1992; Yan and Gray 1994). Tomlinson (1970) observed that 
UK joint ventures in Pakistan were more successful when the UK parent firms had 
a more relaxed attitude towards control. Beamish (1984) using the same scale and 
classification of joint ventures as Killing (1983) investigated 12 joint ventures in 
less developed countries and found that shared or locally dominant controlled 
joint ventures performed better than when the parent firm’s had dominant control. 
He also observed that in a few number of cases dominant control was associated 
with unsatisfactory performance. Bleeke and Ernst (1991) also found in their 
study of 49 strategic alliances that split ownership was more conducive to 
successful alliances. Like Bleeke and Ernst (1991), Blodgett (1992) in a sample 
of 1000 international joint ventures also observed that ventures with equal 
ownership were more successful than dominant partner ventures. While 
Blodgett’s (1992) sample was much larger than Bleeke and Ernst’s (1991) she 
investigated the effect of change in the ownership on the stability of the joint 
venture. Blodegett (1992) emphasizes in her research that the measure of
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instability was not related to the performance of the joint venture but rather the 
frequency of change in the joint venture contract. Thus Blodgett’s (1992) 
research fails to provide a clear sense of the joint ventures success or of the 
achievement of the joint ventures objectives. More recently Yan and Gray (1994) 
also found in their study that a shared management structure of control is 
associated with the success of a joint venture.
In this study equity ownership was characteristic of both successful and less 
successful UK international strategic alliances (see Table 6.27). This suggests 
that while dominant control is characteristic of UK partners engaged in successful 
international alliances, dominant control is not influenced equity ownership. This 
finding is consistent with Glaister and Wu (1994) who found that UK partners 
engaged in international joint ventures with Chinese firms are limited in their 
extent to which they can control the joint venture through their influence as 
shareholders. As suggested in section (6.6.5.2) other mechanisms of control are 
adopted.
While the studies discussed above have provided a significant contribution to the 
control-performance relationship in joint ventures in indicating that shared 
management control is related to the success of international strategic alliances, 
the findings of this study suggests that overall control through the use of positive 
control mechanisms rather than negative control mechanisms is the ultimate 
means of managing UK international alliances.
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The difference in findings may be due to the focus of the studies. Previous studies 
(Tomlinson 1970; Killing 1983; Beamish 1984) have tended to focus on 
international joint ventures in developing and less developed countries. This 
study focuses on UK strategic alliances in developed countries. Bleeke and Ernst 
(1991) investigated only 49 international strategic alliances in three different 
regions: the U.S. Europe and Japan, while the findings in this study are based on 
only UK international alliances. Their measure was based on the financial 
ownership rather than managerial or overall control in a sample of twenty 50:50 
joint ventures of which only 60% were successful. This study had a much larger 
sample and measured the extent of overall control in strategic alliances that 
included 50:50 joint ventures, joint ventures based on equity participation and 
contractual arrangements that involve no equity.
Furthermore, the group of studies discussed above have focused on the division of 
equity and performance in international joint ventures. While these studies have 
provided a valuable contribution to the issue of control in international joint 
ventures, empirical findings have indicated that ownership plays only a limited 
role in the control of joint ventures (Schaan 1983; Geringer and Herbert 1989). 
The results of this study are supportive of Killing (1983) and Kogut (1988) 
indicating that UK partners with dominant control are characteristic of 
international strategic alliances that have higher levels of performance, but do not 
support the notion that this dominant control is influenced through equity 
ownership as the above studies have indicated. This suggests that dominant 
control is not a consequence of ownership (Geringer and Herbert 1989). 
However, it must be noted that not all of the international strategic alliances
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sampled in this study are equity related. Approximately 25% of the alliances 
sampled were contractual agreements and just under nine percent were consortium 
which may or may not have been equity related. This may have affected the 
findings of the results in terms of equity ownership not being a significant factor 
of successful UK international alliances affecting dominant control.
Table 6.278 Differences in Extent of Control between Successful and Less 
Successful UK International Strategic Alliances in terms of Performance
Successful G roup Less Successful Difference
Extent of Control M ean SD
G roup
M ean SD T  value Sig
O verall C ontrol 3.05 0.63 2.72 0.99 2.15 .034*
Scale 1=UK firm  have dom inant control; 5=Partner firm  have dominant control 
♦ Difference significant a t the 0.05 level
Since the majority of the literature supports the notion that shared management is 
conducive to successful alliances, the results of this proposition are surprising. 
However, evidence from proposition 12 suggests that there was no difference over 
the control of particular functions (except for pricing policy) between the two 
groups. This suggests that successful UK international strategic alliances may 
seek to exercise control over specific activities that are strategically important to 
them. However it may be the case that in the current study extent of control was 
assessed with a single measure.
In summary, it can be concluded that successful UK international strategic 
alliances are likely to have overall control in managing the activities of the 
partnership that are strategically important to them in order to achieve their
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objectives. The results have also indicated that they are likely to achieve this 
through positive mechanisms of control rather than negative mechanisms. 
However, based on the evidence on the issue of control in this study, it is not 
possible to offer clear directions for managers to take certain courses of action to 
enhance management control in UK international alliances. In any case, managers 
need to realize that the process of control can influence the degree of control, the 
focus of control over activities that may be important for a partner to achieve its 
goals and objectives and the mechanism they use to influence control. For this 
reason managers must try and achieve a fit between both partners in an alliance 
relationship in terms of their goals and objectives. The way in which the alliance 
is controlled should allow both partners not only to achieve their goals and 
objectives but allow them to interact with each other.
• Summary
The t-tests have revealed that while there are significant differences in the means 
of successful and less successful UK international strategic alliances in terms of 
the behavioural characteristics, the majority of the organizational characteristics 
between the two groups were less significantly different. In terms of the 
behavioural characteristics the t-tests have indicated that relative to the less 
successful group, the successful group was characterized by higher levels of 
coordination, commitment, trust, interdependency and communication and lower 
levels of conflict. While the organizational attributes have been shown to differ 
between successful and less successful UK international alliances, they are less 
prominent. This suggests that behavioural attributes are eminent to the 
performance of UK international strategic alliances. Overall, these findings are
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consistent with past research that has examined one or more of these attributes in 
other interorganizational contexts (Devlin and Bleackley 1988; Mohr and 
Spekman 1994; Kumar et al 1995; Olson and Singsuwan 1997; Monckza et al 
1998).
However, this study represents a first attempt to evaluate systematically the 
differences between successful and less successful partnerships in terms of the 
behavioural and organizational characteristics within the context of UK 
international strategic alliances. The results confirm that UK international 
strategic alliances are more successful as a result of the behavioural 
characteristics. This suggests that behavioural characteristics distinguish 
successful UK international strategic alliances from less successful international 
alliances. Thus managers should focus on managing their alliances by striving for 
greater coordination, commitment, trust, interdependence and communication as 
well as trying to formulate an effective conflict management strategy.
6.7 Discriminant Analysis: Behavioural and Organizational 
Variables Affecting UK International Strategic Alliances
A further test of the propositions was obtained by application of the multivariate 
statistical technique of discriminant analysis (MDA). The t-tests confirmed that 
there are statistically significant overall differences between successful and less 
successful UK international strategic alliances in terms of behavioural and 
organizational characteristics. However, the behavioural characteristics 
distinguished better between successful and less successful UK international
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alliances compared to organizational characteristics. The MDA will be used as an 
explanatory device to further test the propositions and to identify the specific 
behavioural and organizational variables and their relative importance in 
contributing to the classification of alliance success. It was intended that the raw 
data responses to each item in the questionnaire would provide the data input for 
the discriminant analysis. The total number of behavioural and organizational 
variables was 126. However, this number exceeded the total number of cases (one 
hundred and fourteen) and did not satisfy the mathematical assumption of the 
discriminant analysis (Klecka 1984; Hair et al 1998). For this reason it became 
necessary to eliminate 15 variables from the analysis.
Three single measures used to measure coordination were removed, because it 
was felt that these measures were reflected in the multi-item measure of 
coordination. For this reason they were also not included in the factor analysis. 
These measures included “ how well do you think your activities with your 
partner, are closely coordinated”; “how well do the different functional groups in 
the alliance work together towards achieving the objectives of the alliance”; and 
“to what extent are your firm’s goals and objectives consistent with those of your 
alliance partner”. Three variables measuring the level of trust were eliminated. 
Two of the variables were “the level of trust between your firm and partner firm” 
and “how much confidence do you have in your partner”. These two variables 
were also not included in the factor analysis because they were single-item 
measures which assessed the overall level of trust. A third variable “our partner is 
seen as being self centered and opportunistic” was eliminated because it exhibited 
a low correlation in the reliability analysis and was subsequently not included in
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the factor analysis. The item “how often would you say there are disagreements 
between your firm and your alliance partner” measuring conflict was eliminated. 
This measure was also not included in the factor analysis because it was a single­
item measure which reflected the overall level of conflict. Question 28 measuring 
the quality of information was removed. In question 34, which measured the 
focus of control, three variables were eliminated because of missing values. The 
number of missing values was too great for these variables to be included.
6.7.1 Estimation of the Discriminant Function for Alliance
Performance
A step-wise procedure was used to distinguish statistically between successful and 
less successful strategic alliances in terms of alliance performance on the basis of 
the 111 behavioural and organizational variables examined for the discriminant 
model. The variable that minimised Wilks’ lambda the greatest was entered into 
the model first. This procedure was repeated until no other variables were related 
to the outcome variable significantly. Thus, the estimation process stopped after 
70 steps with 56 variables constituting the discriminant function. A summary 
presenting the overall stepwise discriminant analysis results can be found in Table 
6.29. Sixty-three variables were entered into the stepwise procedure. Seven 
variables were removed, leaving 56 variables that entered the discriminant 
function. The centroid or mean values of the discriminant function were 
transformed into an F statistic which was used to determine if the two groups were 
statistically significant. The results in Table 6.30 showed that the discriminant 
function proved to have considerable discriminating power between the two
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groups and was highly significant at the 0.000 level. The derived discriminant 
function had a canonical correlation of 0.954, whose squared value (0.9101) 
indicates that 91.0% of the variance in the dependent variable is accounted for by 
this model. The results suggest that 56 behavioural and organizational variables 
were capable of contributing to the discrimination between successful and less 
successful UK international strategic alliances. This indicates that the behavioural 
and organizational variables are unidimensional and that relatively little overlap 
exists among the variables in their ability to discriminate between the two groups.
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Table 6.30 Canonical Discriminant Functions for Successful versus Less 
Successful International Strategic Alliances
Discrim inant
Function
Eigenvalue Canonical
C orrelation
W ilks’
L am bda
Chi-square Df Significance
1 10.117 .954 .090 202.309 56 .000
6.7.2 Predictive Accuracy
As the discriminant function indicated significant overall group separation, the 
relative impact of each independent variable was analysed to determine the 
predictive accuracy of the derived discriminant function. Differentiation between 
successful and less successful alliances has also been shown by the examination 
of the differences between the group means on each discriminating variable as 
reported in section 6.3. The classification results have been summarized in Table 
6.31. Comparing the predicted group column to the actual group column indicates 
that only one case has been misclassified.
Table 6.31 Classification Results : Full Original Sample Predicted Group
Membership
Actual G roup N u m b er 
o f C ases
Predicted G ro u p  M em bership  
Successful Alliances Less Successful 
Alliances
% of Cases 
C orrectly  
Classified
Successful
Alliances
64 64(100% ) 0 (0 )
99.1%
Less Successful 
Alliances
50 1 (2%) 49 (98%)
Total 114 65 49
The results showed that 49 of the 30 observations in the group “less successful 
alliances” were correctly classified as coming from this group while all 64 
observations belonging to the group “successful alliances” were correctly 
classified for that group. These results indicated that the classification rule
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provided correct classifications approximately 99.1 percent of the time if we use it 
to predict the group membership of strategic alliances.
In assessing the validity of the discriminant function the study employed the 
single observation U-method holdout jackknife procedure (Dillon 1979). As 
shown in Table 6.32 the validated classification analysis indicated that 
approximately 96.9% of the successful cases and 92% of the less successful cases 
could be classified correctly by the discriminant function resulting in an overall 
hit ratio of 94.7%.
Table 6.32 Classification Results : Validated Sample Predicted Group
Membership
Actual Group
Number 
of Cases
Predicted Group Membership 
Less
Successful Alliances Successful 
Alliances
Prior
Probability
% of Cases 
Above Cprop
% of
Cases
Correctly
Classified
Successful
Alliances
64 62(100% ) 2 (0 ) .56
44.2% 94.7%
Less Successful 
Alliances
50 4(2% ) 46 (98%) .44
Total 114 66 51 -
As a further test, the upward bias in the classification results was evaluated by 
using the proportional chance criterion to test the validity of the model. This 
criterion gave a value of 50.5 percent, while the maximum chance criterion, 
exhibiting the proportion of correct classifications if all cases fall into the larger 
group, yielded a value of 56.1 percent. Since the resulting overall classification 
accuracy of the validated sample (94.7 percent) is substantially higher than the 
values of both the proportional and maximum chance criteria, the derived function
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can be considered valid. These results indicated that the predictor variables are 
important discriminators of successful alliances.
6.7.3 Discriminating Behavioural and Organizational 
Characteristics
The MDA has distinguished statistically between successful and less successful 
international strategic alliances on the basis of 56 behavioural and organizational 
characteristics. As a further examination of the differences between successful 
and less successful UK international strategic alliances the relative impact of each 
behavioural and organizational characteristic was analysed by considering the 
within-groups structure coefficients also referred to as discriminant loadings. 
These coefficients enabled the assessment of the relative importance of individual 
variables to the overall function.
Table 6.33 shows the 56 variables that best discriminated between successful and 
less successful UK international strategic alliances. However an examination of 
the means of all the significant behavioural and organizational variables for the 
two groups allows a profile of the differences between successful and less 
successful UK international alliances to be built. The Univariate F statistics show 
that 38 out of the 56 discriminating variables are significant.
6.7.3.1 Discrminating Variables: Partnership Attributes 
• Coordination
The stepwise analysis has shown (see Table 6.29) that for coordination two 
variables (exchange o f ideas between partners and strategic fit) significantly
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contributed in discriminating between successful and less successful UK 
international strategic alliances. However, an examination of the means in Table 
6.33 has shown that the exchange o f ideas between partners significantly 
discriminates between the two groups, while strategic fit does not. This suggests 
that there is a regular exchange of ideas between partners in successful UK 
international strategic alliances. The t-test also found exchange of ideas between 
partners to be an important characteristic of coordination of successful alliances, 
with no significant difference shown for strategic fit. Thus, the discriminant 
analysis provides further support that UK firms engaged in successful 
international strategic alliances coordinate through regularly exchanging ideas 
with their partners and through developing strategies suitable to both parties.
As indicated earlier (see proposition 1 in section 6.6) while previous research 
found coordination to be associated with alliance success (Mohr and Spekman 
1994; Monckza et al 1998) both studies used insufficient measures to assess 
coordination. Furthermore, their measurement did not assess either exchange o f 
ideas between partners. In view of this the MDA results together with the t-tests 
provide incomparable findings for the proposition that the level of coordination 
for successful UK international strategic alliances will be higher. There is no 
reasonable explanation for why the variable strategic fit was included as one of 
the most discriminating characteristics of coordination between the two groups, 
since as already indicated strategic fit was non-significant in the t-test analysis and 
also this item had a low item-to-total correlation in the reliability analysis (see
section 5.3).
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• Interdependence
In testing proposition 2, it can be seen that eight variables concerning 
interdependence were identified as good discriminators between successful and 
less successful UK international strategic alliances (see Table 6.29). These 
included dependency on technological expertise, manufacturing capability, 
marketing capability, market information, financial resources and sales and 
profits, partner easily replaceable and likely to switch to new partner. Table 6.33 
clearly indicates that dependency on technological expertise and manufacturing 
capabilities are the best discriminators between the two groups, while dependency 
on market information, marketing, financial resources and sales and marketing 
have less discriminatory power. The means also clearly show that UK firms 
engaged in successful international strategic alliances are more likely to be 
dependent upon their partners for technological expertise and manufacturing 
capabilities. This clearly support the findings of the t-tests (see proposition 2 in 
section 6.6) which found significant differences between the two groups for 
dependency on technological expertise and manufacturing suggesting that 
successful UK international alliances attach greater importance to their partners 
technological expertise and manufacturing capabilities.
The results in Table 6.33 also indicate that replacing an existing partner easily and 
switching to a new partner make a negative contribution to the success of the 
alliance and are more characteristic of less successful UK international alliances. 
The t-tests indicated that UK international alliances less satisfied with their 
performance were more likely to switch to a new partner. Combined, these 
findings confirm previous research that low mutual dependence decreases alliance
Chapter Six: Findings and Discussion 276
performance (Heide and John 1988; Buchanan 1992; Monckza et al 1998) since 
the evidence here suggests that UK firms engaged in less satisfied alliances are 
less dependent on their partners and are thus more likely to switch to a new 
partner. Therefore, the results of the MDA provide support for proposition 2.
• Commitment
For commitment, 17 variables discriminated between successful and less 
successful UK international strategic alliances (see Tables 6.29 and 6.33). Both 
the stepwise analysis and means scores suggest that commitment is characteristic 
of successful UK international alliances. The results suggest that commitment 
variables exercising the most influence on the overall differences between 
successful and less successful UK international strategic alliances are agreement 
on: goals and objectives o f alliance, strategic direction, daily operations, roles 
and functions performed, contractual terms, future plans, resource allocation, key 
alliance decisions, conflict resolution and activities performed; encouraged to 
achieve ■ alliance goals and objectives, to help build the relationship, satisfy 
partner needs and listen to their problems; motivated by profitability, desire and 
necessity. The positive signs of the discriminant loadings indicate that, in 
comparison with successful UK international alliances, less successful UK 
international alliances perceived all 17 commitment variables as significantly less 
important in satisfying the level of their performance. The results suggest that 
agreement between partners over the goals and objectives of the alliance is the 
single most important discriminating factor between successful and less 
successful UK international strategic alliances. Here, commitment reflects the 
acceptance of the goals and values of the alliance. Partners in successful
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international alliances also give higher priority to the way in which activities are 
performed, commitment to future plans and prospects and the strategic direction 
of the alliance to show their identification to the goals of the alliance. Also, 
putting effort and investment into building the alliance relationship and trying to 
satisfy each others needs are the most important ways in which partners in 
successful international alliances show their responsibility to meeting the goals 
and objectives of the alliance. Finally, profitability and desire are more 
significant than necessity for maintaining the alliance relationship. Regarding 
such differences between successful and less successful UK international 
alliances, the MDA results provide additional support for the t-tests (see section 
6.3) and proposition 3 that successful UK international alliances are more likely to 
be committed in terms of accepting the alliance goals and values, are willing to 
make an effort to achieve these goals and objectives through maintaining a long­
term relationship.
• Trust
Regarding trust between international partners the MDA (see Tables 6.29 and 
6.33) indicated that the most significant discriminators of trust between the two 
groups were: partner trusted to be sincere, share work related problems, partner 
makes effort to keep commitments, rely on each other, do not take advantage o f 
each other, close personal ties between partners, partner trusted to keep 
promises. The results in Table 6.33 also indicate that while these characteristics 
of trust are important for successful UK international alliances, they are less 
significant for less successful alliances, probably because these characteristics are 
not seen to contribute to the alliance performance (Mohr and Spekman 1994).
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The discriminant analysis also highlights that relying on each other when it counts 
is the most significant factor of trust for partners in successful international 
alliances. This aspect of trust highlights the confidence that partners have in each 
other to keep promises and be sincere through commitments and close personal 
ties and thus not taking advantage of each other. Thus the results strongly support 
the t-tests that successful UK international strategic alliances find the trust to be 
more important in their relationships compared to less successful international 
alliances.
6.7.3.2 Discriminating Variables: Communication Attributes
In terms of communication attributes, the MDA determined that both parties keep 
each other informed, participation in planning activities, partner seeks advice of 
UK firm, participation in goal setting, UK firm seeks partners advice are the most 
significant discriminators between successful and less successful UK international 
strategic alliances. The measures for the quality of information were not included 
in the discriminant analysis as explained earlier and consequently no support for 
proposition 5 can be provided here. Regarding the sharing of information, in 
successful UK international strategic alliances, both parties are expected to keep 
each other informed about events or changes that may affect the other (see Table 
6.33). This finding is supportive of the t-test which showed the variable “both 
parties keep each other informed” to be the most important characteristic of 
successful UK international alliances when sharing information. Therefore, there 
is some support for proposition 6 provided by this result. The extent to which 
partners participate emerged as the as the most discriminating of the 
communication attributes. The MDA results of the data grouped by the level of
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participation indicated that participating in goal setting and planning activities are 
of great importance to UK firms engaged in successful international alliances, 
while seeking each others advice before making decisions is also critical for both 
parties in successful alliances. These findings are also supportive of the t-tests, 
suggesting that input to decision-making and goal setting through participation are 
important aspects of successful UK international strategic alliances. Therefore, 
further support for proposition 7 is provided.
6.7.3.3 Discriminating Variables: Conflict
The MDA evidences that six significant conflict variables distinguish most 
between successful and less successful UK international alliances. In terms of 
conflict these are poor communications and distrust and the degree o f conflict. 
The conflict resolution mechanisms used include joint problem solving, smooth 
over issues, outside arbitration, assertive and domineering. From the analysis it 
can be seen (Table 6.33), that the degree of conflict is highest for less successful 
UK international strategic alliances. In interpreting the means it can be seen that a 
higher degree of conflict associated with poor communications, distrust are more 
characteristic of inter-partner conflict for less successful UK international 
strategic alliances compared to successful alliances. These findings are also 
highlighted by the negative discriminant loadings shown in Table 6.33. This 
supports previous research that conflicts are intrinsic of less successful alliances 
(Killing 1983; Habib 1987; Tilman 1990) and supportive of the t-tests which also 
highlighted that less satisfied UK international strategic alliances are more likely 
to experience conflict. The discriminant analysis further highlights the higher 
level of importance given by successful UK international alliances to resolving
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conflicts through joint problem solving. Other conflict resolution techniques 
(smooth over issues, outside arbitration and assertive and domineering) are of 
least importance to successful UK alliances. This may be because successful 
international alliances are more likely to engage in joint problem solving since 
outcomes based on cooperation are more satisfying and are more likely to meet 
the needs of both parties (Mohr and Spekman 1994). This finding also offers 
additional support to the t-test that successful UK international alliances are more 
likely to engage in joint problem solving and thus is consistent with previous 
research that joint problem solving is characteristic of successful partnerships 
(Mohr and Spekman 1994; Monckza et al 1998). Accordingly, additional support 
for proposition 8 is provided that successful UK international alliances experience 
a lower level of conflict.
6.7.3.4 Discriminating Variables: Structure
In terms of structure the MDA (see Table 6.29) distinguished between the two 
groups in terms of complexity, hierarchy and partnership based on an informal 
understanding. While the Univariate statistics in Table 6.33 showed no 
significant differences between successful and less successful UK international 
alliances, the interpretation of the means suggest that while successful UK 
international alliances are more likely to have partnerships based on a shared 
informal understanding, less successful alliances are more likely to be complex 
and hierarchical in their organizational arrangement. These findings are 
consistent with the t-tests that also highlighted that there are no significant 
differences between the two groups in terms of either the extent of formalization 
or the way in which the international alliance is organized. The MDA (see Table
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6.29 and 6.33) evidently indicates that partnerships based on a shared informal 
understanding may be a key dimension of successful international alliances and 
thus may have some significance on the alliance performance. Therefore, there is 
some superficial support for proposition 9 that successful UK international 
alliances will be less formalized in their approach to managing activities and 
relationships compared to less successful alliances. In addition the results also 
provide weak support for proposition 11 that successful UK international strategic 
alliances will have simpler levels of organizational arrangements compared to less 
successful alliances. While previous research has posited that complexity leads to 
distrust in partnerships (Moorman et al 1993), these findings have demonstrated 
that high complexity and hierarchy are characteristic of less successful UK 
international strategic alliances and may have a negative impact on the 
performance of the alliance. The MDA did not discriminate between successful 
and less successful UK international alliances in terms of centralized activities and 
relationships and thus no support is provided for proposition 10.
6.7.3.S Discriminating Variables: Control
The most significant areas over which UK international strategic alliances are 
likely to seek control over include pricing policy, marketing and sales and quality 
control. The results in Table 6.29 indicated that pricing policy and marketing and 
sales emerged as the most significant discriminators between successful and less 
successful UK international strategic alliances, while quality control was slightly 
less important. This analysis confirms the t-test findings that control over pricing 
policy are more important for UK firms engaged in successful international 
strategic alliances. In addition, the results evidence that quality control and
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marketing and sales also represent a relative contribution to the discrimination. 
Thus the findings suggest that UK successful international alliances perceive 
control over these activities to effect alliance performance and provide some 
support to previous research that international strategic alliances that seek to focus 
their control over strategically important activities are more likely to be successful 
(Schaan 1983; Geringer and Herbert 1989). Accordingly there is some support for 
proposition 12.
Four control mechanisms used to monitor international alliance activities were 
also derived from the function as discriminators between the two groups (regular 
reporting on performance, appointment of key personnel to important activities, 
power o f veto and equity ownership. The positive discriminant loadings in Table 
6.33 indicated that regular reporting on performance and appointment of key 
personnel to important activities are most characteristic of UK international 
strategic alliances while power of veto and equity ownership indicated by the 
negative sign are given least emphasis and are thus more likely to have a negative 
impact upon the alliance. However, the means showed that while UK partners of 
successful international strategic alliances are more likely to appoint key 
personnel, the most important mechanism they use for monitoring alliance 
activities are reporting regularly on performance. Likewise, the results have 
suggested that less successful alliances pay greater attention to both power of veto 
and equity ownership, though power of veto is more significant. Therefore, it 
appears that successful UK international alliances are more likely to direct control 
through regular reporting on performance and appointment of key personnel to 
important activities, while more less successful UK international alliances are
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probably likely to give more importance to power of veto and equity ownership as 
mechanisms to monitor alliance activities. These types of activities have been 
referred to as positive and negative control mechanisms (Schaan 1983) and have 
been shown by the t-tests to impact the performance of international alliances. 
Thus the results of the MDA provide some support for the t-test as well as 
proposition 14.
Finally, proposition 13 was not supported by the MDA results since the extent of 
control was not found to discriminate between successful and less successful 
international strategic alliances and was thus not in the stepwise analysis results.
• Summary
The results of the MDA above has again evidenced the significant role played by 
the behavioural and organizational characteristics in distinguishing between 
successful and less successful UK international strategic alliances. The 
behavioural attributes received solid empirical support since they constituted 45 of 
the total 56 variables that discriminated between the two groups. This finding has 
affirmed the significance of behavioural characteristics in international strategic 
alliances and provides additional insight in distinguishing between successful and 
less successful UK international strategic alliances. Therefore the results provide 
additional support to the t-tests in confirming the importance of the behavioural 
characteristics.
The implication of the MDA for the research as a whole is its value in testing the 
viability of the behavioural and organizational in classifying successful and less
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successful UK international strategic alliances. The discriminant analysis has 
indicated that the UK international strategic alliances studied can be classified, on 
the basis of the behavioural and organizational variables into successful and less 
successful alliances with a very high degree of accuracy. Furthermore, the 
accurate classifications of the discriminant functions provide additional support 
that the survey instruments employed were reasonably capable of measuring and 
reflecting the difference between the two groups.
6.8 RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN BEHAVIOURAL AND 
ORGANIZATIONAL CHARACTERISTICS AND ALLIANCE
PERFORMANCE
6.8.1 Regression Analysis
To investigate the combined effect of the behavioural and organizational 
characteristics on the success of international alliances, multiple regression 
analysis was undertaken with each of the dependent variables measuring success. 
All the identified factors from the factor analysis were used as the explanatory 
variables (independent variables). The predictors and independent measures are 
presented in Table 6.34.
The behavioural and organizational factors were regressed for each measure of the 
dependent variables, in order to identify the influence of behavioural and 
organizational factors that might be related to each of the different aspects of 
success. The justification for running the regression model for each single 
measure of the dependent variables was to realise how much explanatory power
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do the independent variables have for each dependent measure. If for example a 
summated score of the dependent measures (market share, profitability, and sales 
growth) were used, then it would not be possible to know how much of the 
dependent variable is significant because of market share, profitability or sales 
growth. Therefore, 16 separate regression models (one for each outcome success 
item) were examined. For each regression model, all the thirteen behavioural 
factors, and seven organizational factors produced by the factor analysis were 
included as potential predictors. Only the result for the three dependent measures 
of alliance performance (market share, profitability and sales growth) will be 
reported here. The regression results for 16 measures of alliance satisfaction will 
be reported in Appendix 5.
The regression analysis estimates the significance of the coefficients 
corresponding to the set of propositions and assesses the changes in the proportion 
of variance explained (R2) and the statistical significance of each of the 
independent variables. The regression model was defined as:
Y = a + |31 Xl + |32 X2 + |33 X3.....+ ^ 20 X20
Where Y represents the measures of success (dependent measures) and a is the 
intercept. The intercept is the expected value of Y when the value for each X 
variable are zero. The XT, X2, X3 are the behavioural and organizational
characteristics (independent variables), and |3 l , \)2 , t)3, are the regression 
coefficients for the twenty independent variables. The coefficients are the amount 
by which the expected value o f y increases when XI increases by a unit amount.
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when all the other X variables are held constant (Tabachnick and Fidell 1989; 
Afifi and Clark 1996; Hair et al 1998).
Table 6.34 The Independent and Dependent Measures used in the 
Regression Analysis.
Independent Variables Dependent Measures
B e h av io u ra l F ac to rs
Factor 1 = Trust in partner = bl
Factor 2 = Commitment to alliance goals = |>2
Alliance Perform ance
Factor 3 = Committed to alliance by obligation = (>3 Market Share Y1
Factor 4 = Commitment to stay in relationship = (>4 
Factor 5 = Information quality = (>5
Profitability Y2
Factor 6 = Dependency on marketing capabilities = ()6 
Factor 7 = Coordination between partner firms = ()7 
Factor 8 = Information sharing = (>8 
Factor 9 = Participation = (>9 
Factor 10 = Conflict = (>1 0
Factor 11 = Dependency on administrative support = (>1 1 
Factor 12 = Dependency on management skills = (>12 
Factor 13 = Dependency on financial resources = t>l 3
O rganizational Factors
Factor 1 = Operational control = (314 
Factor 2 = Technological Control = (>15 
Factor 3 = Informal Control mechanisms = (>18 
Factor 4 = Formal Control mechanisms =  \)'\7 
Factor 5 = Centralized decision-making = (>18 
Factor 6 = Organization of alliance = (>19 
Factor 7 = Formalization = ()20
Sales Growth Y3
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6.8.2 Regression Model Testing.
All the behavioural and oragnizational factors were entered simultaneously as 
predictors of the 16 dependent measures of success. The specific variables 
identified as significant predictors, the resulting standardized beta weights, and 
the percentage of variance explained for each of the success items are presented in 
Table 6.35. The regression analysis produced a number of interesting results. 
The overall goodness of fit for each of the success measures was quite high, 
ranging from 53.2 % to 72.9%. This has indicated that a high proportion of the 
variation in each of the dependent measures was explained by the explanatory 
variables. However, the alliance performance measures, profitability (47.4%) and 
sales growth (40%) group had slightly lower goodness of fit.
To test the hypothesis that the amount of variation explained by the regression 
model is more than the variation explained by the average, the F statistic was 
used. Table 6.35 gives the results of the 3 regression equations of the independent 
variables that were generated by factor analysis. In general the results of the 
regression analysis were reliable. The F statistic (see Table 6.35) for each of the 3 
regression equations exceeded the F critical with 93 degrees of freedom at the 
0.01 level and therefore, it can be concluded that each regression model has 
significant explanatory power. This means collectively the predictors explain 
some variation in every case. The statistical significance of the individual 
regression coefficients are presented in Table 6.35. These coefficients indicate 
the relative importance of each predictor in the prediction of each of the 
dependent measures of success.
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6.8.3 Relationship between Partnership Attributes and Alliance
Performance
6.8.3.1 Coordination
The regression analysis (see Table 6.35) has shown that coordination has a 
positive relationship with the success of UK international strategic alliances. 
Coordination (factor 7) was positively related to all three measures of alliance 
performance (market share, profitability and sales growth). This suggests that the 
higher the level of coordination between partners in UK international strategic 
alliances, the greater the success of the alliance in terms of market share, 
profitability and sales growth. While the regression analysis findings indicate that 
coordination is a good predictor of alliance performance, it must be considered 
that the coordination factor (factor 7) consisted of only two variables that related 
to how well the partners integrated with each other in their relationship. The two 
measures reflected in factor seven “UK firm integrated with partner” and “partner 
integrated with UK firm” were also found to be characteristic of successful UK 
international alliances by the t-tests. However, factor seven represents 
coordination in terms of the integration between partners and the regression 
analysis correlated factor seven positively with each of the three measures of 
alliance performance. Furthermore, both Mohr and Spekman (1994) and 
Monckza et al 1998) who showed coordination to be positively correlated with
A ll sig n ifica n t pred ictors are h igh ligh ted . F urtherm ore, the interpretation o f  the
regression  c o e ff ic ie n ts  w e r e  not a d v erse ly  a ffec ted  b y  m u ltico llin ea rity . A ll
to lerance v a lu es w ere q u ite  h igh  and V IF  v a lu es  w ere  c lo se  to  1.0.
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partnership success, investigated coordination with a limited number of reliable 
measures.
The findings of this study provide more effective results concerning coordination 
to earlier research because coordination has been identified as a significant 
characteristic of successful UK international strategic alliances as well as 
predicting alliance success. Thus the regression analysis provides additional 
support to both the t-tests and the MDA.
6.8.3.2 Interdependence
There were four factors of interdependence in the regression analysis: dependence 
on marketing capabilities, which included marketing, market information, 
customer service and sales and profits', administrative capabilities; management 
capabilities and financial capabilities. These related to the UK firm’s dependence 
on their partner. Both marketing capabilities and financial resources factors were 
found not to be associated with alliance success. The results in Table 6.35 
showed that marketing capabilities and financial resources are not significant in 
predicting alliance performance (market share, profitability and sales growth). 
This suggests that the dependence of the UK firm on the marketing capabilities 
and financial resources of their partner does not influence the alliance 
performance in terms of market share, profitability and sales growth. While these 
results support the t-tests that showed no significant differences between the two 
groups, the MDA suggested that marketing capability, market information, sales 
and profits and financial resources were good discriminators between successful 
and less successful international alliances. The UK firm’s dependency on their 
partner’s administrative capabilities was found to have a significant negative
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relationship with alliance performance (market share and profitability). The beta 
coefficients in Table 6.35 indicated that the higher the dependence of the UK firm 
on the administrative capabilities of their partner the lower the alliance 
performance in terms of market share and profitability. Both the t-tests and the 
MDA did not observe administrative capabilities to be a significant attribute of 
successful UK alliances. In addition, dependency on management skills was 
positively significant with alliance performance (market share). This finding 
supports the t-test which found a significant difference between the two groups for 
dependency on management skills.
All three analyses (t-test, MDA and regression) have indicated that the UK firm is 
dependent upon its international partners for various resources. While the t-tests 
showed that UK firms engaged in successful international strategic alliances are 
likely to be dependent on the technological, manufacturing and management 
capabilities of their partner, the MDA established that a combination of 
technological, manufacturing, sales and profits, marketing, market information 
and financial capabilities have the greatest discriminatory power for 
characterizing successful UK international alliances in terms of their dependency. 
Finally, the regression analysis predicted that UK dependency on their 
international partners is related to management and administrative skills. These 
findings thus indicate that international partners provide their UK partners with 
critical and important resources and are thus supportive of the view that such 
resources are essential for the firm’s operation because of limited availability
(Buchanan 1992).
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6.8.3.3 Commitment
The results in Table 6.35 revealed that commitment was positively associated with 
the success of UK international strategic alliances. The positive and significant 
beta coefficients showed that commitment between partners in UK international 
strategic alliances leads to higher alliance performance (market share, profitability 
and sales growth). Thus the presence of commitment in UK international 
alliances are found to be positively related with the success of the alliance. The t- 
tests showed significant differences between the two groups for all the 
commitment measures on a mean score of market share, sales growth and market 
share. However the regression analysis used the factor scores (factors 2,3 and 4) 
for commitment to predict profitability, sales growth and market share and 
indicated that not all three factors correlated with all three measures of alliance 
performance. Table 6.35 shows that commitment to alliance goals (factor 2) is 
positively correlated with market share and profitability; willingness to commit 
(factor 3) correlates positively with profitability and commitment to stay in the 
relationship (factor 4) is positively correlated with all three measures of alliance 
performance. This suggests that profitability has the strongest correlations, 
evidencing commitment to alliance goals, willingness to commit and commitment 
to stay in the relationship. The MDA also identified 17 commitment measures 
that discriminate the most between successful and less successful alliances that 
reflected commitment to alliance goals, willingness to commit and desire to 
maintain the relationship. Thus it has been verified by the t-test and MDA that 
committed partners in UK international strategic alliances are more likely to 
commit to goals and objectives of the alliance, exert effort to assist in sustaining 
the relationship as well as demonstrate their commitment by willingly adopting a
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long-term perspective regarding their involvement in the relationship. The 
regression findings explained that as the level of commitment between partners in 
UK international strategic alliances increases, the market share, profitability and 
sales growth of the international alliance is improved. The regression analysis 
also offers greater explanatory power for predicting the alliance performance of 
UK international strategic alliances because commitment was assessed with each 
of the three measures of alliance performance rather than a mean score as in the t- 
tests and the MDA.
Previous research has investigated commitment using different measures and have 
assessed only a fraction of the measures used in this study and a lesser number of 
measures. For instance researchers that have predicted commitment to be 
associated with partnership success (Mohr and Spekman 1994; Olson and 
Singsuwan 1997; Monckza et al 1998) used limited measures of commitment and 
have thus not emphasized the characteristics of commitment assessed in the 
current study.
The regression analysis clearly supports the findings of the t-tests which 
highlighted significant differences between successful and less successful UK 
international alliances in terms of commitment and the MDA which indicated the 
most important commitment measures to distinguish between the two groups. 
Thus overall these strong consistent findings suggest that commitment is a 
characteristic of success in UK international strategic alliances and thus provide 
additional support to previous empirical evidence (Beamish 1988; Anderson and
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Narus 1990; Anderson and Weitz 1992; Mohr and Spekman 1994; Monckza et al 
1998).
6.8.3.4 Trust
The regression results (see Table 6.35) indicate that trust (factor 1) is positively 
related to alliance performance (market share, profitability and sales growth) and 
is thus a good predictor of alliance success. These findings suggest that a higher 
level of trust between partners engaged in UK international strategic alliances is 
likely to result in higher alliance performance. Both the t-tests and MDA found 
strong support for trust as a characteristic of successful alliances. While the t-tests 
showed that partner’s in successful UK international strategic alliances are more 
likely to be trustworthy and more willing to rely on each other the MDA 
determined the most important characteristics of trust for successful UK 
international strategic alliances. Thus the empirical analysis of the current study 
has indicated that the presence of trust between partners in UK international 
alliances is an essential characteristic of alliance performance. Thus trust has 
been identified as an essential element for the UK partner if the alliance is to 
operate successfully. The findings support (Williamson 1985; Ouchi 1980; 
Beamish and Banks 1988) who argued that mutual trust reduces the temptation for 
either partner to take advantage of the other, thus reducing opportunistic 
behaviour. In the current study, opportunistic behaviour was greater for less 
successful alliances. The variable “we do not take advantage of each other” was 
included in the trust factor used in the regression equation. This variable was also 
found to be significantly different for successful and less successful alliances in
the MDA.
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As stated the importance of trust between partners in UK international alliances 
has been made more evident with the regression analysis that has associated trust 
with alliance performance. In particular the trust factor (factor 1) used in the 
regression analysis emerged as the main characteristic of UK international 
strategic alliances (see section 5.2). This provides greater support for the 
regression results that positively associated trust with alliance performance.
6.8.4 Relationship between Communication Attributes and
Alliance Performance
6.8.4.1 Quality of Information
The regression analysis results in Table 6.35 revealed that information quality 
(factor 5) was positively related to the dependent variable alliance performance in 
terms of market share and profitability. Factor five loaded on all the five 
measures assessing information quality. While the t-tests found significant 
differences between the two groups for only three measures of information quality 
(see section 6.6) they were tested with a mean score of market share, profitability 
and sales growth. Accordingly, the t-tests suggested that successful UK 
international strategic alliances are more likely to be manifested with adequate, 
credible and complete information, while the regression analysis indicated that a 
higher market share and profitability is related to the quality of information 
communicated between alliance partners. Thus there is strong support that 
information quality in international strategic alliances is a good predictor for 
alliance performance.
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6.8.4.2 Information Sharing
The findings in Table 6.35 also suggested that the extent of information sharing 
(factor 8) is positively associated with all three measures of alliance performance 
(market share, profitability and sales growth). The information sharing factor is 
comprised of the variables both parties keep each other informed, we inform 
partner of changes and we share proprietary information with partner. The 
evidence therefore suggests that sharing of information between partners and 
keeping each other informed about changing needs and activities are important for 
successful UK international strategic alliances. The variable “hesitate to give 
information” was found not be a predictor of alliance performance. Therefore, 
while the regression analysis suggests that the greater the amount of information 
sharing between partners in UK international strategic alliances, the higher the 
alliance performance, the t-tests showed that there will be a higher level of 
information sharing between partners in successful UK international compared to 
less successful alliances. The findings of both tests imply that the sharing of 
information between partners in UK international strategic alliances is indeed 
robust, and is characteristic of alliance performance.
6.8.4.3 Close Relationship
The communication attribute participation did not result in a factor that reflected 
the extent to which partners engaged in planning and goal setting. Only one 
variable from participation (we hold regular meetings with our partner) loaded on 
factor nine with one variable from the trust dimension (we have close personal 
ties with our partner). Accordingly, it was perceived that this factor reflected a 
close relationship between partners rather than participation in planning and goal
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setting. Nevertheless the results in Table 6.35 suggested that a close relationship 
is positively associated with alliance performance in terms of profitability. While 
the t-tests showed significant differences between the two groups for both 
variables in factor nine, the MDA identified only “we have close personal ties 
with our partner” as an important discriminator of the trust dimension. It would 
appear from these results that evidence of the two measures in factor nine have 
been found to be characteristic of successful UK international strategic alliances 
in both the t-test and the MDA. Therefore, the regression analysis has provided 
further support that “we have close personal ties with our partner” and “we hold 
regular meetings with partner” are predictors of alliance performance in terms of 
profitability.
6.8.5 Relationship between Conflict and Alliance Performance
The conflict factor (factor 10) in the regression analysis related to personality and 
cultural misunderstandings. The beta coefficients in Table 6.35 indicated that 
personality and cultural misunderstandings were not significantly associated with 
alliance performance. Therefore, conflict does not effect the performance of the 
alliance. However, it must be understood that factor ten consisted of only two 
variables. The factor does not take in to account other measures reflecting 
conflict that have be found to be characteristic of UK international strategic 
alliances. For instance the t-tests indicated that less successful UK international 
strategic alliances are more likely to exhibit a greater degree of conflict and 
disagreements as a result of cultural misunderstandings and conflicting goals than 
successful alliances. Further, successful UK international strategic alliances are 
more likely to resolve any conflicts through joint problem solving. The MDA
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also indicated that a higher degree of conflict equalled with poor communications 
and distrust are the most important attributes of less successful UK international 
strategic alliances, while the most important attribute of successful UK 
international alliances was the use of joint problem solving. While the findings 
have identified particular aspects of conflict to be characteristic of less successful 
alliances and both have identified joint problem solving as characteristic of 
successful UK international alliances, both the t-test and the MDA have pointed 
out that conflict is more typical of less successful UK international alliances.
The non-significance of this relationship found in the regression analysis may also 
be due, in part to the negative significant loading of factor ten, which suggested 
that personalities and cultural misunderstandings do not lead to conflict in the 
alliance relationship.
6.8.6 Relationship between Structure and Alliance Performance
Based on the results of the t-tests and MDA, strong relationships between 
organizational measures and alliance performance were not anticipated for the 
regression models.
6.8.6.1 Formalization
The relationship between formalization (factor 7) and alliance performance was 
significant in predicting alliance performance in terms of sales growth (see Table 
6.35). It would appear that while formalized UK international strategic alliances 
are not generally associated with the performance of the alliance, they appear to 
have an affect on its sales growth. Factor seven consisted of two measures of
Chapter Six: Findings and Discussion 299
formalization. The variable “written documents set out detailed tasks and 
activities for both parties” was negatively correlated with the factor, while the 
variable “our partnership is based on an informal understanding” was positively 
associated. This suggests that UK international strategic alliances are less likely 
to follow their agreement in which the tasks and activities of the alliance are 
detailed in written documents and are more informal based relationship. While 
the-test found no significant differences in the formalization of the two groups, the 
MDA indicated that a shared informal understanding between alliance partners 
was characteristic of successful UK international strategic alliances. However, it 
appears that while formalization may not be characteristic of successful UK 
international strategic alliances as indicated by the t-test, the regression analysis 
has shown that less formalized UK international strategic alliances may have an 
effect on the alliance performance in terms of its sales growth. Despite this 
finding, the overall results have shown that formalization is not an important 
factor for UK international strategic alliances.
6.8.6.2 Centralization
The relationship between centralized decision-making (factor 5) and alliance 
performance were found not to be predictors of alliance success. The results in 
Table see Table 6.35 indicated that factor five was not significant in predicting 
alliance performance. It would appear that centralized activities and relationships 
are not strong predictors of success in UK international strategic alliances. That 
is, mere contact through alliance managers and channelling information through a 
designated office does not ensure a high or low level of alliance performance. In
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other words, centralized UK international alliances are not any more satisfied with 
their performance than decentralized alliances.
The t-test also showed no significant differences between the two groups in terms 
of the two measures that reflect factor five. However, the t-test partially 
supported the proposition that successful UK international strategic alliances are 
less centralized in their activities and relationships compared to less successful 
alliances by showing successful alliances frequently participate in joint decision­
making. This variable “both parties participate in joint decision-making did not 
load on factor five and was thus not analysed in the regression model. This may 
account for the non-significant finding for factor five as a predictor of alliance 
performance. Thus, while the t-tests provide some support that successful UK 
international strategic alliances are more likely to engage in frequent joint 
decision-making, the regression analysis has indicated that this has no effect on 
the alliance performance.
6.8.6.3 Complexity
In terms of the organizational complexity of UK international strategic alliances 
the regression analysis found factor six to be positively associated with the 
performance of the alliance in terms of market share. This finding was surprising 
considering the t-tests found no significant differences between the two groups in 
terms of organizational arrangements. Furthermore, the MDA also discriminated 
between the two groups in terms of complexity and hierarchy and indicated that 
these two variables made a negative contribution. One explanation for the 
significant regression finding may be that the factor loadings for factor six were
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relatively high (see section 5.2) and are thus considered significant. It may be that 
a composite score is likely to have a greater effect than a single variable. Another 
explanation is that the t-tests used a computed score for success, while the 
regression analysis considered each success measures in isolation. However, 
while no significant differences were found between successful and less 
successful UK international strategic alliances in terms of their organization, the 
regression findings have indicated that UK international strategic alliances that 
adopt a flexible and informal approach and are less hierarchical may have some 
influence over the performance of the alliance in terms of its market share.
6.8.7 Relationship between Control and alliance Performance
6.8.7.1 Focus of Control
The factor analysis identified two factors concerning the focus of control (see 
section 5.2). These are “control over functional activities” (factor 1) and “control 
over technological activities” (factor 2). The factor “control over functional 
activities” included distribution facilities, pricing policy, customer support, 
marketing and sales, manpower management and financial activities. The 
regression analysis showed a positive correlation of factor one with profitability. 
The t-test showed significant differences between the two groups in terms of 
pricing policy. The MDA also confirmed the importance of control over pricing 
policy for UK international strategic alliances. In these results, control over 
pricing policy appeared to be the most significant for UK partners for alliance 
performance. Apart from the significant associations indicated by the regression 
analysis, there were no differences found for these variables with either the t-test
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or MDA. Again, the factor loadings for factor one were significant, which 
suggests that a high focus on these measures of control will result in high alliance 
performance. While the findings suggest that control over pricing policy is most 
important for successful UK international strategic, the regression analysis has 
shown, that control over functional activities by UK International strategic 
alliances that alliances are likely to impact the profitability of the alliance and thus 
the alliance performance.
In terms of factor two (control over technological activities), the regression 
analysis found no association to alliance performance. Factor two consisted of 
control over “R&D, product planning, production planning and quality control”. 
The non-significant finding was not surprising for this factor for the following 
reasons. Firstly, quality control was not found to be significantly different 
between the two groups by the t-test. Also the MDA showed quality control to 
show very little discrimination between the two groups. Secondly, the variables 
R&D, product planning and production planning were not analyzed with the t-test 
and MDA because these tests do not account for missing values. Therefore, there 
was no evidence provided for the importance of these variables prior to the 
regression analysis. Thirdly, these variables were included in the factor analysis, 
because this test does take into account missing values by substituting them with a 
mean score. For this reason they were included in the factor analysis which 
provided significant loadings for this factor and was thus included in the 
regression analysis.
Chapter Six: Findings and Discussion 303
6.8.7.2 Mechanism of Control
The factor analysis produced two factors relating to the mechanism of control that 
UK international strategic alliances may use to exercise control (see section 5.4). 
These included informal control mechanisms (factor three) and formal control 
mechanisms (factor four). The results in Table 6.35 have shown that informal 
control mechanisms (teamwork culture, planning process, appointment o f 
personnel and formal/informal contact) were negatively related to profitability. 
However the t-tests found three of these variables (teamwork culture, planning 
process and formal/informal contact) are more characteristic of successful UK 
international alliances compared to less successful alliances. Therefore, while the 
t-tests have indicated that positive control mechanisms are key success attributes 
in UK international strategic alliances, the regression analysis has suggested that 
positive control mechanisms do not impact the performance of the alliance and do 
not contribute substantially to the profitability of the alliance, but in fact, reduce 
profitability.
Factor four (negative control mechanisms) were found not to significantly predict 
alliance performance. Thus, there was no association between the use of negative 
control mechanisms by UK international strategic alliances and their success. The 
t-tests suggested th. the use of power of veto was greater in less successful UK 
international alliances compared to successful alliances. In addition, the MDA 
also found that both power of veto and equity ownership were more important for 
less successful UK international alliances. Therefore, while both the t-test and the 
MDA has suggested that negative control mechanisms are more likely to be 
employed by less satisfied UK international alliances, the regression analysis
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indicated that there is no association between the use of negative control 
mechanisms and alliance performance.
The purpose of the regression analysis was to examine the relationship between 
the behavioural and organizational characteristics and the alliance performance of 
UK international strategic alliances. The above findings have provided an 
understanding of the behavioural and organizational characteristics associated 
with the alliance performance of UK international strategic alliances. The results 
of the regression analysis have indicated that while the behavioural characteristics 
are significant in predicting the alliance performance of UK international strategic 
alliances, organizational characteristics have relatively little impact on 
performance. This suggests that behavioural characteristics play a more 
significant role in explaining overall alliance performance compared to 
organizational characteristics.
6.9 SUMMARY
This chapter has presented the results of the study and the interpretations derived 
from the analysis. First descriptive statistics regarding the sample of UK 
international strategic alliances was reported. These statistics revealed that the 
sample UK international strategic alliances exhibited a number of different 
characteristics. For instance, costs and risks of market entry, achieving access to 
overseas and improving market share were the most influential motives for UK 
firms in their decision to form an international alliance. Furthermore, the analysis
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In rating the success of UK international strategic alliances the percentage of 
alliances expressing dissatisfaction with the performance and satisfaction of the 
alliance was lower, with the majority of alliances being satisfied.
An analysis of the behavioural and organizational characteristics was conducted 
on the overall results obtained, it is apparent that partnership attributes and 
communication strategies are more characteristic of successful UK international 
strategic alliances compared to less successful international alliances. These 
characteristics have also been shown to have a greater impact on the alliance 
performance of UK international alliances. Although, the results have 
demonstrated that certain organizational characteristics have been identified with 
both successful and less successful UK international alliances, overall they were 
found not to represent UK international alliances. Thus the importance of 
organizational characteristics such as structure and control, which have been 
largely ignored, should be examined in order to better understand these factors 
and their contribution to international alliance success.
Table 6.36 summarises the results of the propositions that were examined in the 
study.
confirmed that the majority of responding firms were engaged in alliances with
firms from the USA and the division of equity for most was 50/50. Finally, the
majority o f UK international strategic alliances were still in operation.
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CHAPTER SEVEN
SUMMARY AND 
FUTURE RESEARCH
The purpose of this chapter is to summarise the research findings and discuss the 
contributions and implications of these findings. Furthermore, the limitations of 
the study are addressed and areas for future study are outlined.
7.1 RESEARCH PROBLEM
The aim of this study was to determine the behavioural and organizational 
characteristics of successful UK international strategic alliances. Specifically, 
building from the stream of research which has provided important insights into 
the study of interorganizational relationships (Geringer and Herbert 1989; Parkhe 
1993; Mohr and Spekman 1994; Aulakh et al 1996; Saxton 1997) the study 
addressed the following objectives:
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(i) To provide an empirical analysis of UK international strategic alliance 
activity with partner firms from Western Europe, the USA and Japan
(ii) To determine the successful characteristics of strategic alliances between 
UK firms and their international partners
(iii) To assess the influence of behavioural and organizational characteristics 
on the success of UK international strategic alliances.
7.2 RESEARCH DESIGN
Two methodological approaches were used in this study. The first stage of the 
research involved the construction of a comprehensive database of UK 
international strategic alliances, using secondary sources. The creation of a 
database allowed data to be presented on several dimensions of UK international 
alliance activity. These patterns of activity are outlined in chapter three. The 
development of the database facilitated the next stage of the research which 
involved the development of a questionnaire that was mailed to 450 participants 
who agreed to take part in the study. UK firms engaged in international strategic 
alliances with firms from USA, Japan and Western Europe (Germany, France and 
Italy) formed the focus of this study. One hundred and fourteen completed 
questionnaires were received.
In evaluating and interpreting the results of the propositions to be tested it became 
necessary to clarify certain aspects of the research. Consequently, the following
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analyses were undertaken. UK international strategic alliances were divided into 
successful and less successful groups. T-tests were used to measure differences 
between successful and less successful UK international strategic alliances in 
terms of the behavioural and organizational characteristics. In addition, multiple 
discriminant analysis was undertaken to identify the behavioural and 
organizational characteristics which discriminate most between successful and 
less successful alliances. Finally, multiple regression analysis was used to assess 
the influence of behavioural and organizational characteristics on the success of 
UK international strategic alliances. The regression analysis also provided a 
means of determining which of the behavioural and organizational characteristics 
were the strongest predictors of success.
7.3 FINDINGS
Several important empirical findings came out of this study. The presentation of 
the summary results will be centered around the major issues examined in this 
study, namely the results of the database for UK international strategic alliances 
and the research propositions that were examined.
7.3.1 Database of UK International Strategic Alliances
The database constructed (see chapter three) provided a profile of UK 
international strategic alliances for the period 1988 to 1995. The results identified
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several characteristics of UK international alliance activity that can be
summarized as follows:
(i) While there has been an increase in the number of strategic alliances being 
formed between UK and international firms during the period 1988 to 
1995 the overall level of activity appears to have peaked.
(ii) Although the majority of strategic alliances have been formed with firms 
from Western Europe during the period 1988 to 1995, the number of 
international partnerships being formed with US firms is increasing.
(iii) There is a greater emphasis on equity type international strategic alliances 
compared to non-equity.
(iv) The largest number of UK international strategic alliances were more 
concentrated in the financial services sector. Increased activity was, 
however, observed in the pharmaceutical sector, food and drink, property 
and construction and transport. Overall decreased activity was found in 
both the aerospace and automotive industries.
(v) The majority of UK international strategic alliances were formed for 
marketing-related reasons, a change on previous research findings which 
identified more alliances being formed for manufacturing and R&D 
purposes.
7.3.2 Empirical Findings of the Survey
The empirical findings of the study have attempted to ascertain the characteristics 
of successful UK international strategic alliances as well as determine the impact
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of these characteristics on the success of UK international strategic alliances. The 
study has demonstrated that behavioural characteristics are more typical of 
successful UK international strategic alliances than organizational characteristics. 
Furthermore, findings have also determined that behavioural characteristics are 
more likely to be associated with the success of UK international strategic 
alliances than organizational characteristics.
7.3.2.1 Partnership Attributes 
• Coordination
The proposition that the level of coordination between partners will be higher for 
successful UK international strategic alliances, compared with less successful 
international strategic alliances was also strongly supported. The results showed 
significant differences between successful and less successful UK international 
strategic alliances in terms of the level of coordination and suggested that partners 
satisfied with alliance performance were more likely to interact with each other in 
order to achieve their goals and objectives. It was also advocated that the most 
important characteristics of successfully coordinated alliances are the exchanging 
of ideas between partners and strategic fit. Furthermore, the research has shown 
that partners in UK international strategic alliances that are well integrated with 
each other are more likely to have an impact on the performance of the alliance. 
The results are consistent with the findings of Mohr and Spekman (1994) and 
Monckza et al (1998) of a positive relationship between coordination and success 
but extend their findings to suggest successful UK international strategic alliances 
differ from less successful alliances in terms of a number of coordinated activities.
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• Interdependence
Mixed empirical support was provided for the proposition that the level of 
interdependence between partners will be higher for successful UK international 
strategic alliances, compared with less successful international strategic alliances. 
The findings of this study have suggested that partners engaged in successful UK 
international alliances are more likely to be equally dependent on each other while 
less successful alliances are more likely to switch to a new alliance partner. Also 
in successful international alliances, UK firm’s are more dependent on their 
international partners for technological expertise, management skills and 
manufacturing capabilities. There was also some evidence to suggest that the 
technological expertise and manufacturing capabilities of international partners 
were the most important resources for UK firms. However, the regression 
analysis only found UK dependency on their partners management skills to be 
related to the performance of the alliance and no other association between 
interdependency and alliance performance of UK international alliances was 
revealed.
• Commitment
The proposition that the level of commitment will be higher for successful UK 
international strategic alliances compared with less successful international 
strategic alliances was strongly supported. Significant differences between 
successful and less successful UK international strategic alliances were found in 
terms of commitment. Here, commitment reflected the identification and 
acceptance of the goals and values of the partnership, the willingness to exert 
effort on behalf of the organization and a desire to maintain organizational
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membership. Partners in successful UK international alliances were more likely 
to identify with each others goals and objectives and engage in achieving those 
goals and objectives through willingly supporting the relationship. The findings 
also indicated that a higher level of commitment was related to higher alliance 
performance of UK international strategic alliances. Previous research has 
suggested a relationship between commitment and alliance success (Mohr and 
Spekman 1994; Olson and Singsuwan 1997; Monckza et al 1998). However, the 
findings of this study extend the role of commitment in UK international strategic 
alliances in a number of important ways. Firstly, a number of commitment 
dimensions have been examined in this study not previously investigated. 
Secondly, significant differences have been shown between successful and less 
successful UK international alliances and most important attributes of 
commitment for successful alliances have been identified.
• Trust
Strong support was found for the proposition that the level of trust between 
partners will be higher for successful UK international strategic alliances, 
compared with less successful international strategic alliances. The degree of trust 
was found to differ significantly between the two groups. Trust was more 
characteristic of successful alliances with relying on each other when it counts 
being the most significant aspect of trust in successful relationships. The most 
significant aspects of trust have also been identified as being characteristic of 
successful UK international alliances. In addition the findings also provide 
support to previous findings that a trusting relationship in partnerships is
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important in explaining alliance performance (Mohr and Spekman 1994; Monckza 
et al 1998).
7.3.2.2 Communication Attributes
• Quality of information
The proposition that the quality of information between partners will be greater for 
successful UK international strategic alliances compared with less successful 
international strategic alliances was supported for three aspects of information 
quality which have been identified as being essential for effective communication 
between partners. Differences between successful and less successful UK 
international strategic alliances were found in terms of adequacy, completeness 
and credibility of information transmitted. Differences between the two groups 
were not found for the timeliness and accuracy of information transmitted. Thus 
the quality of information was a key aspect of successful UK international 
strategic alliances. Furthermore, quality of information transmitted between 
partners was found to be associated with the performance of the alliance (Mohr 
and Spekman 1994; Monckza et al 1998).
• Information Sharing
There was strong support for the proposition that there will be a greater level of 
information sharing between partners for successful UK international strategic 
alliances compared to less successful international strategic alliances. Significant 
differences between the two groups revealed that successful UK international 
strategic alliances were more likely to share proprietary information and keep 
each other informed about changes and events that may affect the other. The
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expectation of both partners to keep each other informed about events and 
changes that may affect the other was distinguished as being the most important 
aspect of information sharing for successful UK international strategic alliances. 
Sharing proprietary information and consulting each other of changes and events 
was also found to be related to the performance of the alliance (Mohr and 
Spekman 1994).
• Participation
The proposition that the level of participation in planning and goal setting 
between partners will be higher for successful UK international strategic alliances 
compared with less successful international strategic alliances was supported. 
Differences between the two groups showed that partners in successful UK 
international strategic alliances engage jointly in planning and goal setting 
through regular meetings and joint decision-making. Seeking each others advice 
concerning decision-making in planning and goal setting was the most important 
aspect of participation for successful UK international strategic alliances. This 
was consistent with Dwyer and Oh (1988) who proposed that input to decisions 
and goal formulation are important aspects of participation that help partners to 
succeed. The results also suggested that close personal ties between partner’s and 
participation may impact the success of the alliance (Mohr and Spekman 1994).
7.3.2.3 Conflict
The proposition that there will be less conflict between partners in successful UK 
international strategic alliances compared with less successful international 
strategic alliances was supported. The presence of a high degree of conflict and
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disagreements, as a result of conflicting goals and cultural misunderstandings was 
found to be characteristic of less successful UK international strategic alliances 
(Killing 1983; Lewiss 1990). Conflict was not related to the performance of the 
alliance. This suggests that conflict does not hinder international strategic 
alliance performance. This finding is contrary to Ding (1997) who indicated that 
conflict between partner firms significantly hindered the joint venture 
performance. However, Ding (1997) did not identify in his study, whether 
conflicts were characteristic of successful or less successful joint ventures.
7.3.2.4 Structure
• Formalization
The proposition that successful UK international strategic alliances will be less 
formalized in their activities and relationships compared to less successful 
international strategic alliances was very weakly supported. Successful and less 
successful UK international strategic alliances did not differ significantly on any 
of the measures of formalization. However, the regression analysis did find a 
relationship between formalization and alliance performance. This finding 
indicated that UK international alliances that have a shared informal 
understanding are more likely to be successful. Too much formalization results in 
low levels of participation (Dwyer and Oh 1988) and increased opportunism (John 
1984) which can erode trust, subsequently affecting the performance of the 
alliance (Buckley and Casson 1988; Mohr and Spekman 1994).
• Centralization
The proposition that successful UK international strategic alliances will be less 
centralized in their approach to managing activities and relationships compared to
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less successful international strategic alliances was weakly supported. Partners in 
successful UK international alliances are more likely to participate in joint 
decision-making. However, the degree of centralization was not associated with 
the performance of the alliance. While past research has examined the impact of 
the degree of centralization on the success of international alliances, it has been 
shown that too much centralization results in a lack of participation in decision­
making and opportunistic behaviour (John 1984; Provan and Skinner 1989).
• Complexity
The proposition that successful UK international strategic alliances will have 
simpler levels of organization arrangements compared to less successful 
international strategic alliances was also only very weakly supported. While no 
significant differences were found between the two groups in terms of its 
organization arrangements, the regression findings suggested UK international 
alliances that adopt a flexible and informal approach to organizing their alliance 
may impact the success of the alliance.
7.3.2.5 Control
• Focus of Control
The proposition that UK international strategic alliance partners that seek to focus 
their influence over particular alliance activities rather than control all activities 
will be more successful was weakly supported. Successful and less successful 
international alliances differed significantly on one (pricing policy) out of the 
seven measures of the focus of control. Another measure (marketing and sales).
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although not statistically significant was also found to be characteristic of 
successful international alliances. The results also indicated that UK partners that 
seek to focus their control over functional activities such as distribution facilities, 
pricing policy, customer services, marketing and sales, manpower management 
and financial activities were likely to enhance the performance of their alliance. 
These results suggest that while the activities which partners appear to focus their 
control over are not significantly different in either successful or less successful 
international alliances, UK partners of successful international alliances who have 
control over functional alliance activities are likely to perform better. Strategic 
alliances that seek to control activities that are crucial for the achievement of their 
objectives are more successful (Schaan 1983).
• Mechanism of Control
There is partial support for the proposition that UK international strategic alliance 
partners that use positive control mechanisms as opposed to negative control 
mechanisms to monitor alliance activities will be more successful. Negative 
control mechanisms are more characteristic of less successful UK international 
alliances, while positive control mechanisms are employed by successful 
international alliances. However, there was no association between control 
mechanisms used and the performance of the international alliance. While 
previous research has suggested that both negative and positive mechanisms can 
be used for the effective management of alliances (Tomlinson 1970; Schaan 1983) 
the findings of this study indicate otherwise.
C h a p te r  S e v e n :  S u m m a r y  a n d  F u tu r e  R e s e a r c h 320
• Extent of Control
The proposition that successful UK international strategic alliances are those in 
which the management of the alliance is shared compared to less successful 
international strategic alliances was rejected. The results indicated that UK 
partners in successful international strategic alliances preferred overall dominant 
control in their partnerships. The relationship between the extent of control and 
performance was not examined, since this measure was not selected by the factor 
analysis.
7.4 IMPLICATION S FOR MANAGERS
The research findings of this study have suggested several ways in which 
managers of UK firms engaged in international strategic alliances can actively 
manage their working partnerships. While international strategic alliances have 
been plagued by high failure rates, it has been generally recognized that building 
the right type of inter-firm relationship can help improve the chances of success. 
Much of the current disenchantment with international strategic alliances has been 
attributed to inadequate control processes, along with a failure to consider the role 
of interpersonal relations. This study has stressed the importance of a number of 
behavioural and organizational characteristics of international strategic alliances 
and has indicated that behavioural aspects of alliance relationships are more 
characteristic of successful UK international strategic alliances and thus have a 
greater impact upon the performance of the alliance as well as satisfaction with the 
relationship. This means that it is imperative for managers of UK firms engaged
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in international alliances to focus their attentions on the interpersonal relationships 
between partner firms if they want to be successful.
The most important action to be taken by managers in building a successful 
international alliance is to foster and nurture the alliance relationship. This can be 
done through the development of a greater level of coordination, interdependence, 
trust and commitment, communication and avoidance of frequent conflicts.
It is important that managers in both parties identify and agree on how to 
coordinate and adapt the activities that are particularly critical to the alliance. This 
requires both parties to have similar or complimentary goals and objectives which 
can be brought into operation by managers from both parties, by becoming closely 
involved in the activities of the alliance. Thus partners should be in complete 
agreement about the purpose of the alliance and the process by which its goals can 
be achieved. Clarity of focus is vital. Having ambiguous fuzzy goals and 
uncoordinated activities are the primary causes of failure of strategic alliances. 
The encouragement of greater harmony and cooperation will enable partners to 
achieve the goals and objectives of the alliance. This will require the different 
functional groups of both parties to work together toward achieving those goals 
and objectives. This will encourage a higher level of interaction between 
managers as well as heighten a regular exchange of ideas between partners.
Managers can also help to enhance greater coordination between firms by 
recognizing the benefits of mutual interdependence. The study has indicated that 
while successful UK international strategic alliances appear to be equally
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dependent, dependency is related to the importance of resources that are critical 
for the firm’s operation. Thus interdependence is fundamental to international 
strategic alliances and structuring it appropriately would appear to have important 
outcomes. For this reason managers need to be aware of the role of 
interdependence in international strategic alliances. This means that managers 
must realize that each firm needs the other to provide information and resources to 
complete their work. Thus, research, production, finance and marketing 
departments in each firm need to share their expertise and knowledge for the 
effective management of the alliance. This can also encourage the individuals and 
groups from each firm to interact with each other and thus coordinate their 
activities.
In addition to helping guide mutually dependent partners to coordinate their 
alliance activities, managers can also assist in the development of mutual trust and 
commitment to the relationship. The results of this study have suggested that 
building trust and commitment is essential for the long-term success of UK 
international strategic alliances. This is an issue which managers in UK 
international strategic alliances should address. While the contractual terms of the 
relationship are important, the development of trust between partners should play 
a more significant role in the management of the alliance. To enhance alliance 
performance and satisfaction, managers must demonstrate and reciprocate trusting 
behaviours by investing time and effort into partnership relationships. Several 
behaviours and actions associated with trust have been identified by UK partners 
to have a positive effect on alliance performance. For instance, the relationships 
that enjoy a high degree of harmony, loyalty and sincerity, have close personal ties
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with each other through commitments made, willing to offer each other support by 
sharing work related problems and not taking each other for advantage by being 
opportunistic represent some of the actions and behaviours which could support 
the development of trust. When there is trust between partners, both parties have 
the confidence that the other will be inclined to help with and share work related 
problems.
Managers can facilitate the development of trust by institutionalizing commitment 
to the alliance relationship. This requires that both parties are in complete 
agreement about the purpose of the alliance and the process by which the goals 
can be achieved. Thus managers have to clearly define a number of important 
things for this to be effective. The goals and objectives of the alliance should be 
clearly defined, the operational responsibilities of each party, authority over key 
decisions as well as the way in which activities are to be performed also need to be 
defined. Details regarding resource commitments, daily operation, resolution of 
conflicts should be clearly stated. All these factors can be stated and formalized in 
an alliance agreement to which both parties must agree. However, this can only 
be effective to the extent that both parties share a strong mutual obligation to the 
alliance and understand each other and the extent to which they are willing and 
able to adopt each others commitments. Thus, efforts can be concentrated on 
listening to each others problems, satisfying each others needs, compromising 
with each other to reach mutual objectives.
Communication behaviour also played a significant role in determining UK
Both the depth and breadth of informationinternational alliance success.
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conveyed within the alliance relationship proved to be important in managing the 
relationship. Managers must be able to understand how certain facets of 
communication such as the quality of information exchanged can be used to 
enhance the transmission of effective information. For instance sharing 
information with your partner in a timely manner, providing accurate and adequate 
information should enable managers to interact and share ideas and information 
more effectively. Thus the need to exchange information on a regular basis is 
important for both parties and could encourage partners to keep each other 
informed about events and changes that may affect the other. This may lead to 
improved managerial decision-making when planning activities and goal setting. 
However, participation in planning and goal setting should be rigorous and 
detailed enough to be effective. This again can be achieved by managers through 
openly communicating their commitment to the alliance goals and objectives and 
also their participation in shared decision-making on a regular basis. Therefore, 
for effective alliance management communication must be frequent, on time, open 
and shared.
While this study has indicated that conflicts are characteristic of less successful 
international strategic alliances, it has been readily acknowledged that 
disagreements are inevitable in every alliance relationship. Each firm has its own 
agenda and goals for the alliance which can result in conflicting goals. Further, 
differences between cultures of partners can lead to cultural misunderstandings. It 
is suggested that partners work jointly together to develop mediating mechanisms 
to defuse and settle their differences. Firms can train their personnel to be 
sensitive to each others problems and deal with these problems through using joint
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problem solving techniques. In this way problems may be discussed to develop 
mutually acceptable solutions. Helping to blend in the different cultures of the 
partners will help to phase in the relationship between the partners. Thus it is 
suggested that the complexity of managing such differences should be highlighted.
The way in which the alliance is structured and the control processes used to 
monitor alliance activities were generally not found to be distinctive of either 
successful or less successful UK international strategic alliances and were thus 
considered to be of less importance in the development of successful international 
strategic alliances. There was very little evidence to suggest that the way in 
which the alliance is structured and controlled are crucial for the success of the 
alliance. However, the results do indicate that frequent participation in decision­
making and shared informal understanding associated with some flexibility can 
have some impact on the success of the alliance. What is recommended is that 
managers should help to design structures that fit the needs of the alliance. While 
an international strategic alliance secured by an administrative hierarchy with a 
formalized systems of rules and procedures may erode the effectiveness of an 
alliance, too little formalization and centralization may result in each party 
behaving opportunistically. What is required is a balanced consideration. It is 
suggested that the alliance is managed through a system where authority is shared 
and decision-making is collaborative.
International managers also need to recognize that the issue of control may impact 
the success of international strategic alliances. If both parties to an alliance strive 
for majority control, this may jeopardize their relationship and inhibit the success
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of their partnership. The results of this study have implied that the preferable 
option for control is to pursue dominant managerial control over decisions or 
activities that are critical to the success of the international strategic alliance. 
Partners in international alliances need to arrive at a mutually acceptable solution. 
A balance may need to be struck between the need for control and the need to 
maintain a harmonious relationship. Furthermore, control should be monitored 
through social interactions for maintaining partnerships such as regular reporting 
on performance, involvement in the planning process and informal and formal 
contacts between managers. For instance regular reporting on the performance 
and progress of the alliance as a mechanism to monitor the alliance activities 
should be made available to management
Finally, the identification by respondents of utilizing several measures to evaluate 
the performance and satisfaction of alliances demonstrates that UK partners 
engaged in international strategic alliances follow a multiple rather than a single 
strategy to measure success. Therefore, in addressing the measurement of success 
in UK international alliances managers need to determine the success of alliances 
on multiple measures of success.
Thus the key principles to effective management of UK international strategic 
alliances have been clearly defined above. The study has suggested that the ability 
to coordinate activities, develop a sense of trust and commitment to the 
relationship, mutual interdependence, communication behaviour and joint 
problem solving are critical to the relationship and can help to promote the 
effective management of international alliances. Thus all these factors can
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contribute to the success of the international alliance. The challenge lies in UK 
firms developing international alliances in which the control and structure of the 
alliance can house these relationships. The major contribution of the research for 
managers of UK international strategic alliances is that they now have an 
empirically derived framework to guide them in their decision regarding the 
effective management of alliances.
7.5 CONTRIBUTIONS OF THE STUDY
This study has contributed to the existing literature in a number of ways. The 
contributions pertain principally to our understanding of the relationship between 
behavioural and organizational characteristics and international strategic alliance 
success. Other contributions are related to the distinctive importance of the 
different dimensions developed for each construct of the study to the development 
of an integrative framework.
This study offers empirical data on the impact of behavioural and organizational 
factors on the success of UK international strategic alliances. Firstly, the study 
has suggested that behavioural factors are more characteristic of successful UK 
international strategic alliances and have a greater impact on the success of these 
partnerships. Secondly, the study found few differences in the structure and 
control of successful and less successful UK international strategic alliances. The 
data also revealed that structural and control characteristics had very limited 
impact on the performance and satisfaction of the international alliance.
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Therefore, the most significant contribution of the study is that it represents the 
first systematic study that has revealed that behavioural characteristics are most 
important in distinguishing between successful and less successful UK 
international strategic alliances and have a major impact on the alliance 
performance and satisfaction.
The empirical data of this study is distinguished from previous research in a 
number of respects. First, the study has tried to determine both behavioural and 
organizational characteristics of UK international strategic alliances and their 
impact on success. Previous research has examined either the behavioural 
characteristics or organizational characteristics (Geringer and Herbert 1989; Mohr 
and Spekman 1994; Monckza et al 1998). There have been no studies that have 
investigated both aspects. While complementing previous research, this study 
provides new and greater evidence regarding behavioural characteristics and 
alliance success. The findings of this study have shown (i) there are significant 
differences between successful and less successful UK international strategic 
alliances in terms of the behavioural characteristics, (ii) the most important 
discriminating behavioural characteristics of successful UK international strategic 
alliances and (iii) that behavioural characteristics have an impact on the 
performance and satisfaction of UK international strategic alliances. Past 
researchers have focused only on the association between behavioural aspects of 
the alliance relationship and its success (Mohr and Spekman 1994; Monckza et al 
1998). Furthermore, these studies did not find all behavioural attributes of 
supplier alliances to be significantly related to partnership success.
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The results have also provided a few differences in the organizational 
characteristics of successful and less successful UK international strategic 
alliances. While these differences were few no previous research has attempted to 
address this issue. While the findings of this study found relatively little impact 
on the performance and satisfaction of the international alliances, the study did 
reveal some aspects of structure and control characteristic of successful UK 
international strategic alliances. Previous studies investigating control in 
international strategic alliances have tended to focus on ownership-control 
relationships mainly in less developed countries (Geringer and Herbert 1989). 
While the structural characteristic of interorganizational agreements have been 
emphasized, there has been no research which has investigated its impact on 
alliance success.
The literature on interorganizational relationships that have addressed the 
behavioural characteristics of successful partnerships have failed to measure 
success in terms of both performance and satisfaction. Where researchers have 
used performance measures such as market share and profitability, they have 
evidenced only minimal association between behavioural factors and success. 
Furthermore, this study adopted an integrative research perspective that included 
multiple determinants of alliance performance and satisfaction.
An important methodological contribution of this study is that highly reliable and 
valid measures for each of the behavioural constructs have been provided. Better 
measures have also been provided for the control dimensions. Previous research 
on supply chain alliances (Mohr and Spekman 1994; Monckza et 1998) have not
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conceptualized the behavioural dimensions to the same extent as this study. For 
instance previous conceptualization of commitment and its operationalization 
through a three or four-item scale does not capture the many facets of this concept. 
In this study commitment was operationalized using 28 items and have thus 
incorporated the many different dimensions of commitment. This type of 
operationalization has been accomplished for each of the behavioural dimensions 
used in this study. It is suggested that future research should also systematically 
examine the behavioural-success relationship by incorporating different 
dimensions of these constructs.
This study also offers data not only on international strategic alliances, but also in 
the context of UK international firms representing a wide range of industries. Past 
research has tended to examine interorganizational relationships concentrating 
mainly on the US domestic market usually within the context of one single 
industry. To generalize these findings to international strategic alliances would be 
a misconception. International strategic alliances are more complex in that they 
have to deal with different cultures and styles of management. This means that 
data collected from international strategic alliances are more generalized.
The present study has provided a more comprehensive analysis by acquiring 
multiple perspectives from several types of alliances, including both equity and 
non equity agreements. Previous research has considered only supplier-dealer 
type relationships (Mohr and Spekman 1994; Monckza et al 1998). Again the 
findings of this study can be generalized to international strategic alliances
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because they are more complex than supplier-dealer type relationships and 
experience a greater level of behavioural and oragnizational characteristics.
The results of the study also enriches the theoretical perspectives of international 
strategic alliances. The findings highlight significant differences between 
successful and less successful international strategic alliances in terms of the 
behavioural aspects of alliance relationships. The research implications here call 
for the existing theoretical perspectives to incorporate these findings in order to 
explain the success of international strategic alliances. This study provides an 
important extension to current theoretical perspectives on behavioural and 
organizational factors. The framework of this study has provided researchers with 
new insights in to the way coordination, interdependence, commitment, trust, 
conflict and communication processes develop in international strategic alliances 
as well as important insights on how international alliances are structured and 
controlled. In addition, the use of multiple measures of success to measure the 
performance and satisfaction has provided incomparable evidence in evaluating 
the success of alliances. Overall, there was little difference found between the 
measures in terms of the success of UK international alliances. Thus these 
findings complement existing research and provide a greater contribution to the 
understanding of the phenomenon of success in international strategic alliances.
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7.6 LIMITATIONS AND DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE
RESEARCH
While this study has determined the behavioural characteristics of successful UK 
international strategic alliances and complemented the research based on 
organizational characteristics, the findings of this study should be evaluated in the 
light of the limitations of the study. Recognition of the limitations of this study 
are important because they will help to qualify the findings of the study and also 
identify the directions for future research. Therefore, the results of this study 
should be viewed in light of the following limitations.
• Use of Secondary Data
The secondary data collected for the establishment of the database and for the use 
in the subsequent part of the research study may not be representative of all UK 
strategic alliances formed in Western Europe, USA and Japan as they were 
recorded from the Financial Times and other newspapers on CD-ROM. While 
this method of collecting data on the number and formation of UK international 
strategic alliances has been used by previous researchers (Glaister and Buckley 
1994) it may be that this method does not represent the activity of all UK 
international strategic alliances since not all alliances are reported. Furthermore, 
UK international strategic alliances represent only a small sub-set of possible 
alliances formed. Therefore, a replication of the study in other national settings 
would enhance the generalizability of the findings of this study.
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• Use of Primary Data
The collection of primary data through the administration of a postal questionnaire 
represents a methodological limitation. Data in this study were obtained from one 
senior manager for each international alliance. This design may be inherently 
ineffective in controlling for potential biases associated with the information 
provided by the UK respondents, since the information provided is based only the 
perceptions of one informant engaged in the alliance. However, since senior 
managers are likely to be knowledgeable about all stages of the development of 
the alliance the respondent is likely to provide reliable information. Despite this, 
it would be useful for future researchers to obtain information from a broader 
sample of senior managers from each alliance and perhaps even non-managers. 
This would minimize any potential bias in the information provided resulting from 
the level of the informant.
• Focus on UK Firm Perceptions
This study is based on the perceptions of the UK partners engaged in international 
strategic alliances. Thus the results of the study are based on information obtained 
from one side of the partnership dyad. While it may be beneficial to elicit the 
perceptions of foreign partners to better understand the phenomena of 
international strategic alliances, it was not feasible in this study because of a 
number of constraints. First, to obtain information from the international partner 
would have been difficult since many of the UK partners were unwilling to 
identify their partners for confidential and strategic reasons. Since the variables in 
the study are based on cooperative features involving both partners, the collection 
of data from one partner does not capture these cooperative aspects and findings
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should be interpreted keeping this limitation in mind. Thus further research is 
encouraged to utilize dyadic responses from both partners in order to better 
understand the characteristics of such relationships from the perspectives of both 
firms.
• Focus on Multiple Industries and Alliance Types
The findings of this study should be viewed in the light of the research 
methodology employed and the nature of the strategic alliance investigated. The 
study’s focus on a multiple of industries and different types of international 
strategic alliances may have posed some problems. In this study only three 
measures of performance (market share, profitability and sales growth) criteria 
were indicated to be used by all the respondents of this study. Other measures of 
performance such as cost control, technology development, product design were 
not criteria used by all respondent firms. One explanation is the widely diversified 
use of international strategic alliances in various industries used in this study. 
Thus there was no homogeneity within the sample used. Although such 
heterogeneity of industry and type of alliance may be desirable for the analysis of 
intra-firm differences, this was not possible in this study because a sufficient 
number of sample firms were needed for the analysis. Eliminating alliances on the 
bases of industry and type of agreement would have resulted in a smaller sample. 
In future, research may be conducted on one type of international strategic alliance 
within a single industry and thus determine the success of the partnerships on 
multiple perspectives of alliance performance. Also, in order to identify industry 
specific effects, replications with single industries would be desirable.
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• Conceptualization of Structure
This study examined the impact of structural relationships on the success of 
international alliances. The conceptualization of the structural dimension and its 
operationalzation through three multi-item scales did not capture the many facets 
of this concept. The measures used to examine this dimension were taken from 
the strategic alliance literature in which only a very small contribution has been 
made. The reason for this was because very little or no empirical research has 
been done on the structural characteristics of international strategic alliances and 
thus very little contribution to theory has been made. Because of a need to 
develop a more complete theoretical explanation for structural characteristics of 
international strategic alliances and their outcomes more empirical inquiry is 
needed. As part of theory development the case study approach (Yin 1989) is 
recommended.
• Issue of control
The inconclusive results concerning control may be attributed to the fact that only 
limited aspects of control were surveyed in UK international strategic alliances. 
This study has assessed only the degree of each partners control over ten 
functional activities. Future research should consider influence over a wider range 
of decision-making areas as well as the assessment of the importance of each 
decision. The study also provides some support to suggest that positive control 
mechanisms are more characteristic of successful international alliances. Thus 
future research should concentrate more on the importance of positive 
mechanisms of control and their impact on the success of alliances.
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• Future Scope for Behavioural and Organizational characteristics
While this study has addressed the impact of both behavioural and organizational 
factors on the success of UK international strategic alliances and provided 
substantial findings that lend credence to theoretical arguments, a further need for 
understanding behavioural and organizational characteristics in international 
strategic alliances is stressed. Despite the importance of these findings, 
knowledge concerning these issues is at an early stage. Future research may need 
to improve on the definitions of concepts and their operationalizations. While the 
concepts used in this study are highly reliable and show validity, it is not possible 
to capture all the complexities of say commitment and trust when measuring these 
variables. Different researchers have used different measures to describe the same 
dimension. For example researchers such as Mohr and Spekman (1994), and 
Monckza et al (1998), while they have provided fruitful insights in to the factors 
affecting partnership success they have failed to adequately characterize their 
dimensions in a number of different ways. Therefore, it would be useful for future 
research to explore the many complexities of each of the behavioural and 
organizational dimensions used in this study.
• A Case study Orientation
Because of the nature of the research question this study employed large sample 
hypothesis-testing to establish the relationships between behavioural and 
organizational characteristics and international strategic alliance success. 
Focusing on a large number of cases made it possible to construct a picture of 
behavioural and organizational characteristics associated with successful UK 
international alliances that are specific to any case or any group of cases.
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However, it would be interesting for future research to use the case study approach 
in order to investigate why certain behavioural characteristics are associated with 
successful alliances. In other words, if successful international strategic alliances 
have behavioural characteristics not held by less successful alliances, and vice 
versa, case analysis may reveal why one set of factors leads to increased alliance 
performance and satisfaction and another set leads to less alliance performance 
and satisfaction.
• Success Measures
In measuring the success of UK international strategic alliances, this study used 
data that are perceptual and subjective. Though it is encouraging to note that 
perceived alliance performance and satisfaction are adequate, and previous 
literature has supported this view (Geringer and Herbert 1991), it would be 
interesting to see if future research could incorporate a few objective measures of 
performance in order to investigate the efficiency of alliance outcomes. It may be 
that in this study the performance and satisfaction measures used capture only part 
of the multidimensional aspect of alliance performance. Future studies should 
examine whether the same results can be obtained by using more objective 
measures of performance. It was not possible to include objective measures of 
performance such as profitability or sales data in this study since respondents were 
reluctant to provide such data.
Regarding future research, it can be stated that the results from the present study 
are very encouraging. The possibility of obtaining reliable and valid data on 
behavioural and organizational aspects of international strategic alliances as well
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as data on their performance, suggests that there is potential for future researchers 
to obtain further and additional information on these aspects of alliance 
partnerships. For instance, it would be interesting to consider the various 
interactions between behavioural and organizational variables and their impact on 
alliance performance. Both practitioners and researchers could benefit from work 
in this area. Thus the knowledge of alliance performance would be greatly 
enhanced by the study of multiple paradigms.
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APPENDIX 1
Mr. Ronald Davidson 
A.H.T. International pic 
Ambury Road 
Hertfordshire 
HP7 9NA
Dear Mr. Davidson
Following a recent telephone conversation with your secretary I was given your 
name as a contact for assistance in my research project.
I am a doctoral researcher at the Warwick Business School (University of 
Warwick). I am conducting research into the effectiveness of UK international 
strategic alliances.
The objectives of the research are to develop a clear understanding of the 
behavioural and organizational characteristics of successful and less success 
ful UK international strategic alliances. The research aims to present new data 
based on a questionnaire survey of UK partners of strategic alliances in developed 
countries. The study aims to determine the behavioural and organizational factors 
which are most associated with success within strategic alliances.
The research results will be of considerable interest to practitioners and will 
provide managers with a greater appreciation and understanding of alliance 
management and help them to develop more successful partnerships.
I would be grateful therefore if you would agree to participate in this study by 
taking time to complete the enclosed questionnaire. The questionnaire concerns 
the alliance between A.H.T. International and the Nesbitt Group in the USA. I 
realize that your time is precious, but the success of Ph.D. and this important 
research project depends upon a sufficient response from as many companies as 
possible.
All information provided will be treated in the strictest confidence and the results 
will only be presented in aggregate form thus ensuring that complete ananomity is 
maintained. A copy of the research will be disseminated to all respondents.
Could you please attempt to complete the questionnaire even if the alliance has 
been terminated. If you have any questions concerning the study, pleas feel free 
to contact myself or my supervisor DR Vivienne Shaw.
Thank you in anticipation
Yours Sincerely
Saleema Kauser 
Doctoral Researcher
Marketing and Strategic Management Group
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APPENDIX 2
WARWICK
B U S I  N t  NN s <  H O O L
SUCCESSFUL CHARACTERISTICS OF UK 
INTERNATIONAL STRATEGIC ALLIANCES
(Research Questionnaire)
SECTION 1. BACKGROUD INFORMATION
1. Name of Alliance Partner
2. Date of Alliance Partner
3. Please indicate Industry served
4. Pleas indicate the type o f alliance you have with the above organization 
(Pleas tick only one box)
4.1 Majority Equity Investment □
4.2 Minority Equity Investment □
4.3 50:50 Joint Venture □
4.4 Contractual Agreement □
4.5 Consortium □
5 Please indicate the function of the alliance: (Please tick only one box)
5.1 Joint Marketing Agreement □
5.2 Joint Manufacturing □
5.3 Joint Product Development □
5.4 Joint R & D Agreement □
5.5 Shared Distribution Services □
5.6 Other (pleas specify) □
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6. To what extent were the following factors influential in your decision to form 
an alliance? (1 = Not at all important; 5 = Very important)
6.1 Potential for economies of scale 1 to 5
6.2 Potential for economies of scope 1 to 5
6.3 Technological competition 1 to 5
6.4 Shortening product life cycle 1 to 5
6.5 Increasing international competition 1 to 5
6.6 Spreading costs and risks of New Product Development 1 to 5
6.7 Spreading costs and risks of market entry 1 to 5
6.8 High costs of distribution networks Ito 5
6.9 High costs of R&D 1 to 5
6.10 High costs of operating in the market 1 to 5
6.11 Access to overseas market 1 to 5
6.12 Need to improve market share 1 to 5
6.13 Marketing skills of partner 1 to 5
6.14 Managerial skills of partner 1 to 5
6.15 R & D  capability of partner 1 to 5
6.16 Distribution channels of partner 1 to 5
SECTION 2. BEHAVIOURAL CHARACTERISTICS |
7. How well do the following describe the coordination between your firm and 
your partner firm? (1 = Not at all; 5 = Very well)
7.1 We work as a team with our partner 1 to 5
7.2 There is a regular exchange of ideas
between our firm and the partner firm 1 to 5
7.3 We develop strategies and expect our
partner to fit in with them 1 to 5
7.4 Our partner’s activities are an extension
of our firm’s activities 1 to 5
7.5 There is a high level of interaction 
between managers working within the
alliance partnership 1 to 5
7.6 We keep our partner well informed about
important decisions I to 5
7.7 Our partner is well integrated with our firm 1 to 5
is well integrated with our partner 1 to 5
8 . How well do you think your activities with your activities with your partner 
are closely coordinated?
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Not very well 1 to 5 Very well
9. How well do the different functional groups in the alliance work together 
Towards achieving the objectives o f the alliance?
Not very well 1 to 5 Extremely well
10. To what extent are your firm's goals and objectives consistent with those o f 
your alliance partner?
Not at all consistent 1 to 5 Very consistent
11. How often are you in contact with your alliance partner?
11.1 Daily □
11.2 Weekly □
11.3 Monthly □
11.4 Quarterly □
11.5 !/2 Yearly □
11.6 Yearly □
11.7 No set frequency □
12. How important are the following contact mechanisms in your relationship
With your alliance partner? (1 = Not at all; 5 = Very important)
12.1 Personal face to face discussions 1 to 5
12.2 Letters, memos, written reports 1 to 5
12.3 Telephone calls 1 to 5
12.4 Group / committee meetings 1 to 5
12.5 Board meetings 1 to 5
13. Would you say your firm and your partner firm are equally dependent on
each other ? (1 = Not at all; 5 = Very much so)
Not at all 1 to 5 Very much so
14. How easily do you think you could replace your existing partner? (1 = Not a 
at all 5 = Very easily)
Not at all 1 to 5 Very easily
15. How likely is your firm to switch to a new alliance partner? (1 = Not at all 
Likely; 5 = Very likely)
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Not at all 1 to 5 Very likely
16. How dependent is your firm on your partner in terms of the following? 
(1 = Not at all; 5 = Very dependent)
16.1 Financial resources 1 to 5
16.2 Technological expertise 1 to 5
16.3 Management skills 1 to 5
16.4 Marketing 1 to 5
16.5 Sales & profits 1 to 5
16.6 Market information 1 to 5
16.7 Customer services 1 to 5
16.8 Manufacturing capability 1 to 5
16.9 Administrative support 1 to 5
16.10 Manpower resources 1 to 5
17. How would you describe the level o f agreement between you and your 
partner? ( 1 = Weak agreement; 5 = Strong agreement)
17.1 The goals and objectives of the alliance 1 to 5
17.2 The ways in which activities are performed 1 to 5
17.3 The contractual terms of the relationship 1 to 5
17.4 The strategic direction 1 to 5
17.5 Allocation of resources 1 to 5
17.6 Control over key decisions in the alliance 1 to 5
17.7 Roles and functions to be performed 1 to 5
17.8 Future plans and prospects 1 to 5
17.9 Conflict resolution mechanism 1 to 5
17.10 Daily operation of the alliance 1 to5
18. How well do the following statements describe your firm's commitment to 
your alliance partner? (1 = Not very well; 5 = Exactly)
18.1 Our firm shows a strong sense of loyalty
to our partner 1 to 5
18.2 Our firm has a strong sense of belonging
to the alliance partnership 1 to 5
18.3 We strongly identify with the goals and
objectives of the alliance 1 to 5
18.4 We believe the alliance partnership has a
shared vision and understanding 1 to 5
18.5 The alliance partnership is valuable to us 1 to 5
19. To what extent does your firm meets its obligations to the alliance partner? 
(1 = Not at all; 5 = To a large extent)
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19.1
19.2
19.3
19.4
19.5
19.6
19.7
We are always willing to listen to any problems 
our partner may have
We encourage our firm to achieve the goals of 
the alliance
We try to overcome problems as they arise 
We try to satisfy the needs of our partner 
We out a lot of effort and investment in to 
building the relationship 
We try to be patient with the partner firm if 
they make mistakes
We are always willing to make compromises 
to reach our mutual objectives
1 to 5
1 to 5 
1 to 5 
1 to 5
1 to 5
1 to 5
1 to 5
20. How well do the following describe your firm ’s motivation for maintaining 
the relationship with your alliance partner? (1 = Not at all; 5 = Very well)
20.1 Staying in the relationship is a necessity for us
20.2 Staying in the relationship is a desire for us
20.3 We make short term sacrifices in order to achieve 
long term gains
20.4 We enjoy our relationship with our partner
20.5 We believe that a long term relationship 
with our partner will be profitable
20.6 The relationship is important in achieving 
our strategic objectives
1 to 5 
1 to 5
1 to 5 
1 to 5 
1 to 5 
1 to 5
1 to 5
21. How would you describe the level of trust between your firm and your
partner firm? (1 = Very low trust; 5 = Very high trust)
Very low trust 1 to 5 Very high trust
22.
22.1
22.2
22.3
22.4
22.5
To what extent do you agree with the following statements about your 
partner? (I = Strongly disagree; 5 = Strongly agree)
Our partner can be trusted to keep promises they make 1 to 5
Our partner is sincere when making important decisions 
concerning the alliance 1 to 5
Our partner is seen as being self centered and opportunistic 1 to 5
Our partner is always ready and willing to offer us support 1 to 5
Our partner shows a high degree of loyalty towards us 1 to 5
23. Which o f the following statements best describes your firm ’s relationship
with your partner? (1 = Not at all; 5 =Very well)
23.1 There is a lack of continuity in management teams 1 to 5
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23.2 The relationship is marked by a high degree of harmony 1 to 5
23.3 The relationship is open and informal 1 to 5
23.4 There are close personal ties between us and our
alliance partner 1 to 5
23.5 Our partner firm makes every effort to keep to the
commitments made 1 to 5
23.6 We do not take advantage of each other 1 to 5
23.7 We can always rely on each other when it counts 1 to 5
23.8 We share work related problems with our partner 1 to 5
24. How much confidence do you have in your partner?
(1 = No confidence at all; 5 = A lot of confidence)
No confidence at all 1 to 5 A lot of confidence
25. How would you describe the degree o f conflict between you and your 
partner? (1 = Very low; 5 = Very high)
Very low 1 to 5 Very high
26. I f  disagreements arise between your firm and your partner firm, how well do 
the following statements describe your response?
(1 = not at all; 5 = very well)
26.1 We generally try to avoid the issue 1 to 5
26.2 We try to smooth over the issues 1 to 5
26.3 We are assertive and domineering 1 to 5
26.4 We try to persuade our partner to accept
our point of view 1 to 5
26.5 We engage in joint problem solving 1 to 5
26.6 We use outside arbitration 1 to 5
27. How often would you say there are disagreements between your firm and
your alliance partner? (1 = Never; 5 = All the time)
Never 1 to 5 All the time
28. To what extent do the following contribute to any conflict between your 
organization and your alliance partner?
(1= Not at all; = To a large extent)
28.1 Poor communications 1 to 5
28.2 Distrust 1 to 5
28.3 Conflicting goals 1 to 5
28.4 Personality Conflicts 1 to 5
28.5 Cultural misunderstandings 1 to 5
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28.6 Language difficulties
29. How would you describe your
29.1 untimely 1 to 5
29.2 inaccurate 1 to 5
29.3 inadequate 1 to 5
29.4 incomplete 1 to 5
29.5 not credible 1 to 5
1 to 5
mications with your alliance partner?
very timely 
very accurate 
very adequate 
very complete 
very credible
30. To what extent do you agree with the following statements?
(1 = Strongly disagree; 5 = Strongly agree)
30.1 We participate in goal setting with our partner firm 1 to 5
30.2 We help our partner in its planning activities 1 to 5
30.3 We hold regular meetings with our partner 1 to 5
30.4 We seek our partner’s advice for ideas when
making decisions 1 to 5
30.5 Our partner firm consults and informs us before
making key decisions 1 to 5
31. To what extent do the following describe the way in which you and you 
partner share information? (1= Not at all; 5=To a large extent)
31.1 We share proprietary information with our partner 1 to 5
31.2 We inform the partner in advance of the changing
needs of the alliance 1 to5
31.3 Both parties are expected to keep each other informed
about events or changes that may affect the other 1 to 5
31.4 We hesitate to give our partner too much information 1 to 5
32. How well do the following describe the terms o f your agreement with your 
partner? ( 1= Not at all; 5 = Very well )
32.1 Written documents set out detailed tasks and
activities for both parties 1 to 5
32.2 Our partnership is based on a shared informal
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understanding 1 to 5
32.3 Both parties follow the specific terms and
conditions of the agreement 1 to 5
33. How well do the following describe the decision making process within the
alliance? ( 1 = Not at all; 5 = Very well)
33.1 All information passed to the partner is
channelled through a designated office 1 to 5
33.2 All contact between the two firms is through
alliance managers 1 to 5
33.3 Both parties frequently participate in joint
decision-making 1 to 5
34. How would you describe the organization o f this alliance?
34.1 very complex 1 to 5 very simple
34.2 very hierarchical 1 to 5 very informal
34.3 very flexible 1 to5 very inflexible
35 Could you please indicate in which o f the following your firm has control
within the alliance? (1= Our firm has complete control; 5 = Alliance partner
has complete control)
35.1 Financial activities 1 to 5
35.2 Product planning 1 to 5
35.3 Production planning 1 to 5
35.4 R&D 1 to 5
35.5 Marketing and sales 1 to 5
35.6 Quality control 1 to 5
35.7 Pricing policy 1 to 5
35.8 Distribution facilities 1 to 5
35.9 Customer support 1 to 5
35.10 Manpower management 1 to 5
36. How would you describe the extent of overall control within the alliance ?
We have dominant control 1 to 5 They have dominant control
37. To what extent does your firm use the following mechanisms to monitor the
alliance activities? (l=Never; 5=Always)
37.1 Board of directors 1 to 5
37.2 Power of veto 1 to 5
37.3 Equity ownership 1 to 5
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37.4 Contractual formal agreement 1 to 5
37.5 Technical superiority 1 to 5
37.6 Management skills 1 to 5
37.7 Involvement in planning process 1 to 5
37.8 Regular reporting on performance 1 to 5
37.9 A teamwork culture 1 to 5
3.10 Appointment of key personnel to important activities 1 to 5
37.11 Informal and formal contacts between managers 1 to 5
SECTION 4 SUCCESS OF ALLIANCE
38 Could you please indicate first, which of the following criteria you use to
evaluate the performance o f the alliance and second, in terms of these 
criteria, how successful the alliance has been ?
Criteria used 
(please tick all relevant)
Level of satisfaction 
l=very unsuccessful; 
5=very successful
Market Share □ 1 to 5 too early to comment
Sales growth □ 1 to 5 too early to comment
Profitability □ 1 to 5 too early to comment
Access to market □ 1 to 5 too early to comment
Cost control □ 1 to 5 too early to comment
Competitive position □ 1 to 5 too early to comment
Technology development □ 1 to 5 too early to comment
Product design a 1 to 5 too early to comment
Marketing a 1 to 5 too early to comment
Distribution a 1 to 5 too early to comment
Return on Investment a 1 to 5 too early to comment
39. How satisfied are you with the following aspects o f the relationship with your 
alliance partner? (1= Very dissatisfied; 5= Very satisfied)
39.1 Coordination of activities 1 to 5
39.2 Level of Interaction between managers 1 to 5
39.3 Compatibility of activities 1 to 5
39.4 Participation in decision making by partner 1 to 5
39.5 Level of commitment shown by your partner 1 to 5
39.6 Your partner’s sharing of information with your firm 1 to 5
39.7 Your partner’s assistance in managing alliance activities 1 to 5
39.8 Level of honesty shown to your firm 1 to 5
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40. What is your perception of your partner’s satisfaction with the alliance's 
performance?
Very dissatisfied 1 to 5 Very satisfied
41 To what extent do you think the alliance is meeting 
overall objectives? (1= Not at all; 5= Very well)
/  has met your firm ’s
41.1 Profits 1 to 5 too early to comment
41.2 Market share 1 to 5 too early to comment
41.3 Sales growth 1 to 5 too early to comment
41.4 Market development 1 to 5 too early to comment
41.5 Product development 1 to 5 too early to comment
42. Since the alliance started how would you rate your firm ’s performance ? 
(1= Increased a lot; 5= Decreased a lot)
42.1 Market share 1 to 5 too early to comment
42.2 Sales growth 1 to 5 too early to comment
42.3 Profitability 1 to 5 too early to comment
43. In overall terms how satisfied are you with the alliance’s overall 
performance ?
Very dissatisfied 1 to 5 Very satisfied
44. To what extent does your firm and your partner firm agree on the future of 
the alliance?
Both our firm and our partner firm 
have agreed on a specific plan 
for termination
1 to 5 Both our firm and our partner 
firm anticipates a long-term 
relationship
45. Has the alliance already been terminated? yes □  no O. I f yes please 
explain why ...........................................
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46. Please indicate, if  applicable the date of termination of the 
alliance.................................................................................
Name of Alliance Executive completing 
questionnaire.......................................
Company Name and Address
THANK YOU FOR YOUR COOPERATION
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Appendix 4
VARIABLE LIST FOR CORRELATION MATRIX
COORDINI
COORDIN2
COORDIN3
COORDIN4
COORDIN5
COORDINÒ
COORDIN7
COORDIN8
COORACT
WORKTOG
CONGOOB
DEPEND
REPLACE
SWITCH
DEPFRES
DEPTECEX
DPEMKSKLL
DEPMKCAP
DEPSALPR
DEPMKINF
DEPCSERV
DEPMCAP
DEPADMIN
DEPMANPO
AGROBJEC
ARGACTIV
AGRTERMS
AGRSTRAT
AGRAIRES
AGRKYDES
AGROFUN
AGRFPLAN
AGRCONFL
AGRDOPER
COMMIT 1
COMMIT2
COMMIT3
COMMIT4
COMMIT5
MEETOBL1
MEETOBL2
MEETOBL3
MEETOBL4
MEETOBL5
MEETOBL6
MEETOBL7
MOTREL1
MOTREL2
MOTREL3
MOTREL4
MOTREL5
MOTREL 6
Coordination- teamwork with partner 
Coordination - exchange of ideas with partner 
Coordination - strategic fit
Coordination - partner activities an extension of UK firm 
Coordination - high level of interaction between partners 
Coordination - keep partner well informed 
Coordination - partner firm integrated with UK firm 
Coordination - UK firm integrated with partner 
Coordination - activities closely coordinated 
Coordination - work together to achieve objectives 
Coordination - goals and objectives consistent with partner 
Interdependence - equally dependent 
Interdependence - partner easily replaced 
Interdependence - likely to switch to new partner 
Interdependence - dependent on financial resources 
Interdependence - dependent on technological resources 
Interdependence - dependent on management skills 
Interdependence - dependent on marketing capability 
Interdependence - dependent on sales and profit 
Interdependence - dependent on market information 
Interdependence - dependent on customer services 
Interdependence - dependent on manufacturing capability 
Interdependence - dependent on administrative support 
Interdependence - dependency on manpower resources 
Commitment - agreement over goals and objectives 
Commitment -  agreement over activities performed 
Commitment -  agreement over contractual terms 
Commitment -  agreement over strategic direction 
Commitment -  agreement over allocation of resources 
Commitment -  agreement over control over key decisions 
Commitment -  agreement over roles/functions performed 
Commitment -  agreement over future plans 
Commitment -  agreement over conflict resolution 
Commitment -  agreement over daily operation of alliance 
Commitment -  show strong sense of loyalty to partner 
Commitment -  show strong sense of belonging 
Commitment -  identify with goals and objectives 
Commitment -  share understanding and vision 
Commitment -  partnership is valuable to us 
Commitment - listen to problems of partner 
Commitment -  encourage goal achievement 
Commitment -  try to overcome problems 
Commitment -  try to satisfy partners needs 
Commitment -  help to build the relationship 
Commitment -  patient with partner over mistakes made 
Commitment -  make compromises to reach mutual objectives 
Commitment -  staying in relationship a necessity 
Commitment -  staying in relationship a desire 
Commitment -  achievement of long-term goals 
Commitment -  enjoy the relationship 
Commitment -  motivated by profitability 
Commitment -  achieve strategic objectives
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TRUST
TRUSPROM
TRUSSINC
TRUSOPPO
TRUSSUPP
TRUSLOYL
RELPART1
RELPART2
RE1PART3
RELPART4
RELPART5
RELPART6
RELPART7
RELPART8
CONFDNCE
DEGRCONF
DISARIS 1
DISARIS2
DISARIS3
DISARIS4
DISARIS5
DISARIS6
DISAGREE
CONFLIC1
CONFLIC2
CONFLIC3
CONFLIC4
CONFLIC5
CONFLIC6
COM MTIME
COM MACUR
COM MADEQ
COM M COM P
COM MCRED
PARTGOAL
PARTPLAM
PARTM EET
PARTDEC1
PARTDEC2
SHARINF1
SHARINF2
SHARINF3
SHARINF4
A G RTERM 1
AGRTERM2
AGRTERM3
d e c p r o c i
DECPROC2
DECPROC3
OGANFLEX
OGNAHIER
OGANCOM P
FIMCON1
FIM CON2
FIM CON3
FIM CON4
FIM CON5
FIM CON6
FIMCON7
FIM CON8
Trust -  level of trust
Trust -  partner trusted to keep promises
Trust -  partner trusted to be sincere
Trust - partner self centered and opportunistic
Trust -  Partner trusted to be supportive
Trust -  Partner trusted to show loyalty
Trust -  lack of continuity in management teams
Trust -  relationship marked by a high degree of harmony
Trust -  relationship open and informal
Trust -  close personal ties between us
Trust -  partner makes effort to keep commitments made
Trust -  we do not take advantage of each other
Trust -  we can always rely on each other
Trust -  we share work related problems
Trust -  level of confidence in partner
Conflict -  degree of conflict
Conflict -  try to avoid the issue
Conflict -  try to smooth over issues
Conflict -  assertive and domineering
Conflict -  persuasion
Conflict -  engage in joint problem solving
Conflict -  outside arbitration
Conflict -  frequency of disagreements
Conflict -  poor communications
Conflict - distrust
Conflict -  conflicting goals
Conflict -  personality conflicts
Conflict -  cultural misunderstandings
Conflict -  language difficulties
Communication -  untimely/timely
Communication -  inaccurate/accurate
Communication -  inadequate/adequate
Communication -  incomplete/complete
Communication -  not credible/credible
Communication -  participate in goal setting
Communication -  participate in planning activities
Communication -  participate in regular meetings
Communication -  seek partner’s advice when making decisions
Communication -  partner seeks advice before making decisions
Communication -  we share proprietary information
Communication -  inform partner in advance of changing needs
Communication -  keep each other informed changes
Communication -  hesitate to give too much information
Structure -  detailed tasks and activities
Structure -  shared informal understanding
Structure -  specific terms and conditions o f agreement
Structure -  all information channelled through designated office
Structure -  all contact through alliance managers
Structure -  both participate in joint decision-making
Structure -  very complex/very simple
Structure -  very hierarchical/ very informal
Structure -  very flexible/inflexible
Control -  over financial activities
Control -  over product planning
Control -  over production planning
Control -  over R&D
Control -  over marketing and sales
Control -  quality control
Control -  over pricing policy
Control -  over distribution facilities
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FIMCON9
FIMCONIO
OVERCON
MONMEC1
MONMEC2
MONMEC3
MONMEC4
MONMEC5
MONMEC6
MONMEC7
MONMEC8
MONMEC9
MONMECIO
MONMEC11
SUCMKHSA
SUCSALGR
SUCPROFI
OBJET 1
OBJET2
OBJET3
SATCORAC
SATINTMG
SATCOMAC
SATPARDC
SATLVCOM
SATSHINF
SATMANGT
SATHONST
PARTNSAT
OVERPER
Control -  over customer support
Control -  over manpower management
Control -  extent of control
Control -  monitored through board of directors
Control - monitored through power of veto
Control -  monitored through equity ownership
Control -  monitored through contractual agreement
Control -  monitored through technical superiority
Control -  monitored through management skills
Control -  monitored through involvement in planning process
Control -  monitored through regular reporting on performance
Control -  monitored through teamwork culture
Control -  monitored through appointment of personnel
Control -  monitored through informal / formal contacts
Alliance Performance -  market share
Alliance Performance -  sales growth
Alliance Performance - profitability
Alliance Satisfaction - profitability
Alliance Satisfaction -  market share
Alliance Satisfaction -  sales growth
Alliance Satisfaction -  coordination of activities
Alliance Satisfaction -  interaction between managers
Alliance Satisfaction -  compatibility of activities
Alliance Satisfaction -  participation in decision making
Alliance Satisfaction -  commitment of partner
Alliance Satisfaction -  sharing of information
Alliance Satisfaction -  assistance in management activities
Alliance Satisfaction -  honesty of partner
Alliance Satisfaction -  perceived partner satisfaction
Alliance Satisfaction -  over all alliance performance
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APPENDIX 5
RESULTS OBTAINED USING SATISFACTION MEASURES 
OF SUCCESS FOR UK INTERNATIONAL STRATEGIC
ALLIANCES
T-TESTS
1 LEVEL OF COORDINATION
Proposition 1: The level of coordination between partners will be higher for 
successful UK international strategic alliances compared with less successful 
international strategic alliances
Table A5.1a Differences in the Level of Coordination between Successful and 
Less Successful UK International Strategic Alliances in terms of Satisfaction
with the Relationship
Coordination
Successful
Group
Mean SD
Less Successful 
Group
Mean SD
Difference 
T value Sig
Teamwork with partner 4.1 0.84 2.7 093 7.88 .000*
Exchange of ideas with partner 4.1 0.84 3.1 1.1 5.77 .000*
Strategic fit 2.4 1.0 2.6 1.1 -1.44 Ns
Partner activities an extension of UK firm’s 
activities
3.1 1.3 2.6 1.4 2.24 .027***
Interaction between managers 3.9 1.1 2.9 1.1 4.55 .000*
Partner informed of important decisions 4.2 0.89 3.3 0.88 5.68 .000*
Partner integrated with UK firm 3.0 1.3 2.3 1.0 3.03 .003**
UK firm integrated with partner 2.9 1.3 2.1 0.91 3.67 .000*
Coordinated activities 4.0 0.79 2.8 1.1 6.74 .000*
Working together to achieve objectives 4.0 7.0 2.6 0.83 9.10 .000*
Goals/objectives consistent with partner’s 3.8 0.99 3.0 1.0 4.19 .000*
* <p=.001, ••<p-.01, ***<p«.05
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Table A5.1b Differences in the Level of Coordination between Successful and
Less Successful UK International Strategic Alliances in terms of Satisfaction
with Alliance objectives
Coordination
Successful
Group
Mean SD
Less Successful 
Group
Mean SD
Difference 
T value Sig
Teamwork with partner 4.0 0.90 2.9 1.0 6.24 .000*
Exchange of ideas with partner 4.0 0.88 3.1 1.1 4.95 .000*
Strategic fit 2.4 1.0 2.6 1.1 -0.98 Ns
Partner activities an extension of UK firm’s 
activities
3.2 1.2 2.5 1.4 .002**
Interaction between managers 3.9 1.1 2.8 1.1 5.46 .000*
Partner informed of important decisions 4.2 0.89 3.3 0.93 4.83 .000*
Partner integrated with UK firm 3.0 1.2 2.2 1.0 3.87 .000*
UK firm integrated with partner 3.0 1.2 2.1 1.0 4.36 .000*
Coordinated activities 3.9 0.87 2.9 1.1 5.52 .000*
Working together to achieve objectives 3.8 0.84 2.9 0.96 5.27 .000*
Goals/obiectives consistent with partner’s 3.8 0.92 3.0 1.1 4.28 .000*
*<p=.001, **<p=.01
Table A5.1c Differences in the Level of Coordination between Successful and 
Less Successful UK International Strategic Alliances in terms of Satisfaction 
with Overall Alliance Performance
Coordination
Successful
Group
Mean SD
Less Successful 
Group
Mean SD
Difference 
T value Sig
Teamwork with partner 3.9 1.0 2.9 0.95 5.23 .000*
Exchange of ideas with partner 4.0 1.0 3.2 1.0 4.29 .000*
Strategic fit 2.4 1.0 2.6 1.0 -1.17 Ns
Partner activities an extension of UK firm’s 
activities
3.2 1.1 2.5 1.4 3.12 .002**
Interaction between managers 3.9 1.0 2.8 1.2 5.46 .000*
Partner informed of important decisions 4.2 0.80 3.3 1.0 4.83 .000*
Partner integrated with UK firm 3.0 1.2 2.3 1.0 3.50 .001*
UK firm integrated with partner 3.0 1.2 2.1 1.0 4.16 .000*
Coordinated activities 3.9 0.82 2.8 1.0 6.57 .000*
Working together to achieve objectives 3.9 0.83 2.7 0.82 7.33 .000*
Goals/objectives consistent with partner’s 3.9 0.85 2.9 1.1 5.45 .000*
*<p~.001, **<p=.01
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Table AS.ld Differences in the Level of Coordination between Successful
and Less Successful UK International Strategic Alliances in terms of
Perceived Partner Satisfaction with Alliance Performance
Coordination
Successful
Group
Mean SD
Less Successful 
Group
Mean SD
Difference 
T value Sig
Teamwork with partner 3.9 0.99 2.9 0.10 5.13 .000*
Exchange of ideas with partner 4.0 1.0 3.2 1.0 3.75 .000*
Strategic fit 2.3 1.0 2.6 1.0 -1.62 Ns
Partner activities an extension of UK Arm’s 
activities
3.2 1.2 2.4 1.4 3.31 .001*
Interaction between managers 3.7 1.1 3.0 1.2 3.08 .003**
Partner informed of important decisions 4.0 1.0 3.5 0.91 3.06 .003**
Partner integrated with UK firm 2.9 1.2 2.4 1.1 2.51 .001***
UK firm integrated with partner 2.9 1.2 2.2 1.1 2.93 .004**
Coordinated activities 4.0 0.82 2.8 1.1 6.46 .000*
Working together to achieve objectives 3.7 0.84 2.9 0.98 4.94 .000*
Goals/obiectives consistent with partner’s 3.8 0.91 3.0 1.1 4.41 .000*
* <p=.001, **<p=.01, •••<p=.05
2 LEVEL OF INTERDEPENDENCE
P roposition  2: The le v e l o f  in te rd ep en d en ce  be tw een  p a r tn e rs  w ill b e  h igh er f o r  
su ccessfu l U K  in tern a tion a l s tra teg ic  a llia n ces  c o m p a red  w ith  le ss  su ccessfu l 
in tern a tio n a l s tra teg ic  a llian ces
Table A5.2a Differences in the Level of Interdependence between Successful 
and Less Successful UK international Strategic alliances in terms of 
Satisfaction with the Relationship
Interdependence
Successful Group 
Mean SD
Less Successful 
Group
Mean SD
Difference 
T value Sig
Eauallv dependent 3.1 1.4 2.3 1.2 2.93 .004**
Partner replaceable 2.5 1.1 2.9 1.1 -2.00 .048**
Likely to switch to new partner 1.7 it 2.4 1.3 -3.45 .001*
Dependent of financial resources 1.8 1.1 1.8 1.2 .04 Ns
Dependent on technological resources 2.5 1.2 2.2 1.1 1.10 Ns
Dependent on management skills 2.4 1.0 2.1 0.93 1.56 Ns
Dependent on marketing 2.5 1.3 2.7 1.4 .99 Ns
Dependent on sales/proflt 2.2 1.2 2.3 1.4 -.33 Ns
Dependent on market information 2.5 1.3 2.6 1.2 .69 Ns
Dependent on customer services 2.4 1.4 2.6 1.4 -66 Ns
Dependent on manufacturing 1.8 1.3 1.6 1.2 .52 Ns
Dependent on administration 1.7 1.0 2.0 1.1 -1.90 Ns
Dependent on manpower 2.3 1.3 2.2 1.3 .45 Ns
•  <p-.001, ••<p=.01
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Table A5.2b Differences in the Level of Interdependence between Successful
and Less Successful UK international Strategic alliances in terms of
Satisfaction with meeting UK firm’s overall Objectives
Interdependence
Successful Group 
Mean SD
Less Successful 
Group
Mean SD
Difference 
T value Sig
Eauallv dependent 3.3 1.3 2.1 1.2 4.89 .000*
Partner replaceable 2.3 1.0 3.1 1.1 -3.69 .000*
Likelv to switch to new partner 1.6 0.91 2.5 1.4 -3.80 .000*
Dependent of financial resources
Dependent on technological resources 2.7 1.2 2.0 1.0 3.01 .003**
Dependent on management skills 2.5 0.99 2.1 0.97 2.20 .030***
Dependent on marketing 2.6 1.3 2.5 1.4 .19 Ns
Dependent on sales/profit 2.4 1.3 2.1 1.3 1.03 Ns
Dependent on market information 2.5 1.3 2.3 1.2 -.01 Ns
Dependent on customer services 2.6 1.4 2.3 1.3 1.15 Ns
Dependent on manufacturing 1.9 1.3 1.5 1.1 1.54 Ns
Dependent on administration 1.7 1.0 2.0 1.1 -1.74 Ns
Dependent on manpower 2.5 1.3 2.1 1.3 1.64 Ns
* <p=.001, **<p=.01, ***<p=.05
Table A5.2c Differences in the Level of Interdependence between Successful 
and Less Successful UK international Strategic alliances in terms of 
Satisfaction with Overall Alliance Performance
Interdependence
Successful Group 
Mean SD
Less Successful 
Group
Mean SD
Difference 
T value Sig
Eauallv dependent 3.4 1.3 2.0 0.96 6.74 .000*
Partner replaceable 2.4 1.1 3.0 1.1 -3.12 .002**
Likely to switch to new partner 1.6 .89 2.5 1.4 -4.30 .000*
Dependent of financial resources 1.7 1.0 1.9 1.2 -.92 Nl
Dependent on technological resources 2.6 1.2 2.1 1.1 2.66 .009**
Dependent on management skills 2.4 .99 2.1 .99 1.61 Ns
Dependent on marketing 2.4 1.3 2.7 1.4 -1.19 Ns
Dependent on sales/proflt 2.2 1.2 2.3 1.4 -.44 Ns
Dependent on market information 2.4 1.3 2.7 1.2 -1.37 Ns
Dependent on customer services 2.3 1.4 2.5 1.4 .08 Ns
Dependent on manufacturing 2.0 1.4 1.4 1.0 2.50 .014***
Dependent on administration 1.8 1.1 1.9 1.0 -.48 Ns
Dependent on manpower 2.3 1.3 2.2 1.4 .35 Nl
•  <p=.001, •*<p».01, *»*<p-.05
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Table A5.2d Differences in the Level of Interdependence between Successful
and Less Successful UK international Strategic alliances in terms of
Perceived Partner Satisfaction with Alliance Performance
Interdependence
Successful Group 
Mean SD
Less Successful 
Group
Mean SD
Difference 
T value Sig
Eauallv dependent 3.1 1.3 2.2 1.2 3.72 .000*
Partner replaceable 2.4 1.1 2.9 1.2 -2.70 .008**
Likelv to switch to new partner 1.7 95 2.4 1.4 -3.56 .001*
Dependent of financial resources 1.7 .99 1.9 1.3 -.88 Ns
Dependent on technological resources 2.6 1.2 2.1 1.2 2.25 .026***
Dependent on management skills 2.3 1.0 2.2 1.0 .41 Ns
Dependent on marketing 2.5 1.3 2.7 1.5 -.72 Ns
Dependent on sales/profit 2.2 1.2 2.3 1.4 -.33 Ns
Dependent on market information 2.4 1.2 2.6 1.2 -.99 Ns
Dependent on customer services 2.5 1.4 2.4 1.4 .15 Ns
Dependent on manufacturing 1.8 1.3 1.5 1.2 1.28 Ns
Dependent on administration 1.8 1.0 1.9 1.1 -.63 Ns
Dependent on manpower 2.3 1.3 2.2 1.3 .45 Ns
* <p=.001, **<p=.01, •••<p=.05
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3 LEVEL OF COMMITMENT
Proposition 3: The level o f commitment between partners will be higher for 
successful UK international strategic alliances compared with less successful 
international strategic alliances
Table A5.3a Differences in the Level of Commitment between Successful 
and Less Successful UK international Strategic Alliances in terms of 
Satisfaction with the Relationship
Commitment
Successful Group 
Mean SD
Less Successful Group 
Mean SD
Difference 
T value Sig
Goals/objectives 4.3 .90 3.1 1.2 5.91 .000*
Activities performed 3.8 .82 2.9 .95 5.60 .000*
Contractual terms 4.1 1.0 3.3 1.1 4.20 .000*
Strategic direction 4.0 .90 3.0 1.1 5.27 .000*
Resource allocation 3.6 1.1 2.7 .96 4.71 .000*
Kev decisions 3.9 1.1 2.9 .83 5.39 .000*
Roles/functions 4.1 .83 3.3 .99 4.51 .000*
Future plans 3.8 .92 2.8 1.0 5.58 .000*
Conflict resolution 3.9 .88 2.7 .98 6.39 .000*
Daily operations 4.1 .77 2.9 .98 7.27 .000*
Loyalty to partnership 4.1 .97 2.9 1.1 5.99 .000*
Sense of belonging 4.0 1.1 2.8 1.1 5.48 .000*
Identify with goals/objectives 4.1 1.0 3.2 1.1 4.06 .000*
Shared vision 3.9 1.1 2.9 1.1 5.14 .000*
Partnecship valuable 4.3 1.0 3.4 1.1 4.23 .000*
Listen to problems 4.4 .69 3.8 .91 3.67 .000*
Goal achievement 4.4 .64 3.8 .90 4.05 .000*
Overcome problems 4.4 .62 3.9 .84 3.45 .001*
Satisfv partner needs 4.1 .87 3.4 1.0 3.95 .000*
Effort/investment to build relationship 4.2 .89 3.5 1.0 3.81 .000*
Patient over mistakes 3.9 .75 3.5 .86 3.07 .003**
Compromise to achieve objectives 3.7 .97 3.3 1.1 2.08 .040** *
Motivated bv necessity 3.1 1.3 2.5 1.3 2.59 .011***
Motivated bv desire 4.0 1.0 3.3 1.1 3.21 .002*
Motivated bv long-term gains 3.3 1.0 3.2 1.0 .68 Ns
Motivated bv eniovment 4.1 .78 2.9 .97 7.62 .000*
Motivated bv profitability 4.4 .94 3.3 1.2 5.39 .000*
Motivated bv strategic obiectives 4.2 1.1 3.3 1.3 3.94 .000*
* <p=.001, ••<p=.01, •••<p=.05
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Table A5.3b Differences in the Level of Commitment between Successful and
Less Successful UK international Strategic Alliances in terms of Satisfaction
with meeting UK Firm’s Overall Objectives
Commitment
Successful G roup 
Mean SD
Less Successful Group 
Mean SD
Difference 
T value Sig
Goals/obiectives 4.4 .72 3.1 1.2 7.21 .000*
Activities performed 3.8 .72 2.9 1.0 5.97 .000*
Contractual terms 4.1 .89 3.3 1.2 4.13 .000*
Strategic direction 4.0 .84 3.1 1.2 4.50 .000*
Resource allocation 3.6 .98 2.8 1.1 4.53 .000*
Kev decisions 3.8 .95 3.0 1.0 4.70 .000*
Roles/functions 4.0 .84 3.4 1.1 3.08 .003**
Future plans 3.8 .94 2.8 1.0 5.41 .000*
Conflict resolution 3.6 1.1 3.0 1.0 3.04 .003**
Daily operations 3.9 .86 3.1 1.1 4.73 .000*
Lovaltv to partnership 4.2 0.85 2.8 1.1 7.13 .000*
Sense of belonging 4.0 1.0 2.8 1.1 5.79 .000*
Identify with goals/objectives 4.1 0.91 3.1 1.2 4.81 .000*
Shared vision 3.9 1.1 3.9 1.1 4.80 .000*
Partnership valuable 4.4 0.79 3.4 1.3 5.27 .000*
Listen to problems 4.4 0.68 3.9 0.92 3.43 .001*
Goal achievement 4.4 0.70 3.8 0.85 4.07 .000*
Overcome problems 4.5 0.60 3.9 0.80 4.70 .000*
Satisfy partner needs 4.2 0.87 3.4 0.97 4.36 .000*
Effort/investment to build relationship 4.2 0.77 3.5 1.1 4.22 .000*
Patient over mistakes 4.0 0.77 3.5 0.86 3.25 .002**
Compromise to achieve objectives 3.9 1.0 3.2 0.97 3.58 .001*
Motivated by necessity 3.3 1.2 2.3 1.3 4.35 .000*
Motivated by desire 4.1 0.82 3.1 1.2 5.20 .000*
Motivated by long-term gains 3.5 1.0 3.0 0.98 2.44 .016**
Motivated by enjoyment 4.0 0.88 2.9 1.0 6.00 .000*
Motivated bv profitability 4.4 0.77 3.3 1.3 5.80 .000*
Motivated by strategic objectives 4.3 0.93 3.2 1.4 4.80 .000*
• <p=.001, **<p=.01
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A5.3c Differences in the Level of Commitment between Successful and Less 
Successful UK international Strategic Alliances in terms of Satisfaction with 
Overall Alliance Performance
Commitment
Successful Group 
Mean SD
Less Successful Group 
Mean SD
Difference 
T value Sig
Goals/objectives 4.4 0.74 3.0 1.2 7.39 .000*
Activities oerformed 3.8 0.79 2.9 0.95 5.97 .000*
Contractual terms 4.2 0.87 3.2 1.2 4.72 .000*
Strategic direction 4.1 0.85 3.0 1.1 6.08 .000*
Resource allocation 3.7 1.1 2.7 0.93 4.98 .000*
Key decisions 3.9 0.96 2.9 0.94 5.67 .000*
Roles/functions 4.0 0.93 3.5 0.98 2.87 .005**
Future plans 3.9 0.89 2.7 0.99 6.43 .000*
Conflict resolution 3.8 0.97 2.8 0.98 5.18 .000*
Daily operations 4.1 0.84 2.9 0.97 6.52 .000*
Loyalty to partnership 4.1 0.92 2.9 1.1 6.30 .000*
Sense of belonging 3.9 1.1 2.9 1.1 5.13 .000*
Identify with goals/obiectives 4.2 0.81 3.1 1.2 5.87 .000*
Shared vision 4.0 1.0 2.8 1.1 6.37 .000*
Partnership valuable 4.4 0.83 3.4 1.2 5.20 .000*
Listen to problems 4.3 0.73 3.9 0.92 2.44 .016***
Goal achievement 4.4 0.69 3.8 0.88 3.53 .001*
Overcome problems 4.4 0.65 3.9 0.81 3.50 .001*
Satisfy partner needs 4.2 0.91 3.4 0.94 4.36 .000*
Effort/investment to build relationship 4.2 0.82 3.5 1.1 4.46 .000*
Patient over mistakes 4.0 0.77 3.5 0.86 3.25 .002**
Compromise to achieve objectives 3.9 1.0 3.2 0.95 3.58 .001 *
Motivated by necessity 3.4 1.3 2.3 1.2 4.71 .000*
Motivated bv desire 4.1 0.91 3.2 1.2 4.32 .000*
Motivated bv long-term gains 3.5 1.0 3.1 1.0 2.05 .043***
Motivated bv enjoyment 3.9 0.94 3.0 0.99 5.24 .000*
Motivated bv profitabilitv 4.4 0.79 3.3 1.3 5.80 .000*
Motivated by strategic objectives 4.3 0.92 3.2 1.4 5.19 .000*
* <p=.001, ••<p=.01, •••<p=.05
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Table A5.3d Differences in the Level of Commitment between Successful
and Less Successful UK international Strategic Alliances in terms of
Perceived Partner Satisfaction with Alliance Performance
Commitment
Successful Group 
Mean SD
Less Successful Group 
Mean SD
Difference 
T value Sig
Goals/objectives 4.3 0.93 3.1 1.1 6.23 .000*
Activities performed 3.8 0.82 2.8 0.95 5.60 .000*
Contractual terms 4.0 1.1 3.4 1.1 2.46 .015***
Strategic direction 4.0 0.92 3.0 1.1 5.22 .000*
Resource allocation 3.7 0.99 2.6 0.92 6.16 .000*
Kev decisions 3.9 0.97 2.9 0.91 5.82 .000*
Roles/functions 4.0 0.91 3.5 1.0 2.72 .008**
Future plans 3.9 0.93 2.7 0.89 7.20 .000*
Conflict resolution 3.8 0.96 2.8 0.97 5.35 .000*
Daily operations 3.9 1.0 3.1 0.93 4.61 .000*
Loyalty to partnership 4.0 0.97 2.9 1.2 5.53 .000*
Sense of belonging 3.9 1.1 2.9 1.2 4.44 .000*
Identify with goals/objectives 4.1 0.90 3.2 1.2 4.67 .000*
Shared vision 3.9 0.98 2.8 1.2 5.36 .000*
Partnership valuable 4.3 0.97 3.5 1.2 3.79 .000*
Listen to problems 4.4 0.73 3.9 0.89 3.15 .002**
Goal achievement 4.3 0.75 3.9 0.85 2.99 .003**
Overcome problems 4.4 0.69 3.9 0.77 3.45 .001 •
Satisfy partner needs 4.1 0.82 3.4 1.1 3.72 .000*
Effort/investment to build relationship 4.2 0.82 3.5 1.1 4.46 .000*
Patient over mistakes 4.0 0.76 3.5 0.86 3.32 .001*
Compromise to achieve objectives 3.8 0.99 3.3 1.0 2.86 .005**
Motivated by necessity 3.2 1.3 2.4 1.3 3.21 .002**
Motivated by desire 3.9 1.0 3.4 1.2 2.83 .005**
Motivated by long-term gains 3.4 1.0 3.1 0.98 1.81 Ns
Motivated by enjoyment 4.0 0.85 2.9 1.1 5.63 .000*
Motivated by profitability 4.4 0.87 3.2 1.3 5.39 .000*
Motivated by strategic objectives 4.2 1.1 3.3 1.4 3.77 .000*
•  <p=.001, **<p=.01, •••<p=.05
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4 LEVEL OF TRUST
Proposition 4: The level of trust between partners will be higher for successful 
UK international strategic alliances compared with less successful international 
strategic alliances.
Table A5.4a Differences in the Level of Trust between Successful and Less 
Successful UK international Strategic Alliances in terms of Satisfaction with
the Relationship
Trust
Successful Group 
Mean SD
Less Successful 
Group
Mean SD
Difference 
T value Sic
Level of trust 4.2 0.58 2.8 0.84 10.20 .000*
Trusted to keep promises 4.3 0.69 3.0 0.90 8.4 .001*
Trusted to be sincere 4.3 0.73 3.2 0.80 7.60 .000*
Opportunistic/self centered 2.1 0.94 2.7 0.89 -3.31 .001*
Trusted to be supportive 3.8 0.73 2.7 0.79 7.35 .000*
Trusted to show lovaltv 4.0 0.69 2.6 0.89 9.32 .000*
Lack of continuitv in teams 2.2 1.0 3.0 1.1 -3.97 .000*
Hieh decree of harmonv 3.8 0.66 2.7 0.71 8.22 .000*
Open and informal 3.9 0.76 2.9 0.93 5.85 .000*
Close personal ties 3.7 1.0 3.0 0.95 3.70 .000*
Keep commitments made 4.0 0.66 3.1 0.76 7.32 .000*
Do not take advantaee of each other 4.0 0.76 3.0 0.92 6.02 .000*
Can alwavs relv on each other 4.0 0.78 2.7 0.86 8.55 .000*
Share work related problems 3.8 0.87 2.8 0.87 6.30 .000*
Level of confidence in relationship 4.2 0.69 3.1 0.94 7.34 .000*
*  <p= .001
Table A5.4b Differences in the Level of Trust between Successful and Less 
Successful UK international Strategic Alliances in terms of Satisfaction with 
meeting UK firm’s Overall Objectives
Trust
Successful Group 
Mean SD
Less Successful 
Group
Mean SD
Difference 
T value Sig
Level of trust 3.9 0.80 3.2 1.0 4.14 .000*
Trusted to keep promises 3.9 0.90 3.4 1.0 3.11 .002*»
Trusted to be sincere 4.0 0.93 3.5 0.86 3.25 .002**
Opportunistic/sclf centered 2.4 1.0 2.4 0.91 0.04 Ns
Trusted to be supportive 3.6 0.83 2.9 0.88 4.39 .000*
Trusted to show loyalty 3.8 0.85 2.9 1.0 5.31 .000*
Lack of continuitv in teams 2.3 1.1 2.8 1.1 -2.02 .046***
High decree of harmony 3.7 0.73 2.9 0.80 5.74 .000*
Open and Informal 3.7 0.83 3.1 0.98 3.88 .000*
Close personal Ues 3.7 0.99 3.0 0.98 3.77 .000*
Keep commitments made 3.9 0.88 3.3 0.73 4.02 .000*
Do not take advantace of each other 3.7 1.0 3.3 0.88 2.28 025***
Can alwavs rely on each other 3.9 0.92 2.9 .90 6.11 .000*
Share work related problems 3.7 0.80 2.8 0.98 5.54 .000*
Level of confidence In relationship 4.1 0.85 3.2 0.92 5.43 .000*
• <p=.001, **<p-.01, •••<p-.05
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Table A5.4c Differences in the Level of Trust between Successful and Less 
Successful UK international Strategic Alliances in terms of Satisfaction with 
Overall Alliance Performance
Trust
Successful Group Less Successful 
Group Difference
Mean SD
Mean SD
T value Sig
Level of trust 4.0 0,75 3.1 1.0 5.38 .000*
Trusted to keep promises 4.1 0.84 3.2 1.0 4.4 .000*
Trusted to be sincere 4.1 0.88 3.4 0.87 3.96 .000*
Opportunistic/self centered 2.3 1.0 2.5 0.90 -1.33 Ns
Trusted to be supportive 3.6 0.81 2.9 0.87 4.92 .000*
Trusted to show loyalty 3.8 0.83 2.9 1.0 5.57 .000*
Lack of continuitv in teams 2.3 1.0 2.9 1.2 -2.91 .004***
High decree of harmony 3.7 0.72 2.8 0.77 6.39 .000*
Open and informal 3.8 0.78 3.0 0.96 4.86 .000*
Close personal ties 3.6 1.03 3.0 0.96 3.35 .001*
Keep commitments made 3.9 0.85 3.2 0.74 4.56 .000*
Do not take advantace of each other 3.8 0.94 3.2 0.90 3.35 .001*
Can alwavs relv on each other 3.9 0.85 2.9 0.95 6.39 .000*
Share work related problems 3.8 0.79 2.8 0.94 6.38 .000*
Level of confidence in relationship 4.2 0.84 3.1 0.85 6.58 .000*
*<p=.001, *«<p=.01, •**<p=.05
Table A5.4d Differences in the Level of Trust between Successful and Less 
Successful UK international Strategic Alliances in terms of Perceived Partner 
Satisfaction with Alliance Performance
Trust
Successful Group 
Mean SD
Less Successful 
Group
Mean SD
Difference 
T value Sic
Level of trust 4.0 0.81 3.0 0.91 6.07 .000*
Trusted to keep promises 4.0 0.86 3.3 1.0 4.29 .000*
Trusted to be sincere 4.1 0.76 3.3 0.93 5.06 .000*
Opportunistic/self centered 2.2 0.94 2.6 0.94 -2.02 Ns
Trusted to be supportive 3.7 0.78 2.8 0.87 5.41 .000*
Trusted to show loyalty 3.9 0.83 2.8 0.99 6.27 .000*
Lack of continuity in teams 2.3 1.0 2.9 1.2 -3.01 .003**
High decree of harmony 3.8 0.68 2.8 0.75 7.40 .000*
Open and informal 3.7 0.78 3.1 1.0 3.78 .000»
Close personal ties 3.6 1.0 3.0 1.0 3.08 .003**
Keep commitments made 3.9 0.78 3.2 0.77 5.28 .000*
Do not take advantace of each other 3.9 0.83 3.1 0.95 4.41 .000*
Can alwavs rely on each other 4.0 0.76 2.7 0.88 8.55 .000*
Share work related problems 3.7 0.91 2.9 0.93 4.70 .000*
Level of confidence in relationship 4.3 0.66 3.0 0.89 8.43 .000*
* <p».001, **<p-.01, •••<p-.05
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5 COMMUNICATION ATTRIBUTES
• Quality of Information Transmitted
Proposition 5: The quality o f information between partners will be greater for 
succesful UK international strategic alliances compared with less successful 
international strategic alliances.
A5.5a Table Differences in the Quality of Information Transmitted between 
Successful and Less Successful UK international Strategic Alliances in terms 
of Satisfaction with the relationship
Information Quality
Successful Group 
Mean SD
Less Successful 
Group
Mean SD
Difference 
T value Six
Untimely / Timely 3.9 0.80 3.1 1.1 4.81 .000*
Inaccurate / Accurate 3.9 0.71 3.2 0.92 4.77 .000*
Inadequate / Adequate 3.8 0.90 3.1 0.76 3.84 .000*
Incomplete / Complete 3.8 0.86 3.1 0.81 4.43 .000*
Not Credible/Credible 4.2 0.86 3.2 1.1 5.46 .000*
< p = .0 0 1
Table A5.5b Differences in the Quality of Information Transmitted between 
Successful and Less Successful UK international Strategic Alliances in terms 
of Satisfaction with meeting UK Firm’s Overall Objectives
Information Quality
Successful Group 
Mean SD
Less Successful 
Group
Mean SD
Difference 
T value Six
Untimely /  Timely 3.9 0.79 3.1 1.1 4.45 .000*
Inaccurate /  Accurate 3.9 0.71 3.3 0.95 4.12 .000*
Inadequate / Adequate 3.7 0.91 3.2 0.77 3.46 .001*
Incomplete / Complete 3.7 0.84 3.1 0.83 4.54 .000*
Not Credible/Credible 4.0 093 3.3 1.1 3.81 .000*
*  <p= .0 0 1
Table A5.5c Differences in the Quality of Information Transmitted between 
Successful and Less Successful UK international Strategic Alliances in terms 
of Satisfaction with Overall Alliance Performance
Information Quality
Successful Group 
Mean SD
Less Successful 
Group
Mean SD
Difference 
T value Six
Untimely / Timely 39 0.84 3.1 1.1 4.22 .000*
Inaccurate / Accurate 39 0.73 3.2 092 4.38 000*
Inadequate / Adequate 3.7 0.95 3.2 0.74 2.97 004**
Incomplete /  Complete 3.8 0.88 3.1 0.78 4.54 .000 •
Not Credible/Credible 4.1 0.90 3.3 1.1 4.02 .000*
•<p-.001, **<p-.01
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Table A5.5d Differences in the Quality of Information Transmitted between
Successful and Less Successful UK international Strategic Alliances in terms
of Perceived Partner Satisfaction with Alliance Performance
Successful Group Less Successful 
Group Difference
Information Quality
Mean SD
Mean SD T value SiK
Untimely / Timely 3.8 0.81 3.1 1.1 3.89 .000*
Inaccurate/ Accurate 3.9 0.74 3.2 0.90 4.50 .000*
Inadequate / Adequate 3.8 0.97 3.1 0.66 3.84 .000*
Incomplete / Complete 3.7 0.90 3.1 0.77 4.17 .000*
Not Credible /Credible 4.1 0.92 3.3 1.1 4.30 .000*
* <p=.001
• Level of Information Sharing
Proposition 6: There will be a greater level of information sharing between 
partners for successful UK international strategic alliances compared with less 
successful international strategic alliances.
Table A5.5e Differences in the Level of Information Sharing between 
Successful and Less Successful UK international Strategic Alliances in terms 
of Satisfaction with the Relationship
Level of Information Sharing
Successful Group 
Mean SD
Less Successful 
Group
Mean SD
Difference 
T value Sic
Share proprietary information 3.8 1.0 2.9 1.1 3.98 .000*
Inform partner of changing needs 4.1 0.73 3.2 0.90 5.64 .000*
Both parties expected to inform each 
other of changing needs
4.2 0.89 3.6 0.84 3.95 .000*
Hesitate to eive information 2.1 1.1 2.9 093 -4.29 .000*
•  <p=.001
Table A5.5f Differences in the Level of Information Sharing between 
Successful and Less Successful UK international Strategic Alliances in terms 
of Satisfaction with meeting UK Firm’s Overall Objectives
Level of Information Sharing
Successful Group 
Mean SD
Less Successful 
Group
Mean SD
Difference 
T value Sic
Share proprietary information 3.7 1.1 3.1 1.2 2.76 .«•7«
Inform partner of changing needs 3.* 0J< 3 A 029 3.69 .000*
Both parties expected to inform each 
other of changing needs
43 •.73 33 •.92 4.97 .000*
Hesitate to rive information 2.2 1.1 2.8 1* ■3.11 .002«
*<p-.001, •*<p-.01
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Table A5.5g Differences in the Level of Information Sharing between
Successful and Less Successful UK international Strategic Alliances in terms
of Satisfaction with Overall Alliance Performance
Level of Information Sharing
Successful Group 
Mean SD
Less Successful 
Group
Mean SD
Difference 
T value Sig
Share proprietary information 3.6 1.1 3.1 1.2 2.58 Oil***
Inform partner of changing needs 3.9 0.80 3.3 0.95 3.69 .000*
Both parties expected to inform each 
other of changing needs
4.2 0.87 3.6 0.87 3.69 .000*
Hesitate to give information 2.2 1.1 2.8 1.0 -3.18 .002**
•  <p=.001, **<p=.01, ***<p=.05
Table A5.5h Differences in the Level of Information Sharing between 
Successful and Less Successful UK international Strategic Alliances in terms 
of Perceived Partner Satisfaction with Alliance Performance
Level o f  In fo rm a t io n  S h a r in g
Successful Group 
Mean SD
Less Successful 
Group
Mean SD
Difference 
T value Sig
Share proprietary information 3.7 1.1 3.0 1.1 3.60 .000*
Inform partner of changing needs 4.0 0.87 3.3 0.84 4.27 .000*
Both parties expected to inform each 
other of changing needs
4.2 0.89 3.6 0.86 3.71 .000*
Hesitate to give information 2.1 1.1 2.8 0.99 -3.47 .001*
<p=.001
• Level of Participation
Proposition 7: The level of participation in planning and goal setting between 
partners will be higher for successful UK international strategic alliances 
compared with less successful international strategic alliances.
Table A5.51 Differences in the Level of Participation between Successful and 
Less Successful UK international Strategic Alliances in terms of Satisfaction
with the Relationship
Participation
Successfal Group 
Mean SD
Less Successful 
Group
Mean SD
Difference 
T value Sig
Participate in goal setting 4.1 0.68 2.7 1.0 8.31 .000*
Participate In planning 3.3 1.2 2.3 1.1 4.32 .000*
Participate in meetings 4.2 0.79 3.8 0.95 2.23 .026***
Seek partner’s advice in decision 
making
3.6 1.0 2.6 1.1 5.07 000*
Partner seeks advice in making 
decisions
3.4 1.1 2.2 0.89 6.64 .000*
* <p=.001, ***<p».05
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Table A5.5j Differences in the Level of Participation between Successful and
Less Successful UK international Strategic Alliances in terms of Satisfaction
with meeting UK Firm’s Overall Objectives
Participation
Successful Group 
Mean SD
Less Successful 
Group
Mean SD
Difference 
T value Sig
Participate in goal setting 3.9 0.99 3.1 1.1 4.14 .000*
Participate in planning 3.1 1.2 2.5 1.2 2.70 .008**
Participate in meetings 4.3 0.66 3.7 1.0 3.18 .002**
Seek partner's advice in decision 
making
3.7 2.6 0.90 1.2 5.78 .000*
Partner seeks advice in making 
decisions
3.3 1.0 2.3 1.0 5.37 .000*
*<p=.001, ••<p=.01
Table A5.5k Differences in the Level of Participation between Successful and 
Less Successful UK international Strategic Alliances in terms of Satisfaction 
with Overall Alliance Performance
Participation
Successful Group 
Mean SD
Less Successful 
Group
Mean SD
Difference 
T value Sig
Participate in goal setting 3.9 0.91 3.0 1.1 5.01 .000*
Participate in planning 3.1 1.2 2.5 1.2 2.70 .000*
Participate in meetings 4.3 3.7 0.72 0.97 3.42 .001*
Seek partner’s advice in decision 
making
3.7 0.92 2.6 1.1 5.78 .000*
Partner seeks advice in making 
decisions
3.3 1.1 2.3 0.93 5.60 .000*
• <p=.001
Table A5.51 Differences in the Level of Participation between Successful and 
Less Successful UK international Strategic Alliances in terms of Perceived 
Partner Satisfaction with Alliance Performance
Participation
Successful Group 
Mean SD
Less Successful 
Group
Mean SD
Difference 
T value Sig
Participate in goal setting 4.1 0.83 2.8 1.0 6.92 .000*
Participate in planning 3.2 1.1 2.4 1.2 3.24 .002**
Participate in meetings 4.2 0.80 3.8 0.93 2.71 .008**
Seek partner's advice In decision 
nuking
3.5 1.1 2.8 1.1 3.28 .001*
Partner seeks advice in making 
decisions
3.2 1.2 2.4 0.96 4.34 .000*
•  <p-.001, **<¡».01
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6 LEVEL OF CONFLICT
Proposition 8: There will be less conflict between partners for successful UK 
international strategic alliances compared with less successful international 
strategic alliances.
TableA5.6a Differences in the Level of Conflict between Successful and Less 
Successful UK International Strategic Alliances in terms of Performance in 
terms of Satisfaction with the Relationship
Conflict
Successful Group 
Mean SD
Less Successful 
Group
Mean SD
Difference 
T value Sig
Level of disagreements 2.3 0.58 2.9 0.86 -4.57 .000*
Avoid the issue 1.9 0.93 2.4 0.88 -2.87 .005***
Smooth over the issue 2.8 0.98 3.2 0.91 -1.88 .062***
Assertive and domineering 2.3 0.97 2.5 1.0 -1.24 Ns
Persuasion 3.8 0.96 3.7 0.83 0.66 Ns
Joint problem solving 4.0 0.75 3.2 0.85 4.98 .000*
Outside arbitration 1.2 0.72 1.2 0.55 -0.20 Ns
Degree of conflict 2.0 0.90 3.0 0.93 -5.82 .000*
Poor communications 2.9 1.1 3.1 0.95 -.90 Ns
Distrust 1.8 0.90 2.7 0.91 -5.53 .000*
Conflicting goals 2.6 1.2 3.3 1.2 -3.39 .001 *
Personality Conflicts 2.4 1.2 2.8 1.0 -2.07 .041***
Cultural misunderstandings 2.8 1.2 3.4 1.2 -2.67 .009**
Language difficulties 1.9 1.1 1.9 1.1 -0.13 Ns
* <p=.001, **<p=.01, •••<p=.05
Table A5.6b Differences in the Level of Conflict between Successful and Less 
Successful UK International Strategic Alliances in terms of Performance in 
terms of Satisfaction with meeting UK Firm’s Overall Objectives
Conflict
Successful Group 
Mean SD
Less Successful 
Group
Mean SD
Difference 
T value Sig
Level of disagreements 2.4 0.64 2.8 0.88 -2.72 .008***
Avoid the issue 2.0 0.96 2.3 0.88 -1.98 .050***
Smooth over the issue 2.9 0.97 3.0 0.94 -0.88 Ns
Assertive and domineering 2.3 i t 2.4 0.94 -0.60 Ns
Persuasion 3.8 0.99 3.8 0.80 -0.22 Ns
Joint problem solving 3.9 0.71 3.3 0.92 4.31 .000*
Outside arbitration 1.3 0.73 1.2 0.52 0.45 Ns
Degree of conflict 2.2 0.96 2.8 1.0 -3.59 .000*
Poor communications 2.8 1.1 3.2 0.98 -2.00 .048***
Distrust 2.0 0.97 2.4 1.0 -2.14 .034***
n 1 g I 2.5 1.2 3.3 1.2 -3.57 .001*
Personality Conflicts 2.4 1.2 2.8 0.95 -1.97 .052***
Cultural misunderstandings 2.7 1.2 3.4 1.2 -2.99 .003**
Language difficulties 1.8 1.0 2.0 1.2 -0.97 Ns
• <p-.001, • •< p -.0 l, •••<p-.05
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Table A5.6c Differences in the Level of Conflict between Successful and Less
Successful UK International Strategic Alliances in terms of Performance in
terms of Satisfaction with Overall Alliance Performance
Conflict
Successful Group 
Mean SD
Less Successful 
Group
Mean SD
Difference 
T value Sig
Level of disagreements 2.3 0.62 2.9 0.85 -4.10 .000*
Avoid the issue 1.9 0.90 2.4 0.91 -2.84 .005***
Smooth over the issue 2.8 1.0 3.2 0.86 -2.09 .039***
Assertive and domineering 2.3 1.0 2.5 0.98 -0.98 Ns
Persuasion 3.8 0.98 3.7 0.81 0.82 Ns
Joint problem solving 3.9 0.82 3.3 0.84 3.79 .000*
Outside arbitration 1.3 0.73 1.2 0.52 0.45 Ns
Degree of conflict 2.0 0.74 3.0 1.0 -6.23 .000*
Poor communications 2.9 1.1 3.1 1.0 -0.90 Ns
Distrust 1.8 0.87 2.6 1.0 -4.02 .000*
Conflicting goals 2.5 1.2 3.4 1.2 -3.92 .000*
Personalitv Conflicts 2.4 1.2 2.8 0.10 -2.32 .022***
Cultural misunderstandings 2.7 1.2 3.4 1.2 -2.82 .006 **
Language difficulties 1.8 0.97 2.1 1.3 -1.14 Ns
* <p=.001, **<p=.01, ***<p=.05
TableA5.6d Differences in the Level of Conflict between Successful and Less 
Successful UK International Strategic Alliances in terms of Performance in 
terms of Perceived Partner Satisfaction with Alliance Performance
Conflict
Successful Group 
Mean SD
Less Successful 
Group
Mean SD
Difference 
T value Sit
Level of disagreements 2.2 0.36 2.9 0.83 -5.54 .000*
Avoid the issue 1.9 0.99 2.4 0.83 -2.43 .016***
Smooth over the issue 3.0 1.0 3.0 0.87 -0.48 Ns
Assertive and domineering 2.2 0.93 2.6 1.0 -2.60 Oil«*
Persuasion 3.8 0.98 3.8 0.81 -0.17 Ns
Joint problem solving 3.9 0.73 3.3 0.90 4.15 .000*
Outside arbitration 1.3 0.76 1.2 0.47 0.97 Ns
Degree of conflict 2.0 0.88 3.0 0.91 -6.37 .000*
Poor communications 2.8 1.1 3.3 0.92 -2.39 019«*
Distrust 1.8 0.85 2.7 0.97 -5.27 .000*
Conflicting goals 2.5 1.1 3.4 1.2 -4.47 .000*
Personalitv Conflicts 2.2 1.1 3.0 0.99 -3.93 .000*
Cultural misunderstandings 2.7 1.2 3.5 1.2 -3.52 .001*
Language difficulties 2.0 1.1 1.9 1.2 0.37 Ns
*<p-.001 , • • •< p - .0 5
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7 STRUCTURE
• Formalization
Proposition 9: Successful UK international strategic alliances will be less 
formalized in their approach to managing activities and relationships compared 
to less successful international strategic alliances.
TableA5.7a Differences in the Formalization of Activities between Successful 
and Less Successful UK International Strategic Alliances in terms of 
Satisfaction with the Relationship
Successful G roup Less Successful
G roup Difference
Formalization M ean SD M ean SD T  value Sifi
Written documents detail tasks 3.2 1.2 33 1.1 -0.20 Ns
Informal understanding 3.1 1.2 2.8 1.2 1.42 Ns
Specific terms/conditions 3 3 1.1 33 0.93 0.10 Ns
Table A5.7b Differences in the Formalization of Activities between Successful 
and Less Successful UK International Strategic Alliances in terms of 
Satisfaction with meeting UK Firm’s Overall Objectives
Successful G roup Less Successful
G roup Difference
Formalization M ean SD M ean SD T  value SIR
Written documents detail tasks 3.4 1.2 3.0 1.1 132 Ns
Informal understanding 3.0 1.2 3.0 13 0.01 Ns
Specific terms/conditions 3.5 1.1 3.2 0.98 1.44 Ns
TableA5.7c Differences in the Formalization of Activities between Successful 
and Less Successful UK International Strategic Alliances in terms of 
Satisfaction with Overall Alliance Performance
Successful G roup Less Successful 
G roup Difference
Formalization M ean SD M ean SD T  value S is
Written documents detail tasks 3 A 1.2 3.0 1.0 1.99 •049***
Informal understanding 2.9 1.2 3.1 1.2 -0.62 Ns
Specific terms/conditions 3.5 1.1 3.1 0.96 230 .030«*
•••<p-.05
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TableA5.7d Differences in the Formalization of Activities between Successful
and Less Successful UK International Strategic Alliances in terms of
Perceived Partner Satisfaction with Alliance Performance
Successful G roup Less Successful
G roup Difference
Formalization M ean SD M ean SD T value Sifi
Written documents detail tasks 3.4 1.2 3.1 1.1 1.44 Ns
Informal understanding 3.1 1.2 2.8 1.2 1.27 Ns
Specific terms/conditions 3.4 1.0 3.2 1.0 1.01 Ns
• Centralization
P ro p o sitio n  10: Successful U K  in ternational s tra teg ic  a llia n ces w ill be  less  
cen tra lized  in th e ir  ac tiv itie s  a n d  rela tionsh ips com pared  to  le ss  successful 
in tern a tion a l stra teg ic  a lliances.
TableA5.7e Differences in the Centralization of Activities and Relationships 
between Successful and Less Successful UK International Strategic Alliances 
in terms of Satisfaction with the Relationship
Successful G roup Less Successful
G roup Difference
Centralization M ean SD
M ean SD T  value S‘R
All information channelled 3.1 1A 3A l J ■0.98 Ns
Contact through alliance managers 3.1 1.5 3.1 1.2 0.01 Ns
Both parties participate in decisions 3.9 0.95 2.9 0.98 5.97 .000*
<p=.001
TableA5.7f Differences in the Centralization of Activities and Relationships 
between Successful and Less Successful UK International Strategic Alliances 
in terms of Satisfaction with meeting UK Firm’s Overall Objectives
Successful G roup Less Successful
G roup Difference
Centralization M ean SD
M ean SD T value Sis
All informaUon channelled 3.1 1A 3 J IA -0.81 Ns
Contact throuah alliance managers 3.0 1A 3.3 1.2 -0.95 Ns
Both parties participate in decisions 3.9 0.95 2.9 1.1 5.09 .000*
< p - . 0 0 1
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TableA5.7g Differences in the Centralization of Activities and Relationships
between Successful and Less Successful UK International Strategic Alliances
in terms of Satisfaction with Overall Alliance Performance
Successful G roup Less Successful
G roup Difference
Centralization M ean SD
M ean SD T value Sifi
All information channelled 3.2 1.4 3.2 1.4 0.01 Ns
Contact through alliance managers 3.1 1A 3.1 1.3 -0.11 Ns
Both parties participate in decisions 3.9 0.98 2.9 0.96 5.81 .000»
<p=.001
TableA5.7h Differences in the Centralization of Activities and Relationships 
between Successful and Less Successful UK International Strategic Alliances 
in terms of Perceived Partner Satisfaction with Alliance Performance
Successful G roup Less Successful
G roup Difference
Centralization M ean SD
M ean SD T  value S‘fi
All information channelled 3 3 1.4 3.1 1 J 0.53 Ns
Contact through alliance managers 3.2 1.4 3.1 1 J 0.29 Ns
Both parties participate in decisions 3.8 1.1 3.1 1.1 3.52 .001*
* <p=.001
• Complexity
Proposition 11: Successful UK international strategic alliances will have simpler 
levels o f organizational arrangements compared to less successful international 
strategic alliances.
Table A5.71 Differences in Organization Arrangements between Successful 
and Less Successful UK International Strategic Alliances in terms of 
Satisfaction with the Relationship
Successful Group Less Successful 
Group
Difference
Complexity Mean SD Mean SD T value Sit
Complex / Simple 33 \A 3.1 1.1 1.17 Ns
Flexible/Inflexible 2.9 1.2 3.1 0.79 -1.50 Ns
Hierarchical / Informal 3.1 1.1 2.9 1.0 0.93 Ns
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Table A5.7j Differences in Organization Arrangements between Successful
and Less Successful UK International Strategic Alliances in terms of
Satisfaction with meeting UK Firm’s Overall Objectives
Successful G roup Less Successful 
G ro u p
Difference
Complexity M ean SD M ean SD T  value Sig
Complex / Simple 3.1 1.3 3 3 1.2 -0.72 Ns
Flexible / Inflexible 2.9 1.1 3.1 0.94 -1.12 Ns
Hierarchical / Informal 3.1 1.1 3.0 1.1 0.59 Ns
Table A5.7k Differences in Organization Arrangements between Successful 
and Less Successful UK International Strategic Alliances in terms of 
Satisfaction with Overall Alliance Performance
Successful G ro u p Less Successful 
G ro u p
Difference
Complexity M ean SD M ean SD T value Sig
Complex / Simple 33 13 3.1 13 0.60 Ns
Flexible / Inflexible 2.9 1.1 3.1 0.86 -131 Ns
Hierarchical / Informal 3.1 1.1 3.0 1.1 0.42 Ns
Table A5.7I Differences in Organization Arrangements between Successful 
and Less Successful UK International Strategic Alliances in terms of 
Perceived Partner Satisfaction with Alliance Performance
Successful G ro u p Less Successful 
G ro u p
Difference
Complexity M ean SD M ean SD T  value Sig
Complex / Simple . 33 13 3.1 1.2 0.87 Ns
Flexible/Inflexible 2.9 1.0 3.1 0.99 -0.75 Ns
Hierarchical /  Informal 3.1 1.1 2.9 1.0 0.93 Ns
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8 CONTROL
• Focus of Control
Proposition 12: UK international strategic alliance partners that seek to focus 
their influence over particular alliance activities, rather than control all activities 
will be more successful.
Table A5.8a Differences in Focus of Control between Successful and Less 
Successful UK International Strategic Alliances in terms of Satisfaction with
the Relationship
Successful G roup Less Successful 
G roup Difference
Control Focus M ean SD M ean SD T  value Sifi
Financial Activities 2.9 1.1 3.0 0.83 -0.44 Ns
Marketing / Sales 3.1 0.98 3.0 U 0.49 Ns
Oualitv Control 2.7 1.1 i n 1.1 ■1.08 Ns
Pricing Policv 2.9 1.0 3.1 1.2 -1.00 Ns
Distribution Facilities 3.0 1.1 3.1 12 -0.41 Ns
Customer Support 2.8 1.2 24 14 0.08 Ns
Manpower Management 2.9 1.2 2.8 12 0.41 Ns
Table A5.8b Differences in Focus of Control between Successful and Less 
Successful UK International Strategic Alliances in terms of Satisfaction with 
meeting UK Firm’s Overall Objectives
Successful G roup Less Successful 
G roup Difference
Control Focus M ean SD M ean SD T value S is
Financial Activities 331 1.0 23 14 147 Ns
Marketing / Sales 34 1.1 23 1.1 148 Ns
Oualitv Control 2.9 1.1 23 n 040 Ns
Pricing Policv 3.1 1.94 23 14 147 Ns
Distribution Facilities 3.2 1.1 23 14 1.71 Ns
Customer Support 3.1 1.1 U 14 241 .018***
Manpower Management 2.9 14 2.7 1.1 1.03 Ns
•••<p-.05
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Table A5.8c Differences in Focus of Control between Successful and Less 
Successful UK International Strategic Alliances in terms of Satisfaction with 
Overall Alliance Performance
Successful G roup Less Successful 
G roup Difference
Control Focus M ean SD M ean SD T  value Sig
Financial Activities 3.0 1.1 2.9 0.89 0.88 Ns
Marketing / Sales 3.2 1.1 2.8 1.1 1.88 Ns
Oualitv Control 2.9 1.1 2.7 1.1 0.72 Ns
Pricing Policy 3.0 0.95 3.0 u 0.01 .003**
Distribution Facilities 3.2 1.1 2.8 14 1.55 Ns
Customer Support 3.0 1.2 2.7 1.2 1.44 Ns
Manpower Management 2.9 1.1 2.7 1.2 1.03 Ns
***<p=.05
Table A5.8d Differences in Focus of Control between Successful and Less 
Successful UK International Strategic Alliances in terms of Perceived 
Partner Satisfaction with Alliance Performance
Control Focus
Successful G roup  
M ean  SD
Less Successful 
G roup
M ean SD
Difference 
T  value Sig
Financial Activities 3.0 0.97 2.8 1.0 1.08 Ns
Marketing /  Sales 3.2 2.9 14 1.17 Ns
Oualitv Control 2.7 u 2.9 1.1 ■1.08 Ns
Pricing Policy 3.0 0.97 2.9 14 0.70 Ns
Distribution Facilities 3.2 i.i 24 14 145 Ns
Customer Support 2.9 i.i 24 14 044 Ns
Manpower Management 24 u 2.9 14 -0.40 Ns
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• Mechanism of Control
Proposition 13: UK international strategic alliance partners that use positive 
control mechanisms as opposed to negative control mechanisms to monitor 
alliance activities are more successful.
Table A5.8e Differences in Mechanism of Control between Successful and 
Less Successful UK International Strategic Alliances in terms of Satisfaction
with the Relationship
Successful G ro u p Less Successful
G roup Difference
Control Mechanism M ean SD M ean SD T  value S is
Board of Directors 3.7 IS 3.1 IS 2.17 .032***
Power of Veto 1.7 1.0 2.0 13 -1.58 Ns
Equity Ownership 2.7 IS 2.6 1A 033 Ns
Contractual Formal Agreement 3.1 13 3.6 1.1 ■2.15 .034***
Technical Superiority 2.2 13 2.1 1.2 039 Ns
Management Skills 3.2 0.97 3.0 1.2 0.73 Ns
Involvement in Planning Process 3.7 0.90 3 3 1.0 2.59 .011***
Regular reporting on Performance 4.0 0.85 3.6 1.0 2.65 .009***
Teamwork Culture 3.» 0.97 2.9 1.2 438 .000*
Appointment of Key Personnel 3.7 U 33 I J 1.07 Ns
Informal / Formal Contacts 43 0.77 3.7 i.i 337 .000»
* <p=.001, ***<p=.05
Table A5.8f Differences in Mechanism of Control between Successful and 
Less Successful UK International Strategic Alliances in terms of Satisfaction 
with meeting UK Firm’s Overall Objectives
Successful G ro u p Less Successful 
G roup Difference
Control Mechanism M ean SD M ean SD T  value Sic
Board of Directors 33 13 33 13 334 .003«
Power of Veto 1.7 8.97 2.0 13 -133 Ns
Equity Ownership 23 13 23 13 1.19 Ni
Contractual Formal Agreement 33 13 33 13 ■0.09 Ni
Technical Superiority 23 13 23 1.1 137 Ns
Management Skills 33 0.97 3.1 13 037 Ni
Involvement In Planning Process 3.7 032 33 13 239 305«*
Regular reporting on Performance 43 030 33 0.98 231 310«
Teamwork Culture 3.7 1.1 3.1 13 2.76 .007**
Appointment of Key Personnel 3.9 13 33 13 234 .027***
Informal /  Formal Contacts 4.1 0.90 3.9 13 0.97 Ni
•*<p-.01, •••<p-.05
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Table A5.8g Differences in Mechanism of Control between Successful and 
Less Successful UK International Strategic Alliances in terms of Satisfaction 
with Overall Alliance Performance
Successful G ro u p  
M ean SD
Less Successful 
G roup Difference
Control Mechanism M ean SD
T value Sig
Board of Directors 3.7 1.4 3.2 13 1.97 Ns
Power of Veto 1.6 0.93 2.1 13 ■2.64 .009**
Equity Ownership 2.7 1.4 23 13 0.80 Ns
Contractual Formal Agreement 33 13 33 u -.09 Ns
Technical Superiority 23 13 2.1 1.1 1.05 Ns
Management Skills 33 0.92 3.0 13 1.28 Ns
Involvement in Planning Process 3.7 0.80 33 1.1 2.68 .009**
Regular reporting on Performance 4.0 037 3.6 0.99 239 .018***
Teamwork Culture 3.9 1.0 2.9 1.1 4.67 .000*
Appointment of Key Personnel 33 13 3.4 13 1.77 Ns
Informal / Formal Contacts 4.1 0.98 3.9 0.9« 1.16 Ns
• <p=.001, **<p=.01, ***<p=.05
Table A5.8h Differences in Focus of Control between Successful and Less 
Successful UK International Strategic Alliances in terms of Perceived 
Partner Satisfaction with Alliance Performance
Successful G ro u p  
M ean SD
Less Successful 
G roup Difference
Control Mechanism M ean SD
T value S«8
Board of Directors 3.6 13 33 13 1.27 Ns
Power of Veto 13 037 23 u •335 .001«
Equity Ownership 2.6 13 2.7 1.4 -0.31 Ns
Contractual Formal Agreement 3.1 u 33 1.2 -1.67 Ns
Technical Superiority 2A u 2.0 1.1 1J2 Ns
Management Skills 33 0.90 2.9 13 1J0 Ns
Involvement In Planning Process 3.6 0.95 33 1.0 138 Ns
Regular reporting on Performance 4.1 0.91 33 0.93 3.09 .003«
Teamwork Culture 3.7 1.0 3.1 1.2 3.04 .003«
Appointment of Key Personnel 3.7 IA 33 1.1 0.77 Ns
Informal / Formal Contacts 4.1 0.96 3.9 0.98 0.97 Ns
•*<p-.01
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• Extent of Control
Proposition 14: Successful UK international strategicalliances are those in which 
the management o f the alliance is shared compared to less successful 
international strategic alliances.
Table A5.8i Differences in Extent of Control between Successful and Less 
Successful UK International Strategic Alliances in terms of Satisfaction with
the Relationship
Successful G roup Less Successful
G ro u p Difference
Extent of Control M ean SD M ean SD T value Sig
Overall Control
3.1 0.72 2.7 0.89 2.04 .044***
***<p=.05
Table A5.8j Differences in Extent of Control between Successful and Less 
Successful UK International Strategic Alliances in terms of Satisfaction with 
meeting UK Firm’s Overall Objectives
Successful G roup Less Successful
G ro u p Difference
Extent of Control M ean SD M ean SD
T  value SiR
Overall Control
3.0 0.74 2S 0.90 0.84 Ns
Table A5.8k Differences in Extent of Control between Successful and Less 
Successful UK International Strategic Alliances in terms of Satisfaction with 
Overall Alliance Performance
Successful G ro u p Less Successful 
G ro u p Difference
Extent of Control M ean SD M ean SD T  value S ip
Overall Control 3.0 0.7* U 0 J 5 1J1 Ns
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Table A5.81 Successful UK International Strategic Alliances in terms of 
Perceived Partner Satisfaction with Alliance Performance
Successful G roup Less Successful 
G roup Difference
Extent of Control M ean SD M ean SD T value Sig
Overall C ontrol 3.1 0.72 2.7 0.89 2.04 .044***
***<p=.05
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9 MULTIVARIATE DISCRIMINANT ANALYSIS FOR SATISFACTION 
WITH THE RELATIONSHIP
In this section MDA is reported for differences between successful and less
successful UK international strategic alliances in terms of alliance satisfaction.
Table A5.9a Summary of Variables Entered / Removed into the 
Discriminant Analysis for Satisfaction with the Relationship
Step Dimension V ariables Entered V ariables
Removed
W ilks’
Lam bda
Sig
1 Trust Partner trusted to show loyalty 86.944 .000
2 Participation Participation in goal setting 61.085 .000
3 Trust Partner trusted to keep promises 47.002 .000
4 Interdependence Dependency on administrative support 40.689 .000
5 Commitment Agreement on daily operations 36.568 .000
6 Complexity Organization flexible/ inflexible 32.289 .000
7 Formalization Information channelled through designated office 29.218 .000
8 Information sharing Share proprietary information 27.012 .000
9 Commitment Compromise to achieve mutual objectives 25.267 .000
10 Control mechanism Teamwork culture 24.307 .000
11 Interdependence Dependency on market information 23.477 .000
12 Participation Participation in regular meetings 22.397 .000
13 Control mechanism Power of veto 21.422 .000
14 Trust High degree of harmony 20.682 .000
15 Coordination Partner firm integrated 20.035 .000
16 Trust We can rely on each other 19.528 .000
17 Participation Seek partners advice 19.043 .000
18 Commitment Agreement on key decisions 18.735 .000
19 Commitment Agreement on conflict resolution 18.815 .000
20 Conflict Avoid issue 18.507 .000
21 Interdependence Dependency on sales/proflts 18.181 .000
22 Coordination Partner activities an extension of our activities 18.445 .000
23 Commitment Agreement on fliture plans 18.711 .000
24 Trust Partner trusted to be sincere 18.720 .000
25 Conflict Persuasion 18.818 .000
26 Commitment Motivated by desire 18.567 .000
27 Commitment Identify with coals and objectives 18.441 .000
28 Conflict Cultural misunderstandings 18.165 .000
29 Participation Joint decision-maklnt 18.143 .000
30 Complexity Organization hlcrarchical/informal 18.186 .000
31 Commitment Overcome problems as they arise 18.207 .000
32 Variable 13 18.991 .000
33 Interdependence Dependency on marketlnc capability 18.964 .000
34 Conflict Personality conflicts 18.804 .000
35 Information sharing Hesitate to tlve too much information 18.601 .000
36 Trust We do not take advantace of each other 18.460 .000
37 Commitment Agreement on roles performed 18.333 .000
38 Commitment Acrcement on stratetlc direction 18.135 .000
39 Commitment Acreement on coais/obiectives of alliance 17.940 .000
40 Variable 1 18.571 .000
41 Trust Relationship Is open and informal 18.418 .000
42 Commitment S tronc sense of bekractnc to alliance 18 209 .000
43 Control mechanism Board of directors 18.051 .000
44 Coordination UK Arm Intecrated with partner 18 056 .000
45 Variable 30 18.647 .000
46 Control mechanism Formal/lnformal contact 18.486 .000
A p p e n d ix  5 4 1 8
Table A5.9a (continued) Summary of Variables Entered /  Removed into the
Discriminant Analysis for Satisfaction with the Relationship
Step Dimension V ariables Entered V ariables
Removed
W ilks’
L am bda
Sig
47 Control mechanism Equity ownership 18.441 .000
48 Conflict Assertive and dominant 18.450 .000
49 Variable 16 19.044 .000
50 Variable 15 19.692 .000
51 Trust Close personal ties between partners 19.573 .000
52 Variable 31 20.287 .000
53 Commitment Shared vision and understanding 20.327 .000
54 Commitment Motivated to achieve strategic objectives 20.103 .000
55 Interdependence Switch partner 20.108 .000
56 Control focus Control over customer support 19.800 .000
57 Control focus Control over distribution facilities 19.868 .000
58 Coordination Coordinated by a regular exchange of ideas 19.637 .000
59 Coordination Teamwork with partner 19.580 .000
60 Commitment Strong sense of loyalty to partnership 19.610 .000
61 Variable 10 20.283 .000
62 Commitment Partnership is valuable 20.889 .000
63 Interdependence Dependency on manufacturing capability 21.216 .000
64 Commitment Agreement on contractual terms 21.688 .000
65 Variable 6 22.367 .000
66 Trust Share work related problems 22.694 .000
67 Control focus Control over quality control 22.905 .000
68 Variable 51 23.567 000
69 Conflict Arbitration 23.639 .000
70 Commitment Enioy the relationship 23.853 000
71 Variable 24 24.674 .000
72 Complexity Organization flexible/inflexible 24.631 .000
73 Commitment Listen to partner problems 24.747 .000
74 Commitment Help to build the relationship 24.652 .000
75 Control focus Technological superiority 24.652 .000
76 Coordination Inform partner of important decisions 24.476 .000
77 Variable 29 24.344 .000
78 Commitment Motivated by profitability 25.068 .000
79 Extent of control Overall control 24.729 .000
80 Variables 24.630 .000
81 Control mechanism Control over financial activities 25.378 .000
82 Variable 2* 25.615 .000
83 Interdependence Dependency on customer services 26.321 .000
84 Commitment Agreement on resource allocation 26.104 .000
85 Control mechanism Regular reporting on performance 26.299 .000
86 Variable 57 26.166 .000
87 Formalization Partnership based on informal understanding 26.927 .000
88 Commitment Try to satisfy partner needs 26.955 .000
89 Variable 74 26.689 .000
90 Conflict Joint problem solving 27.465 .000
91 Commitment Agreement on daily operations 27.301 .000
92 Trust Partner trusted to show loyalty 27.101 .000
93 Interdependence Dependency on management skills 26.876 .000
94 Information sharing Inform partner of changing needs 26.821 .000
95 Conflict Degree of conflict 26.607 .000
96 Control mechanism Appointment of personnel 26.427 .000
97 Variable 66 27.165 .000
98 Variable 17 28.158 .000
99 Trust Partner trusted to be supportive 29.103 .000
100 Variable 20 28.954 .000
101 Commitment Agreement on activities performed 29.818 .000
102 Interdependence Dependency on technological expertise 29.714 .000
103 Coordination Partner firm integrated with ours 29.578 .000
104 Formalization Detailed tasks and activities 29.695 .000
105 Complexity I f 29.937 .000
106 Control focus Control over marketing sales 29 907 000
A p p e n d ix  5 4 1 9
Table A5.9a (continued) Summary of Variables Entered / Removed into the
Discriminant Analysis for Satisfaction with the Relationship
Step Dimension V ariab les Entered V ariables
Removed
W ilks’
Lam bda
Sig
107 Coordination High level of interaction between managers 29.511 .000
108 Variable 55 29.186 .000
109 Variable 14 29.991 .000
110 Trust Partner trusted to be supportive 30.802 .000
111 Trust We can rely on each other 30.807 .000
112 Variable 99 30.906 .000
113 Participation Partner seeks advice 31.867 .000
114 Variable 106 32.169 .000
115 Variable 33 33.209 .000
116 Conflict Smooth over issue 34.233 .000
117 Formalization Specific terms and conditions of agreement 34.096 .000
118 Control mechanism Involvement in planning process 33.740 .000
119 Control focus Control over distribution facilities 33.368 .000
120 Commitment Patient with partner when mistakes made 33.191 .000
121 Variable 96 32.807 .000
122 Interdependence Switch partner 33.773 .000
123 Variable 9 33.476 .000
124 Variable 54 34.711 .000
125 Control mechanism Contractual formal agreement 35.811 .000
Table A5.9b Canonical Discriminant Functions 
(Satisfaction with the Relationship)
D iscrim inant
Function
Eigenvalue C anonical
C orre la tion
W ilks’
L am bda
C hi-square D f Significance
1 42.284 0.954 0.023 295.772 67 .000
Table A5.9c Classification Results : Full Original Sample Predicted Group 
Membership (Satisfaction with the Relationship)
Actual Group Number of 
Cases
Predicted Group Membership 
Successful alliances Less Successful Alliances
% of Cases 
Correctly 
Classified
Successful
Alliances
60 60(100% ) 0(0)
100.0%
Less Successful 
Alliances
54 0(0) 54(100% )
Total 114 60 54
Table A5.9d Classification Results : Validated Sample Predicted Group 
Membership (Satisfaction with the Relationship)
Actual Group Number 
of Cases
Predicted Group Membership 
Less
Successful Alliances Successful 
Alliances
Prior
Probability
% of Cases 
Above Cprop
% of
Cases
Correctly
Classified
Successful
Alliances
60 60(100% ) 0 (0 ) .52
50.87 100.0%
Less Successful 
Alliances
54 0 (0 ) 54(100% ) .47
Total 114 60 54
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10 MULTIVARIATE DISCRMINANT ANALYSIS FOR SATISFACTION
WITH ALLIANCE
Table AS.lOa Summary Table of Variables Entered / Removed into the 
Discriminant Analysis for Satisfaction with Alliance Objectives
Step Dimension V ariables Entered V ariables
Removed
W ilks’
L am bda
Sig
1 Commitment Agreement on goals/objectives of alliance 51.962 .000
2 Participation Seek partner advice 36.005 .000
3 Interdependence Partner easily replaceable 27.241 .000
4 Coordination High level of interaction between managers 22.418 .000
5 Conflict Conflict over poor communications 19.508 .000
6 Focus of control Control over customer support 18.157 .000
7 Interdependence Dependency on administrative support 17.710 .000
8 Information sharing Hesitate to give too much information 16.344 .000
9 Trust We do not take advantage of each other 15.670 .000
10 Trust Strong sense of loyalty to alliance 14.938 .000
11 Commitment Identify with goals and objectives of alliance 14.395 .000
12 Interdependence Dependency on manpower resources 13.772 .000
13 Commitment Agreement on roles performed 13.217 .000
14 Information sharing Both parties to keep each other informed 12.587 .000
15 Commitment Agreement on activities performed 12.043 .000
16 Trust Share work related problems 11.546 .000
17 Commitment Enjoy the relationship 11.315 .000
18 Participation Participation in goal setting 11.013 .000
19 Trust Relationship is open and informal 10.722 .000
20 Trust High dearer or harmony 10.450 .000
21 Trust Partner trusted to keep promises 10.174 .000
22 Centralization Information channelled through designated office 9.936 .000
23 Interdependence Dependency on customer service 9.712 .000
24 Commitment Agreement on strategic direction 9.458 .000
25 Variable 3 9.951 .000
26 Interdependence Dependency on market information 9.777 .000
27 Commitment Motivated by profitability 9.659 .000
28 Variable 12 10.099 .000
29 Control mechanism Management skills 9.853 .000
30 Interdependence Dependency on manufacturing capability 9.646 .000
31 Commitment Agreement on resource allocation 9.458 .000
32 Participation Partner seeks our advice 9.306 .000
33 Commitment Agreement on daily operations 9.137 .000
34 Commitment Try to overcome problems 8.967 .000
35 Control mechanism Formal/lnformal contact 8.757 .000
36 Complexity Organization hierarchical/ informal 8.564 .000
37 Variable i t 8.881 .000
38 Coordination Keep partner informed of important decisions 8.678 .000
39 Commitment Listen to problems of partner 8.503 .000
40 Variable 4 8.829 .000
41 Conflict Conflict over language difficulties 8.629 .000
42 Conflict Conflict over cultural misunderstandings 8.493 .000
43 Variable 11 8.793 .000
44 Interdependence Kquallv dependent 8.666 .000
45 Interdependence Switch partner 8.487 .000
46 Control mechanism Technological superiority 8.400 000
47 Trait Partner trusted to be supportive 8.204 .000
48 Conflict Conflict over personality conflicts 8.031 .000
49 Commitment Agreement on key decisions 7.869 .000
50 Commitment Agreement on resource allocation 8.128 .000
51 Conflict Conflict over distrust 7.968 .000
52 Commitment Motivated by necessity 7.818 .000
53 Interdependence Dependency on marketing capability 7.694 .000
54 Interdependence Partner easily replaceable 7.617 .000
55 Commitment Patient with partner over mistakes made 7.493 000
56 Variable 21 7.720 .000
57 Coordination Coordinated by strategic fit 7 666 .000
A p p e n d ix  5 4 2 3
Table A5.10a (continued) Summary Table of Variables Entered /  Removed
into the Discriminant Analysis for Satisfaction with Alliance Objectives
Step Dimension Variables Entered V ariables
Removed
W ilks’
Lam bda
Sig
58 Variable 17 7.911 .000
59 Conflict Joint problem solving 7.830 .000
60 Variable 45 8.090 .000
61 Complexity Organization flexible/inflexible 8.050 .000
62 Coordination UK firm integrated with partner 7.949 .000
63 Commitment Compromise to achieve objectives 7.839 .000
64 Control mechanism Equity ownership 7.762 .000
65 Variable 38 8.011 .000
66 Extent of control Overall control 7.922 .000
67 Variable 7 8.152 .000
68 Focus of control Control over financial activities 8.122 .000
69 Variable 15 8.363 .000
70 Focus of control Control over manpower management 8.355 .000
71 Information sharing Share proprietary information 8.271 .000
72 Trust We can rely on each other 8.215 .000
73 Conflict Arbitration 8.108 .000
74 Commitment Partner makes effort to keep commitments 7.990 .000
75 Trust Close personal ties between partners 7.878 .000
76 Conflict Agreement on conflict resolution 7.795 .000
77 Conflict Assertive and domineering 7.719 .000
78 Variable 70 7.940 .000
79 Variable 13 8.174 .000
80 Commitment Partnership is valuable 8.207 .000
81 Trust Partner trusted to be supportive 8.204 .000
82 Coordination Keep partner informed about Important decisions 8.262 .000
83 Trust Partner trusted to keep promises 8.212 .000
84 Information sharing Inform partner of changing needs 8.231 .000
85 Interdependence Dependency on financial resources 8.168 .000
86 Variable 29 8.389 .000
87 Commitment Identify with goals and objectives of alliance 8.338 .000
88 Commitment Strong sense of belonging to alliance 8.440 .000
89 Formalization Specific terms and conditions of agreement 8.486 .000
90 Commitment Agreement on roles performed 8.586 .000
91 Centralization Contact through alliance managers 8.593 .000
92 Focus of control Control over quality control 8.507 .000
93 Conflict Conflict over conflicting goals 8.490 .000
94 Control mechanism Power of veto 8.577 .000
95 Coordination Teamwork with partner 8.850 .000
96 Variable 39 9.162 .000
97 Variable 47 9.434 .000
98 Variable 73 9.750 .000
99 Control mechanism Contractual formal agreement 10.030 .000
100 Variable» 10 298 .000
101 Coordination Partner activities an extension of ours 10.447 .000
102 Commitment Motivated to achieve strategic objectives 10.672 .000
103 Variable 27 11.062 .000
104 Variable «3 11.458 .000
105 Commitment 111§< 11.460 .000
106 Variable« 11.804 .000
107 Commitment Agreement on contractual terms 11.866 .000
108 Variable 49 12.212 000
109 Interdependence Switch partner 12.135 .000
110 Control mechanism Regular reporting on performance 11.986 .000
111 Control mechanism Teamwork culture 11.839 .000
112 Participation Participation in regular meetings 11.703 000
113 Trust Share work related problems 11.369 .000
114 Control mechanism Management skills 11.512 .000
115 Commitment Eniov the relationship 11.424 .000
116 Commltnieiit Agreement on kev decisions 11.293 .000
117 Trust Partner trusted to be sincere 11.149 .000
118 Interdependence Dependency on administrative support 11.105 .000
119 Variable 23 11.509 .000
120 Commitment Agreement on future plans 11.372 .000
A p p e n d ix  5 4 2 4
Table AS.lOb Canonical Discriminant Functions 
(Satisfaction with Alliance Objectives)
Discrim inant
Function
Eigenvalue Canonical
C orrelation
W ilks’
Lam bda
C hi-square D f Significance
1 19.970 0.976 0.048 231.275 72 .000
Table A5.10c Classification Results : Full Original Sample Predicted Group 
Membership (Satisfaction with Alliance Objectives)
Actual Group Number of 
Cases
Predicted Group Membership 
Successful alliances Less Successful Alliances
% of Cases 
Correctly 
Classified
Successful
Alliances
59 59(100% ) 0 (0 )
99.1%
Less Successful 
Alliances
55 1 (1.8%) 54 (98.2%)
Total 114 60 54
Table AS.lOd Classification Results : Validated Sample Predicted Group 
Membership (Satisfaction with Alliance Objectives)
Actual Group Number 
of Cases
Predicted Group Membership 
Less
Successful Alliances Successful 
Alliances
Prior
Probability
% of Cases 
Above Cprop
% of
Cases
Correctly
Classified
Successful
Alliances
59 57 (96.6%) 2 (33.9%) .52
45.5 95.6%
Less Successful 
Alliances
55 3 (5.5%) 52 (94.5%) .48
Total 114 60 54
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11 MULTIVARIATE DISCRIMINANT ANALYSIS FOR 
SATISFACTION WITH OVERALL ALLIANCE PERFORMANCE
Table AS.lla Summary Table of Variables Entered /  Removed into the 
Discriminant Analysis for Satisfaction with Overall Alliance Performance
Step Dimension Variables Entered V ariables
Removed
W ilks’
L am bda
Sig
1 Commitment Agreement on goals/objectives of alliance 56.176 .000
2 Conflict Degree of conflict 41.533 .000
3 8ÎIa Equally dependent 36.316 .000
4 Commitment Agreement on daily operations 30.835 .000
5 Commitment Agreement on roles performed 28.596 .000
6 Formalization Shared informal understanding 26.300 .000
7 Participation Seeks partners advice 24.590 .000
8 Focus of control Control over quality control 22.640 .000
9 Control mechanism Management skills 20.809 .000
10 Interdependence Dependency on manufacturing capabilities 19.489 .000
11 Conflict Conflict over personality conflicts 18.403 .000
12 Conflict Conflict over language difficulties 17.734 .000
13 Control mechanism Involvement in planning process 16.999 .000
14 Control mechanism Regular reporting on performance 16.399 .000
15 Commitment Listen to problems of partner 15.860 .000
16 Interdependence Dependency on manpower resources 15.431 .000
17 Commitment Motivated by profitability 15.081 .000
18 Conflict Smooth over issue 14.645 .000
19 Trust We can rely on each other 14.330 .000
20 Focus of control Control over financial activities 13.978 .000
21 Trust High degree of harmony 13.644 .000
22 Participation Partner seeks advice 13.331 .000
23 Centralization Information channelled throuah designated office 13.104 .000
24 Information sharing Share proprietary Information 13.000 .000
25 Commitment lfa5 12.723 .000
26 Commitment Obligated to satisfy needs 12.650 .000
27 Control mechanism Formal/informal contact 12.525 .000
28 Interdependence Partner easily replaceable 12.377 .000
29 Focus of control Control over marketing/sales 12.167 .000
30 Focus of control Control over pricing policy 12.044 .000
31 Information sharing Hesitate to give too much information 12.060 .000
32 Participation Participation in coal setting 11.983 .000
33 Trust Share work related problems 11.933 .000
34 Interdependence Dependency on management skills 11.815 .000
35 Control mechanism Equity ownership 11.689 .000
36 Control mechanism Technological superiority 11.846 .000
37 Interdependence
11g 11.833 .000
38 Interdependence Dependency on administrative support 11.967 .000
39 Varlable8 12.375 .000
40 Commitment Motivated by necessity 12.436 .000
41 Trust We do not take advantage of each other 12.591 .000
42 Complexity Organization flexlble/lnflexible 12.742 .000
43 Commitment Agreement on contractual terms 13.278 .000
44 Commitment Agreement on key decisions 13.486 .000
45 Variable 2< 13.924 .000
46 Conflict Conflict over distrust 13.956 .000
47 Interdependence Dependency on sales/profits 14.201 .000
48 Conflict Persuasion 14.282 .000
49 Variable 11 14.782 .000
30 Variable 17 15.256 .000
51 Trust Strong sense of loyalty to partner 15.667 .000
32 Commitment Agreement on strategic direction 15.723 .000
53 Trust Partner trusted to be supportive 15.850 .000
54 Conflict Avoid Issue 15.983 .000
55 Participation Participation in regular meetings 15.837 .000
56 Commitment Agreement on resource allocation 15.689 .000
A p p e n d ix  5 4 2 8
Table AS.lla (continued) Summary Table of Variables Entered / Removed 
into the Discriminant Analysis (Satisfaction with Overall Alliance
Performance)
Step Dimension V ariab les Entered V ariables
Removed
W ilks’
L am bda
sig
57 Control mechanism Power of veto 15.520 .000
58 Formalization Detailed tasks and activities 15.494 .000
59 Coordination High level of interaction between managers 15.253 .000
60 Coordination Coordinated by strategic fit 15.029 .000
61 Commitment Partnership is valuable 14.936 .000
62 Trust Partner trusted to be sincere 14.825 .000
63 Commitment Motivated by desire 14.838 .000
64 Interdependence Dependency on marketing capability 14.701 .000
65 Commitment Obligated to satisfy needs 14.686 .000
66 Comiitment Enioy the relationship 14.767 .000
67 Variable5 15.218 .000
68 Variable 54 15.638 .000
69 Coordination Teamwork with partner 15.691 .000
70 Variable 6 16180 .000
Table A5.11b Canonical Discriminant Functions 
(Satisfaction with Overall Alliance Performance)
D iscrim inant
Function
Eigenvalue C anonical
C orrelation
W ilks’
L am bda
C hi-square Df Significance
1 42.284 0.954 0.023 295.772 67 .000
Table AS.llc Classification Results : Full Original Sample Predicted Group 
Membership (Satisfaction with Overall Alliance Performance)
Actual Group Number of 
Cases
Predicted Group Membership 
Successful alliances Less Successful Alliances
% of Cases 
Correctly 
Classified
Successful
Alliances
60 60(100% ) 0(0)
100.0%
Less Successful 
Alliances
54 0(0) 54(100% )
T otal 114 60 54
Table A5.11d Classification Results : Validated Sample Predicted Group 
Membership (Satisfaction with Overall Alliance Performance)
Actual Group Number 
of Cases
Predicted Group Membership 
Less
Successful Alliances Successful 
Alliances
Prior
Probability
% of Cases
Above Cprop
« o f
Cases
Correctly
Classified
Successful
Alliances
60 58 2 .53
44.52 94.7
Less Successful 
Alliances
54 0 54 .47
Total 114 58 56
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12 MULTIVARIATE DISCRIMINANT ANALYSIS FOR PERCEIVED 
PARTNER SATISFACTION WITH ALLIANCE PERFORMANCE
Table A5.12a Summary of Variables Entered / Removed into the 
Discriminant Analysis for Perceived Partner Satisfaction with Alliance
Performance
Step Dim ension V ariables E ntered Variables
Removed
W ilks’
Lam bda
Sig
1 Trust We can rely each other 73.186 .000
2 Commitment Agreement on future plans 44.410 .000
3 Conflict Conflict over poor communications 32.841 .000
4 Conflict Degree of conflict 27.647 .000
5 Conflict Assertive and domineering 24.261 .000
6 Interdependence Technological superiority 21.487 .000
7 Trust Relationship is open and informal 19.715 .000
8 Trust High degree of harmony 18.666 .000
9 Formalization Detailed tasks and activities 17.347 .000
10 Extent of control Overall control 16.249 .000
11 Participation Planning process 15.286 .000
12 Participation Participation in goal setting 14.775 .000
13 Trust Partner trusted to keep promises 14.589 000
14 Complexity Organization simple/complex 14.051 .000
15 Conflict Arbitration 13.647 .000
16 Information sharing Share proprietary information 13.293 .000
17 Interdependence Dependency on manufacturing capabilities 12.842 .000
18 Control mechanism Regular reporting on performance 12.595 .000
19 Conflict Conflict over personality conflicts 12.291 .000
20 Conflict Agreement on conflict resolution 11.951 .000
21 Participation Partners seeks advice 11.740 .000
22 Commitment Motivated by necessity 11.515 .000
23 Commitment Obligated to satisfy needs 11.358 .000
24 Interdependency Dependency on financial resources 11.251 .000
25 Conflict Avoid the issue 11.358 .000
26 Variable 14 11.909 .000
27 Control mechanism Formal /  informal contact 12.327 .000
28 Focus of control Control over pricing policy 12.457 .000
29 Variable 10 13.037 .000
30 Coordination Keep partner informed of decisions 13.157 000
31 Variable 13 13.777 .000
32 Interdependence Dependency on technological expertise 13.777 .000
33 Focus of control Control over quality control 13.847 .000
34 Control mechanism Management skills 14.250 .000
35 Conflict Conflict over distrust 14.656 .000
36 Variable 1 15.335 .000
37 Commitment Motivated to achieve goalafoblectivcs 15.344 .000
38 Centralization Contact through alliance mangers 15.285 .000
39 Complexity Organization flexible/lnflexible 15.230 .000
40 Focus of control Control over financial activities 13.458 .000
41 Interdependence Dependency on manpower resources 15.546 .000
42 Variable 19 12.138 .000
43 Interdependence Dependency on sales/ profits 16.501 .000
44 Interdependence Dependency on management skills 16.472 .000
45 Trust Partner keeps commitments 16.467 .000
46 Information • ha ring Hesitate to give too much information 16.577 .000
47 Focus of control Control over manpower management 16.833 .000
48 Trait Partner trusted to be supportive 16.904 .000
49 Commitment Listen to partner problems 16.895 .000
50 Commitment Try to overcome problems 17.625 .000
51 Formalization Partnership based on Informal understanding 18.256 .000
32 Focua of control Control over distribution facilities 18.885 .000
53 Variable 4 19.470 .000
54 Commitment Motivated bv desire 19.861 .000
55 Both parties keep each other Informed 20.008 .000
A p p e n d ix  5 4 3 2
Table A5.12a (continued) Summary of Variables Entered / Removed into the 
Discriminant Analysis for Perceived Partner Satisfaction with Alliance
Performance
Step Dim ension Variables E ntered V ariables
Removed
W ilks’
Lam bda
Sig
56 Interdependence Dependency on administrative support 20.434 .000
57 Commitment Agreement on activities performed 20.769 .000
58 Conflict Conflict over cultural misunderstandings 21.230 .000
59 Trust Partner trusted to keep promises 21.481 .000
60 Interdependence Dependency on market information 22.376 .000
61 Participation Participate in joint decision-making 22.874 .000
62 Coordination UK firm integrated with partner 23.037 .000
63 Participation Participation in planning activities 23.314 .000
64 Control mechanism Equity ownership 24.048 .000
65 Participation UK Arm seeks partner advice 24.286 .000
66 Participation Participation in regular meetings 24.107 .000
67 Interdependence Switch to new partner 23.960 .000
68 Interdependence Partner easily replaceable 24.290 .000
69 Trust Lack of continuity in management teams 24.264 .000
70 Commitment Identify with goals and objectives 24.210 .000
71 Commitment Obligated to build relationship 24.609 .000
72 Variable 20 25.496 .000
73 Commitment Patient if mistakes made 25.876 .000
74 Variable8 26.561 .000
75 Coordination Coordinated by strategic fit 26.792 .000
76 Commitment Agreement on resource allocation 27.225 .000
77 Conflict Smooth over issues 27.958 .000
78 Trust Partner trusted to show loyalty 28.393 .000
79 Commitment Shared vision and understanding 28.312 .000
80 Interdependence Dependency on marketing capability 28.221 .000
81 Conflict Conflict over language difficulties 27.998 .000
82 Commitment Encourage goal achievement 27.826 .000
83 Trust We can rely on each other 27.500 .000
84 Commitment Motivated to achieve strategic objectives 27.468 .000
85 Trust Close personal ties between partners 27.272 .000
86 Variable 79 28.294 .000
87 Variable <1 29.031 .000
Table A5.12b Canonical Discriminant Functions (Perceived Partner 
Satisfaction with Alliance Performance)
D iscrim inant
Function
Eigenvalue Canonical
C orrelation
W ilks’
L am bda
Chi>square D f Significance
1 42.284 0.954 0.023 295.772 67 .000
A p p e n d ix  5 4 3 3
Table A5.12c Classification Results : Full Original Sample Predicted Group 
Membership (Perceived Partner Satisfaction with Alliance Performance)
Actual Group Number of
Cases
Predicted Group Membership 
Successful alliances Less Successful Alliances
% of Cases 
Correctly 
Classified
Successful
Alliances
60 60(100% ) 0(0)
100.0%
Less Successful 
Alliances
54 0(0) 54(100% )
Total 114 60 54
Table A5.12d Classification Results : Validated Sample Predicted Group 
Membership (Perceived Partner Satisfaction with Alliance Performance)
Actual Group Number 
of Cases
Predicted Group Membership 
Less
Successful Alliances Successful 
Alliances
Prior
Probability
% of Cases 
Above Cprop
% of
Cases
Correctly
Classified
Successful
Alliances
60 58 2 .53
49.82 100.0
Less Successful 
Alliances
54 0 54 .47
Total 114 58 56
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13 REGRESSION ANALYSIS
In this section multiple regression analysis results are reported for each of the 13 
dependent measures of alliance satisfaction. The predictors and dependent 
measures used are presented in Table A5.13a.
Table A5.13a Independent and Dependent Measures used in the Regression 
Analysis for Alliance Satisfaction
Independent Variables Dependent Measures
B ehavioural Factors
Factor 1 = Trust in partner = b  1
Factor 2 = Commitment to alliance goals = \)2
Factor 3 = Committed to alliance by obligation = b3
Factor 4 = Commitment to stay in relationship = t>4
Factor 5 = Information quality = bS
Factor 6 = Dependency on marketing capabilities = b 6
Factor 7 = Coordination between partner firms = \)7
Factor 8 = Information sharing = t>8
Factor 9 = Participation = t>9
Factor 10 = Conflict = b  10
Factor 11 = Dependency on administrative support = b l  1 
Factor 12 = Dependency on management skills = b l  2 
Factor 13 = Dependency on financial resources = b l  3
O rganizational Factors
Factor 1 = Operational control = b l  4  
Factor 2 = Technological Control = b l  5 
Factor 3 = Informal Control mechanisms = b l  6 
Factor 4 = Formal Control mechanisms = b l  7 
Factor 5 = Centralized decision-making = b  1 8 
Factor 6 = Organization of alliance = b l  9 
Factor 7 = Formalization «  b 2 0
Alliance Satisfaction
• Satisfaction with Relationship
1. Coordination of activities
2. Interaction between managers
3. Compatibility of activities
4. Participation in decision making
5. Level of commitment
6. Sharing information
7. Managing alliance activities
8. Level of honesty
• Satisfaction with Overall Objectives
1. Market share
2. Profitability
3. Sales growth
• Satisfaction with Alliance Performance
•  Perceived Partner Satisfaction
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